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This thesis is about globalisation and the finn. Specifically it concerns a particular 
type o f firm called here a 'leading medium-sized enterprise'. or L M E . This term is 
derived from the Japanese 'chuken kigyo\ which is used in Japan to distinguish the 
L M E from small and medium-sized firms on the one hand and large firrns on the 
other. L M E s are not exclusive to Japan, but they thrive there. The thesis establishes 
the importance o f the L M E as a (hitherto neglected) concept and business type, and 
analyses the conditions in Japan that have favoured the émergence o f such firms 
there. Subsequently the investigation employs the Japanese L M E to illustrate the 
approach to globalisation o f this particular kind o f firm. Apart from being medium-
sized and a leader in its self-deterrnined area o f business, the L M E is characterised 
by being independent and highly specialised in its core compétence, to which it has 
devoted considerable time and effort. Deriving from and substantiating its particular 
character is a mode o f opération and strategie philosophy called here 'articulation', 
which is an incrementai approach applied first to the L M E ' s domestic development 
and subsequently to internationalisation. 
The type o f firm dìscussed here is the manufacturing L M E and the form of 
internationalisation analysed is foreign direct investment (FDI). In contrast to the 
large transnational corporation (TNC) , the smaller L M E is hypothesised to be more 
prone to favour proximity in its inaugurai FDI endeavours. So the adjacent 
multinational région o f East Asia is introduced as the potential initiating location for 
FDI by Japanese L M E s . Within this région, Taiwan is posited as the représentative 
of 'super proximity' because o f the high degree o f complementarity it is deemed to 
have with internationalising Japanese L M E s . A n aggregate sample o f 110 Japanese 
L M E s which have invested in Taiwan are compiled and analysed to see how this 
investment has contributed to shaping their globalisation stratégies. From this 
aggregate sample, five case study L M E s are abstracted for more detailed 
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examination of the motives, stratégies and régional impacts (contribution to 
globalisation) of internationalising L M E s . 
In order o f priority, this research has been conducted in Japanese, English. Chinese 
and French. In fact, it could not have been started without knowledge of at least 
written Japanese and Chinese. The first contribution to knowledge o f this thesis, 
therefore, is that it brings to hght information and materials not readily available to 
Westerners not conversant with thèse languages. In addition, the concepts of the 
L M E and articulation have been introduced into accounts o f the internationaUsation 
of the fïrm, and also employed as analytical tools to show that the process of 
internationalisation by the smaller, specialised fïrm (as opposed to the large, 
multifunctional T N C ) is accomplished in a manner distinctive to itself, because o f its 
assertive concentration on its core compétence, and despite the constraints o f size 
and scope imposed upon it. This thesis also demonstrates that Japanese L M E s make 
a distinctive contribution to the on-going process o f globalisation, by their (generalfy 
positive) impacts on the overseas locations in which they operate, and by helping to 
shape the économie intégration of the East Asian région. 
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This thesis is about globalisation and the firm. More specifically it is about the 
internationalisation of a certain type of firm called a leading medium-sized enterprise 
(LME) in a globalising setting. The term L M E is a free translation of the Japanese 
chuken kigyo. It is often used in Japanese popular literature to indicate a company 
which has broken out of the small business mould because of the superiority it has 
attained in production and organisation based on a narrowly defined core competence, 
while still being of modest size rather than large. Until recent times, the Japanese L M E 
has been assumed to be a manufacturing company, and this is the type of L M E under 
consideration here. It has a substantial presence in the Japanese economy (Nakamura, 
1990). Its homologue also flourishes in Germany (Simon, 1996), and to a lesser extent 
in France (Gélinier, 1996), the United States (Kuhn, 1985), and worldwide in general 
(1). 
The application of globalisation in this text is restricted to economic globalisation. This 
can be construed in two ways, both of which are pertinent here. First, it is the positive 
act of development by the large corporation, for example, as it disperses its various 
functions, as deemed appropriate to its advantage, on a worldwide basis. Second, it is 
the phenomenon as experienced by the world community as a whole as the actors act 
upon it and individual units react in their own fashion - large or small - to the 
metamorphosing contextual environment. Put another way, globalisation can be seen as 
essentially an integrative process. Moreover, it is not only characterised by worldwide 
integration but also by more concentrated and pronounced régionalisation. This being 
so, the cross-border, multinational region is a factor to be considered in the 
internationalisation of the firm within a framework of globalisation. Thus, in this case, 
the East Asian region is hypothesised to feature significantly in the internationalisation 
of the Japanese L M E . 
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Economie globalisation can have various manifestations, and the one forming the basis 
for the investigation here is foreign direct investment (FDT). So, in examining how these 
manufacturing L M E s internationalise, the région is studied as a potential initiating 
location for this process. In other words, the question is posed as to whether proximity 
is relevant, both as a considération in the initial internationalisation of the firm, and as 
an élément in the evolving spatial structure of the global economy. To give sharper 
définition to proximity, moreover, Taiwan, as one of the two countries within the East 
Asian région which demónstrales the characteristics of proximity vis-à-vis Japan most 
convincingly, is taken as the starting point. Apart from offering a means for testing the 
validity of incrémental internationalisation in this fashion, this approach is also based 
on a concept of how LMEs function because of their particular characteristics. This 
concept is called 'articulation'. As defined in the following pages it signifies an 
incrementai progression of business activity predicated on the L M E ' s intensive 
dedication to its core compétence. This thesis is an inquiry into how the L M E achieves 
a présence in the global arena through articulation, and how in that process the 
(regional) spatial structure of globalisation is shaped. 
1.2 Personal E x p é r i e n c e 
My own expérience is the main Ímpetus for researching this subject. I lived in Japan for 
twenty-one years from 1969 to 1990, during which time I taught, wrote, translated and -
from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s - worked for two small Japanese firms, before 
becoming a consultant for developers of new producís seeking overseas buyers. These 
latter occupations involved considerable travel in the East Asian région, notably the 
Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand, negotiating and carrying on business 
with firms in these countries for the Japanese side, This was the background for my 
knowledge about Japanese smaller firms and the East Asian région. 
1.2.1 Encounters with Japanese SMEs and LMEs 
One thing that interested me from the start was how individuai Japanese businessmen 
and firms differed from the stereotypes so often inferred in the literature. Here, often, 
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were highly individualistic characters who hardly embodied the image of subservient 
subcontractor, although subcontracting was in fact what many of them did. However, 
the independent spirit so often remarked is important because, as will be seen, this is the 
source of many an L M E . But first it is worth noting the kind of company that does not 
make tt to L M E status the better to appreciate what the L M E is. These can be illustrated 
by three examples from my expérience. 
Company A produced aluminium castings for machinery and also made sporty 
aluminium wheels on the side because the young président had once been a national 
racing driving champion. He had separated from his father, who was in the same line of 
business and had flourished in the 1960s when demand for simple castings was high. At 
its peak, the father's company had 150 workers, but by early 1970s it was down to 
twenty. The son's company had about thirty. There are two points to note here because, 
as will become apparent, they are what most LMEs do not do. First, family unity within 
one company was lost. Second, the father's company failed to build on its earlier 
success through the development of original technology. 
Company B was the developer of an activated carbón device intended chiefly for water 
and air purification. It had some of the assets of an L M E in the making: a self-evident 
core compétence plus a devoted and capable engineering staff, to name but two. It had 
good publicity, with one of its units clearly visible cleaning the Imperial Moat in Tokyo. 
And it had signed a licensing agreement with a fairly large British water treatment firm. 
Its problem was egregious management which precipitated total financial disarray. This 
combination of promising technology and operational incompétence caught the 
attention of the loansharks, gangsters or yakuza in fact, who performed the classic act of 
fleecing the owners and then selling off to a member company of one of Japan's largest 
keiretsu (group). 
Company C was in the process of developing laser technology for application to 
ceramics. The technology was well advanced and largely proven, but the président was 
short of cash and encountered indifférence from the banking community, both the local 
banks and the so-called 'city' (nationwide) banks. He attempted to make good this gap 
by collaborating with one of Japan's largest electronics firms, which was only too 
happy to oblige by seconding four of its engineers. This, needless to say, was the start 
of the haemorrhaging of know-how and Company C*s eventual demise. 
A l i three companies were représentative of the heart of what the Japanese rejoicc in 
calling monozukuri (makìng things) because they believe that this is where Japan's 
strength lies, not only among the very large household names but also the tiny 
Workshops starting up in the backstreets (cf. Fuji Sogo Kenkyujo, 1998; Hashimoto, 
2000). To this day there is a wealth of literature describing both the honest tradesman in 
the urban network Clusters of Ota-ku in Tokyo and of Higashi-Osaka (cf. Ueda et al, 
2000), which Company A represents, and the go-it-alone start-up, which Company C 
tried to become (cf. Hibi, 2002). The commitment to monozukuri is likewise the 
foundation of successali companies which became L M E s , having averted the pitfalls 
illustrated by the above small firms. I was to encounter a number of these too, and most 
of them are still prosperous today. One such L M E , although I was not to think of it in 
that way at the time, was Rheon Automatic Machinery. 
Rheon Automatic Machinery (www.rheon.co.jp') started life in 1963 as an incrusting 
machinery maker. By the time 1 knew of it in the early 1970s it had reached the point 
where it was just beginning to become a significant manufacturer of small baking 
machines for installation at bakers' shops, and other food-processing machinery. It was 
located in unfashionable, provincial Utsunomiya to the north of Tokyo. The country at 
the time most prominent for this kind of baking equipment was West Germany. So the 
président, Torahiko Hayashi, resolved to crack that market, not least to enhance his 
company's image back home in Japan. He studied German and frequented the trade 
shows there, soon winning orders because of the quality of his product. Today Rheon 
leads the industry in Japan with prepared food-production Systems developed in-house 
(JCH, 2002). tn Japan it has 683 employées and has been listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange since 1987. Abroad it has three consolidated subsidiaries, two in the United 
States and one in Germany, plus a sales office in Taiwan. Unlike Company A, it 
developed a unique area of expertise; unlike Company B it was competently managed; 
and unlike Company C it retained the resilience and capacity to make it on its own. This 
is an L M E . It is the type of company that will be studied in this thesis. 
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1.2.2 Nomura Research Instituto and Hideichiro Na ka mu ra 
I first became aware of the term chuken kigyo (LME) when preparing a paper on small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for a conference at Newcastle University some 
twenty years after my first contact with Rheon (Evans, 1995). Apparently, Japan's best-
known research company, Nomura Research Institute (NRt), had been publishing 
analyses oí chuken kigyo on an annual basis since the mid-1970s. Actually, however, 
NRT had a different picture of them than the one to be elaborated here. at least by the 
1990s. In its £ L M E White Paper' for 1992 it equated the emergence of L M E s with the 
start of prívate venture capital companies at the beginning of the 1970s. According to 
NRI, L M E s are characterized by: 1) having a high ratio in the service industries as 
opposed to manufacturing and wholesale, 2) being relatively young, typically 
established since 1965, 3) working under family management, 4) showing high sales 
profit ratios, 5) being headquartered in Tokyo (over 50% of them), and 6) tending to go 
public. In stressing the crucial relevance of LMEs for the Japanese economy, NRT 
advocated what it called 'middle-sizing'. Not only must large fírms dismantle their 
burdensome structures as they 'downsize', but small companies should reinforce their 
foundations and coalesce with others in order to 'upsize' for optimum effect (NRI, 
1992a, b). 
This, I was to discover, was a 'modern' versión of the theme particularly tailored to the 
prevailing concerns of the early 1990s when it was becoming apparent that the 
economic 'bubble' had burst, and the realisation was mounting that there was a need for 
national economic and individual corporate restructuring. NRT was, in fact, promoting 
its particular visión of the L M E as a salient model for the corporate restructuring 
deemed necessary. Nevertheless this depiction did capture some of the elements of the 
L M E that were to become familiar to me, especially the lean quality of the organisation 
and the family ownership and management. As has already been implied, however, íhe 
emphasis on service industries over manufacturing is directly contrary to the image I 
was to acquire from Hideichiro Nakamura. 
At the beginning of the 1960s, as a young scholar, Nakamura conducted a survey of 
what he thought were goíng to be SMEs (chusho kigyo) in what he took for granted as a 
dual economy of small and large firms, whích was at the time, and still mainly is, the 
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received opinión as to the nature of Japan's economic structure. But as he progressed, 
he became increasingly aware that a significant proportion of the companies he was 
looking at were different from the average run of SMEs. They were predominantly in 
manufacturing, and the fací that he was noting this in the early 1960s, put many of their 
origins considerably in advance of NRJ's date. Based on fus findings, Nakamura wrote 
a book on chuken kigyo in 1962, which he subsequently revised in 1990, by which time 
he saw no reason to recant his earlier stance. On the contrary, the role of LMEs in the 
Japanese economy had been augmented. For Nakamura, Japan does not have a dual 
economy; there is a third element between the two extremities. What is more, the 
foundation of the L M E ; s character is not so much measured in terms of size or quantity, 
but in quality and innovation. The emphasis was on good engineers coupled with a 
small management staff. He has Sony's founder Ibuka as saying, the aim should not be 
to take the large firms as a model, but to créate a completely different kind of company 
(Nakamura, 1990:6). Sony is large now, of course, but its unique business style still 
bears the hallmarks of what Nakamura saw in the L M E . The L M E as he saw it was to 
come increasingly to the fore as the high growth period of the 1960s took hold. Under 
these dynamic conditions there was a general flowering of innovation, a transformation 
of the market structure, and advancing specialisation of production due to the deepening 
of the división of labour in the Japanese society. Thus was the stage set for the domestic 
evolution of the Japanese L M E . 
1.3 Reasons for this Study 
Nakamura's forte is in discerning and describing a given economic phenomenon. His 
writing does not aspire to expansive theorising. Moreover, it sticks almost exclusively 
to recounting what he observes of the activities of LMEs within Japan. However, many 
of them have over the past three or four décades extended the logic of their expertise 
beyond Japan, so this in itself offers the first reason for examining their 
internationalisation process. In this light they can be regarded as a particular type of 
Japanese corporation which can be studied to gain insights into how they, having been 
first generated under the conditions of a certain economic structure at a certain time, 
have translated their compétitive advantages into lucrative overseas ventures. 
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But there are also reasons why such a study can have implications beyond those 
inhérent in one country's expérience. For internationalisation theory itself has likewise 
tended towards dualism. On the one hand there is 'the large'. In this interprétation, 
commentators stress that gathering momentum has been fuelled by rapid and continuous 
innovation in manufacturing, transportât ion and télécommunications, enabling the large 
transnational corporation (TNC) to benefit from économies of scope and scale and an 
increasingly discriminating division of labour, typically demonstrated by the rétention 
of skill- and knowledge-intensive opérations at home base while the labour-intensive 
tasks are farmed out to low-income developing countries (Casson, 1995). The early 
stages of internationalisation in the 1950s and 1960s, therefore, were characterised by 
integrating multinationals, often (although by no means always) in high-technology 
industries. This is essentially what conventional economie theory of international 
business was formulated to describe and interpret. Oligopolies investing abroad to 
exploit fïrm-specific assets (Hymer, 1960) and multinationals capable of internalising 
market failure (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1979) typified this préoccupation. 
On the other hand there is 'the small'. Change in a modernising world has facilitated the 
cross-border mobilisation of the smaller firm, obliging internationalisation theory to 
incorporate the distinctive éléments of this kind of organisation (Buckley, 1979; 
Buckley et al., 1988). It is noted that, in fact, many international investors are small and 
weak (Wells, 1983). Far from exploiting strengths, the act of FDI can be interpreted as 
an attempi to access external resources to offset weaknesses in which the "Unkages via 
FDI are considered to be a strategie choice that enhances, maintains, or restores the 
investor's competitiveness in a globalised market, rather than a profit-seeking motive 
aimed at extracting economie rent from a foreign market by exploiting its own strategie 
assets" (Chen and Chen, 1998:446). 
This exaggerates to an extent, but it is a fact that, with some exceptions (cf. Steinmann 
et al, 1980; Brooksbank et al, 1992; Roth, 1992), internationalisation theory has 
inclined toward the polar extremes of large and small. There is nothing wrong with this, 
because theory création draws on singular characteristics to gain effect (Krugman, 
1995), but it nevertheless both subsumes too much in généralisation and leaves too 
much unaccounted for. Rapid change is partially to blâme for this, so that "[t]he 
difficulty in explaining thèse developments is not that conventional theory is 
fundamentally flawed, but simply that it is not yet rich enough to do justice to the 
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complexities that arise in international business opérations'" (Casson, 1995:1). Even so, 
lack of richness is also evident regarding circumstances which have existed for some 
time. Medium-sized companies. L M E s among them, have been internationalising for 
decades and scant attention has been afforded them as a distinct group even though 
much information about them is readily available. This suggests three reasons for 
studying them in the interests of adding to the theoretical understanding of evolving 
globalisation. 
Rea son 1 : LMEs already have a considerable and distinctive international présence 
Most of the literature on internationalising medium-sized enterprises is non-theo reti cal, 
but what has been written is often strikingly positive: Kuhn (1985) has portrayed them 
as engines for growth, Drucker (1991) has noted that they are responsible for most of 
U.S. exports, Rommel et al (1995) have depicted them as the prototype for modem 
business activity, and Simon (1992, 1996) has asserted their aptness in a globalising 
environment. This is, needless to say, a very generalised observation based on differing 
définitions of medium-size in terms of scope and scale, a matter to be addressed in the 
following chapter. 
Rcason 2: is possible to abstract the internationalising LME as a category 
distinguishable from other types offìrm and therefore employ this category to explore 
the globalisation process from a différent perspective 
Business theory has persisted with the dichotomy of large and small firms. Typically, if 
the small firm (or small and medium-sized enterprise) is determined by number of 
employées - while hearing in mind that conceptual and administrative références for 
définition are also applied with or without the employée factor - this type of firm has a 
maximum of employées ranging between, say, 249 (U.K.) and 500 (U.S.). So, 
theoretically at least, a firm with 600 employées is lumped together with one having 
100,000. Moreover, in adhering to this dichotomy, theory about the internationalisation 
of small firms has on occasion arrogated to itself medium-sized companies of 
considerable substance with implications regarding the potential of less endowed 
companies which are inappropriate. The four Swedish firms analysed by Johanson and 
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Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) are clearly of this ilk. In fact they could be classilïed as 
L M E s . 
Reason 3: There is a large body of information readily available concerning LMEs 
which can be used tofurther the understanding of the globalisation process 
Many LMEs are listed on stock exchanges, so they are obligated to make public 
corporate information on a regular basis. In addition, neutral institutions provide 
background materials about them and prominent unlisted companies. L M E s are aiso 
intent on getting their message across, so they produce catalogues. Increasingly, this is 
complemented by company home pages on the Internet plus information produced by 
analysts and the like, aiso available for scrutiny in real time. A i l this means that, unlike 
in the case of most SMEs for example, there is a substantial pool of resources to work 
on - even for firm-focused studies - outside any direct contacts that may be made. 
1.4 Structure of Thesis 
The agenda of the thesis can be presented as the set of questions given in Fig. 1.1, and 
the structure of the thesis used to deliver this agenda can be envisaged as comprising 
three layers of investigation and supporting évidence, which together constitute a chain 
of évidence used to demonstrate the complète argument. The first layer, comprising the 
next four chapters, présent the conceptual and substantive context, while the second and 
third layers, comprising Chapter Six and Chapter Seven constitute respectively 
quantitative and qualitative analyses. Specifically, the procédure is as follows. The 
chain of évidence in layered form is aiso depicted in Fig. 1.2. 
Chapter Two outlines two of the three main concepts driving the thesis, thèse being the 
L M E and articulation, locating them in appropriate theoretical debates. 
Chapter Three recounts the evolutionary background leading to modem theorising 
concerning the third main concept of globalisation, and seeks to justify the rôle of the 
L M E , which at some point after attaining this status embarks on internationalisation, as 
one means for elucidating the globalisation process. 
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Chapter Four shows how the development of the Japanese industrial structure, 
especially after the Second World War, has been conducive to the évolution of L M E s in 
that country. 
Chapter Five discusses the relevance of the East Asian région to the internationalisation 
of Japanese LMEs , and then repeats the process with respect to Taiwan as the country in 
closest proximity to Japan, and a destination of particular importance for L M E 
international évolution. 
Chapter Six is a quantitative anaiysis based on an aggregate of 110 Japanese L M E s with 
at least one manufacturing investment made in Taiwan between 1961 and 1990. This is 
to demonstrate how thèse companies have used and benefited from Taiwan as an 
investment location in their internationalisation process, by way of accumulated 
secondary data, and through comparison with other Japanese companies investing there 
and with one large transnational corporation. 
Chapter Seven abstracts five L M E s from the aggregate to function as full firm-level 
case studies for the qualitative anaiysis. The point here is to discern to what extent the 
case study LMEs follow the pattern indicated by the quantitative anaiysis. In addition, 
the case study approach is employed for looking in détail at how they did it, and from 
this to gauge the L M E ' s contribution to intégration and the relevance the L M E concept 
can have for internationalisation and globalisation theory. 
Chapter Eight is the conclusion which draws together the findings derived from the 
quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
The motif binding ail this together is the argument that the L M E is a distinctive type of 
firm in the Japanese economy, which 
(a) has a distinctive approach to internationalisation/globalisation (captured in part by 
the notions of articulation and proximity), and 
(b) via this approach is making a distinctive contribution to régional/global intégration. 
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Fig. 1.1 Question Sequence 
* What is an L M E ? 
The L M E is a composite of size, type and stage and characterised by (a) a 
powerful linkage between firm and core compétence, and (b) its mode of 
functioning. 
* How does the L M E function? 
Its business approach is based on a stratégie philosophy called here 'articulation', 
which is perceived as an incrémental progression predicated on the L M E ' s core 
compétence. 
* Why is the L M E , thus defined and elucidated, deemed a potential contributor to 
the élaboration of globalisation theory? 
The mounting complexity of the globalisation process calls for clearly defined 
analytical tools like the L M E for probing aspects of the multidimensional nature 
of globalisation. 
* What is the background of the spécifie L M E employed in this thesis? 
Japan, because its particular industrial structure and récent économie 
development have contributed significantly to the évolution of the L M E 
domestically. 
* As the immédiate, definable multinational région to Japan, what relevance does 
East Asia have for the internationalisation of the Japanese L M E ? 
For the past thirty to forty years East Asia has been the world's fastest growing 
régional economy, both offerïng the Japanese L M E a proximate base for its 
initiating internationalising endeavours and benefiting from the L M E ' s 
contribution to its own économie progress. 
* Is there any particular member country of the East Asian région that can be 
cited to further highlight this process of globalisation through régionalisation ? 
Taiwan, because it has been involved from the start of the progress of the 
Japanese L M E internationalisation as they address the globalising environment. 
* What is the essence of this internationalisation/globalisation process? 
Based on its distinctive emphasis on core compétence and stratégie philosophy of 
articulation, the Japanese L M E has both advanced its own expansion through 
progressive internationalisation (coincidentally contributing to régional 
intégration of East Asia and to the industrial upgrading of the individual countries 
within the région). 
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Fig. 1.2 Chain of Evidence 
Layer One 
Long and direct first-hand expérience with Japanese business praciices in 
East Âsia, establishing awareness of the LME phenomenon 
Theoretical, marketing andpopuiar literature in Japanese, English and 
French describing LMEs or their équivalents 
Information in the said literature ofsujficient détail to justify the 
identification of a distinctive manner offunctkming which distinguishes the 
LMEfrom other company catégories 
The body of theoretical literature concerning trade, internationalisation and 
globalisation which can be used to place the LME within a framework of 
globalisation theory 
Narrative data drawn from économies, économie andpolitical history, 
officiai government reports, and journals to demonstrate the particular 
évolution and quality of Japanese LMEs 
Similar sources of information plus international institutional sources to 
depict the multinational région of East Asia as the immédiate arena for 
initial internationalising of Japanese LMEs. and within that, of Taiwan as 
the epitome of 'superproximity ' (SP) 
Layer Two 
Data sourced in Taiwan in Japanese, Chinese and English indicating 
the existence and nature of Japanese firms investing in Taiwan 
Supporting materials in Japanese and English, and sourced in Japan, for 
determining which of the above firms can be classified as LMEs 
Evidence in Japanese, Chinese and English to show when and how a 
comprehensive sample of these LMEs have invested and subsequently 
performed in Taiwan and worldwide 
Lay er Three 
Interviews condueted in Japanese or English with five case study LMEs in 
Taiwan and Japan, to establish motives, practices and impacts of 
internationalising LMEs in the globalising environment. 
Supporting materials in the form of catalogues, corporate histories, reports 
reeeived from these LMEs and their afßliates in Japan, Taiwan and 
the U.K, together with their home pages on the web. 
Additional third party Information from newspapers, Journals and the Internet 
to aid Interpretation of behaviour of the case study LMEs 
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Fig. 1.3 L M E 'Globalisation' According to the Propositions 
- Attributes -
Région = Proximity 
Globalisation 
Fig. 1.3 neatly summarises the course of the argument as prescnted. LMEs are 
possessed of highly distinctive attributes and core compétences, which they combine 
with a stratégie philosophy of articulation, first domestically and then overseas. The 
heart of such articulation is a measured approach to internationalisation which favours 
incrémental steps, hence the significance of the immédiate multinational région as the 
L M E addresses internationalisation, as well as the attraction of anywhere within the 
région that can represent 4super proximity1 (SP). Thèse factors together - the L M E , its 
spécial attributes, its articulation, the rôle of the région and proximity - when blended 
présent a distinctive approach to internationalisation, with spécifie conséquences for the 
region(s) in which LMEs become embedded. Not having the scope of the large 
transnational corporation to achieve 'globalisation' in the full sensé of the first définition 
of globalisation given above, the L M E nevertheless manoeuvres for global reach from a 
proximate base. 
Notes 
( l ) In the list of 'small' firms Forbes publishes every year, for example, there are not a 
few which could be classified as LMEs . 
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Chapter Two 
Concepts, Aims and Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
Economies is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models vvhich are 
relevant to the contemporary world. Il is compellcd to be thîs, because, untike the typical natural science, 
the material to which it is applied is, in too many respects, not homogeneous through time. (Keynes, 
1973:296). 
The theory of the internationalisation of the firm is, as the above quotation suggests, of 
necessity a model constantly subject to revision because of the ceaseless temporal and 
spatial métamorphoses it undergoes. The model as represented hère is an attempt to 
suggest updated modifications to internationalisation theory in the light of récent 
developments. It comprises three concepts: the L M E (the actor), articulation (the key 
élément of strategy), and globalisation (the evolving environment). Thèse concepts in 
turn each generate a proposition which in turn provoke research questions, which are 
employed to take the discussion of the concepts forward. This chapter is devoted to 
exploring the nature of the first two of thèse concepts, while the third will be discussed 
in terms of its theoretical progression and its relationship to the other two in Chapter 
Three. 
The L M E , articulation and globalisation are the concepts that drive the thesis. In 
addition, two other éléments to be borne in mind are the nation-state and the 
multinational région. The nation-state is important with respect to globalisation in the 
first instance because it ftinctions as a prime instigator of domestically generated 
industry and business structures: "Différences in national économie structures, values, 
cultures, institutions, and historiés contribute profoundly to compétitive success" 
(Porter, 1990:19). This thesis postulâtes that the L M E has flourished particularly well in 
Japan, so it is necessary to investigate the récent history and circumstances of Japan's 
industrial structure to find out how this has corne about, a task taken up in Chapter Four. 
As for the multinational région, it is commonly deemed to play a significant integrating 
rôle in the process of globalisation, and when that région is also the one in which a 
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particular nation-state finds îtself, it may also be hypothesised to embody advantages of 
proximity for the firm embarking upon internationalisation. Chapter Five présents the 
East Asian multinational région in the globalisation context by assessing to what extent 
it rulfills this function. Proximity can be regarded as one factor facilitatirig 
internationalisation. So the relevance of proximity - geographical, cultural and 
historical - is afforded further focus by the inclusion of Taiwan as potentially the host 
country closest to Japanese firms within the région. Hence, the East Asian région and 
Taiwan within it form the backdrop for analysing how the specifîcally defined L M E 
articulâtes its internationalisation course. Or put another way, this thesis explores the 
extent to which proximity influences the process of internationalisation of medium-
sized firms which are both bounded in their options but nevertheless possessed of 
exceptional attributes. But to understand how ail thèse parts fit together it is first 
necessary to define the L M E and explain how it is deemed to function. This is followed 
by an outline of the aims of this thesis and a discussion of the methodology in gênerai 
terms. 
2.2 Leading Medium-sized Enterprise (LME) 
2.2.1 Overview 
The leading medium-sized enterprise (LME) is the proactive concept playing the central 
rôle in this thesis. The term is actually a free translation of the Japanese term chuken 
kigyo first employed by Evans (1995) in an unpublished paper and subsequently 
adopted by Whittaker (1997:31) (1). This thesis employs the chuken kigyo concept to 
illustrate in détail some important emerging aspects of business internationalisation not 
usually emphasised in the literature of the multinational firm. which tends to be 
preoccupied with the 'giant' firm. However, the contention here is that the L M E is not 
restricted to Japan; there are firms bearing its hallmark throughout the world. In some 
cases their particular significance has been recognised, albeit under différent labels than 
chuken kigyo or L M E , and bearing traits peculiar to the business environment where 
they are chiefly perceived to exist, such as Simon's (1992, 1996) 'hidden champions' of 
Germany, Gélinier's (1996) 'moyennes entreprises patrimoniales' of France, and Kuhrïs 
(1985) 'mid-sized firms' which compete with the giant corporations in the United States. 
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More often, however, in the orthodox dualistic approach, which simply contrasts large 
and small, they are either subsumed under the large enterprise rubric or arrogated to the 
cause of small-firm theory. lt is first essential, therefore, to elabórate on the concept in a 
general sense and to show how this kind of firm has manifested itself in reality. 
2.2.2 The L M E as Conceptual Category 
(i) LME Properties 
The L M E is defined here as an ¡ndependent, mediunvsized business unit, capabte of 
accessing external operational resources while maintaining a tight inner management 
control, and intensively concentrated on its core competence as it strives to optimise its 
bounded market scope. The concept straddles the ground between positive and 
normative in that, for example, it has been both described as an existing phenomenon as 
well as being prescribed as an objective ideal. By incorporating the word 'leading' (1) ¡t 
transcends mere verifiable defmition to become, in part, an idealised abstraction as well 
as being a valué judgement implying competitive success. However, valué judgements 
can be circumspect i f applied "without examining precisely how and at what point they 
enter a piece of economic reasoning" (Blaug, 1992:121). So while bearing in mind the 
normative aspects of the L M E concept, the following is an attempt to depict the critical 
L M E characteristics in positive, descriptive terms. 
Status: The L M E is an independent medium-sized company; this independence being 
manifested more in its power of decision-making concerning basic policy (Nakamura, 
1990:176) than in its command over capital, although tight control over the latter is 
usually likewise deemed essential. This is not independence in an absolute sense, but 
independence within a framework the L M E endeavours to define for itself. lt functions 
within networks of degrees of dependence on others while being capable of a relatively 
wide freedom of manoeuvre presaged on its producís and expertise and the fact that it 
holds a leading position in its defined área of business. 
Size/Type/Stage: The L M E is defined here as a manufacturing firm having from 200 to 
1.999 employees. This is their size domestically as of 1999 when research of specific 
companies commenced, and evidence available suggests that a large majority of the 
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Japanese LMEs cited in this thesis were of very similar size when they started to 
internationalise by investing in Taiwan and elsewhere. What this implies is that the 
L M E concept indicates both a type of firm and a stage of development which it has 
attained, but also which it could outgrow (or, indeed, fail to sustain) (2). The fact that 
the concept denotes a stage as well as a type confers on it a dynamic quality, 
demonstrating that the L M E is both an actor bringing about change and an embodiment 
of change. The lower figure marks a division between small and medium-sized, and is 
the demarcation line adopted for manufacturers by the Bolton Committee in Britain, for 
example, as well as Nakamura in Japan. Companies with more than 200 employees are 
deemed here to have reached a point where they can work to a business strategy through 
which they achieve leadership in a defined sphere of production, which goes beyond the 
simple 'niche' role of producing "something marginally different" (Storey, 1994:11). 
The upper limit of 1,999 is around the point where firms start to shed, although by no 
means entirely lose, the distinctive L M E qualities described below. It has been observed 
that "in practice, researchers have to tailor their definitions of a small firm according to 
the particular groups of small firms which are the focus of interest" (Storey, 1994:16). 
The same should apply to 'large' firms given their substantial variety in size (and 
activity), and it is certainly necessary when discussing medium-sized enterprises which 
straddle the two according to definitions as befits the research objectives. 
With respect to these definitions, too, it has been noted that "[a] 'firm' is by no means 
an unambiguous clear-cut entity; it is not an observable object separable from other 
objects, and it is difficult to define except with reference to what it does or what is done 
within it" (Penrose, 1959:10). Penrose was talking about the firm in general and thought 
that the fact that analysts could choose the characteristics they wanted to describe the 
firm could lead to confusion. The intent here, however, is a deliberate exercise in 
tailoring and selection of characteristics in order to fashion a clearly defined analytical 
tool. The L M E , as the type of firm in question, is abstracted from the numerical 
continuum and ascribed certain functioning characteristics to further set it apart. 
Cardinal among these is its attachment to and its constant association with its core 
competence in all the latter's tangible as well as intangible aspects. By way of contrast, 
Chandler (1990) sees the growth of the firm as the mastering of opportunity in which 
products and lines are adopted and discarded as their respective potential rents rise and 
decline, so that the firm's ultimate raison d'être is itself as an organisation and nothing 
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but that. But for the L M E as described here, the core competence in all its aspects is 
inseparable from the firm; it is inalienably conjoined with the corporate organisation so 
that together they constitute a unified conceptual whole. This is, as it were, in order to 
harden and sculpture the outlines of the conceptual perspective. It must be borne in 
mind, moreover, that the aim of this research is to ascertain how firms distinguishable 
as such at a given time have internationalised, and that the very L M E characteristics and 
the act of internationalisation can have been instrumental in subsequently taking the 
firm beyond the size definition as given here. 
Operation: The L M E is a professional business organisation in the sense that it is 
directed towards specific targets which do not change erratically on personal whim, 
while it has a demonstrably more compact founder/agency/employee relationship 
structure than is usually associated with large corporations. Specifically, the capital of 
the founder and his family and/or associates may well be transmitted over two to three 
generations and more, which presupposes a familial ethic based on a commitment to 
serve the enterprise rather than being served by it and is demonstrated in the 
generational transfer of the technology and know-how to realise this (Gelinier, 1996). 
With expansion of operations, resort may be made to the capital market, albeit subject 
to ultimate family/associate control. This instinct for control is also manifested in a 
strong resistence to separation of power between owner and managerial agent; an 
attitude which arguably saves on agency costs as firm governance takes on increasing 
complexity while perhaps sacrificing some sophistication in managerial technique. But 
it also reduces the risk of agency conflict of interest and is complemented by 
foreshortened chains of command with employees who, in turn, respond positively to 
policy aimed at long-term mutual interdependence (Kage, 1991; Simon, 1992; Gabel 
and Moraw, 1994). 
Product/Market: The essence of the L M E approach to both product and market is a 
dedication to core competence (Porter, 1980). A core competence is a set of 
technologies and associated assets that form the basis for the firm's sustainable 
competitiveness in a given area of business. This calls for simultaneous focusing to 
enhance market share and leadership status while consciously defining and 
circumscribing the scope of operations. Technology (as the foundation of the product on 
the one hand) and intensive customer orientation (as the strategic mode of entry to the 
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market on the other) are not mutually exclusive alternatives, ñor even is one of thèse 
stressed to the détriment of the other. Rather, together they form a synergy in which the 
définition of market essentially comprises two éléments: the more traditional one based 
on product and the more recent one derived from the customers' needs and applications 
(Simon, 1996 A4). So the LME's endeavours in specialist innovation are both 
technology-driven and customer-driven. But to say that L M E s are specialist is far from 
positing them, without qualification, merely as complementary furnishers of niche 
products in the way that term is often applied. As Rommel et al (1995) point oui, niche 
may imply a restricted zone or corner into which a firm may be pushed for lack of 
technological flexibility. ít can be lucrative in certain cases of highly specific demand 
where, for example, standardization is not viable. However, for this kind of firm - the 
L M E - it should not interfere with volume production in its specialized sphère. lt is not 
ñlling a gap fortuitously left open; it is serving a specialist market based on the superior 
technologies and products it has created and maintains. The LME's sphère of opérations 
is better envisaged as a drive for bounded optimisation through singular administration 
of scope and linkage. The product range may be narrow, but the breadth in terms of 
customers and/or the depth as represented by the number of single product variants may 
well not be. As a corotlary, in their market définition, L M E s are not geographically 
confined to one région or country; concentrated market focus may be combined with a 
international orientation in which the core of competitive advantage comprises the 
specialized product, the manufacturing process, and the ancillary services. That having 
been said, it is possible to think in terms oíclosed niche and open niche in referring to 
the combination of product, technology and market; crayons sold to children aged two 
to eight are closed niche, while electronic motors sold with a wide range of assemblers 
and with potential for adaptation to new products and amplification of the firm's 
etablished area of expertise are open niche. This niche continuum, especially as it 
concerns broadening potential, is applied below as one means of positioning the L M E . 
(ti) The LME in Practice 
Nakamura (1990) created the category chuken kigyo (LME) because he perceived that 
this kind of company had characteristics and conducted its affairs in ways which could 
be distinguished from large corporations on the one hand and small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) on the other. These distinctive aspects, hearing in mind that they are 
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o/ten rather a mailer of degree than substantive modification, can be highlighted under 
the rubrics of leadership, policy aims and strategy. 
Leadership: In its initial stage of development. the L M E is often under a strong, 
idiosyncratic founder with a powerful entrepreneurial drive - a Schumpetarian 
'innovator'. He produces new producís, applies new technologies, uses new materials, 
develops new industrial sectors. This breed of founder bursts out of the physical and 
psychological framework of the ordinary S M E , surmounting résistance both tangible 
and intangible, to ultimately service and challenge a wider business world. Early on, 
too, he is the majority shareholder, leaning on the small majority shareholding group of 
family and associâtes, which in turn is active, together with a limited managerial staff, 
in supervising and controlling opérations. Shareholder interests are satisfied because the 
managers, in the main, are the shareholders. In time the family/associate influence may 
be diluted; faithful adhérence to the philosophy of the company's inner circle may 
ensure entry by outsiders into what Gélinier (1996) calis the 'famille élargie', or the 
'cultural famiiy as opposed to the biological. This is in fact a centuries-old custom in 
Japan, where the gifted apprentice is enrolled in the ie, or household. Whatever the case 
may be, however, the point to remember is that, following established practice, L M E 
management - that is, leadership - remains small and compact. This leadership, 
moreover, continues to espouse and to act on principies geared to sustaining the 
company's intrinsic identity through the pursuit of classic Weberian bureaucratie ideáis 
of prioritorising the future over the présent, investment over consumption, and self-
financing over liquidation of capital. 
Policy aims: Over the past fifty years LMEs have been at the forefront of the drive for 
quality, and this is the leitmotiv which infìises ali aspects of their policy. It permeates 
the decision-making process; it is demonstrated in product development, manufacturing 
technology and marketing creativity; it is realised in the superior equipment and 
personnel. As such it is reflected in a détermination to come out with producís of the 
company's own originai technology and design to achieve a leading position in spécifie 
markets defined and explored by the company itself (Kuhn, 1985; Nakamura, 1990). 
The formula is 'differentiation' x 'excellence' x 'creativity' emanating from originality in 
produets and services + originality in the company's credo and mission (Kage, 
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1991:77). The exercise is to circumvent market dependence, he it on particular clients 
or geographica! areas, attain quasi-monopolies in crafted demand environments, and 
build up the strength to counter incursion both by large predators and small 
opportunists. This calls for a prolonged and exacting focus on relatively stable markets 
rather than on fashion and boom cycles, and incrementai improvements rather than 
stratospheric leaps. Quality, therefore, is de rigueur an essential élément of competitive 
advantage which LMEs strive for in policy. And although they do not seek to 
outperform in every competitive dimension, they are particularly intent on combining 
quality with close customer relations together with service (Simon, 1992). 
Neither is market leadership deemed purely a quantitative dimension; it also includes 
such aspects as superiority in innovation, technology, market influence and power. This 
led Simon (1996) to propose the terni 'psychotogicat market leadership', incorporating 
these attributes along with quality, as the objective to be aimed for in policy and, just as 
important, the image to be conveyed to the customer. This in turn requires knowing the 
trends of the customer's needs, as well as being cognizant of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the L M E and its rivais trom the customer's perspective. From this 
analysis, the L M E at the top of its game comprehends the boundaries of its potential and 
consequently senses the proper level at which to target its long-term profit 
maximization (Kage, 1991; Kuhn, 1985). Such tight-fitting positioning further demands 
the understanding of a cooperative and flexible workforce. Hence, an indispensible 
factor in L M E policy is ensuring its employées' durable allegiance to and identification 
with the company's cause, notably through internai training, the dévolution of authority, 
and the rewarding of talent, in préférence to hiring outsiders (other than those of 
exceptional ability), preserving vertical hiérarchies, and promotion based on seniority. 
Strategy: The contention in this thesis is that LMEs in their domestic development and 
subséquent internationalisation nave refined a particular élément of strategy called here 
'articulation'. The concept of articulation is discussed in more detail below, this section 
being confined to some généralisations. L M E strategy can be summed up as 'bounded 
flexibility'. It can be envisaged as a solidly circumscribed Chamber encasing a field of 
action comprising highly mobile and flexible mechanisms. In broad terms the area of 
specialization and potential markets have been defined, but within this arena there is 
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both purposeful and opportunistic flexibility. By way of example, the five Japanese case 
study firms in this thesis specify their businesses as writing and drawing materials 
(Pentel), dental materials (Shofu), miniature electronic motors (Mabuchi), drills and 
other equipment for the manufacture of printed circuit boards (Union Tool), and 
industrial precious metals (TKK). These are proactive definitions of self-limited general 
fields, against which the company's distinctive competences and competitive advantages 
are mapped according to opportunities and circumstance. As these transpire, the L M E 
applies its superior techniques in one or a number of parameters to attack one or a small 
number of narrow target markets, a practice Porter (1985) refers to as 'focused 
differentiation'. What is more, most of the mechanisms for achieving this are within the 
chamber (Penrose, 1959); outsourcing and alliances are largely shunned and high return 
on capital is sought to sustain the firm's self-determining financial integrity. At the same 
time, while the general goals are clear, they are rarely spelt out in detail in recognition 
of the LME's comparative vulnerability to change. Rather than precisely enunciated 
planning, the LME's approach is nearer to what Mintzberg and Walters (1985) call 
'emerging strategy1, which "evolves through a process whereby the results of many 
individual actions come together to form a consistent pattern" (Mintzberg and Walters, 
1985:257). So if the chamber is proactive, the mechanisms therein are essentially 
reactive devices working to find solutions and gain benefits within the bounded scope 
the chamber affords. This is not a wholesale change of direction, but rather conceding to 
the necessity for constant, gradual renewal, mobilised from within, or - even more 
incrementally - the continuous process of improvement known in Japan as kaizen. 
(Hi) The LME and the Theory of the Firm 
Fransman (1999) classifies some of the more prominent theories of the firm into two 
groups. The first of these sees the firm as a means for solving information-related 
problems. These can arise due to bounded rationality, information-related costs of 
making market transactions, the need to monitor and control activities, and the possible 
misalignment of objectives of principals and agents. This kind of theorising includes the 
work of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1979), for example, and, as will be 
elaborated upon below, such theories are associated in this thesis with the large firm as 
opposed to the L M E , which is intent on confining its information needs within strict 
limits. On the other hand, the second group of theories envisages the firm as a 
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repository of specific knowledge, including technological and organisationai 
capabîiities. which is embodied in its routines and competencies (cf. Penrose, 1959; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982). "It is this specific knowledge which leads not only to 
différences amongst firms (and hence to variety) but also to the earning of quasi-rents 
on the part of those firms which possess distinctive competencies which cannot he easily 
emulated by would-be competitors" (Fransman, 1999:7; my italics). This proactive 
depiction encapsulâtes the L M E which is perceived here as the practitioner par 
excellence of this approach. However, the L M E does this by deepening and 
concentrating its knowledge rather than extending and dispersing it in the fashion of 
Chandlers (1990) large diversirying, multiproduct corporations in pursuit of profit 
through économies of scope and scale and reduced transaction costs. 
2.2.3 The L M E as Accomplishment: Examples 
As will be elucidated in Chapter Four on the Japanese economic structure, the 
circumstances in that country have been particularly propitious for the development of 
leading medium-sized enterprises, and this is one good reason to single them out to 
instance distinctive emerging aspects of globalisation. However, other countries 
propagate them too. So by way of illustration, the following présents five examples, one 
from Japan itself, together with one each from Denmark, Germany, the United States, 
and Norway (3). These companies each have an analogue among the five case study 
firms in Chapter Seven. In addition, an 'articulation attribute' is attached to each of 
them, in an attempt to characterise the key élément of the articulation strategy guiding 
the firm, while recognising that such attributes are not exclusive to them; quality, for 
instance, can justifiably be ascribed to ail of them. 
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LME Example 1; LEGO 
Original Source: Simon (1996) 
Website: www.lego.com 
Head Office: Billund. Denmark 
Established: 1932 
Employées: 8,000 (worldwide) 
Case Study Analogue: Pentel 
In 1932, master carpenter and joiner, Ole Kirk Christiansen, established his business 
in Billund to manufacture stepladders, ironing boards and wooden toys. Two years 
later, with a full complément of six or seven employées, the company and product 
name L E G O derived from the Danish 'play well' was adopted, along with the motto 
'Only the best is good enough'. By 1949, the company was producing 200 différent 
plastic and wooden toys, including the forerunner of the L E G O bricks as known 
today. The first foreign venture was the setting up of a sales office in Hohenwestedt 
in Germany. When the wooden toy warehouse was destroyed by fire in I960, the 
décision was made to discontinue wooden toys and concentrate exclusively on 
plastics. In 1973, a single new L E G O logo replaced the various logos of hitherto to 
unify ali the company producís under a single banner. In keeping with the times, in 
1980 L E G O introduced its Educational Products Department, subsequently in 1989 
renamed LEGO Dacta. Over the past 60 years worldwide sales of L E G O bricks have 
exceeded 320 billion. LEGO is now the only European toy maker among the world's 
top ten, while remaining throughout an unlisted, wholly family-owned enterprise 
Articulation Attribute: Open Niche 
L E G O can be categorised as 'open niche' for íhree main reasons. First are the simple 
base materials it has applied to a wide variety of toys and building block sets; initially 
wood, then wood and plastic, and finally plastic only, followed in 1963 by a shift 
from cellulose acétate, as the most important raw material, to A B S (acrylonitrile 
butadiene styrène), for bricks of a better colour qualîty. Second is the company's 
ready embrace of new technology when it clearly enhances the product, as with the 
introduction of a C D - R O M containing building inslructions and the launching of a 
LEGO computer game, both in 1997. Third is its ability of exlension of Ihe basic 
concept both to producís designed for older age groups and contemporary settings, 
and to Legoland leisure parks. 
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IME Example 2: Stilli 
Originai Source: Simon (1996) 
Websites: www.stihl.de + www.stihl.co.jp 
Head Office: Stuttgart, Germany 
Established: 1926 
Employées: 6,000 (worldwide) 
Case Study Analogue: Shofu 
In 1926, Andreas Stihl established a factory in Stuttgart to produce the world's first 
electric powered chain saw. This was followed in 1929 by the launching of a 2-stroke 
gasoline engine chain saw when the company stili only employed twenty people. 
Other market fìrsts were to follow, such as its one-man chain saw in 1952 and its 
direct drive one-man chain saw in 1959, so that by 1971 Stihl could claim to be the 
world's foremost chain saw maker. Right from its founding, perhaps in récognition of 
the national limitations imposed by its elected core compétence, Stihl was 
internationally minded. Already, in the 1930s, it was developing business in the 
United States and the Soviet Union, opérations thereafìer expanding over time into 
Europe, South America and elsewhere. Now, in addition to its seven plants in 
Germany, it also has factories in the United States, Brazil, China, Australia and 
Switzerland, complemented by a worldwide network of some 30,000 sales outlets 
selling Stihl products in 140 countries. The company is stili family-led. 
Articulation Attribute: Focus 
Since 1926, Stihl has not wavered in pursuing the specialised development and 
manufacture of portable electric and gasoline power tools. The main products are 
manifestly geared to a clearly defined market, includtng as they do chain saws, 
trimmers, brushcutters, blowers, cut off machines, saw chains and guide bars, both for 
DIY and professional purposes. 
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LME Example 3: Molex 
Original Source: Kuhn (1985) 
Website: \vw\v.molex.com 
Head Office: Lisle, Illinois, United States 
Established: 1938 
Employées: 16,241 (worldwide) 
Case Study Analogue: Mabuchi 
Having developed a plastic material which he called Molex, Frederick August 
Krehbiel founded Molex Products Company in 1938 to make from this material items 
such as clock cases, flower pots and valve wheels. Soon thereafter one of his sons 
assumed the entrepreneurial mantle having recognised the material's exceptional 
electrical insulating properties. Consequently, by the 1950s Molex was moving fast 
into the appliance market with its connector terminal blocks and became one of the 
pioneers in developing pin and socket connectors. By the 1980s, its connector 
components were being supplied to original equipment manufacturers in consumer 
goods (e.g. télévisions and electronic games), office automation (e.g. computers and 
copiers), and industriai equipment (e.g. automobiles and médical instrumentation). 
Already, three fifths of its revenues were being generated outside the United States, 
having established five plants in East Asia, four in Europe, and one each in Mexico 
and Brazil (Kuhn, 1985:182-3). In the 1990s, it entered such growth industries as télé-
communications, industriai automation and premise networks. Today, Molex 
describes itself as "the world's second-largest manufacturer of interconnection 
products and Systems." Its market-place is now truly global, servicing global 
multinationals including the likes of Compaq of America, Sony of Japan, Nokia of 
Finland and Thaïes (formerly Thomson) of France. Molex went public in 1972. As of 
now, the two joint chairmen are family while the chief operating officer and chief 
executive officer are not. 
Articulation Attribute'. Quality 
Molex opened its first overseas plant in 1970 in Japan. Its quality allowed the 
company to establish itself in Japan at the very tirne when Japanese companies in the 
industry were beginning to manifest their full potential. Just as Japan's electronics 
industry was gearing up to achieve worldwide supremacy, Molex was not on the 
outside fighting a losing battle against seeming invincibility, but on the inside 
contributing to the process. 
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LME Examole 4: Fuiikin 
Original Source: Nakamura ( 1990) 
Website: w\vw.fuiikin. co.jp 
Head Office: Osaka, Japan 
Established: September 1954 (initially founded in May 1930) 
Employées: 704 (Group total in Japan as of August 2000) 
Case Study Analogue: Union Tool 
The company was originally founded in 1930 as a specialist wholesaler of piping 
materials and machinery products under the name of Kikai Kogusho. Having made 
patent applications in seven countries for its long-life 'QS Valve R' in 1965, Fujikin 
advanced into production in 1967. But rather than merely reproducing the items it had 
hitherto soid, Fujikin concentrated on the production of special valves for advanced 
technology industries, including atomic power, marine development, high polymer 
chemicals, energy-saving machines and space rockets. In this way Fujikin developed 
into what it itself conceptualised as a maker of super-précis ion fluid control devices. 
In 1976, it advanced into the construction of clean rooms for the production of valves 
for space rockets which are state-of-the-art for the industry; thèse valves requiring an 
extremely high degree of purity to resist ultra-low températures for use in rockets. 
Fujikin has received numerous awards, as proof of its superior ability in its core 
compétence, including the (then) Ministry of International Trade and Industry's 
commendations for high-pressure gas disaster prévention (1986) and safety (1989). 
With respect to overseas, markets rather than cheaper production sites have been the 
prédominant référence, as indicated by the the establishment of a représentative office 
in New Jersey, a sales office in California and an operating centre in Germany in the 
1980s, followed by the purchase of a manufacturer of précision valves in Connecticut 
in 1990. Fujikin remains unlisted. 
Articulation Attribute: Compact Nucleus 
The fact that Fujikin was able to take advantage of Japan's Small and Medium 
Enterprise Agency's grants for technological improvement in 1985, 1988 and 1989 
underlines the modest size of this specialist company even as it was 
internationalising. This has remained so since. The number of employées in Japan, for 
example, having been 600 at the end of the 1980s (Nakamura, 1990:46) is now just 
over 700 in a company which sustains itself on advanced technology for demanding 
customers. 
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LME Example 5: Norske Skos 
Original Source: Sather (2000) 
Website: www.norskeskog.no 
Head Office: Skogn, Norway 
Established: 1962 
Employees: 11,000 (worldwide) 
Case Study Analogue: Tanaka Kikinzoku (TK.K) 
Norske Skog was established by forest owners in Skogn, Mid-Norway in 1962 as part 
of a forward integration strategy to secure outlets for their timber and learn abouí the 
forest products market. From the start, the chairman of the board and several of the 
board mernbers have been forest owners. While the ownership-management 
relationship has been cióse, however, the two sides have not always advocated 
identical approaches (Sather, 2000:6-7). By 1966, Norske Skog had the biggest and 
most modern facility for publication paper in Europe, and remained a solid, medium-
sized, essentially single-country-based firm for the next 20-odd years. But by the mid-
1980s, declining profits pointed to expansión as the surest means of survival. This 
was a predicament common to paper milis within Norway (and, indeed, beyond), so 
Norske Skog's initial steps entailed consolidating its home territory by merging with 
one Norwegian company (Follum) and acquiring another (Saugbrugs), both in 1989. 
In turning to Europe, however, it resorted to alliance capitalism by setting up a 
greenfieid mili in France with French and Germán interests. Through the I990s it 
internadonalised rapidly, buying milis in Austria and the Czech Republic, then in 
Thailand and South Korea. By 2000, it had attained global reach through the 
acquisition of a firm with milis in New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Brazil, Chile 
and Canadá. Today, however, having divested pulp milis and shipping companies in 
2001, it concentrates on its core business of wood-containing publication paper. It is 
quoted on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
Articulation Attribute: Strategic Clarity 
On its website Norske Skol enunciates its strategic approach with precisión. Key 
elements of this include a commitment to its core business as above, plus the fact that, 
while operating worldwide, ¡t will base its growth on "profitable, long-term industrial 
development in Norway and Europe." Also highlighted are customer orientation, a 
competitive dividend policy, effective and long-term relationships with suppliers, and 




The LME is a concept which dérives Us définition front three key éléments: size, type 
and stage. That is to say, it has a minimum of200 and a maximum of1,999 employées 
at ils home country base: it is highly specialised, having a self-defined and self 
contained core compétence, it is already established as a medium-sized company 
occupying a leading position in its selected sphère of business. Thèse éléments have a 




(a) Whai distinguishes the fashion in which the LME undertakes its business 
opérations? 
(b) How does thisform of conducting business differ from that of large firms and 
SMEs? 




At the start of the last decade Porter (1990) advocated a shift in theoretical attention 
with regard to the nation and the firma within it. This entailed four aspects. First, rather 
than comparative advantage, it must be expiained why a nation's fìrms gain competitive 
advantage in ali its manifestations. Second, theory should reflect the richness of the 
competitive environment to include segmented markets, differentiated products and 
diversified technologies, and économies of scale. Third, analysis should commence with 
the premise that compétition is dynamic and evolving, rather than the static view of 
hitherto focusing on cost efficiency. Finally, improvement and innovation in methods 
and technology must be made centrai to the debate, bringing in the role of the nation 
into the innovation process. Discussion of how the nation fits into the process of 
globalisation is reserved for later chapters. But as far as the firm is concerned, what 
Porter is proposing is to recast the fìrm in a proactive light, focusing on how it gains 
competitive advantage by realigning attributes, circumstances and constraints to achieve 
its ends. This is the essence of the concept of articulation, a concept which I argue is 
centrai to understanding the strategie philosophy and évolution of L M E s . 
2.3.2 Defîning Articulation 
(a) Competitive Advantage and Articulation 
Competitive advantage can be defìned as "a unique position which a firm develops vis-
à-vis its competitore" (Bamberger, 1994:134). A panoply of competitive advantages can 
be assembled resulting from past entrepreneurial activity which at any given point in 
time demonstrate a given firm's superiority to others in certain sphères. These 
advantages are based on distinctive compétences embodied in specialist equipment, 
advanced technology, skilled workers, efficient information Systems and other factors 
(Porter, 1985). They come to comprise the ownership-specifìc advantages (Dunning, 
1979) or the tools for articulation. But no firm has been able to achieve the ultimate 
logie of Hymer's (1976) theory of monopoly, and the total internaiìsation of knowledge 
- if ever contemplated - is an illusion. The firm is constrained by the abilities of other 
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companies, the intervention of local, national and supranational organisations (e.g. 
regulatory bodies, trades unions, pressure groups), and Us own limitations, including 
knowledge deficiency. Articulation entails the firm recognising the circumstances in 
which it finds itself and then trading off attributes agaìnst the constraints to best 
advantage. At the same time, to borrow the imagery favoured by Teece et al (1990), 
articulation is the manipulation of very 'sticky' capabilities which are far from easy to 
acquire or pass on. It comprises a concentrated routinisation based on knowledge plus a 
capacity for incrémental adaptation (Nelson and Winter, 1982). But to distinguish this 
concept from similar constructs further refinement is called for. 
(b) Représentations of Articulation 
B O X 1 offers one perspective based on a military analogy. Although deprived of many 
of the trappings of power, the Swiss militiamen devised a format of opération which 
enabled them to keep company with, and for a time outmanoeuvre, much stronger and 
more elaborate forces. The French, being much more sophisticated and possessing the 
broad array of assets (to which the large T N C is accustomed, in this analogy), 
responded by first emulating and then internalising the attributes of the offensive heavy 
infantry. Finally undermined, the Swiss abruptly lost their articulating faculty, rather as 
if they constituted an L M E with a closed niche product derived from technology which 
could not be redirected to other uses. To continue the metaphor, the Panzer division, 
although large like the French army, was contrived as a highly specialised attack unit, 
shorn of ail extraneous impedimenta. Reduced to the essentials of tank, radio and 
motorisation it epitomised the bare bones of articulation: economy and proactiveness. 
To thèse must be added simplicity and imaginativeness, traits well exhibited by both the 
Swiss militia and the Panzer division. The units of opération applying thèse principies 
can also be small, as shown by Robic and Bamberger (1994) in their study of the French 
dairies with their multiple choice potential: product, market, región. Defíned size, 
thercfore, is not a prerequisite of articulation. But, as will be shown, articulation is an 
art much practised by L M E s as they have grown and internationalised. It is the 
'strategie philosophy' underpinning their survival and success. 
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B O X I 
ARTICULATION TN MILITARY THEORY AND PRACT1CE: A METAPHOR 
AND MODEL FOR BUSINESS 
Articulation in military literature usually - although not entirely - concerns the ability 
of military untts to manoeuvre. In this thesis some liberty has been taken with the term 
to include the means acquired to effect manoeuvre as well as the manoeuvre itself. 
These means, with respect to LMEs, are assumed to be restricted, hence the importance 
of articulation. Illustration (A), describing a type of heavy infantry devised by the Swiss 
in the fourteenth Century, is intended to simulate the L M E predicament and articulated 
response. Articulation is not, however, simply the remedy for modest attributes as the 
Panzer Division in Illustration (B) makes clear. 
Illustration (A): In the fourteenth Century the Swiss were in the main impoverished 
peasants, along with a small class of urban dwellers, separated by mountains into small 
communìties, each having a militia. They fought on foot, without body armour or 
shields, using only a halberd, which is essentially a combined pike and axe. Rather than 
form into a battle line they adopted a formation similar to a séries of solid squares, 
which allowed for the soldiers to stand shoulder-to-shoulder, keep their front in 
alignment, avoid gaps in the line, and level their pikes in ail directions if necessary to 
défend flank and rear, as well as to attack frontally. Solidarity and cohérence were 
achieved due to the fact that ail soldiers in a given unit came from the same village, 
town or guild. They believed in taking the offensive; rather than receiving an attack 
they preferred to advance against the foe at surprising speed for such seemingly 
unwieldy formations. Inasmuch as they brought back to the European battlefield a 
heavy infantry capable of offensive manoeuvres and remained undefeated for décades, 
the Swiss had a profound effect. That the much larger French military establishment 
emulated them is évidence of this. So, although being very poor and lacking horses, 
armour and sophisticated weaponry, the Swiss were able to articulate what they had -
their halberds, their unique formation, their solidarity, and their offensive strategy - into 
a successful engagement with a much larger world. 
Illustration (B): The symbol of the Panzer division was the tank, there being at least 
500 of thèse highly manoeuverable units of destruction per division. But the real secret 
32 
behind the articulation of thèse divisions was their combination with two other factors: 
the radio (which had been incorporated into all modern military in the 1930s) and 
motorisation, the latter for artillery, antitank guns and supplies. By combining the tanks 
with the other motorised weapon Systems the Panzer divisions were able to carry out 
traditionaî turning movements to enclose and neutralise the enemy. The équivalent of a 
Strategie alliance with the airforce. made possible not least by the technological advance 
in the form of the radio, also contributed significantly to the successful outcome. Thus, 
through an original articulation, which blended new and old éléments, the Germans in 
1939-41 were able to break the tyranny of the battle line that had ruled since the First 
World War. 
Source: Archer Jones (1987) 
2.3.3 Articulation and Theory 
(a) Articulation and Internationalisation Theory 
As will be discussed in more détail in the following chapter, post-equilibrium holistic 
internationalisation théories find their inspiration in large transnational corporations 
which encompass multiple activtties and territories. As such they can be subsumed 
under the rubrics of monopoly, intemalisation, control, and the eclectic paradigm. 
Should the said corporations play out such theoretical formulations to their logical 
conclusion they would achieve a kind of monopolîstic stasis. By contrast, the concept of 
articulation represents a dynamic interacting with circumstances concerning which there 
is no perceivable fînite conclusion even in the broadest theoretical terms. On the other 
hand, cohérent predetermination of objective and course is the foundation of articulation 
effectiveness. Firms with clearly defined products and markets are, in a sensé, idéal 
candidates for longitudinal/gradualist theory because they can articulate their well 
honed spécialisation tnto an international présence. The four Swedish firms described 
by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) are just such cases. Because of the frrm's 
strong se If-de finition, moreover, the stimuli motivating internationalisation are likely to 
be more endogenous than exogenous in origin. Constraints and limitations, on the other 
hand, comprise part of the essential fabric of articulation, functioning as they do to cast 
the outline of the feasible, while articulation itself is at the kernel of strategy. 
Knowledge and the decision-making emanating from it are intensively Consolidated 
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while being consciously ctrcumscribed. Offering a backdrop to this conceptualising is 
contingency theory, which is based on the assumption that "strategy performance 
relaíionships can vary across different environments" (Siu and Kirby, 1998:53). That is, 
the company has to contend with environmental influences such as the structure of the 
industry, market growth rates, the extant technology, the characteristics of demand, and 
the attributes of the macro economy. To this it brings to bear its particular know-how, 
equipment. human and financial resources and management capabilities. The 
articulation concept is in agreement with the overall gist of this contingency theory 
approach. However, it is a concept, not a theory. And articulation itself entails focusing 
intensively on the key innovating forces, adding to its power of insight. 
(b) Articulation, Adaptation and Flexibility 
Adaptation and flexibility are two other concepts of adjustment which can fruitfully be 
contrasted with articulation. Barnard (1938) noted that the main preoccupation of an 
organisation is that oí adaptation to changing circumstances, and that such adjustments 
could not be made in discrete piecemeal fashion but had to be effected through a 
strategic balance of the various aspects of the organisation's activities. Williamson 
(1975) applied this to transaction cost economics, asserting that administrative 
hierarchies, as epitomised by the large enterprise, are the most efficient way of reducing 
information costs. Henee, adaptation to change can be most easily associated with large 
and growing bureaucracies. It can also be inferred that the process is internal with 
adjustment being achieved by the realignment of competencies within the organisation. 
An example is the shift of personnel within the Hitachi group starting in the late 1970s 
from its declining shipbuüding sector to its burgeoning electronics sector. Conversely, 
flexibility is often linked with the actions of smaller firms, implying their ability to 
switch rapidly and perhaps opportunistically into different áreas of business. Where 
articulation differs from these is that it communicates the idea that the firm manoeuvres 
partially or wholly as an embodied core competence. It does not créate or extend to 
other competences within itself (adaptation), neither does it randomly lock onto other 
competences outside itself (flexibility). This is best seen as the functioning (incremental 
improvement) of the 'chamber' of core competence ascribed to the L M E above. 
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In this scenario, therefore, there is a simple chain of associations, thus: adaptation for 
large firms, articulation for LMEs, and flexibility for small firms. There is considerable 
justification for this; organisations of différent size tend to act by différent criteria 
(Pugh, 1988). However, some qualification is in order here or else the full implications 
of thèse concepts would not be brought across. Structural conditioning rather than size 
can define behaviour (Bergqvist, 2002), as illustrated by Hewlett-Packard's 
establishment of semi-autonomous business units for ail its core producís (Saxenian, 
1994). Here, both this large company as a whole and the individual units are practising 
an articulation strategy. Yokogawa Electric, the world's second largest maker of 
industrial instruments after Honeywell, has recently announced its intention to close 
fifteen plants in Japan and move their opérations to China and other East Asian 
countries (Nikkei, October 12, 2002). This again is articulation because it entails the 
simple partial relocation of the same core compétence. Alternatively, articulation by 
smaller firms thèse days is évident in their wholesale introduction of the Internet to 
increase sales, reduce costs and augment profits because it involves readjustment of 
their existing business as a complete entity. As for flexibility, the common référence for 
large firms is their use of subcontracting to keep their employment options open 
(Atkinson, 1984; Blau, 1993), and it has already been suggested in this thesis that L M E s 
can be very flexible within their core compétence. Small firms can likewise be flexible 
within their existing opérations. Palaez-Ibarrondo and Ruiz-Mercader (2001) illustrate 
this by showing how an SME making various metallic parts for lamps and bathroom 
fittings can achieve optimal results through operational flexibility. But this example also 
underlines a distinction. The S M E technology used here is relatively simple and extra 
flexibility is at hand by merely bringing in more numerical control equipment (Palaez-
Ibarrondo and Ruiz-Mercader, 2001:10). However, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
in Nakamura's (1990) view, one of the cardinal factors distinguishing LMEs (chuken 
kigyo) from SMEs (chusho kigyo) is their much greater dedication of time, learning, 
personnel and equipment to their chosen core compétence. The 'chamber' thus created 
effectively constìtutes a framework functioning as an entry barrier. Moreover, at one 
and the same time, the elevated expertise closely defines action and opportunity, while 
the in-depth commitment constrains manoeuvre. The concept of articulation is an 
attempi to visualise the field of tension experienced between the sustained commitment 
to a specialised area of endeavour and the constant need to address a changing 
environment. 
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Fig. 2.1 Images of Adaptation, Articulation and Flexibility 
Adaptation: shift of resources to new area of (internally developed) compétence 
Articulation: incrementai improvement of core compétences 
Flexibility: active pursuit of diverse opportunities as they présent themselves 
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2.3.4 Articulation as Practised by LMEs 
(a) Key Elements of LME Articulation 
It was explained at the beginning of this chapter that the term leading medium-sized 
enterprise embodies a valué judgement and is as such an idealisation. Nevertheless. it is 
also a descriptive term which can justtfiably be employed to give perspective to a 
certain genre of company. But in either case, being leading as well as medium-sized -
which hints at its limited scope - this kind of enterprise can be expected to exhibit 
aggressive articulation tendencies. Earlier the L M E has been characterised as 
independent, professional in its undertakings, and highly committed to its core 
competence. The leadership and management are compact, quality spearheads policy, 
and strategy is broadly defmed yet circumscribed (the chamber), while open to great 
flexibility in detail (mechanisms). Attributes stand out, as with the five, international 
examples gíven above, these being open niche (LEGO), focus (Stihl), quality (Molex), 
compact nucleus (Fujikin), and strategic clarity (Norske Skog). Added to this is the 
'first decisión' as to what the core competence should be. This may have been, but does 
not have to have been, made simultaneously with the founding or establishment of the 
company, but it is the crucial decisión which has shaped the company and its 
articulation ever since. This articulation feeds an attitude which is projected out to the 
world beyond. In this way, the 'first decisión' is the direct ascendant of 
internationalisation. 
(b) The Five International Examples and the 'First Decisión' 
Stihl was established for the express purpose of making chain saws and Norske Skog 
likewise for paper manufacturing. So their 'first decisión' coincided with their 
commencement. Stihl, according to its website, was also conscious from the start of the 
worídwide market outside Germany, and in targeting the United States and the Soviet 
Union almost from the beginning it showed that this 'first decisión' had overseas 
implications. Norske Skog commenced with no such pretentions and only 
internationalised when survival was at stake. Then it was able, in the first instance, to 
leverage its resource-based advantage to benefit from market demand in the immediate 
vicinity of Norway before going international by stages. The 'first decisión' for L E G O 
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and Molex was, as it were, a reflex reaction within two or three years of establishment. 
They both quickly and decisively determined where their compétitive advantages lay 
and articulated their success from that point. Again, one of them, L E G O , in choosing 
Germany favoured proximity as the conduit to internationalisation, while Molex -
when it came to investing abroad - placed the emphasis on the product and the need to 
be close to the market. Fujikin's 'first décision' only came when it switched from being 
a wholesaler to being a manufacturer of specialist valves, some thirty-five years after 
the establishment of the original company. Like Molex, product and market have been 
paramount in its internationalisation strategy. 
PROPOSITIONS 
P2 
Articulation characterises a stratégie approach entailing the exercise of bounded 
options within afield of sustained mohility. It captures well the stratégie philosophy 
of the typical LME, while not being exclusive to it. Articulation is a gradualist, 
incrémental approach which entails movement of thefirm as a unit of embodied core 
compétence. It can be contrasted with the création of new compétences within the 
business entity (adaptation) and the attachment to compétences outside (flexibility). 
Articulation and the core compétence comprise a symbiosis, the source for both being 




(a) Does the LME, thus defined and functioning as indicated, have a particular rôle to 
play in the globalising world economy? 
(b) Can the LME be placed in the body of theory to explicate a particular form of 
internationalisation/globalisation? 
(c) As a business and internationalising entity, how does the LME differ from large 
TNCsandSMEs? 
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2.4 A i m s and Methodology 
2.4.1 Research Aims 
The primary aim of this thesis is to show how the firm designated as an LME as 
ouîiined above has progressed along the path of internationalisation. Complementing 
this is the aim to show how the L M E , with the character that it has and the fashion in 
which it opérâtes and internationalises, is able to contribute to the understanding of the 
globalisation phenomenon. A secondary aim of the thesis is to make observations 
regarding the part Japanese L M E s have played in the économie intégration and 
industrial upgrading within their 'local' région. For this it is intended to pursue the chain 
of évidence laid out in Chapter One and embellished by a séries of propositions and 
research questions, two sets of which have been presented in this chapter, to be 
followed by four more sets over the next three chapters. 
More specifically, the premise taken in this thesis is that the theory of business 
internationalisation and, within that, the theory of foreign direct investment (FDI), have 
been overly concentrated on the very large or very small company, while not enough 
attention has been directed at medium-sized firms, which non-theoretical work 
nevertheless suggests have played a signiftcant rôle in both exporting and foreign 
investment. One of the économies with a strong représentation of medium-sized 
enterprises in the manufacturing sector is Japan. With the exception of Nakamura 
(1962, 1990) and a few others, however, medium-sized Japanese companies have been 
given short shrift as far as theoretical placement is concerned, although here again there 
is a large popular and marketing literature which champions their attributes. Not ail 
medium-sized companies are under considération here, but only those which have 
clearly manifested an effective business discipline and strategy (Rommel et ai, 1995; 
Porter et al, 2000), are capable of competing on their merits with ail corners (Kuhn, 
1985), and have honed specialist markets on a régional if not on a worldwide scale 
(Simon, 1996). Thèse are designated as L M E s . The basic aim of this thesis is to 
investigate to what extent and how L M E s have initiated and sustained, through 
articulation, a program of internationalisation starting any time within the period from 
the 1960s to 1990. Regarding this process, particular référence is made to the rôles of 
the nation and the multinational région as context and active influences on the L M E 
internationalisation process and as locations in turn shaped by the evolving L M E s . The 
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nation here is représentée! by Japan and Taiwan as they interact and evolve within the 
région of East Asia. The significance of this région, and of Taiwan within it, are 
highlighted both to investigate the relevance of proximity, that is their potentiai to 
fonction as a springboard for the L M E in its course of internationalisation, and to serve 
as évidence of how their interaction with the L M E is conducive to the process of 
globalisation. The outline of the argument is presented in the following table. 
Fig. 2.2 Outline of Argument based on Propositions 
1 Type of firm and object 
of studv 
— • L M E : a distinctive — • 
business tvpe 
Japan as source/ 




of L M E 
Articulation: incrémental 
^. improvement within ^. 
defined sphère 
Articulation as.basis 
forTunctioning óf the 




of L M E 
Sequential FDI: proximity" 
• to global présence; ~~• 
management of internat-
ional production networks 




Contribution of L M E to 
globalisation process 
— • Intensification of — • 
regional level integration/ 
embeddedness/role of 
Japan and Taiwan 
East^ia'as^müllihátional • 
re^óh^fluenceH|by:y . ; 
évolution Öf firm and 
région) 
2.4.2 Research Methodology and Design 
The research methodology applied here comprises three main éléments: theory, 
narrative analysis and empirical analysis. The theoretical élément, which is the subject 
of the next chapter, entails placing the L M E within the setting of internationalisation 
and globalisation theory as it has evolved. It is essentially a sélective review of the 
theoretical literature, interjecting comments throughout concerning its pertinence 
regarding the L M E , with the intention of illustrating the viability of the L M E as a 
concept for elucidating aspects of the increasingiy multidimensional nature of 
globalisation. Chapter Four présents the first of the background narratives, this 
concerning the récent development of Japan's industrial structure to demonstrate the 
L M E as fact and to suggest how and why it happened to flourish in that particular 
country's économie environment. This is followed in Chapter Five by accounts of East 
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Asia as the general immediate regional environment pertaining to Japanese LMEs , and 
then of Taiwan as the prime example of 'super proximity' for thèse L M E s within that 
région. This is with the idea of painting in the scenario geographically adjacent to Japan 
from which its LMEs have benefited and to which they have contributed as they 
internationalise in a globalising environment. The approach in both these chapters can 
be termed historical, based largely on secondary Japanese, Chinese, English and French 
language sources, though with some originai data interpreted from officiai Japanese and 
Taiwanese sources. These sources are identified in the text and evaluated in 
methodological notes at the start of each chapter. The analytical section takes up the 
subséquent two chapters, the first presenting a quantitative firm-level examination of 
the estimated population, of 110 Japanese L M E s which have invested in Taiwan, based 
on secondary Japanese and Taiwanese (Chinese-language) officiai, commercial and 
corporate sources. The second is a qualitative anaìysis by way of five L M E s extracted 
from the originai 110 as case studies, combining primary data through interviews in 
Japanese and English conducted in Taiwan and Japan, together with newspaper and 
journal reports, company historiés, catalogues and websites. 
(a) Reasoning for Methodology Adopted 
Put simply, this study employs a number of language sources - English, Japanese and 
Chinese - to set the scene, review secondary data of a fairly large sample, and then 
concentrate on a small number of case studies. This was essentially the format adopted 
from the beginning for reasons that will become apparent. Other approaches could have 
been taken; it could have been possible to stick to English, conduct an ethnographie 
study, or regard all of the 110 sample companies as case studies, for example. To take 
the matter of language, it would now be possible to investigate large Japanese 
companies purely in English because of the materials they produce themselves in that 
language and general data availabte in publications and the media. But, this is not 
possible for smaller Japanese firms, including LMEs, although it is worth pointing out 
that the L M E as defined above is the smallest sized company for which a substantial 
body of data in Japanese is readily available. 
This study started with the examination of Japanese and Chinese sources, these being 
relatively detailed materials produced in Taiwan about Japanese companies which had 
41 
invested there. An alternative could have been to start with the brief EngÜsh-language 
accounts of companies on the Japanese stock exchanges to work out which of them 
could be classified as LMEs . However, a fifth of the 110 LMEs - including two very 
good case studies - are not listed. Besides, the only publication which teils you if they 
have invested in Taiwan while also presenting a comprehensive picture of their 
investments worldwide is in Japanese. There again, there is the list of members of the 
Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Taipei in English, but thèse are predominantly large 
firms and only eighteen of my sample turn up there. Most these L M E s now have 
websites, but some are only in Japanese, and very few of them have home pages 
emanating from their Taiwan affliliates in any language revealing anything of much 
substance. In addition to English, then, Japanese and Chinese sources are essential for a 
study like this, not only to work through the detailed data but also to get profounder 
understanding of the cire um stances. The very core of the subject matter, the book 
written by Nakamura (1990), is only in Japanese; in contrast to large firms, literature on 
smaller Japanese firms is almost exclusively in Japanese; there is a growing body of 
literature by Japanese economie historians about Taiwan and other Asian countries; 
likewise, Chine se-language literature written by Taiwanese scholars about the Japanese 
corporate présence in Taiwan is on the increase. 
As for the ethnographie approach, my main base for this study has been Taipei. The 
likelihood of a manager of a Japanese affiliate agreeing to having a field worker on site 
is remote, and the Japanese heaquarters sanctioning it even more so. Added to which, 
there is the problem of too close an association with the subject compromising the 
conclusions, especially if limited to a single company. As has already been illustrated 
with the five international examples presented earlier in this chapter, moreover, L M E s 
are présent in a whole range of businesses, so that it is désirable to come up with a 
cross-section of business activity to incorporate différent kinds of L M E . Other reasons 
are related to the continuation of this discussion immediately below, but another factor 
was that I had in the past already had ten years expérience of working in and with 
smaller Japanese companies, so that I felt that with the impressions thereby absorbed I 
could stand back and observe from the middle distance so to speak. 
So, given this language knowledge and personal expérience, for the empirical analysis 
the research design emerged as follows. The main question at issue was how to obtain 
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the sharpest and deepest insights into the internationalising Japanese L M E . I was able to 
obtain considérable written data, including surveys, in Japanese and Chinese for a basic 
population of 110 Japanese LMEs as described in Chapter Six. Having determined my 
basic sample I could have approached all of them in an attempt to achieve survey results 
of my own. I did not. ïnstead, I continued to amplify the picture of each company from 
further written sources to eventually produce substantial summaries of ali 110 
companies as in Box 5 in Chapter Six and Boxes 7 - 1 1 in Chapter Seven. The reason 
for not relying on early direct contact with thèse firms was 1 reasoned that the response 
would have been poor. This is justified by the fact that, as will be seen, when I finally 
did make contact very few firms replied favourably, and follow-up téléphone calls to 
thirty of them yielded nothing extra. I could have sent out a questionnaire of a simpler 
variety than I eventually did, but, even i f responded to by a good percentage of the 
firms, it would not have added much in terms of information - particular and aggregate 
- that I already had. 1 could have gone through prominent Japanese Taiwan-based 
institutions which had already provided me with general data, such as the branches of 
the Japan External Trade Organization and Nomura Research Institute. Again, my 
instinctive doubts proved correct, because when l finally asked them i f they could put 
me in touch with any of the 110 firms, I drew a complete blank. Finally, one of the 
requisites for this study was to attain an understanding from the Standpoints of both the 
Taiwan affiliâtes and the headquarters in Japan. To have pursued this to the depth 
required for a large sample would have been very costly and time-consuming. Making 
case studies out of all the sample firms was from the start not a viable proposition and 
nothing that happened subsequently gainsaid that. The profiles constructed of the 110 
firms provide considérable insight, and also constitute the basis for more detailed case 
studies of selected firms. 
The approach to the case studies started by compiling as much information as possible 
about the firms before making contact, and then doing so with a questionnaire of 
considérable detail which would only attract companies seriously interested in 
cooperating (see Appendix). The resuit was four responses (the fifth case study was 
through a personal contact) from firms which proved to be excellent examples of what I 
wanted to describe, as well as being as a group (with the fifth one added) an interesting 
cross-section of L M E business activity. The three-dimensional définition of the L M E 
also influenced this choice of research strategy. As we have seen, apart from being 
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simply abstracted from a numerical continuum, the L M E is a particular type of Furo 
which may be at a specific stage of development. It is as such a dynamic concept which 
cannot be merely projected in Statistical terms; it must be brought to life. For this it 
must have a profile and a name, preferably the actual name of an actual firm whose 
existence and activities are there for confirmation by other observers. As one in a 
survey of 110 companies, it would forfeit the relief that has been crafted by this 
définition. It is necessary to delve into what type and stage mean, and for this is needed 
an in-depth idea of what particular companies are like and what they have done. At the 
same time, having been abstracted from the larger sample for minute inspection, it can 
then be returned to the fold of généralisation. Hence, with this sélection of five case 
studies both cross-sectional range and individuai particularities are obtained to 
substantiate and embellish the previously conducted survey investigation. In this way, 
the combining of quantitative and qualitative culminating with case studies has 
comprised the empirical analysas. 
(b) Quantitative and Qualitative 
The quantitative data thus constitutes the base from which the subjects for qualitative 
analysis are selected. That is to say, this is a multimethod strategy founded on the 
premise that there is no single method applicable for such a study and that différent 
kinds of complementary data can be acquired by using différent research techniques for 
mutuai supplementation and vérification (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Gil l and Johnson, 
1977). This amounts to an exercise in methodological triangulation comprising "the 
combination of méthodologies in the study of the same phenomenon" (Denzin, 
1970:297). Such a strategy implies combining principle research methods, such as 
historical research, Statistical data and case studies. It spans the micro-macro divide in 
order to achieve a stronger substantiation of the propositions made (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In support of the multimethod strategy Glaser and Strauss (1967:68) have argued that 
"theory generated from just one kind of data never fits, or works as well, as theory 
generated from diverse slices of data on the same category." To overly stress the 
superiority of, say, the quantitative research stance at the expense of the qualitative, or 
vice versa, is to deprive the research of the common benefit that is derived from the 
éléments of both. The différent methods have inhérent strengths and weaknesses that 
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need to be given their due considération (Gill and Johnson, 1991). Advocates of this 
position of triangulation, other than those already mentioned, include Smith (1989), 
Snow and Thomas (1994), and Yin (1994). It is seen as a means by which personal bias 
stemming from single méthodologies can be curbed (Denzin, 1978). Moreover, 
methodological triangulation is a frequently cited rationale for combining qualitative 
and quantitative methods in a study (Seale, 1999). These methods are perceived as 
différent ways of investigating the same subject matter which when combined can 
enhance the conclusions drawn through mutual confirmation. This is referred to as 
methodological triangulation and is given visual rendition in Fig. 2.3. As we have 
indicated. bodies of data are readily available concerning the sample companies and 
their overseas activities. Consequently, thèse have been edited and compiled to render 
an Overall picture regarding the internationalising L M E . The various bodies of data 
(sources and methods of analysis) used in each stage of this research are discussed and 
critically evaluated in the relevant chapters in the text. 
Fig. 2.3 Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches: Triangulation 
QUANTITATIVE 
Government and other 
third party data 
Literature review Secondar)" surveys 
Catalogues, websites, 
company histories 
FACTS l Past expérience 
interviews in Taiwan 
(Japanese) 
in Japan 
(Japanese or English) 
QUALITATIVE 
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(c) Case Stuäies 
Among the ways in which Bryman (1988) saw this combination working were, first, the 
fact that quantitative research can lay the groundwork for subséquent qualitative 
examination. Second, the combination of the two can be instrumental in producing a 
general picture, inasmuch as, for example, the formulation of certain patterns may be 
unobtainable through the quantitative method alone. The décision may therefore be 
taken to augment the study through qualitative investigation in order to access the finer 
complexities of the situation. "Indeed, one of the ways in which quantitative research 
may facilitate qualitative research is in the judicious sélection of cases for further study" 
(Bryman, 1988:136). The case study can be envisaged as completing the triangulation 
through an inductive process by which explanation is further embellished (de Vaus, 
1996; Schofield, 1993), while at the same time eschewing any undue emphasis on 
scientific rigour in order to afford leeway for the elucidation of processes, emergjng 
structures and institutions (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Mintzberg, 1979). 
Case studies can be multiple, whereby a set of experiments replicating the same 
phenomenon is conducted under différent conditions, for instance (Yin, 1994). The 
likelihood of achieving such replication with business case studies is small if not 
impossible, however, Replication such as it goes is best derived from the quantitative 
side. The other extreme is to concentrate on one exampie only for an intensely in-depth 
analysis rendering insights that "wil l be both more accurate and more appropriately 
tentative because the researcher must take into account the intricacies and qualifications 
of a particular context" (Gibb Dyer and Wilkins, 1991:615). As stated above, there were 
a number of practical reasons for rejecting the multiple approach. On top of that, in my 
view employing such large numbers for a study of this nature would have been counter-
productive and shallow. To my mind, a case study in general, and particularly in a study 
like this is for elucidating real-life situations in ail their complexities; it is getting at the 
détails of firms with différent products, différent individuals, différent styles of 
opération and différent séquences of results, but with underlying discernable 
similarities. So we need a few case studies to encompass the variations, but not a large 
number which would obfuscate the detail. The L M E is therefore an institutional 
construct with variations, a fact which is reflected in the sélection of a small number of 
cases (5), chosen to capture some of this variation, as advocated by Eisenhardt (1989). 
46 
(d) Research Design 
The research design is the plan and structure of investigation to get answers to research 
questions while controlling the variance (Kerlinger, 1986), that is, it is "the logic that 
links the data to be collected (and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of 
the study" (Yin, 1994:18). Two fonctions of the research design as determined by 
Nachmias and Nachmias (1992) are of interest here. The first is that it guides the 
researcher in the collecting, analyzing, and interpreting of observations. Second, it 
defines the domain of gêneraiisability. The crucial components of the research design 
for this thesis are the unit of analysis, research questions, and the propositions. The unit 
of analysis is the L M E , which, although previously not employed in the study of 
business internationalisation, is nevertheless clearly defined and easily recognisable. 
The research questions are centered on why and how L M E s have engaged in 
internationalisation through FDI, and the régional conséquences of this. The main 
proposition is that L M E s have the potential to internationalise within a globalising 
environment, as demonstrated by Japanese L M E s , which, through their investments in 
Taiwan and other East Asîan countries, played a key rôle in the co-evolution of the 
Japanese and Taiwanese économies and in the development of the the East Asian 
région. Stemming from this is the former proposition that the term L M E (chuken kigyo) 
and the particular way in which Japanese L M E s conduct their international opérations 
are globally generalisable. The structure for the research design thus derived is as 
shown in Fig. 2.4. The L M E is presented as the unit of analysis, and this initiâtes a 
séries of research questions from which tentative propositions are drawn. The 
cumulative effect of thèse questions and propositions is then matched against mutually 
complementary quantitative data and case studies. 
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Fig. 2.4 Structure of Research Design 
L M E 
Research Questions ^ Propositions 
{Cou hi butions 
fo theorv) 
Quantitative data] ^ (Case studies 
Généralisations on L M E internationalisation 
(e) Methodology Serving Aims 
To briefly summarise the methodologicai séquence as it serves the purpose of achieving 
the aims, the first step, in the following chapter, is to posit the L M E in a theoretical 
framework, the better to justiry its utilisation as a représentative concept in the theory of 
globalisation. This is done by a literary review punctuated by références to the L M E ' s 
relevance. The next move is to show that the L M E is an organic entity within an actual 
economie and social space by relating the historical and structural realities through 
which it has evolved. The literary review is again employed to show how the L M E 
developed in Japan, especially after the Second World War. Finally in this narrative 
phase, to support the contention that the multinational région is an indispensable partner 
in the globalisation process, the pertinence of the région in general geographical, 
economie and cultural terms and in particular terms relating to the Japanese L M E is 
outlined. The nature and relevance of proximity in ali its implications - including 
technological and historical - is then given further emphasis with an analysis of Taiwan 
as the epitome of 'super proximity'. By this stage much more use is being made of 
officiai government materials, both Japanese and Taiwanese, in an attempt to balance 
the biases in the académie literature (while recognising that government data can be 
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biased too). Having reached this juncture the setting with all its comportent parts -
L M E , articulation, nation-state (home and host), multinational région and proximity -
have been identified and fleshed out in préparation for the two-stage empirical anaylisis 
which follows. 
The first of these is the quantitative analysis of the population of I IO manufacturing 
LMEs . In the first instance, this set of sample L M E s was extracted from a Japanese-
language compilation of information published in Taiwan covering about a thousand 
affiliâtes of Japanese firms of ali kinds which had invested in Taiwan (also 
incorporating some information in Chinese). Determining whether the parent company 
headquartered in Japan could pass as an L M E was done by matching the account 
published in Taiwan against information published in Japanese and English in Japan 
concerning stock-market listed and unlisted companies. That having been done, turther 
information was sought concerning their activìties, including overseas, to produce 
corporate profiles for all HO LMEs , an example of which is given in Box 5 (Chapter 
Six). The information in these profiles then serves to provide the aggregate data 
regarding the population. The information thereby derived is subsequently compared, 
first, with a survey of various types and sizes of investing Japanese manufacturing 
Investors in Taiwan to find out where the similarities and différences lie. Second, a 
comparison is made with a large Japanese T N C , Matsushita Electric Industriai (MEI), 
with respect to activìties in Taiwan and Worldwide to help to put the L M E in 
perspective in the locai, regional and global contexts. This contextual représentation is 
further nuanced at the end of the chapter with a temporal élément by way of a set of five 
vignettes of L M E s , each of which made their initial investment in Taiwan at différent 
times during the period from the 1960s to 1990. This is set against the backdrop of 
Taiwan's economie development and its evolving reciprocai relationshìp with Japan to 
see if rurther insights can be discerned concerning the L M E internationalisation process. 
It also serves to link the general with the particular, thereby setting the stage for the case 
studies which follow. 
Like the vignettes, the case studies were abstracted from the original 110 L M E s . They 
are intended to supply the specific detail which the aggregate survey is not in a position 
to provide because we now enter the real-life context of the actual firm with ali its 
idiosyncratic intricacies. The approaches to potential case studies (except for the test 
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case) were made after data about them had been collected and compiled. In the first 
instance, 35 of them which happened also to have affiliâtes in the United Kingdom were 
contacted on the grounds that it would seem logical to them that a British citizen 
researching through a British university would do this. In fact, this could have had an 
effect because of the four Taiwan affiliâtes which responded to the subséquent letter 
and questionnaire sent in English and Japanese, three belonged to firms that responded 
from the U.K. The questionnaire was deliberately detailed to convey knowledge and 
seriousness, and also because I had often translated in the past questionnaires of a 
similar style and depth for Japanese research missions going abroad. The letter and 
questionnaire were sent to Taiwan affiliâtes with Japanese, rather than Taiwanese, 
managers because it was the Japanese perspective that was being sought. Likewise, for 
the three interviews which took place in Taiwan I requested that they would be held in 
Japanese because I thought I might get more insights that way. At my request also, 
thèse three Taiwan affiliâtes arranged for me to interview staff in Japan so that I could 
alloy viewpoints from two angles as far as they were concerned. The interviews were 
then combined with the profile information, catalogues, websites, newspaper and 
journal articles, and corporate historiés to produce the case study analyses. Each 
analysis comprises sections on company and product, the L M E character pf the firm, its 
internationalisation process, and the rôle of Taiwan in its strategy. Finally, each case 
study L M E is ascribed an 'articulation attribute', which is a key word intended to aptly 
encapsulate the essence of that firm's approach in gênerai and consequently with 
respect to its approach to internationalisation. Thèse articulation attributes - publicity, 
positioning, linkage, ultra-focus, density - are then employed as a conduit for assessing 
the gênerai conclusions that can be drawn about the process of internationalisation of 
L M E s by combining quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
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2.5 Summary 
The three concepts governing this thesis are the L M E , articulation and globalisation, the 
first two of which have been discussed in this chapter. 
Concept 1: The LME as a term is a free translation of the Japanese chuken kigyo and 
this type of firm ¡s characterised by its independence, its professional organisation, and 
its dévotion to a core compétence, while it is well-practised in the art of articulation, lt 
is particularly characterised as a firm by its capacity for building and deepening its 
specialist knowledge base. The L M E concept is based not only on size but also type and 
stage. It is distinguished from the large firm by its medium size and the fact that it is 
highly concentrated on a closely defined sphère of business (type). Its distinction as 
against the S M E is that it is already an established medium-sized company (stage), 
specialised in an area of business which is considerably more significant in scope than a 
narrow niche left over by large companies for small companies to take advantage of, 
and it is in a leading position in this selected area of business. The strategie philosophy 
of articulation is more pronounced among L M E s than large corporations and SMEs, 
based on the depth of its commitment to its strictly delineated core compétence. 
Examples are presented to show that LMEs are found around the world and that they 
function at various stages of the upstream-downstream continuum. 
Concept 2: Articulation has been presented as a means of practice and strategy for 
growth particularly suited to describing the nature of the L M E (although not exclusive 
to it), in that it is a concept that is predicated on the tension between capabilities and 
constraints that the L M E is ever conscious of contending with. Articulation is 
contrasted with (internai) adaptation and (external) flexibility to demónstrate how it 
compléments the L M E ' s attention to its core compétence. 
The aim of this research is to discern how the L M E employs its articulation attributes to 
internationalise in an increasingly globalising environment. This is to be pursued by 
first placing the L M E in theoretical context. This is followed by narrative analysis 
which reconstruets the national and regional environments - including within that the 
particular country of Taiwan - in which Japanese L M E s find themselves and then 
applying quantitative and qualitative analytical methods to elucidate their situation in a 
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progressively spécifie mariner, culminating in fïve case studies. By combining the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches it is intended to create a clearer depiction of 
how the L M E acts on the stage of globalisation. 
Notes 
(1) Chuken kigyo directiy translated is 'medium[-sized] strong enterprise'. However, the 
usage of the Japanese term leaves one in no doubt that such firms are leaders in their 
chosen fields, which is why Whittaker (1997; personal correspondence) asked me if he 
could adopt the term L M E . Before that he had been using the term 'core enterprise'. 
This obviously ran the danger of depicting chuken kigyo as firms central to hierarchical 
setups such as keiretsu, which would have been precisely the obverse of the image of 
independence he wished to get across concerning the L M E . 
(2) Nakamura, for example, gives the domestic employée figures for the time he was 
writing in the late 1980s, and where he is citing the same companies as I have over a 
décade later, thèse figures differ very little. In most cases employment expansion has 
corne with internationalisation and if the international figures are included this makes 
some of the companies considerably larger than the range specified hère. However, in 
ail cases - and this is considered essential - they have retained much of their L M E 
character, especially regarding their sustained commitment to their core compétences, 
and often with respect to ownership and leadership. More to the point, they were L M E s 
at the time they initiated internationalisation. Given the fact that L M E is a dynamic 
concept, citing the now larger firms to illustrate how such firms have internationalised 
is perfectly consistent with such a concept. At the same time, using the 1999 domestic 
employée figures also reins them in, setting LMEs apart from the Hkes of Sony, 
Matsushita, Canon, Honda and Kyocera, which also could be said to have gone through 
brief L M E stages and were run by their founders for décades, but which are now very 
large both domestically and worldwide. 
(3) Thèse firms were regarded as being of the ' L M E ' type at the times the cited authors 
were writing about them. 
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Chapter Three 
Globalisation and the LME 
3.1 Introduction 
A i l iïve companies comprising the international group of LMEs in Chapter Two have in 
common - as indeed do ail the L M E s referred to in this study - the fact that they have 
internationalised through the 1980s in an increasingly globalising environment. The 
neologism globalisation, coined to underscore the intensification and multifaceted 
nature of modem internationalisation, gained currency in the 1980s, just as thèse 
companies were consolidating their international pedigree and looking to broaden their 
horizons still further en route to accommodating globalisation. They themselves were 
both propagators contributing to the process and récipients responding to the évolution 
which described the course of internationalisation as it elaborated into globalisation. 
Tracing the path followed by internationalisation constitutes, therefore, the prerequisite 
for comprehending the position of the internationalising L M E in the globalising setting 
and the L M E ' s contribution to globalisation. To this end, this chapter commences with 
a brief historical account of the internationalisation process on its way to globalisation. 
Then cornes a sélective summary of the interpretive theory which has followed in the 
wake of events, covering trade theory, internationalisation theory and globalisation 
theory. The argument is that as this progression unfolds both in fact and as intepreted by 
theory it becomes increasingly complex. The actors are more diverse and more 
intricately interconnected, leading to the need for more varied and sophisticated tools to 
interpret globalisation. The chapter culminâtes with the proposition that the L M E is just 
such an analytical tool, leaving to the next chapter the task of elucidating its émergence 
as a reality. 
3.2 Methodology Note 
The terms L M E and articulation in the fashion that they are applied in this thesis are 
new concepts. They are combined with the established, albeit multifarious, concept of 
globalisation to endeavour to shed light onto both how LMEs internationalise in a 
globalising environment through the application of articulation, and how in doing this 
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the L M E serves to illustrate an aspect of globalisation in action. The tack adopted here 
has been to blend the L M E and articulation with the actors and constructs that have 
been identified over time as internationalisation theory has progressed - the nation, the 
hierarchical firm, the eclectic paradigm, strategic alliances, networking and so on, and 
thereby to show how the L M E locks into globalisation theory in its modern setting. 
3.3 From Internationalisation to Globalisation: The Background 
Internationalisation as it is understood today surfaced as a reality only when knowledge 
and perception of the world as an entity had been achieved at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, a circumstance which "transformed the world from a multitude of 
autarchic and culturally self-sufficient groups into something approaching an economic 
unit and a single strategic conception" (Ashworth, 1962:3). The fundamental 
underpinning of this internationalisation was technological change, accompanied by the 
transformation of economic organisation. In assuming its modern guise, a further 
impetus was given to post-war internationalisation through the inauguration of 
institutions claiming a global competence outside the Communist arena: the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank. 
If technology and international institutions have contrived the enabling and mobilising 
environment in the post-war era, the chief actors have been nations and firms. Early on, 
the former were prone to adopt the fortress mentality of the inviolate nation-state. But, 
in general, over time nations have sought an accommodation with the changing 
circumstances (Sassen, 1996; Weiss, 1998), opening up to trade, deregulating and 
privatising, and becoming more amenable to FDI ( U N C T A D , 1996b). As for firms, 
their most overt manifestation in the internationalising world has been the multinational 
corporation (MNC), or what is now more often referred to as the transnational 
corporation (TNC), owing its apparition to the increasing sophistication of 
transportation and communications systems, developments in production leading to the 
fragmentation, standardisation and deskilling of specific tasks, and access to a reservoir 
of labour worldwide. 
The mounting complexity of nation-firm relationships, in fact, serves to epitomise the 
integrative forces at work as internationalisation metamorphoses into globalisation. 
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Ostensibly, as the world economy has opened up in what appears to be an unremitting 
surge of "technological innovation, deregulation, and trade liberalisation" (Bryan, 
Lyons and Rosenthal, 1998:6), it is the firm - and especially the large firm - which 
would appear at first sight to be gaining the most ground. Industries which are 
essentially the preserve of these extensive corporations, notably electronics (Ernst, 
1994), automobiles (Doner, 1994) and semiconductors (Scott and Angel, 1988), as early 
as the 1970s spearheaded a move toward a mode of operations in sourcing, 
manufacturing and marketing which was global and borderless. Compounding this 
representation has been foreign direct investment (FDI), a clear barometer of the 
integrating thrust of globalisation. That is to say, FDI marked time with the emergence 
of globalisation in the 1980s as its measured flows grew three times faster than trade 
flows and nearly four times faster than output (Wade, 1996). The fact that this FDI has, 
since the 1980s, been very disproportionately skewed regarding both source and 
destination towards OECD countries, and within that the Triad of the U.S.A., the E U 
and Japan (Clegg, 1996:44; U N C T A D , 1999a:15), seems to endorse the impression of 
the large-scale, advanced technology nature of FDI as an agent of globalisation driven 
by large TNCs based in the developed world. 
But national governments have been far from passive onlookers. They have come to 
realise the necessity of being outward looking and export oriented as opposed to inward 
looking and import substituting (Ozawa, 1992). They are now aware that it is in their 
best interests to provide information and coordination for investors, and to attempt to 
ensure a viable infrastructure, a productive labour force and support institutions and 
services. Many of them recognise that locational advantages in the form of natural 
resources may no longer suffice in the competition for mobile capital; 'created assets' 
are the key (UNCTAD, 1999b). That having been said however, simply positing the 
nation-state in polar contradistinction to the firm falls well short as a means of 
elucidating the ramifications of globalisation. In fact some suggest that in the 
globalisation discourse the state-centred approach is already outmoded (Henderson et 
alt 2001), although a crucial role for the state is still claimed by others (cf. Sassen, 
1996; Weiss, 1998). But whichever angle is adopted, both would agree that a factor of 
mounting significance as globalisation progresses is regional multilateralism, which 
emphasises the point that the global economy is still spatially structured (1). 
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Multinational régions, be they treaty-bound units like the E U and N A F T A or the "resuit 
of private économie forces" (Urata, 1994:177), constitute potent testimony to the 
globalisation process, while at the same time accenting the fact that it is also 
geographically structurée. While the larger TNCs are increasingly devising giobally 
integrated networking stratégies (Dicken, 1992; Henderson et al, 2001), régional 
proximity and the extent of régional intégration also appear to be décisive shapers of the 
globalisation process. Wilh respect to trade, it is still intraregional flows that dominate 
(Yeung et al, 2001). Much FD1 is still regionally-oriented ( U N C T A D , 1999b); it would 
appear to be proximity witkin their own région which is often the décisive factor, 
especially for smaller firms (Duchénaut, 1995; Riedel, 1998). Here the région 
constitutes a matrix of locally dense interconnecting aelivities within the globalising 
framework. The implication that follows is that it is a natural seedbed for the ambitious 
smaller firm, like the L M E , to test its internationalising potential. But there again, 
L M E s are, needless to say, not hostage to the région. L M E s themselves présent a 
further dimension of globalisation. Like régions they have efFected connections 
complementing globalisation. But unlike régions their connections are not of necessity 
geographically bounded and compact; they can extend out Worldwide. That is, L M E s 
may integrate themselves into a format with global reach. How they achieve this, given 
their size and scope constraints recounted above, is the key question of this thesis. 
The first step as a means for elucidation is to connect the L M E to the évolution of 
theory encompassing the state, the firm and the multinational région. The review which 
follows is comprehensive but not indiscriminate. It comprises three parts: the first 
covers internationalisation theory (including trade theory), the second globalisation 
theory, and the third the placement of the L M E within the theoretical framework. It 
examines the literatures (mainly from économies, business theory and économie 
geography) that attempt to explain how and why firms have made the transition from 
national to transnational firms. In addition to the summing up in the third part of the 
review, concepts of particular relevance for understanding the L M E and the links 
between internationalisation and globalisation are foregrounded throughout. 
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3.4 Internationalisation Theory 
Internationalisation theory started with trade theory. This latter was preoccupied with 
demonstrating a balancing of attributes and mutual advantages between nations 
achieved through the exchange of goods and services. In time, as firms became more 
prominent and more realism was sought, attention was directed at explaining the 
émergence of the large multinational corporation, while spécifie forms of 
internationalisation were incorporated into theory, including foreign direct investment. 
In this process the nation's rôle and situation were also re-examined, both as the 
reciprocating partner of business on the international scène and as the home and 
nurturing environment of smaller firms with intemationalising potential, thereby 
contributing to the national economy. Imbuing the theoretical discourse is the interplay 
of the forces of supply and de m and as enacted between and among nations and firms. 
3.4.1 Trade Theory, Equilibrium Theory and the State 
Early trade theory concerned transactions between two nations and placed the emphasis 
on the ability of nations to supply. This helps to account for accrediting its pioneer, 
Adam Smith, with formulating the idea of absolute davantage whereby a country 
exports an item if it is the low-cost producer. In fact he was more circumspect, as 
witness: "When the producer of any particular branch of industry exceeds what the 
demand of the country requires, the surplus must be sent abroad, and exchanged for 
something for which there is a demand at home" (Smith, 1993:223; my italics). 
Nevertheless, supply capacity was still at the heart of Ricardo's theory of comparative 
advantage in which market forces allocate a country's resources to industries where it is 
relatively the most productive in forms of the return to labour, meaning that it could still 
import a product for which it is potentially the cheapest producer if it is even more 
productive in other goods. In this theory, trade is based on discrepancies in labour 
productivité between nations resulting from their différent environments (Porter, 
1990:11). Comparative advantage, with its inclination to supply-oriented interprétation, 
thereafter retained its appeal, resurfacing as the Heckscher-Ohlin model. But whereas 
Ricardo saw labour productivity as the crux of differentiation, Heckscher and Ohlin 
argued that countries' abilities differed depending on their particular endowments of 
factors of production, as represented by land, labour, natural resources and capital. As 
ultimateîy expressed in the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (HOT), countries concentrate 
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their exports in production which takes advantage of the factors in which they are well 
endowed. 
Prior to this, however, Menger and the Vienna School had stressed the centrality of 
demand in averring that "human needs are the driving force of the economic 
mechanism" (Schumpeter, 1997:84). In fact, they unduly emphasised the importance of 
demand in response to the undue emphasis on supply of the classical theorists, a conflict 
ultimately resolved by Marshall (1920) with his theory of elasticity of supply and 
demand. This has relevance to this thesis because one of the cardinal points of 
discussion is the reason for the selection of overseas locations by L M E s . The contention 
is that the L M E , when making such a decision, confronts a continuum of 
production/market priorities equating to the supply and demand sides respectively like 
any other firm, but is more acutely aware of the need to accurately balance the options 
both due to size and scope constraints and its high degree of specialisation. If cost is of 
the essence, for example, production (supply) orientation takes precedence; if quick 
client access is called for, market (demand) orientation prevails. Further elaboration of 
this argument is to follow. 
On a more prosaic level however, HOT's 'intuitive appeal' (Winters, 1991:79) 
notwithstanding, comparative advantage theories are unrealistic for many industries 
because they ignore economies of scale while assuming universally identical 
technologies, undifferentiated products, and fixed pools of national factors (Hibbert, 
1997; Porter, 1998:12), precisely the reverse or mirror-image of the L M E as described 
above. Furthermore, even with the refinements emanating from the Ohlin-Samuelson 
research program, the end result was still "a highly simplified, aggregate G E [general 
equilibrium] theory that promised more than it was capable of delivering" (Blaug, 
1992:188). As a consequence, the 1960s and thereafter saw attempts to introduce more 
realism to the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) doctrine (Samuelson, 1948), taking 
into consideration location-specific endowments (especially natural resources) and 
differences in quality of inputs (especially labour), while allowing for possible 
discrepancies in the production function of companies and imperfect markets (Dunning, 
1988). There was also a need to explain international production as a major form of 
non-trade involvement. In noting that the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson-Stolper model 
only allows for trade, for instance, Hirsch (1976) produced an international trade and 
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investment theory of the firm that incorporated firm-specific assets and other intangible 
proprietary assets. Internationalisation theory thus embraced the firm and FDI, seeking 
to explain why firms invest abroad, rather than simply exporting a 'surplus1. Explaining 
overseas investment/production (intrafirm) rather than trade (interfirm) became the 
focus. These refinements brought the debate closer to an accommodation of the L M E . 
Location-specific endowments and the quality of inputs in the form of technical training 
facilities and acquired skills, for instance, can both be associated with the particular 
environment under which L M E s have developed, while firm-specific assets are the very 
essence of the L M E ' s raison d'être. However, the initial concentration in the 
internationalisation theoretical discourse on intrafirm activity spelled a preoccupation 
with large, multidimensional corporations rather than the L M E . 
3.4.2 Internationalisation Theory and the Firm 
This was because of the apparent predominence of 'multi-activity hierarchies' 
(Dunning, 1995:465; my italics) which owed their origins to the exploitation of 
technological, organisational and financial advances, commencing from the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century, in a fashion purportedly more effective than would be 
possible for firms acting at arm's length. According to Dunning (1995), the role of 
hierarchies relative to markets as an organisational modality intensified throughout the 
twentieth century. This has been due to amplifying market imperfections emanating 
from increasingly specialised and complex economic activity, together with 
technological progress and political interventions. This eventually provoked a shift in 
theoretical preoccupation away from the emphasis on perfect competition and arm's-
length transactions (trade) to the intricacies and consequences of market failure as 
causes of internationalisation. The concept of hierarchical capitalism as it has evolved 
assumes that a firm's prosperity depends on how efficiently management internally 
organizes its resources and capabilities and that companies react to structural market 
failure by absorbing the perceived inconsistencies rather than working with the market 
to find solutions. 
With respect to internationalisation, the theoretical debate centred on explaining the 
growth of the multinational enterprise. Multinational indicates by definition that the 
firm in question has sent out capital in the form of money or in kind to finance or equip 
a project in another country. In other words, internationalisation theory saw its 
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beginnings at the downstream end of the internationalising process: foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Related here are evolutionary theories where the evaluation of FDI 
location hinges on the nature or stage of maturity of the product to be manufactured. 
Vernon's (1966) product life cycle theory, to take the most oft cited, envisaged 
production first being shifted abroad with the build-up of market potential while also 
attempting to forestall the impact of competition accompanying the diffusion of 
information. Subsequently, overseas production at the later stage of the product cycle is 
also assumed to be located where production factors are cheaper, and so it is a quest for 
cost minimisation when products have become mature and consumers more price 
sensitive. Hence, information - or knowledge - and cost became cardinal themes, and 
these were the essential ingredients of internalization theory and transaction cost 
analysis. 
The precursor of internalisation theory per se was Hymer (1976) who saw FDI as a 
result of an imperfect market environment where it was possible for firms to acquire 
certain net advantages over, or to eliminate, rivals with the intention of monopolising 
the market (Kim and Lyn, 1989). Recognising that local companies do not have the 
disadvantage of operating in a foreign culture at a distance from their home 
environment, there must be powerful reasons for embarking on FDI. The key factor 
here is that the foreign investor possess a distinctive, firm-specific advantage embodied 
in its intangible assets which is not transferable but which it can exploit in imperfect 
market conditions (Caves, 1971; Goodnow and Hanz, 1972; Hymer, 1976). Hence, 
although stemming from classic trade theory, the rationale provided here for FDI 
represents a departure from the model of perfect competition and inevitably provoked 
further exploration of distortions imposed by market structure, disequilibrium and 
failure as well as government intervention (Calvet, 1981). Epitomising the character of 
such imperfections are the oligopolist industries possessed of formidable barriers to 
entry which curb spasmodic competitive incursion (Knickerbocker, 1974; Krugman, 
1979; Lancaster, 1980). 
Reflecting this approach, M N E theory as developed by Buckley and Casson (1976) 
focuses on management's attempt to control the imperfect market for knowledge 
(McManus, 1972). Modern business encompasses much more than products and 
services; it also entails activities like research and development which are related 
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through flows of intermediate products. The trouble is that imperfections mean that the 
markets for thèse intermediate products are difficuit to control, leading to the désire to 
internalise them rather than sell or share them. Hence they are exploited overseas by 
subsidiaries and not, for example, licensed subcontractors or agents (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976:31). Such internalisation can extend across national boundaries, hence the 
M N E (TNC). This approach regards the fïrm as an internalised composite of resources 
which can be parceled out to product groups or between national markets (Buckley, 
1990). It expands at the expense of arm's length relations, maximising profits through 
the exercise of efficient intra-firm trade and the élimination of what may be regarded as 
excessive transaction costs incurred from middlemen, exchange-rate risk, infringement 
of intellectual property rights and bargaining costs (Buckley and Casson, 1976). 
Gaining control over knowledge, Buckley and Casson (1976) theorised, was with the 
ultimate goal of minimising costs, a conclusion they reached through the application of 
transaction cost analysis. This focuses on the économie efficiency of mechanisms which 
have developed to coordinate and control transactions, where a transaction has been 
defined as the transference of a product or service across a "technologically separable 
interface" (Williamson, 1985:1). The costs incurred are contingent on three types of 
factors: the extent investments are made in order to conduct the transactions (asset 
specificity), the volume of transactions (transaction frequency), and the Iimited mental 
capabilïties of the décision makers (uncertainty), this latter being analogous to 
incomplète knowledge. Internalisation of transaction costs can be seen as an act of 
incrémental intégration, aimed at stabilisation of input and output conditions and 
logically culminating in the consolidation of authority by a single party, and this 
progression signifies a growing degree of control by that party (Williamson, 1979). 
Presented in this light, hierarchy and broad-based internalisation and control are 
essentially the practices of extensive corporations or conglomérâtes. In other words 
such theorising concerns 'large firm' internationalisation. The L M E as described eartier 
in this chapter does not fit this pattern. Being highly specialised while aware of its 
bounded scope it has shied away from creating complex, all-embracing hiérarchies, 
while, at the same time, its powerful decision-making independence has rendered it 
largely immune from external hierarchical predators. In fact, far from makingthe L M E 
vulnérable, increasing spécialisation and économie complexity have worked to enhance 
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its distinctiveness, especially in the environment to be elucidated in the following 
chapter. This has had the effect of ensuring that differentiation of core competence takes 
precedence over a preoccupation with plugging the gaps of market failure, while the 
'chamber' keeps things out as much as it keeps things in. Internal is ation, therefore, is 
necessarily highly selective, being intimately enmeshed with the exigencies of the core 
competence. The L M E thus does empathise with the overseas entry mode literature 
which focuses its attention on control "because it is the single most important 
determinant of both risk and return" (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986:3), but within the 
narrow confines of its core competence. In that it is the very life-blood of the L M E , it is 
essential that the core competence be firmly under its control through internalisation 
wherever it is taken. Conversely, transaction costs and the desirability of internalising 
them vary with the circumstances. The L M E is discriminating and nonconformist in its 
identification of onerous costs. Williamson's 'technologically separable interface' can 
be contrasted here to the high wall of the 'chamber', inside which is a lean, i f not 
sparse, management team. Arguably, augmenting the staff in order to eliminate 
transactions and uncertainty could increase costs rather than reduce them, particularly 
when there is a relatively high level of trust which can be at least partially attributed to 
the L M E ' s own quality and competence. The position taken here, therefore, is that, 
given its intensely concentrated disposition, the L M E is much more inclined to direct its 
time, money and energies to value creation centred on its core competence rather than 
to the internalisation of market failure. 
3.4.3 The Smaller Firm 
The capacity for internalisation can also be a matter of firm size, as became apparent 
when nation-states started to embrace SMEs because of their perceived exporting 
potential to the benefit of national economies in the 1960s and 1970s. The state found a 
new role for itself as it devised measures to compensate for supposed SME 
disadvantages. 
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(a) SME Deficiencies 
This nurturing approach has been justified to an extent by the fact that SMEs have often 
been presented as deficient by comparison with their larger counterparts. Typical of the 
handicaps they are purported to face are limited sources of financing, the lack of 
managerial time, and rudimentary marketing skills, together with poor language 
capabilities and insuffictent information gathering (Dichtl, Koeglmayer and Mueller, 
1989; Duchénaut, 1995). Added to which, they may compare unfavorably with larger 
firms in terms of plant and equipment, design and productivity (Yong and Keng, 1990), 
and their perceived instability plus vulnerabifity to competition may instil 
misapprehensión in the minds of potential overseas distributors (Jones, Wheeler and 
Young, 1992). Indeed, with respect to the SME attitude towards internationalisation 
through exporting, in this negative vein management is deemed to be indifferent, 
unadventurous and low in aspirations for the company, which in turn lacks 
technological prowess, unique products and an organisational structure geared to 
exporting (Cavusgil, Bilkey and Tesar, 1979). Small firms are often in highly 
fragmented industries with many competitors and so prone to price-cutting, while there 
are limited personnel with the time and aptitude for delving into the intricacies of 
exporting or for familiarising themselves with foreign cultures and practices (Welsh and 
White, 1981). 
Extending this Une of argument to FD1, given the claimed limitations tempering the 
SME's scope of manoeuvre, the motivation to invest abroad is depicted as exogenous in 
origin or irrational. With respect to the former, the firrn may be 'pulled' overseas by 
larger client companies or host government regulation such as the imposition of tariffs, 
or it may be 'pushed' there as a a result of a declining home market or other 
unfavourable domestic circumstances (Buckley, 1993). As for the latter, the venture 
may be stimulated by uninformed, personal hunch or instantaneous persuasión by 
acquaintances on the spot (Buckley, 1993; Chen, 1998), subject to no feasibility study, 
and implemented with no premeditated plan (Ferdows, 1980). More explicitly, the 
initiation of FDI may entail searching for potential locations, conducting feasibility 
studies, getting government approvals, building plants, installing machinery and 
equipment, hiring workers, and so on (Chen and Liu, 1998), much of which can be 
compromised because of lack of capital, managerial resources and risk-absorbing 
capacity (Buckley, 1979; van Hoorn, 1979). These deficiences may lead to 
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underinvestment or an ill-advised partnership; they limit the scope of FDI and force 
precarious decisions based on insufficient knowledge and administrative techniques. In 
addition, management is not geared to reacting quickly and adequately to change and 
effective economies of scale are not attained to minimise transaction costs (Buckley, 
1993). 
(b) Firm Size 
Firm size and its implications for internationalisation have hence been one of the major 
research preoccupations (e.g., Cavusgil, 1976; O'Rourke, 1985; A l i and Swiercz, 1991). 
The issue is raised that "size related characteristics may constrain a firm's ability to 
scan and analyse its environment and/or its ability to produce an effective strategic 
response" (Wyer and Smallbone, 1999:13), shortcomings which would impinge upon 
internationalisation endeavours as with everything else. By contrast, according to some 
advocates of largeness, the large corporation has been thought to have an elaborate 
formal structure where management acts within supposedly rational, justifiable 
parameters presaged on administrative prerequisites (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). It is 
highly disciplined and functions through the sophisticated control and mobilisation of 
specialists (Carson, 1985), so that in its activities abroad it can refer to accumulated data 
on economic conditions, apply econometric models to predict trends, and consort with 
influential political and business contacts (Douglas, Craig and Keegan, 1982). Hence, 
the tendency has been towards the conclusion that the larger the size, usually measured 
by number of employees, capitalisation and sales volume, the easier it becomes to 
conduct business on an international scale (Miesenböck, 1988; Aaby and Slater, 1989). 
Given the right stimuli, it was hypothesized that the response would be greater if the 
firm were large. This line of thinking paralleled the view of the small firm, at the other 
end of the size spectrum, as at a transitional stage in the life cycle of an organisation 
while in its current state suffering from size disadvantage (Becker and Porter, 1983). 
This being so, scholars studying the small firm environment have often contrasted its 
structure and behavioural patterns with its larger counterpart the better to define the 
small firm's predicament and distinctiveness. 
One such distinctive aspect suggested here is the particular relevance of proximity, or 
conversely, psychological or cultural distance (Hofstede, 1984), to the 
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internationalisation process of the smaller firm, in that familiarity implies that acquiring 
the knowledge for achieving outcomes would be less costly and less time-consuming. 
Psychological distance has been defined as "the factors preventing or disturbîng the 
flows of information between the firm and market" (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 
1975:308). while cultural distance is described as "the sum of factors creating, on the 
one hand, a need for knowledge, and on the other hand, barriers to knowledge flow and 
hence also for other flows between the home and target countries" (Luostarinen. 
1980:131-32). Examples of obstacles encountered include the language barrier, culture, 
political Systems, the level of éducation, and the stage of industrial development. There 
have been plenty of studies indicating the préférence for cultural proximity by overseas 
investors, notably among the Anglo-Saxon countries (cf, Wiedersheim-Paul, Oison and 
Welch, 1978; Cavusgil and Nevin, 1981; Davidson, 1983; Buckley, Newbould and 
Thurwell, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989). The debate has even embraced large TNCs 
(Vernon, 1979; Buckley and Mathew, 1980), but the immédiate geographical région 
beyond national borders has more often been seen as the natural business extension for 
the smaller firm (cf, Ibuki, 1994; Anderson, 1995; Duchénaut, 1995; Gomes-Casseres, 
1997; Hsing, 1998), helping to breath life into the contention that régional intégration is 
a parallel and contributing force in the process of globalisation (Robson, 1987; 
Jovanovic, 1998). 
(c) SME as Différent 
This observation also draws attention to the fact that a countervailing strand of S M E 
internationalisation literature sees the process as undertaken by SMEs as différent. The 
large company orientation is criticised by Dandridge (1979) because it fa ils to deal with 
the small firm on its own terms (Welsh and White, 1981). Closer scrutiny of the 
internationalisation process, moreover, began to unravel the notion of given size as the 
essential prerequisite. Czinkota and Johnston (1983), for example, opined that size was 
not relevant as a segmentation criterion among firms with respect to exporting and other 
studies have insisted that size as such is not a déterrent (Piore and Sabel, 1984; 
Edmunds and IChoury, 1986; A l i and Swiercz, 1991; Gemunden, 1991). Butoverall the 
patterns of SME internationalisation behaviour are still seen as distinct. In contrast to 
the internalising hierarchically organised, resource rich large corporation, this S M E 
literature postulâtes that the small firm is much more dépendent on external conditions 
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(Miesenböck, 1988), where it relies on exogenous networks and resource bases 
(Johnson and Mattson, 1989) and participâtes in a division of labour which is 
multidirectional rather than linear (Anderson, 1995). 
(d) The Evolving SME 
That having been said, there is another area of the literature, which essentially paints a 
positive, progressive picture of firms which are assumed to be SMEs. In fact, most 
firms involved in FDI currently are small and medium-sized (UNCTAD, 1997b:xv). 
The development of this body of theorising has itself been progressive. In the late 
1960s, Simmonds and Smith (1968) suggested that the Stimulus to start exporting 
originated outside the firm and resulted from the efforts of exchange agents. By the 
middle of the 1970s, Simpson and Kujawa (1974) had added internal Stimuli, such as 
excess capacity, the entry of competitors into the export market, and the profit 
motivation, to a list of external Stimuli which included trade fairs, sales agents' 
activities, and unsolicited Orders. In addition, they averred that Stimuli alone were not 
sufficient; the décision to export had to be proactive in combining such Stimuli with a 
proper perception of the factors involved in the export process itself. Johanson and 
Wiedersheäm-Paul (1975) described a trajectory, in which exporting constiluted the first 
stage of internationalisation culminating in overseas production, which was based on 
the graduai acquisition of knowledge and expérience. Into this phased progression, 
Bilkey and Tesar (1977) injected the flowering of management awareness and 
incorporated Johanson and Vahlne's (1977) concept of psychological distance in 
hypothesising a centrirugal thrust of escalating commitment. Subsequently, Cavusgil, 
Bilkey and Tesar (1979) fleshed out the psychological implications with their model of 
Stimuli => organism => response, postulating that given the right Stimuli the export 
response would be greater i f the Company had over one hundred employées and 
management was constructive in allocating resources for export development. 
Investigations regarding subjective motivation typically revealed that small firms saw 
the advantages of exporting being increased sales, market diversification and hedging 
against a domestic downturn (Rabino, 1980). Objective analyses could, for instance, 
uphold that SMEs had more chance of export success if their managers had overseas 
expérience and were collège educated and that the responsible personnel tended to be 
younger in modem than in traditional industries. In this way, theory began to probe the 
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proactive éléments where the firm was perceived as an agent of positive, self-interested 
behaviour to realise internationalising goals in its own right (Lee and Brusch, 1978; 
Harvey, 1979; Reid, 1981) by consciously assessing and engaging external déterminants 
including the state of the industry in question and the foreign market potential and 
accessibility (Denis, 1990). 
In the theoretical debate about the internationalisation of the smaller firm, then, 
interprétations have ranged from the haphazard to the predetermined. In the ongoing 
research, assumptions which could perhaps be too easily made have been questioned 
and there has been récognition that even as the research is being conducted évolution is 
taking place. The main criticisms of the psychological distance concept, for instance, 
have concerned précision and change over time. Puxty (1979), for example, claims that 
it fails to lay out systematically how cultural différences influence entry choice and to 
provide statistica! évidence based on large samples. In discussing how cultural distance 
affects mode of entry, Kogut and Singh (1988) surmise that "the results may only have 
validity within a particular historical time" (Kogut and Singh, 1988:429). "Récent 
changes in communications, and the general tendency towards global markets," concur 
Benito and Gripsrud (1991:475), "indicate that the impact of cultural and psychological 
distance is likely to decrease over time," while Sharma and Johanson (1987) voice 
doubts about the implied incrementalism. Proximity and its evolving relevance is a 
central issue for this thesis and will be taken up in later chapters. 
(e) The Medium-sized Firm and the LME 
Another central issue, as we have seen, is size, and so far a distinction has been made 
between literature which essentially concerns itself with the behaviour of large firms 
and that which concentrâtes its attention on smaller firms. However, the 
internationalisation of medium-sized enterprises as such has rarely been addressed, 
although there has been some work illustrating successful SMEs that have achieved 
medium size partially on the basis of aggressive exporting (cf. Smallbone et al, 1992). 
More to the point, a significant portion of work ostensibly devoted to demonstrating the 
peculiar attributes of the smaller firm have arrived at the explicit or implicit conclusion 
that it is the medium-sized enterprises within the S M E classification which are more 
prone to internationalising and are therefore, as it were, shouldering the weight of the 
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argument (e.g., Cavisgil, Bilkey and Tesar, 1979; Bonaccorsi, 1992; Duchénaut, 1995). 
Moreover, not a few could be classified as LMEs , that is to say, specialised medium-
sized firms with established, recognised markets of substance. 
Here, scale of opérations of a certain magnitude have been positively correlated with the 
potential (Kaynak and Kothari, 1984), intensity (Bilkey, 1978) and geographical scope 
(Calof, 1993), for example, ail hallmarks alluded to above concerning the L M E . As for 
FDI, research generally concludes that size per se is not décisive (Caves, 1974), 
although technology couid be, and within the small and médium category firms with 
technological advantages tend to be larger (Wolf, 1977). Thus are the two defining 
éléments of the L M E aligned: size and outstanding attributes. That is, the distinction 
being made here dépends not only on size of firm but also type offirm. Or, to put it in 
dynamic terms, the L M E has accomplished a certain stage which can be sharply 
defined. This relative consistency and unity in character and behaviour allows for the 
L M E to be isolated and pursued analytically, as if the rôle of the firm in the évolution 
towards globalisation had been placed under a microscope. This having been said, it 
tnust be bome in mind that the matter under investigation in this thesis is not the L M E ' s 
potential for international undertakings as such but how, by dint of its size plus its 
character as manifested by its attributes, the internationalisation of the L M E differs 
from other types of firm. Just as small firms are claimed to have recourse to networking 
when internationalising, it is argued here, the L M E employs its inculcated capacity for 
articulation when proceeding down this path. 
(f) The Hypothetical Internationalising LME 
Articulation as attributed to LMEs here constitutes the balancing of attributes and 
constraints. Making this assumption, it is possible to draw on the literature to produce a 
hypothetical depiction of L M E internationalisation, which can serve as a référence for 
the subséquent discussion. In initiating the internationalisation process, L M E s have 
been affected by both external and intemal stimuli (Simmonds and Smith, 1968; 
Simpson and Kujawa, 1974), although usually capable of proactively engaging the 
stimuli => organism => response model proposed by Cavusgil, Bilkey and Tesar 
(1979). Because of their superior products and technology, their mood is likely to be 
expansionist rather than reflecting a reaction to declining domestic circumstances, and 
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even when 'pulled' overseas by internationalising clients or host governments (Buckley, 
1993) it is because their expertise is needed. Moreover, while early research (Johanson 
and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Cavusgil, 1980; Thomas and 
Araujo, 1985; Root, 1987) envisagea a 'phased progression' in internationalisation 
culminating in FDI, LMEs need not conform to a strict longitudal/gradualist évolution. 
That is, later studies (Turnbull, 1987; Millington and Bayliss, 1990; Sullivan and 
Bauerschmidt, 1990; Anderson, 1995) have pointed to the relative ease with which 
stages can be leapfrogged and that the propensity and mode of internationalisation can 
vary substantially depending on whether the firm is in traditional manufacturing or 
modem innovation, for example (Boter and Holmquist, 1998). The timing, fashion and 
character of internationalisation, in other words, dépend on what the firm has to offer. 
In this way the L M E evokes the basic assumption of the contingency approach which is 
that "strategy performance relationships can vary across différent environments and 
différent firm sizes" (Siu and Kirby, 1998:53). This in tum reflects the scope and 
manner of the décisions made (Wind, Douglas and Perlmutter, 1973; Zeithami et al, 
1988). 
Like every business endeavour, the L M E ' s internationalising actions are of necessity 
modified by bounded knowledge and a concomitant degree of uncertainty. However, 
given the L M E ' s expertise in its core compétence, which because of the concentrated 
commitment, includes knowledge about rivais and markets beyond its domestic scene, 
in its decision-makïng it is less likely than some (certainly than the S M E stereotype) to 
be compromised by a limited perception of the alternatives and sélective search 
resulting in confined choice (Aharoni, 1966; Robinson, 1978; Luostarinen, 1980; 
Cavusgil and Godiwala, 1982; Johnson and Vahlne, 1990). Rather, it would be expected 
to be nearer to the position propounded by Cyert and March (1963), for example, who 
saw decision-making as a rational process designed to cope with the complexity and 
uncertainty of situations leading to resolutions founded on a satisficing criterion for 
performance (Lee and Brusch, 1978; Newbould et aly 1978; Reid, 1981, 1982; Haahti, 
1998). Decision-making as practised by LMEs also underlines their insistence on 
autonomy and is related, as Johanson and Vahlne (1977) have pointed out, to 
overcoming the obstacles and accruing knowledge which is stored and retrievable and 
vested in the firm as an entity. This contrasts with the type of (smaller) firm which is a 
member of a network of compétences where knowledge exists independently of the 
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individuai actors, while being accessible to them to configure and reconfigure their own 
particular international activities (Anderson, 1995; Coviello and Munro, 1995). As 
opposed to this approach based on flexibility, the L M E , as an entity, has articulated its 
attributes as it internationalises. 
3.4.4 Internationalisation Theory, the Eclectic Paradigm and the L M E 
The L M E can likewise be lodged, with qualification, in Dunning's (1979. 1981) eclectic 
paradigm which is an attempt to synthesise the various strands of internationalisation 
theory, whereby: "The idea of a paradigm is to provide an analytical framework into 
which subsets of spécifie operationally tested théories can be contained" (Dunning, 
1988:10). Here the firm and the nation-state effect a symbiosis of sorts. The theory 
contends that when internationalising, the firm is seekìng to expand. It possesses 
ownership advantages in the form of technology, for example, which allows it to 
expand, and has deemed that there are inlernaiisation advantages in expansion within 
the firm rather than selling the rights to other firms, and that this is best accomplished 
by exploiting locational advantages somewhere overseas rather than at home. The 
paradigm is embedded within the socio-institutional framework of hierarchical 
capitalism, which assumes that the T N C is the possessor of its own "wealth creating and 
efficiency enhancing properties" (Dunning, 1995:466). However, ownership-spécifie 
advantages are not independent of location; choice of production site may well have a 
bearing on cost and the ability to supply markets. The host country is also thereby 
impHcated in the action inasmuch as it must présent location-spécifie advantages for the 
particular FDI project under considération, and it is only when there is a simultaneous 
convergence of ownership, internalisation and location advantages that the 
implementation of EDI as a means of operating overseas will prove viable (Dunning, 
l988;Geringer : 1990). 
In placing the L M E within the eclectic paradigm, the L M E - just as Dandridge (1979) 
stated about the S M E - must be seen on its own terms. It has been described earlier in 
this chapter as an independent, specialised, medium-sized company. In addition, as will 
be rurther elucidated in the following chapter on Japan's expérience, the L M E has been 
nurtured in an environment where spécifie comparative advantages in spécifie industries 
have developed to which over time it carne to contribute. In direct contradiction to 
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classic comparative advantage théories, therefore, the L M E has been an emblem of 
differentiation as a supplier in building and creatîng demand through its high degree of 
spécialisation. 
Furthermore, this intensive concentration on a closely defìned area of activity has 
generated a particular approach to internai i sation which has in turn contributed to the 
formulation of L M E internationalisation strategy. To explícate this, internaiisation is 
best categorised as two distinct types. First, there is supply internaiisation which entails 
absorbing knowledge in the form of specialist staff, competitors, upstream and 
downstream processes, and the like in order to control the chain of supply to the 
maximum possible. Second, there is access internaiisation as manifested by the firm 
selecting to establish its opérations in toto in an overseas location in préférence to 
licensing in order to contro! the market for its producís. Outside the fixed boundaries of 
its designaied expertise the L M E has declíned to exercise the option of supply 
internaiisation and neither has it been subject to it. Dévotion to core compétence and 
insistance on independence aside, reasons for this can be found in an aversion to take-
over and in notions as to where the weak links, translated into costs, are actually 
deemed to lie in différent business cultures. Trust, however derived in a given society, 
favours more arm's length dealings and henee less internaiisation of potentially 
deviating partners, for example. At any event, this particular combination of high-level 
spécialisation and business environment has drawn the cost boundaries within which the 
individual L M E is allowed to exist along contours diverging from those envisaged by 
this interprétation of internaiisation theory (Coase, 1937). Incurring costs in arm's 
length transactions beyond thèse boundaries is apparently regarded as less irksome than 
internalising them for the L M E , which has a conservative attitude to extending its 
boundary of corporate control. The L M E has thus arrogated to itself space to grow as an 
alternative to the hierarchy. 
On the other hand, for the very reason that it has successfully erected high entry barriers 
consonant with its spécialisation, the L M E , when internatio na lis i ng, has usually been a 
keen devotee of access internaiisation. The L M E ' s ability to do this resides to a 
considerable extent in the environment in which it was raised. In terms of Heckscher-
Ohlin endowments, L M E s have benefited especially within their country of origin from 
a highly educated labor force, plus capital, to develop differentiated technologies and 
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superior productivity, many of thera being the direct practitioners of nationally 
promoted compétitive advantages (Porter, 1990). In subséquent venturing abroad, 
therefore, control is encapsulated almost exclusively in the knowledge of technology 
and process, to an extent that réputation and demand often précède the L M E ' s physical 
présence at overseas locations. Restated in the rubric of the eclectic paradigm, the 
L M E ' s ownership advantage lies in a highly differentiated product embodied in a brand 
name and/or patented technology. However, this differentiation makes internaiisation of 
the core compétence essential, rather than a matter of choice because it constitutes the 
very existence of the company. The sélection of location is then dictated by the time and 
space exigencies ofthis already internalised ownership advantage. 
3.5 Globalisation Theory 
3.5.1 Speed, Depth and Strategy 
Internationalisation theory started with the assumption of nations seeking equilibrium 
through trade; hierarchical capitalism induced a realignment of theoretical 
préoccupation to the (large) firm and the environment of market failure in which ît 
fonctions; longitudinalism and other atomistic theorising are focused on the (small) firm 
and how it initiâtes and sustains business abroad, underpinning a spatially textured view 
of globalisation. Although the eclectic paradigm and contingency theory have pointed to 
multilatéralism and circumstantial complexity they are still essentially firm-oriented. 
Globalisation, on the other hand, is multilayered and multidimensional. It is powered by 
a technological and communications révolution which has compounded the composition 
of action and relationship, the essence of which can be discerned by considering the 
changes taking place regarding location and organisation. As internationalisation 
métamorphoses into globalisation the whole matrix of économie behaviour is evolving. 
Trade, personnel and technology increasingly have global reach and interchangeability, 
while the powers of world organs like the IMF and G A T T (now the World Trade 
Organisation) have been augmented and their rôle substantiated. At the same time, 
product life cycles are being accelerated, a process both affecting and being affected by 
more innovation and mounting multinational compétition. Greater speed and depth 
represent the essence of globalisation, intensified strategy the response to it. 
72 
Corporations have a driving role, and their international production networks a 
structuring role. 
(a) Location and Process 
From the economic perspective, the term globalisation is "usually used to describe 
increasing interdependence among national economies through various means -
including international trade, foreign investment, technology transfer and official 
development assistance" (Urata, 1994:177) (2). While initially in the post-war era this 
integrative process was mainly effected through trade, FDI has become more important 
over the past three decades and subsequently the way global production networks are 
organised. What the latter implies is the increasing mobility of firms and industries with 
respect to location. A typical depiction of what globalisation means for the large TNC is 
as follows. Over the last four decades this has inclined many multinationals away from 
the polycentric approach with which they started, whereby operations are organised on 
a country-by-country basis, to one where operations are coordinated across national 
boundaries (Kotabe and Omura, 1989), a tendency which has often led to extension 
within the immediate region (cf. Borrus, 1994). There has been increasing 
experimentation in borderless organisational formats, such as a shift from function- to 
product-oriented structures and the devising of matrixes which incorporate both these 
aspects within extended geographical settings (Rommel et al., 1995; Kneen, 1995). At 
the same time, the "globalisation of industries decouples the firm from the factor 
endowments of a single nation" (Porter, 1990:14), while mass-production, 
microelectronics and information technology have already contributed much to the 
disconnecting of technologies from specific industries. Individual products, on the other 
hand, are becoming globally standardised (Ohmae, 1985), not least because TNCs can 
engage in global sourcing which includes intra-firm trading as a major element (FCotabe 
and Omura, 1989). With growing technological flexibility, it is becoming increasingly 
easier to extend other factors, such as market knowledge, capital, physical artifacts and 
managerial control around the world (Brooks and Guile, 1987; Bryan and Fraser, 1999). 
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(b) Realignment: Strategic Alliances,Clusters and Global Production Networks 
However, a growing segment of the literature indicates that globalisation has not 
necessarily been presaged on the augmented size of the business unit. It is just as likely 
to have stimulated adaptive restructuring and reordering. In such cases, mounting 
competition can have actuated downsizing and concentration on core competencies 
(Dunning and Narula, 1996), plus the resort to mechanisms aimed at simultaneously 
extending the corporation's reach while abating risk, namely subcontracting, joint 
ventures and strategic alliances (Harrigan, 1984; Porter, 1990; Dicken, 1992; Newman, 
1992). With respect to the last of these, Dunning (1988, 1995) sees integrative currents 
at work through strategic, asset-acquiring FDI across national borders and more inter-
firm cooperation in preference to stand-alone internalisation. Dunning (1995) argues 
that, while autonomous firms will continue to be the main unit o f analysis, the 
owners hip-location-internalisation configuration determining cross-border activities is 
being ever more affected by collaborative production and transactional arrangements 
between companies. Strategic alliances are concluded in order to gain access to new and 
complementary technologies, accelerate learning and innovation, and upgrade 
efficiency (Hagedoorn, 1993). As opposed to hierarchical capitalism with its 
predilection for the independent internalising of market failure, this alliance capitalism 
prefers joint internalisation of specified inter-related activities among free-standing, 
autonomous business entities. Hence, control by the individual firm is compromised by 
the need for effective response to rapidly changing circumstances. At the same time, 
however, transnational are also seen to entrench their positions by devising networks 
of commodity chains in a global division of labour for their specific products (Gereffi 
and Korzeniewicz, 1994). 
The acceleration of pace accompanying globalisation is also paradoxically breathing 
new life into geographically localised business clusters. To wit, advanced 
communication and transportation technologies make the clusters more accessible, 
while the clusters themselves become more viable for a wider clientele due to lower 
transaction costs coupled with the concentration of formal and informal information 
networks and specialised institutions (Porter, 1990). Multiple clusters form 'region 
states' (Ohmae, 1995), which in turn constitute the operational nodes within multilateral 
regions. Within the global, regional and local dimensions global production networks 
enlace "the flows of materials, semi-finished products, design, production, financial, 
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and marketing services [which] are organised vertically, horizontally, and diagonally in 
complex and dynamic configurations" (Henderson et al, 2001:17), in a process which 
arguably threatens to compromise the role of the nation-state. Such intensive activity 
within and between interconnecting geographical spaces implies that manoeuvre rather 
than scope and scale comprises the essential lifeblood of globalisation and that 
operating business units capable of decisive manoeuvre within such an environment are 
its essential pioneers. Because of its particular characteristics, the L M E is one of the 
potential candidates for this role, and may be expected to be found playing an 
influential role in the formation, evolution and upgrading of regional spaces within the 
globalising economy. 
3.5.2 The L M E and Globalisation 
Mounting speed and depth have, if anything, been instrumental in promoting the 
internationalisation of the L M E while accommodating its distinctive character. 
Information travelling in real time by definition, can reach small niche demand just as 
fast as huge volume demand; Stihl's chain saws can infiltrate the world just like 
Cargill's brand feeds. And inter-firm as well as intra-firm trade is facilitated; Molex's 
connectors can find their way into IBM's equipment as easily as IBM's proprietory 
semiconductors can. Nevertheless, LMEs differ considerably among themselves 
depending on the character of their business. Illustrating this, the five Japanese case 
studies referred to earlier in this chapter and the five international L M E examples 
described above are presented in sequential order from 'downstream1 to 'upstream' in 
Fig. 3.1 below. As is apparent, they run the gamut of the production process. But in all 
cases they have in common the fact that they have embarked upon a course of 
internationalisation in an increasingly globalising environment, taking them well 
beyond their national confines. In some cases this was first initiated by a venture in the 
multinational region of which their country forms a part. That is, proximity was 
earmarked as a facilitating option in the internationalisation strategy adopted. As for the 
L M E ' s character within the environment of globalisation, the L M E is much more intent 
on keeping the knowledge of its key employees and core technologies internalised and 
concentrated in the home country, imparting a distinctive character to the production 
networks of even highly evolved LMEs. In addition, it is less concerned with product 
75 
cycle and its implications than product evolution based on these core technologies. This 
is true even for end-product makers like L E G O . 
Fig. 3.1 LMEs in Downstream/Upstream Sequence 
Sequence Company Product Description 
(A) Pentel 
L E G O 
Writing materials 
J o y s 











For assembly into 
finished products 
(D) Union Tool 
Fujikin 
PCB drill bits 
Fluid control devices 
For incorporation and 
use by manufacturer 
(E) T K K 
Norske S ko g 
Industrial metals 
Paper 
For incorporation as 
(semi) basic materials 
The L M E , distinguished from the run-of-the-mill medium-sized enterprise by its 
concentrated dedication to its chosen specialisation, is characterised here as being not 
hierarchical, more bounded in scope and reach than the large TNC, self-limited in 
strategy (in that its is driven almost primarily by its ownership-specific advantages), and 
disinclined to network outside strict limits (its 'bounded chamber'). In addition, it has 
been suggested that the geographical region, as an embodiment of proximity theorising, 
can offer the means for compensating for the firm's limitations as it internationalises. 
As such, the region is seen as an aspect of spatial structure within the total global 
setting, and consequently a dynamic factor in the firm's environment influencing its 
choices. The proposition which follows from these observations is that the L M E may be 
making a distinctive contribution to globalisation, and that the multinational region may 
have presented a significant channel for accomplishing this. 
Having established the L M E ' s distinctiveness it can now be justified as an analytical 
tool for theory building, (n the foregoing account of internationatisation theory, it is 
apparent that the 'large' firm is rarely closely defined in terms of size, other than being 
above a given dimension. In fact, as the S M E concept came to be widely accepted the 
large firm was defined, as it were, by default. So if the firm is not an S M E (and 
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assuming that micro-firms are not regarded as a separate cateogory), it is large. This 
lumps together fîrms with very différent capacities and the tendency is for 
internationalisation theory concerning the large firm to concentrate implicitly on the 
very large TNC, while ignoring the smaller end of the category. Likewise, îhe problem 
with S M E theorising - again with size as the basic criterion - is that the subject matter 
can be too amorphous, the observations and conclusions too generalised, while at the 
same time cluttered with diffuse détail. The L M E concept also has size as an essential 
distinguishing élément, although it deliberately straddles the boundaries of large and 
small as commonly set, and type of firm and stage of development are the two other 
indispensible ingrédients. The story starts upon a certain stage in this specialised 
company's development having been attained. The L M E by définition already has a 
successful track record, being a leader in its chosen field of business. It has a strong 
commitment to its core compétence and it acts in a spécifie, deliberative fashion. So a 
définitive platform has been erected part way along the course as a vantage point from 
which to view the subséquent development of the L M E as it internationalises. Or, to 
reverse the perspective, the process of globalisation can be analysed within closely 
delineated parameters. 
3.6 The L M E within the Evolution of Theory 
The following is a summary of this section on trade, internationalisation and 
globalisation theory, which can be read in conjunction with Fig. 3.2. 
Trade Theory: Nation to Nation 
Two nations trade together in a state of equilibrium. As theory progresses they are seen 
to achieve this by means of absolute advantage, comparative advantage through 
productivîty, and then through endowments. The nation is the possessor and shaper of 
attributes, which it imparts to its component institutions, including firms. 
Internationalisation Theory: Firm vs. Firm 
Firms are perceived as growing organisations, which have extended such growth 
through hierarchy building and internalisation to save on transaction costs and boost 
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efficiency by conquering market failure. They have extended this practice beyond their 
national boundaries, as mamfested by FDI. 
Internationalisation Theory: Nation plus Firm 
The nation is once again appreciated as actor. One reason for this is the growing 
awareness that it has within its borders small firms as well as large, and that thèse SMEs 
are potential contributors to the nation's welfare, including through internationalisation. 
This drew theoretical attention to the issue of company size. But even the large firm 
with powerful ownership advantages still had to take account of location advantages 
which could be manipulated by the nation-state. 
Globalisation Theory: Global TNCs + Multinational Régions 
Globalisation has realised new dimensions of intégration and depth; it is multifaceted 
and multilayered. This has led to (a) networking in global space within and among firms 
to meet the challenges presented by the speed of action and the speed of change, (b) the 
émergence of multinational régions as the arenas for économie activity. 
Globalisation: Multidimensionalism 
While globalisation is in one respect by définition of a pièce, the inner workings are 
becoming infmitely more complex and difficult to pursue analytically. 
There is a need for: 
(i) récognition and analysis of multiple actors at various levels and of various 
dimensions; 
(ii) use of clearly defined concepts, shorn of impedimenta, as tools for tracing the paths 
of globalisation activity; 
(iii) analysing globalisation from various starting points and standpoints by employing 
thèse tools. 
The L M E is one such concept because: 
(i) it possesses strong characteristics developed in a given national environment; 
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(ii) it is a highly distinctive type of firm bonded with its clearly delineated core 
competence; 
(iii) it functions adeptly on the multinational regional and global stage. 
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Fig. 3.2 The L M E within the Evolution of Theory 
Theoretical Subject Theoretical Focus Supply/Demand 
Trade 
Nation to Nation 
* Absolute advantage 
* Comparative advantage 




Nation plus Firm 
* Home and host nations create 
locational advantages 
* Small firm internationalisation 




* Global Sourcing 
* Global networks 
+ 
[TNC 
* Strategie alliances 
* Production/commodity chains 
+ 
Multinational Régions 
* Intraregional integration 
* Interregional integration 
* Sélective locational upgrading 
Multidimensionalism 
* Co-evolution/mutual interaction 
of firms and locations 
Need for new analytical concepts 






Globalisation is a process which at the same time entails extension (reach) and 
intensification (depth). As theory it is the culmination of attempts to interpret 
integrative forces, starting with trade between nations, then addressing the rise of 
competing hierarchical firms, and the evolving relationship between the nation and the 
firm. The concept of globalisation itself emerged as a result of rapid progress in 
technology and communications, the advent of the TNC and the acceptance of liberal 
politics; with the development of economically integrating multinational regions, the 
workings of globalisation have become multilayered and multifaceted. This has 
provoked a need to study globalisation from various angles and the LME, because of its 
distinctiveness, character and contribution presents one such opportunity. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
RQ3 
(a) How did the LME come into existence as something distinguishable from the large 
firm on the one hand and the SME on the other? 
(b) To what extent is the LME the product of a specific national environment based on 
a particular historical evolution, giving rise to a particular industrial structure? 
(c) What distinctive role have LMEs come to play within that structure? 
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3.7 Summary 
In this chapter the third concept driving the thesis, globalisation, has been introduced in 
theoretical terms as the culmination of present-day thinking concerning 
internationalisation. The three concepts of L M E , articulation and globalisation drive the 
thesis, while it is recognised that the nation-state and the multinational region have 
important roles to play in the globalisation process, the latter being particularly relevant 
when considering the influence of proximity, which can be instrumental in paving the 
way to internationalisation for the smaller firm like the L M E . As a means for 
interpreting the progression of events, the theory of globalisation is seen as the latest 
stage in an evolution which started with trade theory before moving on to 
internationalisation theory. Globalisation ushers in multidimensionalism, calling for 
new tools of analysis. 
Concept 3: Globalisation is the modern elaboration of internationalisation, 
distinguished from the latter theoretically by its powerful integrative forces, which are 
both exogenous and endogenous to the geographical regions comprising its arenas of 
activity. It has been addressed by way of a review of internationalisation theory, to 
include those aspects with integrative potential, notably proximity. 
The specific characteristics of the L M E can be matched against the theoretical 
background. Being constrained by size and scope of operations and yet a leader in its 
core competence, it is more keenly affected by its production/market (supply and 
demand) orientation options than the large firm, while having more potential than the 
SME of accomplishing an advantageous compromise with global reach. This is to a 
considerable extent based on the location-specific endowments it has initially benefited 
from and the firm-specific assets it has thereby accrued. Not being a hierarchy builder, 
it has instead concentrated on differentiating and developing its core competence, which 
it has then sought to control totally, while not seeking to internalise all transaction costs. 
Having in most cases started as SMEs, LMEs have achieved differentiation in size, type 
and stage through articulating their core competence into leadership in their chosen 
field. This gives them a hypothetical advantage over SMEs as internationalisers, while 
making them compact and manoeuverabie in a world where the larger TNC is 
increasingly obliged to react to accelerating change (initiated by competitors. 
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governments, pressure groups) through divisionai rearrangements, strategie alliances 
and networking. Thus does the L M E stand out as a distinct entity in the globalising 
context, while at the same time demonstrating its theoretical validity. 
Notes 
(1) The word 'région' nere refers to geographically extensive multinational blocs such 
as East Asia as described in Chapter Five. It does not mean the intensive concentrations 
of economie activity either within or spanning national borders as descried by Scott 
(1998) and Ohmae (1995a), for example, although thèse 'region-states', to use Ohmae's 
term, are recognised as highly cogent forces contributing to the shape and character the 
multinational régions assume. 
(2) In the broadest sense, the term globalisation also encompasses transformation in 
culture, politics and international relations as well as economie transformation, but in 
this thesis the focus is on the economie (Held et al, 1999). 
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Chapter Four 
The Japanese Industrial Structure and the LME 
4.1 Introduction 
Japan is often catégorisée! aiong with Germany as a 'late developer', which means 
that its industrialisation process got underway sorne décades after that o f the 
leaders, Britain, the United States and France. It follows that its industrial structure 
had attained distinctive form and substance by the time this account o f its 
subséquent évolution commences after the Second World War. However, for the 
purposes o f this thesis, anything o f significance that happened before can be woven 
into the tapestry o f events as they have infolded over the five and a half décades 
since 1945. During that time, the development o f Japan's industrial framework is 
seen to have comprised two phases, one leading to and encompassing the high-
growth era, and the other confronting internationalisation and the need for structural 
change thereafter. The divide between thèse two phases is a convenient juncture to 
recognise the arrivai and establishment o f the L M E within this framework. 
Consequently, having been onfy partially discernable in the first phase, the L M E 
assumed a définitive rôle in the second. At the same time, from the very start o f this 
latter phase Japan was increasingly engaged with the outside world and its L M E s 
proved themselves particularly adept at participating in this process. 
4.2 Methodology Note 
4.2.1 Ai m s 
The aims o f this chapter are to détermine how the Japanese business/industrial 
structure has contributed to the development o f L M E s and how this bas been 
instrumental in shaping a type o f firm capable o f internationalising in a distinctive 
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way. In this way, the work o f Nakamura (1962, 1990) about L M E s is extended 
beyond Japan to the international scene. 
4.2.2 Äpproach 
The L M E concept has been framed and adopted to view the economic activity o f 
globalisation from a différent perspective than is usually taken, that is, in terms of 
companies somewhere in the middle rather than from the vantage point o f the very 
large or the very small. It is what Mintzberg calls a "creative leap" (1979:584) in the 
quest for new ground in exploratory research. Japan is reckoned to have an 
unusually large number o f such companies which have developed there over time, 
and it is also located in the distinguishable région o f East Asia. The intention is, in 
later chapters, to analyse both deductively and inductively the way these Japanese 
L M E s (chuken kigyo) have internationaüsed and contributed to régionalisation 
within globaüsation. But it is first necessary to ensure that the L M E is viable as a 
concept; it is necessary to show that the L M E has developed and can be said to 
exist. For this it is necessary to review the évolution of the Japanese economic 
structure and to demonstrate how the L M E has corne to be posited within that 
structure, and then how this type o f firm has embarked on internatio nalisation from 
its Japanese roots. This is to be effected in the following by a longitudinal literary 
review of Japan's industriai history since the end o f the Second World War. 
Although Nakamura (1990) is virtually the only economist to examine the L M E per 
.ve, much can be deduced from writers discussing the economy in general and those 
who spécialise in the study o f SMEs . Thus, a range o f literatures is drawn on, mainly 
in Japanese and English, but also including works in Chinese and French. There is a 
large body of literature in English, chiefly by Americans and Japanese being 
published in English, concerning the large-firm environment in Japan and various 
aspects o f industriai policy. However, apart from Whittaker (1997) and a few others 
partially, smaller Japanese companies have not been addressed by writers in English. 
Therefore, most o f the literature concerning S M E s referred to in the following is 
Japanese. Also used have been organisations providing basic research information 
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and company websites. The explanation o f the methodology for operationally 
determining the individuai Japanese L M E is reserved for Chapter Six. 
4.3 Overview 
Prior to the Second World War, Japan's industriai structure had developed to the 
point where it was dominated by a few huge conglomérâtes, known as zaibatsu, 
complemented by a myriad o f smaller concerns. This constellation gave the 
impression o f being an early version o f a dual economy, although with a distinctly 
more Anglo-Saxon flavour than the post-war period we are about to describe, as 
symbolised by a flourishing stock market. Things began to change with the start o f 
the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 which subsequently merged in with the Second 
World War, as the government sought increasingly to control the economy. The 
stock market was shut down, the Materials Mobilisation Plan dictated goods 
allocation, the Munitions Ministry officiated over corporate board appointments, 
industry control associations oversaw production, and specific banks were 
designated to specific companies. These institutions remained to a greater or lesser 
extent after the war came to an end, as were certain practices like life-time 
employment, which had only really taken off due to the growing shortage o f skilled 
workers as the war took hold (Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1999; Dore, 2000). At 
any event, as wil l be seen, attempts to realise outcomes on a planned basis surfaced 
as industriai policy and attempts to control production gave rise to cartels. In the 
sanie vein, banks largely eclipsed stock markets as sources o f financing while 
afTording the backbone o f patient capital. These, in positive and negative ways, 
constituted part o f the environment in which L M E s were generated. 
The post-war era can be conveniently divided into two phases, each comprised o f 
three periods, as shown in Table 4.1. The first two and a half décades after the war, 
constituting the first phase (1945-1970), were devoted to rehabilitation, 
reconstruction, and catching up. The three décades thereafter (1970-2000) were 
marked by pressures for change as illustrated by (i) the need for greater efficiency 
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and productivity impelled by the floating exchange rate System and the oïl shocks, 
(H) the need to internationalise and globalise in order to grow and survive in a world 
of increasing mobility and compétition, and (iii) the need to recognise that the model 
that had worked in earlier times no longer met the exigences o f a later era. 
Throughout, forces functioned to shape outcomes. One of the most important, in the 
first phase, was that policies which aggressively called for and assisted rapid 
industrial development were sélective, both with respect to industries and individual 
firms. This was the seedbed for the évolution of L M E s . One conséquence o f this 
was that, in the second phase, many of thèse L M E s , by dint o f accumulating 
expertise in industries earmarked for their potential - although there were others, 
too, cushioned by no such prognostication - were eventually to transcend their 
national borders en route to embracing internationalisation. This expansive trend 
was contingent upon Japan's extraordinary économie growth as represented in Table 
4.1 by the advance in G D P per capita over the entire period. The periodisation 
presented in this table is also useful for documenting the progression o f events. 
Moreover, the first phase corresponds to the early évolution o f L M E s while the 
second accords with their passage through internationalisation in the direction o f 
globalisation. 
Table 4.1 Periodisation for Postwar Japan and Growth Rates of Japanese 
Economy 
Sub-periods of postwar years 




of real G D P 
1. 1945-1952 The Occupation Period 380 5.0 
2. 1952-1960 The Reconstruction Period 760 9.2 
3. 1960-1970 The Rapid Growth Period 966 10.4 
4. 1970-1980 The Shocks Period 4,789 5.2 
5. 1980-1990 The Internationalisation Period 14,387 3.8 
6. 1990-2000 The Economie Reform Period 32,496 2.2 
Source: Economie Planning Agency, Ajia Keizai (The Asian Economy), 1997. 
N B . $380 is for 1948 and $760 is for 1956. The figures thereafter are calculated by 
deflating the nominal G D P by the average annual exchange rate in the I M F ' s 
International Financial Statistics. Growth rates are those for the real G D P in yen. 
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4.4 First Phase - 1945-1970 
4.4.1 The Occupation Period (1945-1952) 
B y 1945 Japan had lost about one quarter o f its national wealth, meaning that the 
amount o f war damage was approximately equal to the net addition to national 
wealth between 1935 and 1945 (Tsuru, 1993:8). Although this represents 
considérable loss over a short period, it is nevertheless worth pointing out that as far 
as steel, machine tools and other machinery made from steel are concerned, for 
example, Japan still had in workable condition more than twice the facilities it had in 
1931 (Pauley, 1986). Be that as it may, the order of the day was recovery as 
symbolised by the establishment in mid-1946 o f the Economie Stabilisation Board 
(Keizai Antei Honbu; E S B ) , the herald o f industrial policy and precursor o f the 
Economie Planning Agency (EPA) . At the start o f the following year E S B 
inaugurated Japan's first modem industrial policy, initially prioritising coal and steel 
and subsequently electric power, shipbuilding and fertilizers (Calder, 1988; Johnson, 
1982). This was accompanied by a reversai o f sentiment in the American business 
world, which began to see that a restored Japanese capitalism would be a profitable 
customer (Tsuru, 1993). Thus was international rehabilitation already in the wings. 
At the outset, Occupation attitudes had been relentlessly trained at the 
dismantlement o f the zaibatsu and the décentralisation o f the economy as a whole. 
This intention found concrète form in the enactment o f two bills, the Anti-Monopoly 
Law in 1947 and the S M E Agency Establishment Law in 1948, which 
complemented each other in their stipulated aims. The former was enacted to 
regulate excessive concentration o f économie power and eliminate unfair trade 
practices. The latter, in addition to opposing such concentration, also embodied the 
planned policy objective o f creating a proactive environment for smaller firms which 
could act as an effective barrier to monopohstic tendencies and, in so doing, disperse 
économie power (Watanabe, 1992). However, this 'démocratisation' drive was 
short-lived. Already, by the middle o f 1948, the Occupation's Holding Company 
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Liquidation Commission charged with the task o f dismembering culpable 
conglomérâtes had reduced its hst from 325 to 100, with no banks any longer 
included (Tsuru, 1993:41). Even more revealing was the fact that o f the fonds 
disbursed as o f the end o f January 1950 by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC) , which had been set up in 1947 for supplying long-term loans to pivotai 
industries, almost 50% went to a mere 29 companies, heavily concentrated on coal 
mining interests and other industries dominated by very large flrms (Kurose, 
1997:3). Another crucial detennining factor is what became known as the Dodge 
Line, an anti-inflation package implemented by Joseph Dodge at the behest o f the 
U S Chiefs o f StafÇ which had, among other things, recommended limitations on 
credit and improved rationing and allocation o f raw materials and manufactured 
goods. This had the effect o f decimating expenditure plans, in turn inducing serious 
déflation which the Bank of Japan (BOJ) attempted to alleviate through its Tight 
Money Neutralising Measures (Karte Zumari Kanwa Hosaku) for channeling funds 
to distressed companies. There were two conséquences o f this thrust and 
counterthrust. First, BOJ's émergence as indispensable central lender was to give the 
government leverage in the implementation o f industriai policy, while in addition 
elevating the status o f banks as suppliers o f capital. Second, Dodge's poücies started 
a process o f rationalising Japanese industry in that the cuts in subsidies forced 
companies to invest and Upgrade. In practice, investments became concentrated in 
large corporations because they constituted the best credit risk for the banks 
(Vestal, 1993). Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, the millions o f persons 
who had been demobbed, repatriated and released from armament-related industries 
provided a pool o f cheap labour destined to be a significant contributing factor in 
the continuing subjugation o f the small firm. 
Nevertheless, Japan was still one o f the world's more industrialised countries by the 
standards o f the time. Apart from the large body of disguised unemployment in the 
rural districts, the problem Japan faced was not so much wartime destruction o f 
hardware and people, but rather a paucity in knowledge and skills with regard to the 
new American-led scientific industriai revolution which had taken effect while Japan 
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remained isolated during the war years. In fact, for the very reason that it still 
possessed a deep réservoir of hardware and skills, Japan was able to catch up very 
quickly with other advanced countries by importing the innovations and know-how 
already developed. "By the end o f the 1940s Japan was sufficiently advanced in the 
general skill o f her labour force as well as in entrepreneurial capabilities so that she 
could absorb the fruit o f technological progress without much difficulty and even 
improve upon them as in the case o f electronics and caméras" (Tsuru, 1993:69). 
This is one good reason why it was able to take full advantage o f the first o f the 
booms which were to mark the subséquent Reconstruction Period catalysed by the 
Korean war; American special procurements for prosecuting the Korean War were 
roughly équivalent to 25% of Japan's exports in 1951 (Vestal, 1993:26). 
4.4.2 The Reconstruction Period (1952-1960) 
But booms were followed by slumps, and it was this volatility which impacted on 
industry's structural choices. A t the same time, the Overriding goal affbrding added 
relief to the embryonic dénouement was economic autonomy as the natural sequel o f 
the Peace Treaty effective as o f Apr i l 1952. This meant the primacy o f an industry 
promotion strategy (sangyo ikusei seisakü) over the niceties o f domestic economic 
'démocratisation' . Initially the administration viewed reconstruction as essentiaify a 
job for the large and elite corporations and banks, while the world o f small 
enterprise was regarded more as an intrusive social issue. However, the speed at 
which recovery took place was to oblige large-scale assemblers to resumé their pre-
war practice of subcontracting out to smaller specialists, while the boom-and-slump 
instability disinclined them from assuming the extra employment bürden inhérent in 
internalisation. 
More specifically, following fast on the signing o f the Peace Treaty came the 
removal or modération of restrictions on the former zaibatsu. As well as reflecting 
the lack of public antagonism towards such business groupings, this was also 
consonant with a préoccupation with size as a panacea for growth: large producers 
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were to be financed by large banks and have their goods shipped by large trading 
companies. In line with this, the Anti-Monopoly Law was amended in 1952 to allow 
for cross-shareholdings and to raise the permissible maximum shareholding by 
financial institutions from five to ten percent. This reordering o f priorities was 
accompanied by the refinement o f policy aimed at rationalisation, plus the 
modernisation o f selectcd industries as the means to consolidate économie 
autonomy. Given added poignancy during the slumps following the booms, 
rationalisation sought to eliminate inefficiency and obsolescence and to upgrade 
productivity through the introduction o f modem equipment and new technologies 
complemented by enhanced management skills and standardisation. It became the 
rationale permeating the three-tier approach comprising (i) the sélection o f 
industries deemed essential, (ii) the désignation o f fîrms thought to possess the right 
scale o f opérations, and (iii) the firm in-house targeting o f cost réductions and 
product improvement. Already, in 1951, the Foreign Capital L a w had given M I T I 
(1) control over technology imports, while the Japan Development Bank (JDB) was 
established to channel funds to designated industries. Raising the technological level 
o f thèse industries was the subject matter o f the L a w to Promote the Rationalisation 
o f Firms passed in the following year. But here again, rationalisation was associated 
with size: the larger the company, the more efficient it was expected to be (Vestal, 
1993). 
The subséquent stage of this process in the second half o f the 1950s saw attention 
oriented towards synthetic textiles, plastics, petrochemicals, electronics, machinery 
and machine tools. New industry development was now at the core o f the 
endeavour, while industry rationalisation was tecoming more spécifie as illustrated 
by the laws enacted to promote the machinery and electronics industries (Vestal, 
1993; Yamamura, 1997). The outeome was that by the close o f the 1950s a whole 
panoply of nurturing devices was at the disposai o f MITI and other concerned 
government ministries and agencies, including the vetting o f potential récipients o f 
subsidies, authorising o f foreign currency, licensing for the import o f foreign 
technology, granting o f tax breaks and so on (Johnson, 1982). Direct government 
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loans to the rnachinery and electronics industries - initialfy amounting to up to one 
third o f the Investments and even at the end o f the decade still around 10% -
performed the added function of stimulating private investment because o f the 
implied guarantee o f support. Moreover, firms in favoured industries responded 
positively by earmarking a substantial percentage o f their capital expenditure for 
technology imports (Vestal, 1993). It was the turn o f the screw which ensured that 
by the middle o f the 1950s the cotton textile manufacturers, Kanebo and Toyobo, 
were already destined to cede their primacy to the manufacturers o f steel, 
automobiles and electronics. 
Throughout this process with MITI at the heim, the emphasis was on the promotion 
of industries, but with compétition maintained within thèse industries so that no 
national champions predominated. This was contrived by allocating foreign 
technologies to a selected few - but nevertheless a plural number o f firms - to 
ensure that no single company gained undue advantage (Yoshihara, 1994). 
Moreover, compétition was also sélective. For one, foreign direct investment was 
restricted to insulate Japanese firms from outside threat. Added to which, the 
reconstitution o f former zaïbatsu alignments meant that they could compete among 
themselves while excluding others from this competitive arena, and at the same time 
act effectively as a group, exercising oligopolistic power over smaller suppliers to 
force down priées. Such machinations were greatly aided by the fact that on the 
reverse side o f the coin the huge number o f unemployed provided the cheap labour 
reserve to enable innumerable startups based on trifling capital outlays which then 
indulged in excessive compétition, inevitably much to their own détriment. The 
rehabilitation o f large firms, in other words, exacerbated the predicament o f small 
firms (Kurose, 1997). This in turn, although also incidental upon the slump after the 
Korean War boom, Ied to législation such as the Emergency Measures Law for the 
Stabilisation o f Specified S M E s allowing for the formation o f cartels exempted from 
the Anti-Monopoly Law. This again was with the appropriate sìze in mind, the 
better to compete with larger firms, although with the main social objective o f 
shoring up employment (Vestal, 1993; Tilton, 1996). A s such, smaller firms overall 
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were marginalised, their overriding rôle deemed to be as réceptacles for surplus 
labour. 
Moreover, the act o f sélection, by définition, implies non-selection. In its early stage, 
Japan's industriai policy did not embrace the smaller firm, an omission it only started 
to rectify in the second half o f the 1950s. Even then, only firms in specific industries 
were involved. Industriai policy did not affect S M E policy as a whole and S M E s 
were viewed in terms o f the dual structure problem (Ito, 1996; Teraoka, 1997). 
Nevertheless, on a more positive note, the Smaller Business Finance Corporation 
(Chusho Kigyo Kinyu Koko) was established to provide investment funds and long-
term working capital for modernisation (Calder, 1988). More to the point, there 
were some successes. For example, the sewing machine manufacturing industry 
immediately after the war had benefited from a combination o f fevourable 
circumstances: abundant and cheap job-seeking mechanics, Clusters o f small-scale, 
family-run Workshops, 600,000 machine tools needing conversion to peaceful uses, 
and a huge American market. By the 1950s mis had helped spawn a domestic 
machine tool industry based in the main on small firms and actively subsidîsed by the 
govemment (Tsuru, 1993:78-9). 
4.4.3 The Rapid Growth Period (1960-1970) 
The 1960s was the era o f trade and libéralisation. Industriai policy was trained on 
strengthening the economy and economie growth emerged as a specific policy. A t 
the same time, planning as such receded rather than disappeared. The Third 
Rationalisation Plan for the steel industry typifies the format. No longer did the 
government control investment activìties nor did it directly adjust investment to be 
consistent with long-term demand estimâtes. Instead, it restricted itself to providing 
advice and targets while making the industry itself primarily responsible for adjusting 
investment outlays (Vesta!, 1993). Steel also affords the classic illustration o f the 
'investment générâtes investment' phenomenon that characterized the high growth 
era of the 1960s. B y reducing its own costs, the steel industry stimulated investment 
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directly in the automobile industry and in shipbuilding, and hence indirectly in the 
machine tool industry. And to complete the virtuous circle, this rising domestic 
demand for steel mrther drove investment in the steel industry. From 1960 to 1970, 
steel production ballooned from 22 to 93 metric tons, propelling automobile 
production from 165,000 units to three million (Donnet, 1991:54-5). Hence, it was 
corporate investment and the drive for market share rather than consumption which 
propelled economic growth. It was in the 1960s that Japan achieved global 
leadership not only in steel but also in shipbuilding, caméras, radios, Stereos and 
black and white télévisions (Fingleton, 1995; Porter et al, 2000), and by the end o f 
the decade the output value o f the machine tool industry was three times greater 
than at the beginnìng (Friedman, 1988). Although over-expansion engendered a rash 
of bankruptcies in 1964 and 1965, recovery from October o f the latter year presaged 
an unprecedented average annual growth rate o f 11% to the end o f the decade 
during which Japan's economy overtook West Germany's in 1967 to become the 
third largest in the world (Vestal, 1993). 
The underlying motivation for such vigorous expansion and change was supplied by 
the ambition to catch up with the West blended with a strong dose o f external 
pressure. Resolution o f the latter had become a matter o f paramount urgency by the 
start o f the decade. Having joined the I M F in 1952 and G A T T in 1955 Japan had 
dragged its feet over imports and had been compelled by international pressure to 
implement 'voluntary restreints' on exports o f textiles and other Light industry goods. 
But in 1963 Japan accepted Article 11 o f G A T T . Then, in 1964 it was elevated to 
Article 8 status in the I M F - which meant that it no longer had the option of 
manipulating its exchange rate to protect its balance of payments - and was also 
formalfy enrolled into the O E C D (Tsuru, 1993; Kurose, 1997). Unequivocal as a 
resuit was a commitment to trade and capital libéralisation, which in turn bred two 
conséquences for economic structure. First, it compromised industriai planning in 
that it reduced the government's ability to orchestrate investment and to obstruct 
encroachment from abroad. Second, it raised the compétition stakes and heightened 
the awareness o f the need for solutions. Nevertheless, this did not deter 
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prévarication; Japan held back on libéralisation to 1967, and only then liberalised in 
five stages to 1973 (Vestal, 1993). 
A t the corporate level, one reaction to the imminent infiltration o f foreign business 
was a spate o f mergers which picked up pace from the middle o f the 1960s: Prince 
and Nissan Motors in 1965, Nissho and Iwai in 1968, Yawate Steel and Fuji Steel in 
1970 (Vestal, 1993). These, be it noted, were horizontal amalgamations o f peer 
companies aimed at emulating the magnitude and character o f the presumed foreign 
compétition. But préparation could be more nuanced. To take a case in point, 
Toyota of the time lacked the financial clout to confront the American Big Three 
head-on in mass production mode. The answer was to reduce model change-over 
time which was the direct forbear o f the famed just-in-time inventory system and the 
inspiration behind quality control circles, both o f which quickly spread nationwide 
(Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Lincoln, 1993). The need to disseminate thèse and 
associated concepts, such as Statistical process control and value analysis, induced 
Toyota's création and tightening o f supplier associations, which again reflected a 
broad national préoccupation with refining inter-firm relations in the interests o f 
lowering costs and upgrading quality (Lincoln, 1993; Womack et al, 1990). 
Synchronising with this was growing spécialisation in very narrow lines o f product 
in highly focused plants. The emphasis hère, then, is not on internalisation, but rather 
on a more sélective désignation o f suppliers, a more cohesive inter-firm integration, 
and a more concentrated plant-product spécialisation. Moreover, pressure on Japan 
was also self-generated. The rapidîty o f industrial transformation had put a strain on 
capital and labour, further modifying the economie structure. Already by the start o f 
the decade capital was in short supply, offering further openings for the banks. 
Consequently, most investment did not derive from equity or retained earnings but 
from bank borrowings which reinforced the banks1 status and decision-making 
influence, notably among the keiretsu as the zaibatsu were now called (Abegglen 
and Stalk, 1985) (2). Although this drew subcontractors closer to, and even into, 
keiretsu-type groups, in the main their individual corporate standing remained 
inviolate and intact. 
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What did happen, though, was that with the burgeotiing economy the large 
companies grew larger and absorbed a greater proportion o f the workforce to 
increase volume within the same broad parameters, albeit without intemalising 
incidental functions. Complementing this, the conséquent evaporation o f surplus 
labour diminished the wage differential between large and small companies, vvhich in 
turn was a contributing factor in weeding out many of the weaker S M E s (Dore, 
1973). But full employaient also induced a positive reaction from industriai policy 
for SMEs , symbolised by the passing in 1963 of the Basic Law for Small and 
Medium Enterprises, which stipulated the need for plant modernisation, improved 
technology and mergers to raise competitiveness, and promotion o f exports (Vestal, 
1993). More to the point, S M E s were becoming recognised as potential contributors 
in strengthening Japan's international competitiveness and generally upgrading the 
industriai structure. Already in 1960, the need for modernisation o f industries 
associated with S M E s had been acknowledged with the passing o f the Emergency 
Measures Law for Promotion o f S M E Industries, and this intention was further 
substantiated with the enactment o f the S M E Modernisation Promotion Law to 
complément the above basic law in the same Diet session in 1963 (Teraoka, 1997). 
S M E policy was now directed to adaptation and the removal o f handicaps, while 
affording as much protection as possible while thèse were being achieved (Kiyonari, 
1970:44). The key éléments o f this S M E modernisation were, first, creating the 
appropriate scale by eliminating the 'too-many, too-smalT tendency and, second, 
correcting the configuration between industries. This was called 'upgrading the S M E 
structure' (chusho kigyo kozo no kodoka). Thus, with such adjustments, S M E policy 
had undergone a complete reversai from its initial stance in the late 1940s. From 
being a counterweight to economie centralisation and an aspect o f social policy, it 
was now an intégral part of industriai structure policy for confronting the 
international challenge. In line with this, by the second half o f the decade, the focus 
of industriai policy was on fostering "firms that can take on internationalisation" 
(kokusaika ni tatakaeru kigyo) (Kurose, 1997:98). 
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Internationalisation in the first instance signified exports. As stated in the National 
Income Doubling Pian (Kokumin Shotoku Baizo Keikaku) decided upon by the 
cabinet in December i960, it was deemed necessary to form an industriai order 
equipped with an export structure responsive to the requirements o f the world 
market. This would entail: (i) the estabhshment o f an industriai configuration where 
advanced processing industries, especially rrmchinery nranufacturing, occupied a 
strategie position and (ii) centralisation, merging and concentration coupled with 
specialised production (Kurose, 1997;77). But this fell short, overall, o f elirninating 
fierce domestic compétition. Encapsulating ali these factors was the motorbike 
industry, where the fifty manufacturers o f the 1950s were whittled down to thirty by 
1960, eight by 1965, and finally four - Honda, Yamaha, Suzuki and Kawasaki - by 
1969 (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985:44), a process which paved the way for that 
industry's subséquent aggressive export drive. On the other hand, concentration o f 
capital by no means implies geographical concentration. Restrictions on industriai 
expansion in urban areas, as well as the desire to cut costs, in time presaged 
relocation o f manufacturing to form successive rings o f application from, for 
example, an initiai concentration in Tokyo, out in the first phase to the adjacent 
préfectures o f Kanagawa, Saitama and Chiba, and then further out to Ibaragi, 
Gunma and Tochigi (Whittaker, 1997:45). That is, while the head office remained in 
the capital, research and development could have moved to the outer suburbs and 
mass production to the hinterland. Extension o f this logie was apparent in 
subséquent foreign direct investment. 
4.5 The Emergence of LMEs in Phase 1 
The statement that the first postwar phase outlined above corresponds to the early 
évolution o f L M E s is in effect complementary to the observation that this phase saw 
the foundations set for the economy as a whole, o f which L M E s started to become a 
significant part. Over the broad front the postwar economy to the beginning o f the 
1970s was shaped by three interacting factors: (i) the partial rehabilitation o f the 
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zaibatsu as keiretsu, and the subséquent demand for intermediary goods; (ii) 
international pressures which both stimulated growth and demanded adaptation; and 
(iii) the application o f industrial poticy and its eventual extension to S M E s . A i l o f 
thèse factors likewise were instrumental in fashioning the L M E as depicted in Fig. 
4.1. 
4.5.1 Keiretsu Demand 
One o f the Japanese government's first moves upon regaining polxtical autonomy in 
1952 was to commence on a progressive emasculation o f the Anti-Monopoly Law, 
which in any case, according to Tsuru (1993:19), was destined to disintegrate 
because o f its alien character. The immédiate effect was to allow for the 
reconstitution o f loosely integrated conglomérâtes. However, this backtracking was 
accompanied by the reinstatement o f a practice which had first originated among 
large group companîes in the 1920s: a commitment to job security right down to the 
shopfloor level to continue to attract and retain employées who had to be given 
expensive training in order to absorb and utilise the more sophisticated technologies 
(Hatch and Yamamura, 1996; Francks, 1999). 
Fig. 4.1 Japanese Industrial Structure and L M E s 
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S M E Problem 
The conséquence o f mis was to turn what had been a variable cost in production 
into a fixed cost (Gerlach, 1992). High growth during most of the time from the 
1950s to 1970 meant that this did not surface as a spécifie problem at the time. 
What it did mean, though, was that flexibility was sought with respect to other costs 
- including the supply o f raw materiais and components - to offset the internalised 
fixed cost o f labour. The solution in many cases was to seek stable supplies from 
outside the company. This formulation was reinforced by the government's opting 
for growth policy, inasmuch as rationalisation favouring large firms engaging in key 
industries filtered down in the form of orders to specialist suppliers, many of which 
were o f prewar origin. The coercive pressure o f the Dodge Line early on in this 
process had restricted the allocation o f materiais to the most efficient, which, in 
addition to large assemblers, also included putative L M E suppliers in designated 
sectors such as machine tool manufacturers providing for the sewing machine 
industry (Tsuru, 1993; Kurose, 1997), thus contributing to the élaboration of the 
pattern o f inter-firm dealings. 
The externalisation o f supply has from early on in Japan's industrialisation process 
been a distbguishing feature o f its economy (Odaka, Ono and Adachi, 1988; 
Francks, 1999), and its embellishment during the phase from 1945 to 1970 
contributed considerably to the consolidation o f many L M E s . Machine tools, as 
already implied, constituted an exceptional case, to the extent that by the early 
1960s L M E s - Makino Mill ing Machine (www.makino.co. ip) prominent among 
them - were accounting for around 40% o f production (Nakamura, 1990:198). But 
there were plenty o f others emerging to claim niche domains in industries essentially 
associated with large firms, instances including: in the radio and television sector, 
condensor makers Mitsumi Electric* (www.mitsumi.co.jp') (3) and Shizuki Electric 
(www, shizuki.co.jp); in the automobile industry, brake lining maker Akebono Brake 
Industry (www.akebono-brake.co.jp); and in plastic processing, vacuum-formed 
refrigerator parts maker, Kodama Chemical Industry (www.kodama-chemical.co.jp) 
(Nakamura, 1990:200-206), ali of which firms could claim L M E status. To Gerlach, 
the "basic dynamic in Japanese industriai évolution has been the spinning o f fo f new 
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satellite firms from a central set o f operations while organizing these firms 
collectively under a high-level capital and control system" (Gerlach, 1992:92). What 
he is describing is a setup whereby L M E s exist within or peripheral to a keiretsu 
system and, in the first phase under discussion here, among the above firms this 
would certainly have been applicable to Akebono Brake, for example. 
However, this hierarchy pattern is far less prevalent than Gerlach suggests. The 
plethora o f machine tool manufacturers speaks against it (Friedman, 1988) and 
Gerlach himself cites an obverse case in Omron (www.omron.co.jp') - an L M E in 
the first phase - which has consistently adhered to its initial precept to remain 
independent o f formal linkages with any group (Gerlach, 1992:200). The conclusion 
he reaches, faced with this seeming contradiction, is that control in the Japanese 
business environment is achieved not through arm's-length trading but rather 
through longstanding relationships sustained among sets o f companies in degrees o f 
alliance with each other (Gerlach, 1992:232). This point is accepted inasmuch as the 
primacy o f relationships is writ large in the lore of Japanese business practice. 
Moreover, there is no intention here of attempting to argue the case for L M E s as 
atomized traders of classical theory. The crux o f the issue lies, rather, in differing 
notions o f firm autonomy, the prescribed sphere o f the individual firm's activities, 
and where the line is deemed to be drawn between the firm and the market. 
Contrasting Japanese and American experience - as Gerlach (1992) does - affords 
perspective here. The first point to note is that autonomy is not an absolute for firms 
in either country (Evans, 1999); owners and clientele shape the form the company 
takes. The American company, for example, is more likely to be vulnerable to stock 
market whims and takeover, while by contrast much o f the stock o f even large 
Japanese corporations is rarely, i f ever, traded. This characteristic is much more in 
evidence for many Japanese L M E s , especially those with a strong family presence, 
and besides which, not a few are still private (Patrick and Rohlen, 1987). Moreover, 
the demand for fast and substantial dividends together with less consistent business 
relationships exert a pressure on American firms to react by diversifying, while the 
ownership structure o f the Japanese firm affords it more time and leeway to deepen 
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its spécialisation and hence its prescribed sphère (Yoshihara et al, 1981), in essence 
allowing the distinctive strategy of articulation to emerge. Bearing in mind that thèse 
différences are relative rather than unconditional, they can be summarised as in Fig. 
4.2. 
Fig. 4.2 Characteristics of Japanese and American Firm Environments 
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What this implies, in Coase's (1937) terms, is that the market is accommodated 
differently in Japan and the U .S . Or to put it another way: " A l l societies draw the 
line somewhere between coopération and compétition ... The Japanese just tend to 
seek to draw that line closer to the coopération end o f the spectrum" (Dore, 
2000:38). At any event, organisation o f the make-or-buy paradigm to achieve the 
same ends is fashioned difTerently so that, although the scales in Japan are tipped 
more to the 'market' alternative, this is not in the classical arm's length mode 
(Wüliamson, 1993:4). Large Japanese firrns choose to buy more intermediary inputs 
than do large American firrns, but in more mediated markets, and this mediated 
market structure afifords the L M E the economic space in which to develop its 
competitiveness. Furthermore, during the first postwar phase under discussion, the 
costs that militated against American-style internalisation as far as the large Japanese 
corporations were concerned were embedded in business practices to an extent 
peculiar to Japan, and in the exigences o f the time. That is to say, the fact that 
supplîers already existed or that this ingrained practice would encourage their 
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establishment, together with the 'welfare corporatism' which began to prevail from 
the late 1940s (Dore, 1973), plus business volatility over much of the phase, 
represented to the keiretsu fraternity éléments o f cost which had to be balanced. 
Hence was created an environment of demanding yet supportive buyers where 
intermediate suppliers could flourish. In a rapidly expanding economy certain 
successfùl S M E s could achieve L M E status and in the process retine a strategie 
philosophy (articulation) that was exceptionally suited to long term survival and 
success. Gerlach (1992) would no doubt claim that Akebono Brake, with its initial 
overwhelming reliance on Toyota as client, was a classic case o f alliance capitalism 
in which it as supplier was allowed to exist under a keiretsu umbrella. However, the 
externalising tradition provided scope for consistent development o f a spécialisation 
on the part o f the supplier, and this in time saw Akebono wend its way towards 
tecoming an increasingly independent L M E with a considerably broader customer 
base than it started with. 
4.5.2 International Pressure 
External pressure as a contributing factor in the development o f the L M E came in 
two forms during thîs phase: first, there was the build-up o f the Cold War in the 
1940s and 1950s which focused the emphasis on Japan's rehabilitation; second, 
there was Japan's renewed membership in the international community by way o f 
the World Bank, IMF, G A T T and the O E C D which demanded conformity to more 
liberalised trade and capital régimes. The intensification o f the Cold War between 
the United States and the Soviet Union made the Americans amenable to an 
economically robust and politicalfy cooperative Japan. This gave rise to an emerging 
consensus between S C A P (Supreme Commander o f the Allied Powers) and the 
Japanese authorities that the technological transformation to realise this was to be 
attained through 'rationalisation' (gorika), the essential ingrédient o f which entailed 
promoting the introduction o f mass-production techniques throughout Japanese 
industry (Morris-Suzuki, 1994). Eagerly desirous o f catching up with the West, the 
post-SCAP Japanese government pursued this approach by forcing the general 
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populace to save and smgle-mindedly channelling funds into industry in a drive 
which was ultimately to be manifested in the high-speed growth o f the 1960s, given 
expression in the National Income Doubling Plan formulated at the beginning o f that 
décade (Johnson, 1982; Calder, 1988; Fingleton, 1995). Formerly speaking, in 1949 
M1TI set up the Industry Rationalisation Commission (Sangyo Gorika Shingikai) as 
the precursor to the enactment o f the Law for the Promotion o f Enterprise 
Rationalisation (Kigyo Gorika Sokushi Ho) (Morris-Suzuki, 1994). Institutions 
established in the eariy 1950s with the task o f implementing various aspects o f this 
polîcy included the Japan Development Bank, the Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan 
(for rerouting postal savings to the industrial endeavour), the Export-Import Bank 
and the Japan Extemal Trade Recovery Organisation (Arase, 1995). In addition, as 
of 1951, the Ministry o f Finance made annual revisions to the Taxation Spécial 
Measures Law which included the accommodation o f rapid dépréciation for 
designated investments aimed at rationalisation, and the exclusion o f stratégie 
machinery from import duties (Johnson, 1982:234). Moreover, the extenuating 
international environment added extra weight to the argument for favouring the 
large firm because o f its assumed superior efficiency and stability. In response, the 
large firm assumed a System o f organisation and staff relations which, rather than 
being traditional, was essentially "a product o f circumstances, history, and events 
coming together in a particular social and cultural setting" (Abegglen and Stalk, 
1985:209). This situation could also justify a national stratégie outlook whereby the 
effort was heavily concentrated on a restricted range o f industries with the potential 
to spearhead recovery and growth, which by the late 1950s had been elaborated into 
a program for nurturing new industries as well (Johnson, 1982, Fingleton, 1995). 
Thus the mounting international pressure sensed at home, together with the need to 
export abroad, spurred rationalisation at ail levels o f Japanese industry during this 
period. Rationalisation giving rise to mass production was to lead, by the end o f the 
1950s, to the need for specialist parts makers capable o f producing much greater 
volume than hitherto (Whittaker, 1997), a capacity deemed by Nakamura (1990) to 
be one of the first defining characteristics setting L M E s apart from other medium-
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sized firms in the post-war era. Success in dealing with the growing reality o f 
compétition with international implications is what began to set apart the L M E from 
the merely 'successali S M E ' from the 1960s. However, with obligations to 
international institutions now pressing, the biggest issue at the start o f the 1960s was 
the libéralisation of trade, to be followed by the libéralisation o f capital in the middle 
of the decade. In both cases Japan procrastinated out o f concern for the 
conséquences. Liberalization o f designated infant industries, still considered too 
weak to withstand international compétition, but at the same time anticipated to be 
criticai for the future, was delayed for as long as possible. These included the vehicle 
and electronics industries, for example, which were to prove fruittul territory for 
L M E s as intermediary and end-product makers. Fear of takeover by large western 
concerns also accounted for the slow implernentation of inward FDI libéralisation 
during the second half o f the decade, notably in the very same industries because o f 
their attractiveness to foreign investors (Uematsu, 1990). In fashioning their 
response to the irnminent challenge, large companies - Toyota being the classic 
référence - devised their own versions o f quality and inventory control together with 
close relationships with key suppliers, by now seen as contributing to lower costs 
and higher quality (Lincoln, 1993). Akebono Brake commenced its growth to L M E 
status in this environment. Complementing this in what they saw as a race against 
time to ensure survival in the encroaching international arena, the bureaucrats o f 
MITI and other compétent ministries sought to erect a viable structure, this being 
the central préoccupation of industriai policy from the mid-1950s. 
4.5.3 Industriai Policy and the S M E 
The contention here is that industriai policy was influential in the création and 
consolidation of L M E s during the first phase from the beginning o f the 1950s to 
1970, although the réalisation o f this process was far from even throughout. These 
L M E s were, in fact, exceptionally successali SMEs , so how they achieved their 
elevated status can be traced by studying the evolving relationship between S M E 
policy and industriai policy. Fig. 4.3 delineates three distinct stages in this 
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relationship. These are punctuated by characteristic laws, the contents o f which 
serve to typify the prevailing agenda during each o f the three stages. 
Fig. 4.3 Industriai Policy (TP) Approach to SMEs in Phase 1 
Stage Approach to S M E s Law Date Remarks 
1 IP distinct from 
S M E policy 
E M L for Stabilisation o f 
Specific S M E s 
S M E Stabilisation Law 
1952 
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S M E s seen as social 
problem rather than 
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2 Some S M E s 
included in IP 
E M L for Promotion o f 
the Machinery Industry 
E M L for Promotion o f 
the Electronics Industry 
1956 
1956 
Proactive linkage o f 
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3 Incorporation of 
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S M E Basic Law 




Said laws eventually 
applied to all S M E s , 
so dispersing effört 
N B : E M L = Emergency Measures Law 
Stage I: SMEs as social problem - overall protection 
By the time Stage 1 commenced in the early 1950s, in essence the notion o f 
embracing S M E s as equals in industriai planning known as 'economic 
démocratisation' (Ishida, 1999), which had blossomed ephemerally during the 
immediate post-war period, was already a dead letter. Economic growth eclipsed all 
other objectives. Industriai policy, therefore, in its initial rehabilitation guise was 
concentrated on coal and steel and the largest corporations to set the foundations 
for this growth. The vast majority o f S M E s were seen as irrelevant i f not downright 
obstructive to this process, to the extent that by March 1949 when the loans 
disbursed by the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation were discontinued, oniy 2.5% 
of them had gone to S M E s , and even then eligibility was restricted to those S M E s 
capitalised at at least one million yen (Kurose, 1997:5). B y the early 1950s, the 
overabundance o f small firms in certain industriai sectors, notably textiles, but also 
light machinery and agricultural and forestry products, was thought to threaten the 
very existence o f these and related industries. To cope with this, the emergency 
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measures law ( E M L ) recorded for Stage 1 in Fig. 4.3 stipulated the right o f MITI to 
establish cartels which placed restrictions on individuai firms with respect to 
production, shipments and facilities. (The second law in this stage is actually an 
amendment to the initial E M L to make it semi-permanent because o f further 
deteriorating circumstances.) The main goals in this exercise were maintaining 
employment and protecting industries, with the government injecting funds first 
through the Japan Development Bank and then, from 1953, through the Small 
Business Finance Corporation. And what is to be noted here is that for the 
cartelising SMEs , opting for survival in association with others in like predicament 
translated into a significant retreat from the ideals o f open compétition. As such, 
lacking a self-instilled motivating force, they became appendaged to an industriai 
policy with strong oligopohsing tendencies. A t the same time, the outlines o f a 
modem division of labour were tecoming more distinct. In the metals and machinery 
industries, for instance, fonning the base were what were to become, and remain, 
moderately skilled and indifferently specialised S M E s in sheet metal processing, can 
making, casting, lathe grinding, and so on (Nakamura, 1990). This is the image 
beloved o f dual economy theorists and quite possibly it would have been the reality 
i f there had been prolonged economie stagnation. 
Stage 2: SMEs partially inducted ìnto industriai policy - sélective modernisation 
Stagnation was not the case, however. Powered by the United States, the free-world 
economy began to boom in the mid-1950s and Japan was in a position to take full 
advantage. But as its economy took off there was a need for increasingly 
sophisticated technological inputs in addition to the more mundane supplies and 
processing indicated above, and the speed o f progress was such that this was often 
best met by outsourcing rather than intemalising. Furthermore, the commitment to 
growth and catching up internationalfy called for considérable refinement of 
industriai pohey with the emphasis on an economie structure rïsing from the 
foundations laid by coal and steel. Building this structure, given the limitations o f 
time and capacity, required the désignation o f certain industries for favourable 
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treatment, and again the machine tool industry offers the perfect illustration. Already 
in 1953, as a harbinger to Stage 2, MITI had encouraged the establishment o f the 
Japan Machine Tool Producers Association, and thereafter for the rest o f the decade 
the government showered a range o f financial and tax incentives on that industry 
(Calder, 1988). So although, with its mounting complexity, industriai policy was 
beginning to concede that S M E s could have a role to play, the key to Stage 2 was 
industries, not the finn per se. The two E M L s for promoting the machinery and 
electronics industries clearly demonstrate the approach. Being industry-oriented, 
they were only directed towards S M E s inasmuch as given S M E s proved themselves 
capable o f serving the cause o f growth. Industriai pohcy was stili concentrated on 
large corporations with S M E s included incidentally provided they fitted. Moreover, 
size was stili a factor with assistance being afforded to those S M E s who had already 
achieved an appropriate scale o f production. In other words, the S M E s who could 
benefit from the policy were upper level S M E s who had already attained a certain 
scale o f opérations (Kurose, 1997). Many of thèse were prospective L M E s who had 
contributed to their own fortune in this virtuous circle by aiming for growth 
markets, selecting niche products guaranteeing a high market share, and sticking 
thereafìer to their spécialisation, like (to illustrate from the top o f the list o f 110 
companies in Chapter Six) Anest Iwata* (www.anest-iwata.co.jp), Arakawa 
Chemical* (www.arakawachem.co.ip). Asahi Diamond* (www.asahidia.co.jp) in 
painting machines, printing ink resins and diamond-tipped tools respectively. 
Stage 3: SMEs fully accommodated in industriai policy - sélective protection 
By the early 1960s there was no longer a problem of surplus labour. This induced a 
change in industriai policy: it ostensibly became more positive, no longer blocking 
compétition among S M E s but promoting it (Vesta!, 1993). The idea was, that is to 
say, that S M E s were to be embraced into the fold of the viable economy as full 
adults as it were. This was symbolised by the passing o f the S M E Basic Law 
(Chusho Kigyo Kìhon Ho) in July 1963 which, in addition to calling for plant 
modernisation and upgraded technology, was also aimed at correcting the 
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discrepancies - notably wages - between large and small firms. The latter were to be 
elevated to the stage o f growth and international competitiveness, stili the overriding 
goals o f industriai policy. However, this law also stipulated protection from imports 
where possible, thus conceding the impossibility o f totally impartial appUcation. 
Consequently, the wage gap with large firms remained unsolved and many S M E s 
continued to survive behind protective barriers. Furthermore, the basic law was 
complemented by the S M E Modernisation Promotion Law (Chusho Kigyo Kindaika 
Sokushin Ho) which was to hâve an even more ambiguous tenure. In addition to 
modernisation as such, this law was also for the purpose o f encouraging the change 
o f business activities with a shift from areas which had lost their competitive 
advantage to growth areas. But this encountered stubborn résistance and policy 
implementation proved flabby. Having initially been intended for appUcation to 
spécifie industries, this law came to be applied mdiscriminately, and as the labour 
shortage intensified in the second half o f the 1960s S M E s in any industry could 
argue successfully that they needed funds for modernisation (Kurose, 1997). 
So whereas the promotion E M L s in Stage 2 looked to picking out the good to 
make them better in the interests o f tightly delineated policy objectives, the S M E 
basic and modernisation promotion laws in Stage 3 were overwhelmed by the 
vastness and amorphous nature o f their allotted tasks. What is more, by attempting 
to accommodate ail firms in ail industries industriai policy inevitably saw its centre 
o f gravity shift. It passed over the watershed from positive to negative. Thenceforth 
it increasingly assumed the rôle o f insulating domestic industries from pressure to 
adjust (Uriu, 1996; Dore 2000). As such it no longer afforded the constructive 
dynamic conducive to a thriving incubation o f L M E s , and we cannot say that this 
generalised S M E support policy was an active influence on subséquent formation 
and growth. But by now this was not a problem for many L M E s because Stage 2 
had already provided the wedge to ensure their survival and growth, as long as they 
'articulated' according to the evolving circumstances, as discussed below. It was 
Stage 2 o f the S M E policy stance that was the most influential in terms o f 
encouraging L M E formation. By the middle of the 1960s, Nakamura's (1962) 
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observation that a 'third type' of company was a significant player in the Japanese 
economy was amply justified. Thèse were not ail integrated into subcontracting 
Systems as Calder implies (1988:53); independent suppliers like Murata 
Manufacturing (www. murata, co .j p), Mitsumi Electric* and Alps Electric 
(www.alps.co.jp) played a vital rôle in both the transport equipment and electronics 
industries (Whittaker, 1997:31) as the exports of thèse two industries started on 
their advance from 12% and 6% in 1962 to 35% and 20% in 1985 in export shares 
respectively (Nepote and de Vienne, 1999:126). Thèse firms were emblematic o f an 
evolving Japanese structure where manufacturers produced a narrow line o f 
products in very focused plants (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985). With rapid economie 
growth, moreover, they were joined by highly speciaUsed downstream supphers like 
Pentel* and Shoru*, expanding in tandem with a booming domestic and export 
markets. LMEs were now an intégral part of Japan 's industriai structure and as 
such set fair to play a distinctive rôle in the historical évolution comprising the 
second phase. 
4.6 Second Phase - 1970-2000 
In discussing the second phase, I will roll together a characterisation o f the key 
features o f each period with an analysis o f their significance as an influence on L M E 
formation and behaviour. 
4.6.1 The Shocks Period (1970-1980) 
The first shock o f the decade for the Japanese was what they came to cali the 
'Nixon shock', the main élément of which was the sudden revaluation o f the yen 
from a fixed rate o f ¥360 to the dollar to a floating rate which rapidly rose to around 
¥270, resulting from the U .S . décision in August 1971 to abandon gold 
convertability (Tsuru, 1993; Ichimura, 1998). The second was the first oil shock 
followed by the immediate émulation by other primary goods producers. Thèse 
events had the effect o f virtually halving the rate of growth o f G N P for the first half 
of the 1970s to 6% from the average o f 11% in the halcyon days o f the previous 
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decade (Ichimura, 1998:7), while also elevating the cost o f energy and raw materials 
as a proportion o f total imports and thereby undenruning the security assumptions 
on which rapid growth thus far had been based (Calder, 1988). Thereafter saw a 
second hectic yen appreciation starting in 1977 and the second oil shock o f 1978-79. 
Added to which was the culmination o f six years of phased trade liberalisation in 
1973. The overall effect was a sea change in structure in which by the middle o f the 
decade machinery and equipment had replaced industrial materials as the leading 
sector o f the economy (Yoshihara, 1994). At the same time, domestic wages were 
increasing, overseas competition as epitomised by the usurpation o f the cheaper end 
o f the footwear industry by South Korea and Taiwan was picking up steam as it 
heralded the stirrings o f a regional division o f labour. Industry after industry -
having succeded in the catch-up phase - found itself confronted with the need for 
creativity at the technological frontier. 
So even by the beginning o f the decade, and especially as it unfolded, Japan was 
traversing unfamiliar territory. It needed to cut production costs, reverse its energy-
intensive policy, divest itself o f labour-intensive manufacturing, come up with new 
technologies, and invest abroad, all against a backdrop o f an unyielding recession 
which gripped the world economy through the middle years o f the 1970s. The 
buzzword which surfaced to encapsulate the response to these exigences was 
'knowledge intensification'. The acquisition and application o f knowledge was to 
change the structure and behaviour o f Japanese firms. MITI designated strategic 
industries based on advanced knowledge, including computers, semiconductors, 
robots and V T R s (Johnson, 1982), and in 1971 the former emergency measures 
laws for the promotion o f the machinery and electronics industries were rolled into 
one as the E M L for the Promotion of Specific Electronic and Machinery Industries 
aimed at supporting state-of-the-art technologies in certain 'critical' fields where 
firms were deemed to fall short o f the international standard. Upon this law's 
deadline being reached in 1978, it was superceded by the E M L for the Promotion of 
Specific Machinery and Information Industries which differed from the former in 
emphasizing software, as well as cooperative efforts rather than mergers (Kurose, 
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1997; Doane, 1998). Such coopération was embodied in the V L S I (Very Large 
Scale Integration) programme under MITI auspices involving the cream of the 
electronics industry, including Fujitsu, Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric, N E C and 
Toshiba, which owed its success to its leaning towards mutually and broadly 
beneficiai basic research (Doane, 1998). Success, cooperative or otherwise, was less 
forthcoming with respect to S M E s where circumstances and demands were infinitely 
more heterogeneous. Come the 1970s, the view of the policy authorities had 
become much more positive towards S M E s , seeing them as contributing to the 
economy in ways larger firms could not, and thereby reflecting a sentiment that was 
to become widespread in the industriai world (Sengenberger et al, 1990). A shift to 
knowledge-intensive development therefore became the summons for S M E s too. 
But, implemented largely through trade associations and the like rather than 
individuai firms, it lacked définition and logie. Moreover, the dramatic yen 
appréciation and the worst recession since World War II replaced knowledge with 
survival as the key priority, and S M E policy subsided once more into protectionist 
stagnation. 
In stark contrast, knowledge intensification served to give further définition to 
L M E s and to enhance their economie role. It did so in two ways: first, it compelled 
more exacting standards on already existing L M E s ; second, it constituted the 
seedbed for a new crop o f L M E s . Already, by the start o f the decade, they were a 
significant force. In a survey report entitled 'Japan's Enterprise Concentration' 
published in 1971, the Japan Fair Trade Commission stated that in terms o f overall 
capital and profit ratios firms they called L M E s (chuken kìgyo) accounted for over 
20% of the nation's totals. In the saine year the Japan Long-Term Credit Bank 
produced a report called 'The Competitive Relationship between Large Firms and 
Leading Medium-sized Enterprises' fiora which it can be inferred that 95.9% o f the 
L M E s it surveyed were in the position o f ensuring their own markets, testimony to 
their autonomy (Nakamura, 1990:427). In the course o f the decade, according to 
Nakamura (1990:425), the number of L M E s , their capital and their profit were to 
increase by factors o f about 2.2, 2.2 and 3.9 respectively. This occurred despite a 
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considerable shake-up. There were those L M E s which feil by the wayside because 
they could not, other than master mass production techniques, entirely extricate 
themselves from S M E practices. Others were unable to develop new producís after 
their original pioneering success died, and yet others could not cope with the 
managerial and organisational problems attendant upon their own growth. 
Alternatively, those L M E s which carne through, in addition to their rigorous 
appücation to spécialisation and production processing, embellished their tactics by 
erecting their own entry barriers to rivais and working to guarantee their specific 
market shares, developing in both a creative and defensive way the concept o f 
articulation. As specialists their relative contribution to exports began to grow and 
they were accepted as partners in joint research, as was Pentel* with Murata Data in 
facsimile equipment, for example (Doane, 1998:122). And, most importantly, they 
extrapolated on their existing knowledge base to create new producís and markets. 
Kato Spring Works (www.kato.co.jp, name changed io Advanex in 2001) siarted on 
the diversificalion o f ils précision Springs for eleclrical equipmení, business 
machines, and automobiles; 3,000 types a monlh with lots o f anything from 100 to 
100 million (Nakamura, 1990:384; J C H , Spring 2002:525). Taiho Industries 
(www.taihokogvo.cojp) activated ils knowledge in high polymer chemicals to 
produce anticombustion, waierproofing and cleansing agents to realise a wide range 
o f markets in différent industries (Nakamura, 1990:388). A t the forefront o f the 
knowledge-intensive restructuring, thèse L M E s were refrning their arts o f 
articulation. In addition, they were joined by the new progeny of the knowledge 
intensive age, such as - again citing from the population o f 110 L M E s in Chapter 
Six - Airtech Japan* (www.airtech.co.jp.), the specialist manufacturer o f clean air 
systems, and Roland* (www.roland.co.jp), the maker of electronic keyboard musical 
instruments. Established and emerging L M E s were increasingly recognised by 
observers o f the Japanese business scene as significant economie agents by the 
1970s, although not necessarily labelled as L M E s by ail observers. 
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4.6.2 The Internationalisation Perìod (1980-1990) 
By the 1980s, Japan was indisputably ensconced as the second largest economy in 
the non-communist world. It was the paramount exporter of compact disc players, 
semiconductor^, nracbine tools, fax machines and laptop computers, among others 
(Fingleton, 1995). The economy of Kanto - comprising Tokyo and the adjacent 
préfectures - alone outstripped Italy's and then Britain's, and the nation boasted ten 
of the world's top twenty electronics manufacturers (4) (Donnei, 1991). Apart from 
exports, right from the inception o f Japan's modernisation in the nineteenth century, 
a degree o f internationalisation has been indispensible to obtain raw materials. So, in 
the interests o f stabilizing its burgeoning industriai base, by the start o f the decade it 
had in place a formidable array o f policies to ensure their provision, including the 
ownership of extraction opérations and the advancing o f foreign aid and other forms 
of financial help to supplier countries, not least in East Asia (Arase, 1995). B y then 
also, the major Japanese fìrrns and corporate groupings had honed the kernel o f their 
ongoing success: the process o f manufacturing. This was embodied in the 
organisation o f people and macriines with an enrphasis on continuous change or 
improvement in their utilisation and larded by a highly competitive domestic 
environment (Chu, 1994; Lincoln, 1995). The expansionist mode also found 
expression in a tenfold increase in technology licensing exports over the decade, 
although admittedly from a low base and stili less than half the value o f technology 
imports (Lincoln, 1995:93). 
However, illusions o f mercantilist self-sufficiency were in retreat. The declining 
industries o f textiles, basic materials and shipbuilding were shedding workers apace, 
as were the core processing sectors of steel and aluminium (Tilton, 1996; Uriu, 
1996). Cartels were again in évidence, this time as the vehicles for coordinating the 
constraints on excess capacity for the likes o f petrochemicals, synthetic fibers and 
chemical fertilizers. What is more, Japan's share of world exports peaked in in 1986; 
indeed, its export share even in some o f its most competitive industries such as 
télévisions, audio equipment and caméras had been falling since the late 1970s 
113 
(Porter et al, 2000), although what this often meant was that Japanese transplants 
were providing the components and assembling the finished items abroad. A further 
dement o f tension straining the structure was the Implementation during the 1980s 
o f agreements limiting Japan's exports to the United States o f automobiles, 
semiconductors and machine tools, which meant that by the end o f the decade, with 
the addition o f previously concluded pacts concerning cotton textiles, steel and 
colour télévisions, over 30% of this bilateral trade was subject to 'voluntary 
restraint' orders (Calder, 1988). The trickle-down effect on smaller business 
concerns was serious and was countered by a substantial increase in subsidised loans 
and the resort to a wide range of policy tools to staunch unemployment and 
encourage diversification. However, such factual généralisation concerning the at 
least 95% o f companies classified as S M E s in Japan threatens to cloud out the 
détails. For at the dynamic end o f the S M E endeavour, firms were corifronting 
change and realising greater independence at the same time. To illustrate from one 
source: between 1987 and 1990, the ratio o f subcontractors dépendent on a single 
customer for a minimum o f 90% of their orders declined from 34.5% to 15.8% 
(Whittaker, 1997:34). 
One major factor impelling this diversification o f clientele domestically was the 
progressive geographica! dispersai o f major assemblers, first to the nation's 
hinterland and then abroad. Although Japan's firms o f all sizes and kinds, in fact, 
had been making direct investments abroad for some time, up to the 1980s its 
economy was still export-based as far as the outside world was concerned (Zhao, 
1995). A radical reorientation towards FDI and internationalisation strategy was 
about to commence. The appréciation o f the yen, which was to become almost 
exponential in the second half o f the decade following the Plaza Accord, was the 
chief underlying motivator. Western protectionist sentiment, encroaching N I E 
compétition, high costs in Japan, more constructive host govemment policies, and -
for intermediate subcontractors - the overseas demands o f internationalising clients 
likewise contributed impetus. Conversely, of course, the higher yen strengthened 
Japanese corporate purchasing power abroad while the rising value of their physical 
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assets at home allowed them to borrow credit cheaply (Myers, 1996). From 1980 to 
1991 the cumulative value o f Japan's FDI grew at an average annual rate o f 25% 
(Lincoln, 1993:70). 
B y 1986, moreover, some companies were already véritable globalisers: both 
Ajinomoto (food) and YÏCK (zips), for example, were by then manufacturing 70 -
80% of theh* products outside Japan (Ishii, 1992:46). They can be seen as the 
pioneers in strategy change which was beginning to take hold, whereby FDI was -
for the larger firm at least - less and less a simple division-of-Iabour exercise for 
shilling labour-intensive production to cheap-wage countries, but rather increasingly 
a global positioning o f production bases to better serve Worldwide markets 
(Akabane, 1998). With the smaller firm also in mind, on the other hand, government 
policy evolved in step with the globalising trend, enlisting the Japan Small Business 
Corporation, J E T R O and the Japan Chamber o f Commerce, among others, as 
facilitators. For small firms, too, were negotiating tides o f transformation. In 1974, 
Momoi Net (www.momoi.co.ip). in a relatively simple move, transferred much of its 
labour-intensive production to Indonesia to fend off intensifying compétition from 
South Korea and Taiwan (Ibuki, 1994:132). B y 1989, however, when Nakajima 
Doko (www.nakajimadoko.co.jp) arrived in Malaysia its motives were more 
'globalised': having seen costs explode due to the rapidly appreciating yen, and 
having been unable to extend its factory space at home, it chose to employ by now 
relatively skilled labour in Malaysia to manufacture its soldered peripherals there, ail 
for reexport to Japan (Ibuki, 1994:154). 
Momoi Net and Nakajima Doko are two specialised and focused smaller L M E s . 
Moreover, the passage of time between their two investments suggests a growing 
sophistication in their articulation o f options as globalisation progressed. In their 
committed spécialisation, focused approach and articulation practices they bear a 
strong resemblance to their larger L M E counterparts. With the domestic market as 
base, L M E s in general had raised their technological level, upgraded produci quality 
and eut costs. But in sticking closely to their core compétences, by the 1980s they 
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were outgrowing the home market, and rather than diversify produci in Japan, they 
were increasingly looking abroad to diversify their clientele. In fact, as will be seen 
in Chapter Six, many had started internationalising well before, although this was 
much accelerated in the 1980s. The process is well illustrated by Fujitec* 
(www.fuiitec.co.jp'). an L M E headquartered in Osaka. Fujitec's 'first décision' was 
to make and instali elevators, while logicai progression later encompassed escalators 
and moving walkways. Hemmed in by the compétition o f larger companies in Japan, 
and rejecting the alternative of targeting other products outside its chosen niche for 
the locai market, it opted early for internationalisation with the opening o f its first 
overseas manufacturing and services plant in Hong Kong in 1964. By the end o f the 
1980s Fujitec boasted five more overseas manufacturing bases plus a number o f 
designated sales outlets (Toyo Keizai, 2001). It was by then - like many other 
Japanese L M E s - articulating its strategie space in the globalising arena. 
4.6.3 The Economie Reform Period (1990-2000) 
B y 1990, despite harbingers o f disfunctioning accompanying the bursting o f the 
'bubble economy' o f the end o f the previous decade, Japan's economie structure 
wielded immense power and influence. From less than 3% in 1950, Japan now 
accounted for some 16% of the workTs industriai production. Confidence was such 
that in 1993 it launched 'un défi intellectuel', championing its developmental 
structure over World Bank and I M F free-market orthodoxy (Servoise, 1995:227). It 
had oustripped the global opposition in watches, caméras and motorbikes, to name 
but a few. As for newer technologies, it manufactured 60% of the world's industriai 
robots, it appeared to be carving out a lucrative bonanza from fluidised bed 
combustion, solar photovoltaic ceìls and other areas o f environmental technology, 
and no less than 75 o f the cream of corporate Japan - including Ishikawajima-
Harima, N E C and Toshiba - were involved in the establishment of Rocket Systems 
Inc. (Donnet, 1991:196). True, the outside world was impinging; inward direct 
investment flows amounted to US$4.3 billion in 1991 as against a mere US$299 
million in 1980 (Lincoln, 1995:71), and Japan had become a net importer o f 
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télévisions, V C R s and refrigerators. But thèse imports were predominantly from 
Japanese affiliâtes, and even then, in the early 1990s overseas manufacturing activity 
only amounted to 7.4% of Japan's total output (as against 25.1% for the United 
States), and capital stock in its domestic industries continued to expand (Hatch and 
Yamamura, 1996:187). Nevertheless, cracks have appeared, partially as a resuit o f 
external pressures due to globalisation and partially o f Japan's own making. With 
respect to the latter, the educational system's overemphasis on production and 
electrical engineering has left Japan ill-equipped to meet new challenges in computer 
software and aeronautics, for example (Porter et al, 2000). Even in electronics, 
there was overcapacity, overstaffing and flagging productivity in both production 
and research and development (Ernst, 1994). A t the other end o f the scale the 
palpable aging of the owners o f small manufacturing firms was continuing unabated 
from the 1980s reflecting the dramatic decline in independent start-ups, which in 
turn bespoke the redoubtable cost o f entry and the dis inclination o f the younger 
generation to become entrepreneurs (Nakamura, 1990; Seki, 1994; Whittaker, 
1997). 
However, the changing environment which meant discomforture for some has meant 
opportunity for others, and this has included the L M E sector which has proved more 
than résilient in crisis. These have homed in on niche markets and built up their 
resources through the introduction o f information technology, personnel training, 
and research and development. They have achieved greater independence as the 
inclination toward the pyramidal subcontracting structure has given way to less 
exclusive network arrangements. They have become innovators in their own right, 
runctioning as partners rather than subordinates o f their main customers. They have 
concentrated on their core areas o f expertise and sought to apply this creatively. 
Nifco* (www.Nifco.co.ip) makes plastic fasteners for a range of industriai uses; 
Dynax (www.dxj.co.jp) manufactures friction materials and parts for automatic 
transmissions for many leading fìrrns (NRI, 1992b:71). That is to say, the demands 
of reconstruction appear to have vindicated the approach o f L M E s in that they 
essentially already embodied the leanness and dévotion to core compétence which 
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became the vogue among business commentators in the 1990s. They did not 
diversify willfully into totally unrelated areas like Nippon Steel did at the end o f the 
1980s into leisure products and biotechnology. Neither did they parley snowballing 
assets into real estate during the 'bubble' era. Moreover, some were demonstrably 
more efficient than their larger counterparts. While from 1989 to 1998 the three 
leading general electronics manufacturers, Hitachi, Toshiba and Mitsubishi Electric, 
averaged a paltry 0.9% return on sales, that for four leading specialist 
manufacturers, Nidec (www.nidec.co.jp), Rohm (www.rohm.co.jp). Murata 
Manufacturing and Futaba Denshi (www.futaba.co.jp), was 6.4% (Porter et al, 
2000:172). 
To take Nidec, which specialises in the manufacture o f precision motors, boasting 
the world's largest share in small motors for HDDs , C D - R O M s and other electronic 
products. Since 1980 it has been building a worldwide network; 95% of its 
manufacturing is done overseas by plants in the United States and East Asia. 
Moreover, having been founded in 1973, listed in 1988, and blessed with a fourfold 
growth in sales during the 1990s, it is very much a progeny of its times ( J C H , 1999; 
Porter et al, 2000). B y investing abroad for the first time in 1980, Nidec also 
illustrates another point central to this thesis: the internationalising progression over 
time of L M E s . The main reason for setting 1990 as the cut-off year for initial 
overseas investment by the sample L M E s in Chapter Six is so that a time perspective 
can be created to see how this progression has evolved not only within the period 
from the mid-1960s to 1990, but also thereafter to the present. 
To sum up, over this second phase L M E s consolidated their position in the domestic 
economy because o f the recognised need for specialisation in a period o f 'shocks', 
and their ability to adapt to and embrace the more knowledge-intensive environment 
in which they were obliged to function. In addition, as with the larger companies, 
they also moved towards an international presence as a way of capitalising on their 
core competences and responding to less favourable conditions at home. They 
honed their underlying strategy of articulation, avoiding unrelated diversification and 
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spéculation, and by keeping a focus on successfuHy building on core compétences 




Japan 's keiretsu-domirtated domestic industriai market structure, liberalising 
external market relations and certain aspects of industriai policy have been 
particularly favourable to the formation and évolution of LMEs, making them an 
increasingly signiftcant part of the evolving industriai structure. They are 
distinguishable from the general SME, from which category most of them have 
originated, by their concentrated emphasis on their core compétence and their 
ability to assume a leading position in their chosen line of business. This has 
placed them very favourably for extending their activities abroad, notably to the 
immediate région of East Asia. 
R E S E A R C H QUESTIONS 
RQ4 
(a) Why have Japanese manufacturers been particularly attracted to the East 
Asian région? 
(b) How have Japanese LMEs contributed to regional economic and industriai 
integration? 




The leitmotif pervading this chapter is that the circumstances under which the 
Japanese economy grew, especially during the postwar era, has been particularly 
conducive to the évolution of the L M E . The progression of events has been 
separated into two phases: the first from 1945 to 1970, the second from 1970 to 
2000. These phases nave, in turn, been divided into three stages each. Japanese 
L M E s are distinguishable from other firms by their combination o f size, type and 
stage. They have made their mark in Japan because o f the particular business 
practices and ethos, especially as they have developed since the end o f the Second 
World War, including outsourcing, patient capital, and cooperative in préférence to 
adversarial relations. Their distinctive role is as leading specialists both for 
intermediary goods and for end-user producís. 
The first phase saw recovery under the Occupation, followed by reconstruction with 
regained independence, and then rapid growth felicitously aided by advancing 
internationalisation Worldwide. It was during this phase that the first batch o f 
manufacturing L M E s carne to the fore. Their establishment as serious contenders in 
the national economy was stìmulated by three factors: 
(i) The rast growing demands o f large companies and company groups (keiretsu), 
which were not fully met in-house because o f an increasing reliance on 
subcontractors and a disinclination to intemalise due to business volatility; they 
provided demanding but helpful customers to S M E s that could develop the 
compétences to become their long terni suppliers. 
(ii) International pressure from global organisations and trading partners calling on 
Japan to open up its markets and libéralise its institutions, which did not allow 
Japanese firms to develop at their orni chosen pace but rather to accelerate the 
drive to spécialisation and competiveness, characteristics definitive o f the L M E . 
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(iii) A n approach to SMEs , which fîrst ignored them, but then (crucially) veered to 
policies which favoured the prepared and the capable in the S M E sector. providing 
the opportunity for many of them to become L M E s , before subsiding into 
amorphous protectionism for the less equipped at large. 
Thèse conditions encouraged the development o f fîrms that were more than 
'successfiil SMEs ' , in that they had the time, opportunity, resources and incentives to 
develop as ' L M E s ' , laying down the stratégie philosophy of 'articulation' that 
subsequently proved définitive and userai. 
The second phase opened with a séries of'shocks 1, which paradoxically proved to be 
one o f the éléments inducing further upgrading, notably through 'knowledge 
intensification'. This was a situation well suited to many existing L M E s , as well as 
being fertile ground for a new crop o f them. Internationalisation became a natural 
extension of business, including for L M E s , while corne the 1990s, reform of the 
économie structure became ever more pressing as the implications o f globalisation 
began to impinge. With this state o f affairs, speciahsation and the L M E took on 
added relevance both at home and abroad. 
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Notes 
(1) There was a big reshuffle of government ministries and agencies in 2001 in 
which the former Ministry o f International Trade and Industry (MITI) was largely 
reconstituted with additions as the Ministry o f Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI) . With respect to incidences involving the ministry before 2001, therefore, it 
is referred to as MITI in the subséquent text. 
(2) For a similar national economic structure (Germany) as it compares to the 
Anglo-Saxon setup see Lane (1992). 
(3) L M E s marked with an asterisk are among the 110 sample companies in Chapter 
Six which have invested in Taiwan. 




The East Àsian Région and Host Country Taiwan 
5.1 Introduction 
Globalisation, first putatively in the form of internationalisation and then in its own 
right, has evolved over the past three or four décades, which is precisely the period in 
which many of the Japanese L M E s described in the previous chapter have ventured 
abroad and established their présence in locations around the world. This thesis is aimed 
at gaining insights into the globalisation process by studying it through the perspective 
afforded by this particular type of firm, the L M E . Hypothetically functioning as a 
catalyst precipitating the globalisation process and modulating the L M E ' s course of 
action in its interplay with this process is the région. The globalisation of the (large) 
firm and the régionalisation of the firm within the context of globalisation differ in 
scope and depth from internationalisation. Dicken (1998:5) portrays 
internationalisation as entailing quantitative processes of geographical extension, as 
against globalisation where the processes are qualitatîvely différent in that this 
extension is compounded by the functional intégration of erstwhile discrète activities. 
Whereas internationalisation can be seen as an accumulation of atomised variables, 
globalisation is a progression of interlocking fusion with the world market viewed as a 
unit and governed by a global stratégie vision. Given its scale constraints, the L M E is 
deemed to be internationalising in a globalising environment, while interfacing with the 
région and its component locations, which themselves constitute a geographically 
defined matrix of'sub-global processes' (Jessop, 1998:23). 
So one way to gauge how and to what degree L M E s have internationalised is to look at 
the overseas environment immediately adjacent to their home base, while keeping in 
mind that this is just one means of looking at how the L M E is internationalising in a 
globalising environment and that this is not an investigation of regionalism per se. 
There are three reasons for this approach. First, as mentioned above, the multinational 
région and régionalisation are seen to be intimately and symbiotically conjoïned with 
globalisation. Second, as noted in Chapter Three, proximity and related theorising about 
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the rôle of knowledge acquisition and familiarity in decision-making, for example, are 
writ large in the discussion of the internationalisation of the fïrm, and particularly the 
smaller firm. Third, as alluded to in both Chapers Two and Three, the L M E is self-
consciously bounded in its options and therefore could arguably take the same 
incrémental approach to internationalisation as it has done to its other business 
development, and incrementalism as realised through articulation could be nurtured by 
familiarity, which in turn is facilitated by proximity. The East Asian région can be said 
to présent a vista of potential stretching virtually from Japan's doorstep, and it is with 
this in mind that its significance vis-à-vis Japan and the Japanese L M E is elaborated 
upon below. At the same time, within that région and very close to Japan culturally, 
historically, geographically and technologically is Taiwan, which just because of thèse 
characteristics encapsulâtes in concentrated form conceivable motivating stimuli for 
internationalisation by the Japanese L M E . Describing this background and having thus 
established a three-dimensional landscape comprising the world, the région and the host 
country in this chapter, it is intended in the following two chapters to reverse the lens 
and project outwards from host country, Taiwan, in tracing the internationalising course 
of the Japanese L M E and the reciprocal impact of thèse key firms on the régional 
formation process. 
Part I: The East Asian Région 
East Asia is highly diverse yet easily recognisable geographical entity. It is not a clump 
of uniformity to which agents are either associated or not. Rather, it synchronises 
compactness and tractability to a degree convenient for a study which is essentially 
économie and géographie. More prosaically, 'East Asia ' is an idea and a reality readily 
understood by the businessmen and administrators who are the actors running the 
companies and institutions under discussion here. They see East Asia as an operational 
unit within their overall strategy, just as they see North America and Europe in like 
mariner. Some idea of this unity can be gleaned from the map in Fig. 5.1 which also 
gives the trade flows within the région for the year 2000. 
124 
Fig. 5.1 East Asía and its Trade FIows, 2000 
N B : Figures in US$ trillion. 
Source: Nihon Keizai Shinbun, November 6, 2002; accredited to JETRO. 
5.2 Methodology Note 1 
5.2.1 Ai m s 
The intention here is to demonstrate how East Asia has developed as a région as 
internationalisation and globalisation have evolved around and within it. That having 
been done, it is possible to examine how Japanese firms, and specifically LMEs, 
fonction within this région as they internationalise, and at the same time contribute 
incidentally to the intégration, indeed the runctional définition, of the région. 
5.2.2 Approach 
The position taken in this thesis is that régionalisation is intrinsic to globalisation. It is 
therefore necessary to analyse what the région implies, not only economically and 
geographically, but also historically, politically and culturally because thèse latter are 
also contextually relevant to the region's dynamic functioning. The région must then be 
placed within the world setting to see how it engages the global environment and works 
within it. This having been done, it becomes possible to turn the investigation to what 
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mis means for Japanese LMEs and the way they act, and theïr distinctive contribution to 
regional integration. The approach again entails a literary review, coupled with 
supporting quantitative data. The literature includes, again, general materials in 
Japanese, English, Chinese and French, Japanese and Taiwanese officiai data, research 
Institute data, the Japanese and Taiwanese economic newspapers and Journals, and 
company websites. 
5.3 East Asia as a Region 
5.3.1 Identification 
In this thesis the East Asian région is taken to mean East Asia in its broadest sensé, 
incorporating what is alternatively referred to as East and Southeast Asia, or sometimes 
Northeast and Southeast Asia. That is to say, it includes China, Japan, North and South 
Korea, Taiwan and the countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). Leaving aside North Korea, this equates to the A S E A N plus three (China, 
Japan and South Korea) grouping which is seeking to attain some kind of free trade 
association (FTA) format over the next decade or so (Nikkei, November 5, 2002). 
To the présent, however, East Asia has constituted neither a politicai nor an economic 
entity in its own right where integration is manifested by, for example, the progressive 
and systematized de jure removal of discriminatory barriers. Neither does it comprise a 
group of countries with similar socio-economic Systems, nor even mutually recognised 
cultural références such as Christianity in Europe, for example. Démarcation Unes in the 
form of economic frontiers still have to be crossed by goods and factors of production 
and - until very recently - there has been no apparent region-wide inclination towards 
émulation of the E U or even N A F T A . In other words, interconnection within East Asia 
as a whole is not highly politicised and there is no overarching policy body positively 
impelling coalescence and endowed with coercive powers to ensure its matérialisation. 
It is nevertheless subject to the interplay of integrating forces in two ways. First, its 
component countries are variously involved in international organisations at the sub-
and supra-regional levels. A S E A N , now encompassìng the majority of the Southeast, is 
représentative of the former, and the Asia-Pacific Economie Cooperation conférence 
(APEC) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) of the latter. Second, there has taken 
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place a non-governmental de facto régionalisation of production realised through 
enterprise networks and fuelled by direct investment, notably from Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan and the Chinese diaspora (Higgott, 1999). This in turn has stimulated a division 
of labour within a perceptible géographie région, a phenomenon traditionally equated 
with economic integration (Marer and Montias, 1988). 
So there is in évidence an underswel! urgìng forward the combining of previously 
discrete and dispersed économies into larger and more complex arrangements. And 
gradualist though this may be from a politicai Standpoint, it is nonetheless in this 
environment that most of East Asia recorded remarkable growth rates for two to three 
décades. Despite the divergences among thèse countries there are threads of 
communality which are strengthening. Discriminatory and restrictive institutions are 
being levered aside by the logie and force of market imperatives and technological 
progress which increasingly speli disaster for those unwilling or hésitant about 
accommodating the emerging rules of engagement. Apparent in this is what is best 
described as a process of sélective integration. In this scenario, while economie 
frontiers still remain, production, money and resources are comparatively fluid, 
commodities and services are becoming so, and labour is still relatively static, in that 
with direct investment work moves to them. Unilateralism and policy independence are 
thus being eroded rather than sundered by one-off conjunction. At the same time, 
perhaps because of its very lack of formality, there is no 'fortress' implication in this 
kind of regionalism. Tt is a centrifugai regionalism which feeds off globalisation as it 
manoeuvres of necessity to benefit from what the larger world has to offer. An 
important élément in the drive for sélective integration is the recent conduet of Japanese 
LMEs. 
5.3.2 Recent Hi story and Structure 
East Asia's constructive engagement with the world at large over the past four décades 
rests on historical foundations. Although, until very récent times it did not indulge in a 
regional division of labour akin to that already well advanced in Western Europe by the 
middle of the twentieth Century (Rozman, 1991), commercialisation and spécialisation 
had existed for centuries. This had been further stimulated during the colonial period to 
produce a legacy of 'outward links' - Malaysia with Britain, Indonesia with the 
Netherlands, the Philippines with the United States. And, indeed, with older colonies in 
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mind one could add the regionally 'inward links' that Japan maintained with Taiwan, 
where it had commercialised sugar and rice growing for its own larger strategie 
purposes. Moreover, the high speed of development, especially in the 1960s, was to a 
significant degree impelled by fortuitous circumstances which created opportunities for 
deeper integration into the world economy, summarised by Wade (1990:346) as 
favourable reception in the markets of advanced countries, much improved access to 
international finance, and increasing relocation of production by multinational 
enterprises to cheap-wage sites. The result was that between 1960 and 1990, what have 
been referred to as the high-performing Asian économies (HPAEs) - Japan, Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand - averaged 
annual per capita real income growth of 5.5%, and China 5.8% since 1965 (World 
Bank, 1993). These are the nine leading East Asian économies with which Japanese 
L M E s have been most involved over the past thirty to forty years. 
There were two motors driving this boisterous advance: manufacturing exports and FDI. 
Between 1963 and 1995, the nine leading économies increased their share of world 
manufacturing exports from 7.5% to 31.5%. Discounting the paramount leader Japan, 
thèse figures read 1.5% and 19.9% (Dicken, 1998:34-36). Particularly salient regardmg 
FDI was the mounting intraregional activity which can be divided into two distinct 
waves. The first, commencing in the late 1960s, saw Japan divest itself of much of its 
labour-intensive industries for relocation to the Asian NIEs as it restructured to take on 
capital- and tee hnology- intensi ve industries. The second wave in the latter half of the 
1980s was characterised by the Asian NIEs themselves partially emulating Japan's 
earlier move in transferring their labour-intensi ve industries chiefly to the A S E A N 
countries and China and upgrading their technology and productivity (World Bank, 
1989; Kitamura, 1990; Yong and Keng, 1990; Régnier, 1991; Jin, 1995; Pussarungsri, 
1998; Sum, 1999). 
The impression drawn from the above is inevitably one of persistant and, crises 
notwithstanding, ultimately accelerating change throughout the région and in its global 
relationships. It would appear that "within the sphère of East Asia, nations cooperate 
with and stimulate one another, as if technology were being propelled outward by 
centrifugai forces" (Seki, 1994:3). Japan, once the undisputed pioneer, is being obliged 
to cede technological know-how as market pressures heighten and regional capabilities 
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blossom. We shall return to this later in discussing the specific role of Japanese L M E s 
as agents of technology transfer into Taiwan. Patterns of functional specialisation 
emerge: audio equipment in Taiwan and South Korea, electronic watches in Hong 
Kong, less sophisticated and lower value-added products in the Philippines and 
Thailand (Chen, 1990). But such gradations implicit in a regional division of labour also 
suggest lacunae in the individual East Asian countries; deflciencies in the region, to put 
it another way, render flexibility far from ubiquitous. The nub of the issue, with respect 
to four of these countries, has been given diagrammatic expression by Seki (1996) and 
is reproduced here. According to this representation, Japan is proficient at all 
technological levels. China, Taiwan and South Korea, on the other hand, show 
significant gaps or weaknesses. Taking an alternative perspective, however, these can 
also signify opportunities and are discussed in this light with regard to Japanese L M E 
investment in Taiwan below. 
Fig. 5.2 Structure of Technology Accumulation in East Asia 
Japan Korea-Taiwan Asean PRC 
Source: Mitsuhiro Seki (1996). 
N.B . 1. The height of each triangle shows the overall technological level, while the 
width indicates the density of technological accumulation. The dotted Unes indicate 
particularly weak areas. 
2. 'Base technologies' refer to casting, forging, plating, machining and other 
mechanics-related analogue technologies. 'Special technologies' are so-called advanced 
technologies related to such activities as the development of new products. 
'Intermediate technologies', formìng the link between the other two, include production 
technologies, assembly technologies and the like. 
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5.3.3 The Region as a Functioning Unit 
East Asia has therefore evolved in the past few décades as a distinctive economie entity. 
It has become a functioning megaregion in the Triad of the global economy, parallel 
with (but not identical to) the E U and N A F T A (Orru et al, 1997). Table 5.1 shows the 
leading investors external to the région, plus Japan by way of contrast, near the end of 
the period under discussion. Clearly the United States outperforms ail other outsiders to 
the région while creditably keeping pace with Japan overall. On the other hand, Fig. 5.3 
and Table 5.2 demonstrate that, whereas on a historical cost basis Japan's FDI assets 
worldwide are only about a third of those of the United States, they prevail in East Asia 
(JETRO, 1998). In fact, East Asia is the "dominant regional destination" (Yeung et al, 
2001:11 ) for Japan's outward FDI. This is one aspect of the intensification of economic 
activity within the région even as it augments its participation in the global economy. 
Evidencing this, East Asian intraregional trade has taken on significant proportions 
since the mid-1980s, at which time it first surpassed the United States' trade to the 
région (Baran, Pan and Kaynak, 1996). Even with Japan excluded, trade among the 
other countries during the first half of the 1990s was rising much faster than with the 
rest of the world. Moreover, manufactured goods are assuming increasing importance. 
Japan's huge surplus with them notwithstanding, the remaining countries "on average 
now import more manufactures ffom each other than they do from Japan" ( U N C T A D , 
1996:90). 
Table 5.1 Inward FDI to East Asian Region (1996 in flow basis) 
(Unit: US$ millions) 
Host/ 
Source 









USA 2,122 876 474 1,604 2,766 1,150 33 642 3,443 
U K 360 79 36 282 583 151 142 3,391 1,301 
Germany 423 95 38 175 322 59 3 165 518 
France 93 90 20 42 173 5 1 71 424 
Nether-
lands 713 205 29 367 918 29 5 1,330 125 
Switzer-
land 222 162 12 43 104 750 0 160 188 
Japan - 255 545 1,390 6,191 1,831 56 7,655 3,679 
Source: Figures extracted from 'JETRO White Paper on Foreign Direct Investment, 
1998', Fig. I l , page 7. 
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Fig. 5.3 General View of Assets Held by United States and Japan Worldwide 
and in East Asia (End of Fiscal 1996) 
(Unit: US$ millions) 
Total East Asia 
Source: Figures extracted from ' JETRO White Paper on Foreign Direct Investment, 
1998'. Fig. 45, page 34. 
Table 5.2 FDI (Assets) by United States and Japan Worldwide and in East 
Asia (End of Fiscal 1996) 
(Unit: US$ millions) 
Country/region Japan United States 
Worldwide total 258.7 796.5 
East Asia 78.1 64.7 
China 8.1 2.9 
Taiwan 4.0 4.5 
ROK 3.5 5.5 
Hong Kong 9.4 16.0 
Singapore 11.4 14.2 
Thailand 15.8 5.3 
Indonesia 17.2 7.6 
Malaysia 5.8 5.3 
Philippines 2.9 3.4 
Source: Figures extracted from ' JETRO White Paper on Foreign Direct Investment, 
1998\ Fig. 45, page 34. 
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Underpinning this cross-border manoeuvring has been FDI, which likewise is 
încreasingly intraregional (Dicken and Yeung, 1999). And again, despite Japan's 
prééminence, it is worth noting the growing diversity of origin, because it is instructive 
in indicating the evolving environment which Japanese firms must continuously address 
even as they drive it. Put another way, East Asian intraregional FDI is no longer the 
virtualiy exclusive Japanese preserve that it was in the 1970s. Through most of the 
1980s, in fact, intraregional FDI by the four Asian NIEs equated to in excess of two-
thirds of that made by Japan, resulting in their being as a group the top investors in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, for example. Moreover, the potential for symbiosis suggested 
by Seki's (1996) diagram is apparent at differing levels of national development as 
illustrated by Taiwan and Malaysia (Chen, 1992; Chi, 1994; Chen et al, 1995; Chen and 
Liu, 1998; Ku, 1998). As Taiwan's comparative advantage in labour-intensive 
industries, like metal processing and electronic appliances, became unsustainable many 
of thèse businesses relocated to Malaysia, but only because Malaysia was ready (Van 
Hoesel, 1996). 'The stage of development in Malaysia seems particularly suited to 
Taiwanese investors, who experienced a similar phase in their home country not too 
long ago. The fact that Malaysia is not too far behind Tai-wan in terms of economic 
development thus provides a tremendous advantage for Malaysia over other host 
countries in the région' (Ariff and Ng, 1998:168; my italics). This is a case of what can 
be termed 'technological proximity', a phenomenon very relevant to the 
internationalisation of many Japanese L M E s within the East Asian and Taiwan 
especially. 
5.3.4 Japanese FDI and the East Asian Region 
The East Asian région, then, as a recognisable, even self-conscious runctioning 
economic unit started to take palpable form in the 1980s. And Statements above with 
respect to the other countries notwithstanding, the first country internal to the East 
Asian région to begin, through its manufacturing firms, to exploit the regional potential 
as a distinctive single entity was Japan (Suzuki, 1998; Tokunaga, 1992; Tachiki, 1995). 
This was an incrementai development, but active from the outset in its évolution were 
Japanese LMEs . In fact, as early as the mid-1960s, when Japan was in the throes of its 
first overseas investment boom with its prominant textile and fiber firms very much in 
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évidence (Kojima, 1973; NRJ, 1994; Wu, 1992), the first of the sample L M E s in this 
study were setting up in Taiwan. Their significance was to grow with the unfolding of 
the larger picture as it pertains to the advance of Japanese FDI globally and regionally. 
The impetus for real take-off of Japan's FDI was provided by the séries of measures 
implemented by the government from 1969 to June 1972 to libéralise almost completely 
the transfer of funds abroad for investment. The immediate response was a substantial 
increase through fiscal 1972, dubbed 'year one of FDI' (Hiramatsu, 1998:43). As a 
conséquence, whereas total FDI between 1951 and 1971 amounted to a mere US$3.6 
billion, it ballooned to US$5.8 billion in just the two years of 1972 and 1973 (Tsuru, 
1993:193). Driving this high tide were the appréciation of the yen, rising wages and 
other costs undermining Japan's comparative advantage in given industries, and 
mounting dissatisfaction of the advanced industriai nations with respect to Japan's 
skyrocketing trade balance (Kojima, 1990; Tsuru, 1993; Myers, 1996). Essentially, 
thèse conditioning factors would remain unchanged thereafter. The 1980s constituted 
the peak period in Japanese foreign direct investment. Whereas during the 15 years 
from 1965 Japan's worldwide FDI amounted to US$47.13 billion, in just five years 
from 1980 to 1985 it soared to US$51.84 billion, and then more than doubled that to 
US$106.4 billion in the latter half of the decade (Wong and Yamamura, 1996:1). A 
major factor here was the Plaza Accord in 1985 which had the effect of doubling the 
value of the yen against the dollar by 1987. As a conséquence, in the three years from 
1986 through 1988, Japan invested more overseas than in all the previous postwar 
years, and at its peak in 1990 Japan's FDI was ten times more than at the begînning of 
the 1980s. As for manufacturing, there was a six-fold increase in dollar terms during the 
key period of 1985 to 1989 (Lincoln, 1993:67). 
From the mid-1960s through into the 1970s Japanese investment also progressed in 
diversification. Following textiles were radios, télévisions and other home appliances 
and then automobiles (Ozawa, 1979a,b; Lu, 1995; Mason, 1996:20-2). East Asia was 
not overly favoured as against North America and Europe, but the cumulative affect 
was that by the first half of the 1980s Japan was the leading source of FDI in South 
Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, and second in Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and the Philippines. Investment also accelerated during that decade to the 
point that in 1989, compared with 1985, Japanese companies invested four times more 
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in Taiwan, while the factors of increase were five for Malaysia and South Korea, six for 
Singapore, fifteen for Hong Kong, and a whopping twenty-five for Thailand (Fallows, 
1994:264) (I). Accompanying this was an intensification of the Japanese présence as 
Japanese suppliers joined their clients by investing in the région. The smaller Japanese 
firms, LMEs among them, moved ìnto Asia in record numbers in the 1980s; not only 
parts makers but also suppliers of raw materials and semiprocessed goods, contributing 
to the reformulation of hitherto Japanese domestic production networks towards a 
regional scale of opérations. 
This FDI process also evolved in character. What took place in the 1970s could be 
described as 'internationalising within the région'; it was not yet globalisation, but a 
step towards it. Even the large TNC still evinced patterns of investment which are best 
described as reactive and expérimental rather than holistically conceived. But come the 
1980s, within East Asia destinations for Japanese FDI were modified as the need for 
optimal strategie placement in the globalising economy became increasingly evident. In 
other words, whereas at the beginning of the decade Japanese firms had tended to 
perceive East Asia as clumps of discrete entities, by the end the emphasis was on 
recognising its comprehensiveness and its rôle within a global strategie vision (Ozawa, 
1993). This évolution of investment resulted in a number of important conséquences: 
(1) It greatly assisted the transformation of the national économies concerned through 
technology transfer and in situ asset création, which in turn further enhanced their 
appeal as investment venues. Malaysia, for example, having played host for the 
establishment of a televison assembly plant by Matsushita in 1966, by the end of the 
1970s had become one of the world's largest exporters of electronic components (Fong, 
1992), albeit chiefly due to inward investment. 
(2) As far as the Japanese investing companies were concerned, it reoriented and made 
more specific the rôles of the host countries as patterns of plant product spécialisation 
became more refined. Thailand, for instance, not only saw the proportion of total 
Japanese inward investments devoted to manufacturing rise sharply from the middle of 
the decade, but also the retargeting of investment from a local-market orientation to the 
development ofthat country as an export base for Japanese manufactures (Sakamoto, 
1988; Encarnation, 1995; Kuroda, 1995; Santikarn Kaosa-ard, 1996). 
134 
(3) Japanese Firms began to become more critically aware of the distinctive and 
particular advantages offered by the individuai countries within the région. By the end 
of the decade Taiwan and Singapore were benefiting from a new wave of Japanese 
investment incorporating advanced technology to exploit the accumulated skills and 
expérience of these countries (Gereffi, 1996). What this represented was an évolution in 
Japan's FDI in East Asia from simple process division of labour to the transfer of 
increasingly sophisticated production technology to selecteâ destinations (Jingji Ribao, 
2001a,b), amounting to a more discriminating intraregional division of labour based on 
more nuanced corporate production Systems. 
(4) Japanese supplier-client constellations formed in given locations. This could be in 
concentrated form, as when medium-sized companies realised Clusters of expertise in 
the more advanced hubs of Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore (Yonekura, 1988) (2). 
But more often they entailed assemblers and complementary parts makers. An 
illustrative example of what was happening was provided by Japan's Machine 
Promotion Association and is reproduced in Fig. 5.4. It can be seen that the hypothetical 
Japanese audio equipment producer profiled imports the high-tech éléments from Japan, 
makes some of the components locally, and effects the final assembly in-house. lt also 
buys the packing materials and some parts from local East Asian suppliers. Very 
significant, however, is that it relies partially or wholly on other locally-based Japanese 
firms for the case, the speaker, the cassette deck parts, and the nameplate. LMEs are 
prominent manufacturers of this kind of equipment. Dobson (1993) discerned exactly 
the same pattern in a study of the buying practices of Japanese electronics 
multinationals, where in one case 20% of components were imported from Japan and 
70% of the 'locai' input was supplied by Japanese companies. Such Japanese 
intermediate goods suppliers, she found, were becoming increasingly independent and 
more sophisticated, while, because of their familiarity, ensuring lower transaction costs 
for the assemblers than locai suppliers (Dobson, 1993: 57, 69). This increasing 
independence accompanying internationalisation has been one means by which L M E s 
reinforced their self-definition, allowing them to develop an autonomous path to 
internationalisation. 
(5) By the mid-1980s the East Asian région was acquiring the status of a production 
base in a global setting for Japanese firms. At around the ad vent of the 1990s, some 
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65% of Japan's investments worldwide were accounted for by services and real estate 
(Myers, 1996:xv). But as Table 5.3 reveals, from the early 1950s into the 1990s, some 
45% of its cumulative investment in Asia was in manufacturing, prominent among 
which are textiles, electrical machinery, metals and chemicals. What is more, the 
manufacturing bias is further emphasised within the region, a fact reveaied by 
comparing the manufacturing sub-totals with the figures for non-manufacturing. Hong 
Kong is seen to be predominantly non-manufacturing, while China and Taiwan have 
more manufacturing assets than non-manufacturing, in the latter case to a ratio of 2.6 to 
1. The removal of Singapore from the A S E A N figures would raise manufacturing assets 
above non-manufacturing assets for the remaining countries too. 
Fig. 5.4 Typical Japanese Audio Equipment Production in East Asia: 
Production and Sourcing 
Majority of electrical and electronic parts (bought locally from Japanese producer) 
| Imported from Japan Special IC, large capacity condensor 
| Chip parts 
PCB (made in-house by manufacturer) 
Case (resin forming parts: bought locally from Japanese and locai producers) 
Speaker (partially from locally based Japanese producer and partially in-house) 
Cassette deck parts (bought locally from Japanese producer) 
Nameplate and printing (bought locally from Japanese producer) 
Assembly (in-house by manufacturer) 
Shipment (packing materials: bought from locai producer) 
Source: Machine Promotion Association (1993). 
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Table 5.3 Indu striai Composition of Japan's Cumulative FDI in Asia, 1951-1994 
Unit: US$ billion 
Asia ASEAN China Hong Kong Korea Taiwan 
Manufacturing 
Food 1.77 1.13 0.35 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Tcxtiles 3.10 1.71 0.80 1.17 0.21 0.08 
Timber & Pulp 0.75 0.62 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Chemicals 5.61 4.27 0.27 0.04 0.50 0.34 
Metals 4.14 3.06 0.32 0.07 0.19 0.41 
Machinery 2.94 1.72 0.55 0.18 0.22 0.24 
Electrical M. 7.84 4.53 1.39 0.44 0.58 0.76 
Transport M . 2.72 1.50 0.35 0.04 0.34 0.30 
Other 4.60 2.54 0.81 0.30 0.23 0.45 
Sub-total 33.53 21.11 4.90 1.40 2.41 2.74 
Non-Mfg 41.20 21.46 3.50 12.31 2.49 1.07 
Total 74.73 42.57 8.40 13.71 4.90 3.81 
Source: Ministry of Finance Monthly Statistics, December, 1995 
N B : M = Machinery 
5.4 Japanese L M E s in East Asia 
5.4.1 The L M E Perspective 
Looked at from the broad perspective, therefore, Japanese firms have been highly 
influential in advancing the regionalisation of production in East Asia through direct 
investment, the subsequent organisation and reorganisation of production networks 
across the región, and decisions on sourcing and marketing. As this has evolved since 
the 1960s, moreover, the production networks thereby constituted have over time 
reached a point where they are not exclusivist and inward-oriented but increasingly 
directed outward to the global economy. In fact, it is the claim of Hatch and Yaraamura 
(1996) that, since the I980s, the dominant Ímpetus propelling FDI does not stem from 
home or host government policy but rather from the firm's own need to accommodate 
the global marketplace. The emphasis here can be disputed to some extent, and the 
significance of government actions on inward FDI is discussed as it pertains to Taiwan 
in Part II of this chapter, but it goes without saying that the firm's own perspective is 
important. Added to which, the argument here is that East Asia, because of the level and 
characteristics of its economic development overall, has presented possibilities which 
Japanese LMEs , with their particular attributes have been able to incorpórate into their 
articulation strategies as they internationalise. The opportunity factor created by 
shortcomings in the host economy has already been mentioned and is further elaborated 
here with reference to L M E s . Dovetailing with this is the way the home country and 
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host région circumstances, both positive and negative, can invite synergies whereby the 
two complément each other, as when the L M E ' s superior technology constitutes the 
indispensible input in a host country manufacturing venture, for example. Finally, the 
Japanese L M E can ostensibly posit the East Asian région in its strategy as an arena 
within which to maneuvre and/or as a launchpad for extending to the world beyond. 
5.4.2 East Asia as Opportuniry 
As already noted, according to Seki's (1996) diagrammale reconstruction, Japan has 
strength and depth at ail technological levels, an attribute that none of the others can 
claim. For their shorteomings East Asian nations were in the past branded as "paper 
tigers" by Krugman (1994), while less dismissively, although more realistically 
perhaps, Yoshihara (1988) referred to the regime in Southeast Asia as "ersatz 
capitalism" or "technologyless industrialisation". Indeed, the very ease with which 
special technologies can be transferred has, according to Morris-Suzuki (1992), 
disinclined A S E A N countries from acquiring the knowledge and skills needed for 
'depacking' thèse technologies, while they remain overly dépendent on investing 
foreign subcontractors for base technologies. However, thèse are precisely the gaps that 
Japanese LMEs have been so instrumental infìlling, and represent one of the distinctive 
ways the Japanese L M E s are contributing to regional integration (via technology 
transfer) within the bigger picture of globalisation. It also allows them scope in 
intrafirm division of labour; machine tool makers like Yamazaki Mazak 
(www.mazak.co.ip) and Tsugami (www.tsugami.co.ip'), for example, are illustrative of 
technological hierarchy in action by outsourcing the production of simpler models to 
China and thereby making their contribution to intraregional trade, while benefiting 
themselves from cheaper production costs (Ozawa, 1985; Seki, 1994:22-3; Inagaki, 
1994; Taylor, 1996). 
To an extent this is so for even the most successful of the East Asian countries outside 
Japan - South Korea and Taiwan. Government obsession with the mighty chaebol at the 
expense of smaller supplier firms in Korea has resulted in seeming perennial 
dependence on Japanese précision parts and machinery (Kaneko, 1998). There again, 
with respect to both countries, the lack of depth in special technologies oblige South 
Korea and Taiwan to be heavily reliant on Japan, especially, for state-of-the-art input. 
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Even as late as the early 1990s, Japan (often through the medium of Japanese LMEs) 
was providing the high-technology parts and components that account for 20-30% of 
the value of South Korea's automobiles and 65% for its printers, while also being the 
partner in two thirds of Taiwan's technology cooperation agreements (Hatch and 
Yamamura, 1996:179). 
Extrapolating on a broader front concerning East Asia as a whole, being deficient in the 
skills of the developmentahst approach defined as "a set of policies and practices that 
promote cooperation between government and business, between otherwise unrelated 
firms, and between management and labour" by Hatch and Yamamura (1996:xiii), their 
business operations fall short on "dynamic technological efficiency", meaning "a firm's 
ability to adopt successively more sophisticated technology" (Hatch and Yamamura, 
1996:xii). In that sense Seki's (1996) dotted lines present areas of vulnerability to the 
stronger economy, allowing for 'peripheral intermediation'. Or, to put it in the terms of 
this thesis, the environment has not been created within many East Asian national 
economies (outside Japan) whereby strong technological and business linkages have 
been created to bind the economic structure together, a role frequently and 
demonstrably performed by LMEs in Japan, and which they have subsequently played 
to an extent in other nations in East Asia, where both industrial policy and local 
business practices have left a gap. 
5.4.3 Complementarity 
Not all of the reasons for L M E s extending their activities into the East Asian region 
have been of their own making however. Changing circumstances, both 
inconveniencing and inviting, have instigated outcomes. Some of the 'push' factors 
impelling Japanese LMEs abroad have been suggested and they are summarised as the 
' L M E Limits' in Fig. 5.5. Market share in Japan is often rigidly sustained and, for 
L M E s , may be hemmed in by powerful rivals higher up the hierarchy. Competition and 
imposition apart, LMEs have self-imposed limits on their manoeuvre because of their 
specialisation. Then there are the problems of all Japanese companies on the domestic 
front: prohibitive costs, a declining and aging workforce, and strict environmental 
regulations. In Fig. 5.5, these are married to the 'pull ' factors connoted here as 'East 
Asian Needs', or to be more precise, needs which have arisen in East Asian countries. 
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As theïr économies and potentiat nave grown, large Japanese assemblers have moved in 
and subsequently called out their regulär suppliers, while host governments have sought 
to make up local structural déficiences, and enticing hubs of compétence have 
developed. Added to which is to be found the mirror image of Japan in terms of lower 
costs, readily available labour, and less stringent législation concerning the 
envïronment. 
As already remarked, the initial lack of home development of necessary technologies in 
the other East Asian countries can be said to be due to a lack of linkage between actors 
in their économies. If looked at from a positive stance on the other hand, foreign 
incursion in the guise of FDI can be regarded as the means for making good the paucity 
of linkages in the host economy, that is, creating the high level of internai linkage that is 
a hallmark of an advanced industriai economy. So that, with Aoki (1992), we can 
consider the rush of Japanese investment into Malaysia at the end of the 1980s as 
contributing positively to economie development and wealth création/rétention by 
effecting such linkages, as well as cultivating human resources, facilitating technology 
transfer, and spurring the relaxation of régulations. As highly geared specialists, one of 
the major contributions that Japanese LMEs have made to régionalisation within East 
Asia has been as the agents of linkage, both within and between the member countries. 
They have thus contributed to the 'deepening' of the industriai structure of the countries 
they have invested in, which in turn has opened up more opportunities for them (Wade, 
1990). In this mutually reactive process, moreover, East Asian countries have over time 
begun to require increasingly sophisticated inputs for domestic industry which in many 
cases they were not in the position - initially at least - to provide for themsehes. Thus, 
apart from responding to pressure from regionalising large Japanese client companies, 
many Japanese L M E s internationalised for the first time during the 1970s to supply the 
growing needs of East Asian businesses across the région and have remained there since 
as contributors to and benefïciaries of the evolving (local) economie environment 
(Kobayashi, 1995). 
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Fig. 5.5 L M E Limits and East Asian Needs 
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5.4.4 Positioning and Manoeuvre 
From its own standpoint, strategy for the Japanese L M E in the East Asian région can be 
adumbrated under the thèmes of positioning and manoeuvre. It both functions within it 
and in many cases extends beyond it. Some of the articulation configurations thus 
created are epitomised in the examples below, ail being companies which have achieved 
global reach beyond the région to varying degrees. 
Simple positioning in the région. S.T. Chemical* (xvww.st-c.co.ip). producer of 
mothballs, aromatics and household-use resin gloves, after first investing in Taiwan in 
1988, has so far restricted its manufacturing to East Asia. adding Thailand and the 
Philippines thereafter, to service its overseas clientèle. Inexpensive manufacturing 
141 
locations close at hand would appear to be a sufficient basis for an international 
strategy. 
Strategic plotting within the region. More complex, although essentially of the same 
pattern, is that of Mabuchi Motor*, one of the five case studies in Chapter Seven. With 
its factories and R&D facilities in Taiwan, China and Vietnam, it is a stark 
manifestation of a co-ordinated regional manufacturing network, contrived to service a 
global market strategy. 
Selective use of the region over time. Fishing tackle maker Daiwa Seiko* 
f www.daiwaseiko.co. ip). invested first for cheaper production in Taiwan in 1971. This 
helped to create sufficient demand to justify investment in Scotland for the European 
market in 1977. Thereafter it resorted back to East Asia - Thailand in this case - in 
1995 as the need for low costs for its international operations became paramount and as 
the optimum location for such operations reverted back to East Asia. 
Evolving global strategy emanating from the region. Minebea (www.minebeaco.ip). as 
shown in Fig. 5.6, showed initial and sustained concentration in East Asia, which 
eventually functioned as a springboard for advances further afield. That is to say, an 
early start was made in Singapore, and three other plants were already established in the 
region before like investments were made in the United States and Europe in the mid-
19805, in a pattern of progressive decentralisation of production into key markets. 
Withdrawal and repositioning within the region. Uniden (www, uniden.co.jp), the 
telecommunications L M E , and admittedly a wild-west maverick by Japanese standards, 
having moved all manufacturing out of Japan to Taiwan in the 1980s, repeated the 
process in the 1990s with another total transfer of operations to China and the 
Philippines. As with Uniden and their larger counterparts, L M E s have, according to a 
survey by Nomura Research Institute in 1995, for example, revealed a persistently 
growing preference for China among medium-sized enterprises (NRI, 1995:39). But 
even China does not necessarily prove to be the final denouement. Illustrative of this is 
Tokyo Ferrite (www.tokvoferrite-ho.co.ip). a manufacturer of electrical machinery, 
which vacated Taiwan and moved via Hong Kong into China, only to relocate some of 
its operations in Malaysia out of dissatisfaction with the latter (Japan Small Business 
Corporation, 1998). What these withdrawing companies are doing draws attention to a 
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phenomenon which somewhat paradoxically accentuates the progressive cohesiveness 
of the East Asian region: movement and realignment within it. As the region becomes 
economically and functionally more integrated, as well as politically more stable around 
a sense of common interest, it is easier for firms to become more footloose within it, as 
they become more confìdent about legai considerations, labour supply, sourcing and so 
on within the region. Both Uniden and Tokyo Ferrite, be it noted moreover, initially 
withdrew troni Taiwan where, like many other LMEs, they made their initial 
manufacturing investment abroad. It is to a discussion of Taiwan's particular 
constitutìon as a host nation for Japanese FDI that we now turn. 
Fig. 5.6 Worldwide Investments by Minebea, circa 1990 
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Régionalisation is an essential component of globalisation. Especially for smaller 
firms like LMEs, itprésentsproximity and an intermediary scale which facilitate their 
process of internationalisation. The évolution of the région, 'East Asia', within this 
overall process of globalisation has been strongly influenced by the activities of 
internationalising Japanese TNCs and LMEs. In addition to being contributors to 
régional growth and intégration, the LMEs have at the same time taken advantage of 





(a) What are the distinctive features of Taiwan 's development, and how did it prove 
appealing to outside Investors? 
(b) What particular facets of the Taiwanese economy - both positive and negative -
encourage Japanese LMEs to invest there? 
(c) How have Japanese LMEs contributed to Taiwan's economic development and, 
through that. linked up regionally and globally? 
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Part ET: Taiwan as Host Country 
Over a thousand Japanese companies are currently registered as operating in Taiwan 
and hundreds more nave been and gone. To invest in such large numbers implies a 
business appeal based on a perception of local comparative advantage. It is therefore 
pertinent to study the host environment, both natural and contrived, to better 
comprehend investment motives of Japanese firms, including L M E s . In addition to its 
proximity to Japan in ways this concept is familiarly applied - geographica!, cultural, 
historical - Taiwan, along with South Korea, embodied the second wave of 
industrialisation and modernisation in the East Asian région and therefore can be said to 
have, on top of that, a degree of technological proximity to Japan. As such, Taiwan can 
be regarded as the epitome of the theoretical logie, the epìcentre of proximity. So the 
question to pose is: Did this hold out a distinctive appeal for Japanese L M E s in their 
overseas Strategising? Or, phrased another way: How and to what extent did Japanese 
L M E s take advantage of the situation presented by Taiwan in their internationalisation 
process? A subsidiary question is: what distinctive contributions have Japanese L M E s 
subsequently made to the industriai évolution and upgrading of the Taiwanese 
economy? The first step towards providing answers to thèse questions is to see what 
exactly Taiwan had achieved and where it stood as Japanese L M E s moved in as 
investors. 
5.5 Methodology Note 2 
The main officiai data sources for the latter part of this chapter are Taiwan's Ministry of 
Economie Affairs (MOEA) and its S M E department, the China External Trade 
Development Council (CETRA) and the Council of Economie Planning and 
Development (CEPD). The information from M O E A is mainly from its Industriai 
Development & Investment Centre. However, there is also the Investment Commission, 
which on request provides printouts of inward investing companies, but using the 
company's Chinese (Taiwanese) rather than Japanese ñames which makes them 
difficult to trace. (The problem of names is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six). 
M O E A ' s S M E department publishes an annual white paper, but this is exclusively 
concerned with the activities of Taiwanese SMEs and does not go into any detail about 
foreign companies active in Taiwan. Moreover, Taiwan's unique situation can also 
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affect information sourcing in another way. To take JETRO to illustrate this point, since 
1974 it has published an annual report on worldwide investment activities of Japan and 
other nations. Unti! the early 1990s Taiwan simply did not exist in thèse reports. Only 
in 1992, presumably on the grounds that Taiwan's own burgeoning and by then 
irréfutable investments in the Mainland economy made récognition permissible, did its 
activities appear. Navigating thèse definitional pitfalls and data gaps requires care in 
both the compilation and interprétation of the statistics, which has duly been exercised. 
With respect to Taiwan's inward EDI, the data are based on approvals rather than 
arrivais. Schive (1990) has indicated that during the 1950s, for example, inasmuch as 
arrived capital only amounted to 45% of approvals, the data for the latter hardly typified 
the actual situation. There are two reasons for this, First, the data for approvals indicate 
the total capital committed. However, paid-up capital was allowed to arrive any time 
within three years of approvai, so there was always a time lag between the approvai and 
arrivai figures. Second, many approved investment plans in the event never transpired, 
or at best were deferred and curtailed in magnitude (Schive, 1990:10). Nevertheless, 
having made that statement, the same writer is reduced to relying aimost exclusively on 
data for approvals thereafter (cf. Schive, 1990:13). Data on arrivais are available but 
they are disparate, relying as they do on individuai surveys on an inconsistent basis. 
Data on approvals, on the other hand, are consistent in the sensé that they are officially 
registered and stay on the record as such. Over a period of décades, moreover, they 
remain a reliable indication of trends. In addition, in the case of a country like Taiwan, 
which at crucial stages has developed at an exponential pace and manifestly 
transformed its structure to accommodate a rapidly changing environment, thèse data 
présent an architecture whose characteristic shape cannot be denied even if the size 
must needs be diminished the better to correlate with reality. Clearly substantiating this 
point in the data below are the massive build-up in the investment commitments in 
electronic and electric appliances in the 1980s and through the 1990s and, even more 
dramatically, the éruption of investment in banking and insurance in the 1990s. 
5.6 The Character and Development of a Host Country 
At the advent of the 1950s, Taiwan was a poor agriculturai economy recently emerged 
from Japanese colonialism, civil war, and subjugation by a retreating Nationalist 
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government and mainland fellow travellers. Just 40 years later it was the world's 
fourteenth largest trading nation, a major manufacturer of semiconductors, and the 
possessor of a foreign exchange reserve caché second only to Japan (although shortly to 
be overtaken by Mainland China). Inward foreign direct investment had a significant 
role to play in this miraculous transformation. This investment in turn was attracted by 
what Taiwan had to offer. 
From the era of rehabilitation in the 1950s, the economy was to pass to export 
orientation in the 1960s, and then on to industrial upgrading from around 1973. It is 
postulated here that Taiwan's post-war economie history has gone through two main 
phases almost identical timewise to those of Japan described in Chapter Four, although 
for différent reasons. The most important of thèse reasons was the progressive politicai 
isolation of Taiwan commencing in the early 1970s. The first phase (1945-1972) covers 
the country's rehabilitation and the transformation from import substitution to exporting 
as the motor for survival and economie advancement. The second phase (1973-1990) 
entails the 'Taiwanisation' of the economy and rapid growth through the 1970s and 
1980s. There are widely differing interprétations of how exactly industrial and 
economie expansion in general was achieved, particularly during the first phase. Some 
ascribe a paramount role to government planners and institutions along with the state-
owned enterprises (cf. Gold 1986, Amsden, 1989, 1991; Aberbach et al, 1994; Liu , 
1999; Asamato and Liu, 2001), while others intimate that propaganda-influenced 
analyses have undervaiued the significance of private-sector small business and that the 
politicai dénouement was a crucial factor shaping economic outeomes (cf. Gates, 1996; 
Ishida, 1999). The account of the first phase here, therefore, separates thèse two 
perspectives. However, this dual approach is not sustained for the second phase because 
by then the politicai and economie landscapes are beginning to merge. 
In a sensé, given that this thesis is concerned with how Japanese L M E s availed 
themselves of local attributes they deemed to be instrumental for their own 
internationalising purposes, how Taiwan arrived at a point where it could be of use 
would seem to be of secondary importance. However, as will be shown, the 
circumstances and demands of Taiwan's distinctive passage to and élaboration of its 
industrialising economy presented needs which Japanese LMEs , among others, have 
been particularly well placed to complément. 
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5.6.1 First Phase from 1945 to Start of 1970s: The Economic Account 
Throughout Taiwan's modern economic history it has been beholden to inputs 
emanating from Japan and the United States. With respect to Japan, this started with its 
occupation of Taiwan during the colonial period from 1895 to 1945. The Japanese 
administration created an infrastructure comprising railways, roads, communications, 
health care and public utilities, and also implemented agricultural improvements. In 
addition it laid the foundation for a national éducation system, with the result that at the 
end of Japan's tenure in 1945 the elementary school attendance rate was over 70% 
(Ishida, 1999). 
The présence of the Nationalists on the island posing as the legitímate government of 
China and the perceived need to contain communism in the emerging cold war 
environment induced America's first major contribution: economie and military aid 
supervised through the Council on United States Aid (CUSA) which carne into 
existance in 1948. This was to last thereafter until its curtailment in 1965, with the 
economie part mainly invested in state operated enterprises engaged in power supply, 
fertilisers, transportaron and sugar refining. These enterprises were in fact made up of 
fìrms requisitioned from the Japanese upon their departure and reconstituted as state 
monopolies. 
Apart from American aid, agriculture was the initial stimulant for economic take-off. 
Reform instigated by the government redistributed land to the active tenant farmers. 
This had the dual effect of encouraging agricultural produetivity while making a large 
section of the population extending across the island nation relatively positively 
disposed to government policy (Noble, 1998). The substantial increase in agricultural 
production attendant upon the reform together with advances in technology resulted in a 
capacity to satisfy domestic food demand at an early stage and to divert the surplus for 
export (Liu, 1999). This process yielded the means by which the economy could shift 
from primary to secondary industries; it realised the wherewithal to invest in industry 
and the foreign currency to import the essential materials and machinery. 
There were two interweaving éléments at work in Taiwan's economie policy-making of 
the 1950s. The first was the state capitalism practised by the Nationalist Party ostensibly 
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in adhérence to the thinking of Sun Yat-sen, its original founder and leader at the 
beginning of the twentieth Century. He was wary of the effects of private concentration 
of capital, and therefore advocated a mixed economy which was to include state-run 
monopolies purportedly beyond the financial and technological means of the private 
sector (Silin, 1976; Fields, 1995). Henee the protection and assistance afforded to them. 
The second was the dedication of economic technoerats freshly returned from sojoums 
at American universities. In a state-orchestrated development process, it was they who 
selected the 'take-off industries', including textiles, oil and fertilisers, which were to 
project the economy as a whole on the road to development. These technoerats built the 
enabling structure for industrial planning. Early in the decade they inaugurated the 
Economie Stabilisation Board (ESB) whose remit included trade and agricultural 
policy, and, within its Jurisdiction, the Industriai Development Commission (IDC) 
responsible for economie planning (Gold, 1986). In addition, righi from the start in the 
early 1950s, they prioritorised industriai technology. At their instigation, the 
government promulgated the TSational Guidelines for Long Range Scientific 
Development', in tandem with which it inaugurated the Council on Long Range 
Scientific Development (later renamed the National Science Council) which has since 
then published a series of National Science and Technology Development plans (Wade, 
1990:98). 
Düring the 1950s, much of this planning was with the aim of shoring up a vulnerable 
economy, the solution to which was seen as import substitution. With the impending 
withdrawal of American aid in the early 1960s, however, big changes were afoot with 
respect to both the scope of planning and the orientation of the economy. C U S A , having 
been inherited from the Americans, was reorganised as the Council for International 
Economic Cooperation and Development (CIEDC) endowed with a broad range of 
authority over the design, coordination and évaluation of ali economie policies (Fields, 
1995). As for orientation, export promotion rather than import substitution was now the 
watchword. One pivotai initiative for emphasising this orientation was the Statute for 
the Establishment and Management of Export Processing Zones promulgated in 1965 
(Gold, 1986), the first such export processing zone (EPZ) being opened in Kaohsiung in 
1966. EPZs were especially significant because they favoured foreign capital 
investment, offering duty-free importation of intermediate goods, superior 
infrastructural facilities, and simplified administrative procédures (Gamblin, 1992; 
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Yamauchi, 1998). In actual fact, though, Taiwan quickly established its appeal in a 
general sensé, for many export-driven foreign affiliâtes also started to set up outside the 
EPZs (Scott, 1979). On thèse the government exerted pressure to forge as many 
linkages as possible with domestic firms, including conforming to local content 
requirements and entering into subcontracting relationships (Amsden, 1991). At the 
same time, August 1962 saw the passing of a 'technology collaboration ordinance', 
which laid down the stipulations for technology licensing. In this way both the carrot 
and the stick were applied to induce foreign capital to play its part in opening up and 
upgrading the economy. 
Hence, technological change contributed substantially to Taiwan's economic growth and 
much of this technological upgrading had its roots in FDI (Schive, 1990; Wang, 1994). 
With the about-turn to export orientation in the early 1960s, FDI came to be construed 
in a very différent light. Instead of being an adjunct to protectionism, FDI was to 
become a springboard for export expansion, and foreign firms Willing to conform to this 
rôle were sought. In fact, 1964 can be seen as the turning point, for whereas Taiwan 
attracted less than US$100 million in FDI during the previous thirteen years (Gold, 
1988), it saw nearly a fivefold increase to US$466 million in the following six years 
from 1965 to 1970 (Myers, 1986:49). Japan and the United States predominate here too, 
for it is they, along with the overseas Chinese, who have been by far the most important 
sources of inward FDI for Taiwan over the past four décades. 
Industriai production had already doubled in the 1950s, and with the new policy 
direction well in place by the mid-1960s take-off was in the making. Among the major 
beneficiaries of this boyancy were Japanese companies who were just starting to look at 
Taiwan from the perspective of international division of labour come the second half of 
the 1960s. Japan's 'miracle' was not Ieast founded on flooding the American market 
with cheap textile, plastic and electronic items. American manufacturer responded by 
heading for low-cost labour production sites, which in turn forced the Japanese likewise 
to abandon domestic production to ensure survival. In this process, many American and, 
subsequently, Japanese companies resorted to Taiwan, which as a resuit became at one 
and the same time "a repository for industriai sectors no longer viable in the United 
States or Japan" (Gold, 1986:81) and an offshore arena where firms from both countries 
presumed to refurbish their competitive edge, primarily against each other. This was 
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also the time that Japanese L M E s started to enter as Investors, including both the 
makers of end-user products and those manufacturing intermediary goods for both 
Taiwan-based and Japan-based corporate customers. Représentative ofthe first category 
among the five case studies in Chapter Seven is Pentel (stationary goods), and of the 
second category is Mabuchi (electric/electronic motors). 
5.6.2 First Phase to Start of 1970s: Adding the Politicai Realities 
The above is an economic account, assuming a pivotai enabling rôle for the 
government. However, inasmuch as government is essentially a politicai organ from 
which economie policy and structure emanate, a description of the economy without 
référence to the politicai background, particularly in Taiwan's case, would remain a 
depictìon of a bland and uncontoured terrain. More to the point, an account of the 
politica! circumstances in Taiwan offers clues to the 'missing links' which became 
increasingly apparent as the economy evolved over the first phase. This is because, 
throughout this phase, Taiwan was a single-party dictatorship on a quasi-war footing 
with an agenda which was politicai, and where économies was very much subservient 
to this politicai cause. The Nationalist Party (KMT) , as the government of the whole of 
China, recovered Taiwan from the Japanese at the end of the Second World War. It 
subsequently withdrew to Taiwan as the claìmant to be ruler of China in 1949 following 
its defeat by the Communists. Between times, in 1948, in putting down a citizen's 
rébellion, known as the February 28 l h Incident, against its authoritarianism, the K M T 
slaughtered an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 Taiwanese, many of them the intellectual 
elite of the island. This was the start of the 'White Terror' of subjugation which was to 
reign thereafter for over twenty years, and which to a large extent pitted the 
Mainlanders, who had followed the Nationalists to Taiwan (waishengren), against the 
local inhabitants, the descendants of people who had immigrated to Taiwan over a 
period of some four hundred years (benshengren). 
One conséquence is that, because of the highly charged atmosphère where propaganda 
prevailed over truth and every word published was under the eye of the censor, the 
statistics produced and the received opinion concocted on which aecounts such as this 
rely are - at any event for the first decade - of questionable value (Gates, 1996; Ishida, 
1999). There has doubtless been some hindsight cleansing of the faets. It would seem, 
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for example, that land reform was not so much a matter of artless implementation of 
Sun Yat-sen's principles intent on a Chinese-style démocratisation, but rather a cold 
exercise in social control aimed as much at military ambition as economic development. 
The government sought to control both the economy as such for political ends and the 
information consequent upon this control. Its preoccupation with control of the 
economy is well illustrated by the list of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Box 2. 
Herein is a framework of centralised industrial dominance by which it was intended to 
manipulate the socioeconomic structure as a whole, incorporating all the basic elements 
of strategy (petroleum, shipbuilding), infrastructure (power, cement), production 
(machinery, textiles), and subsistence (fertilizer, sugar). It has been estimated that in 
1952 as much as 56% of total industrial production (value added at 1966 prices) and 
56% of manufacturing output was accounted for by SOEs (Amsden, 1991:1123). The 
manufacturing ratio was to decline by some 20% by the 1970s, although the upstream 
predominance of SOEs was to remain essentially intact (Amsden, 1989, 1991). 
The government also attempted to wield the main influence on the economy's 
development and, through its agencies, present itself as the main instigator of progress, 
including through the introduction of foreign investment. In this light, the industry 
originating in the decade of the 1960s which seemingly owes most to the joint attentions 
of government planner and foreign investor is electronics. It is not only the most 
outstanding example of the success that has been achieved in Taiwan with the 
assistance of F D l , but also affords insights into the ambiguities attendant upon such a 
progression. There was, for instance, a consciously designed effort to elevate the 
industry's status initiated with the government's expressed intention in 1966 to make 
Taiwan an electronics centre. In so doing it revised laws to give preferential treatment 
to investors in that sector and the Council for International Cooperation and 
Development inaugurated the Working Group for Planning and Development of the 
Electronics Industry. However, what followed was neither smooth nor particularly 
regulated. According to Hobday (1995), for example, foreign investors were reluctant to 
buy components locally, while much of the early transfer of technology was intrafirm 
and therefore inaccessible to most Taiwanese, rendering initial efforts at technological 
and industrial intervention largely ineffectual during the 1960s and 1970s. And yet the 
industry grew astronomically. 
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BOX 2 
Taiwan: Major State-Owned Enterprises circa 1954 
Chinese Petroleum Corporation, Taiwan Aluminum Corporation, Taiwan Gold and 
Copper Mining Administration, Hsinchu Coal Mining Administration, Taiwan 
Steel Works. Taiwan Salt Works, China Textile Industries Corporation. Taiwan 
Power Company, Taiwan Sugar Corporation (with 30 sugar mills, 41,888 hectares 
of cane farm, 3,247 km of railroad), Taiwan Cement Corporation, Taiwan 
Fertilizer Corporation, Taiwan Alkali Company, Taiwan Paper and Pulp 
Corporation, Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation, Taiwan Machinery Corporation, 
Taiwan Industrial and Mining Corporation (with metallurgical and mining, 
chemical, textile, and engineering divisions), Taiwan Agricultural and Forestry 
Development Corporation (tea, pineapples, marine prods, livestock), Taiwan 
Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau, Taiwan Agricultural Chemical Works, 
Taiwan Camphor Bureau. 
Number of people employed by these companies: 84,300 (this contrasts with the 
120,000 employed by registered private companies, mostly very small). 
Source: Derived from Gates (1996:214) 
A clue to the reason for this can be found in the fact that, type of government apart, 
Taiwan had a dependent or 'late developer' status. As such it lacked pioneering 
technologies and innovating capacities. In seeking to achieve economic development, 
given this inherent disadvantage, latecomers have diversified into a host of maturing 
industries, a role in Taiwan assumed by a plethora of small firms. Contradicting the 
view usually espoused by economists, Gates (1996), an anthropologist, claims that it 
was in fact these firms which became the engine of export growth in a country with a 
small domestic market and therefore highly dependent on exports. However, these 
SMEs were also heavily reliant on the large-scale upstream suppliers for raw and 
intermediate materials, as well as in many cases for technology and finance. Moreover, 
monopolising the banking system as it did, the Nationalist Party made cheap capital 
available to state-run enterprises and a few favoured large private-sector corporations, 
while all but ignoring the smaller private-sector firms (Hatch and Yamamura, 1996). 
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One conséquence of this was that Taiwanese private-sector firms allied themselves with 
foreign firms for material inputs, original equipment manufacture (OEM) production 
agreements, and markets. What this also meant was an uneven juxtaposition of business 
and technological roles. Henee, to take the case of electronics again, while safeguarding 
its technological know-how, Japanese L M E Mabuchi could seil its motors to small 
Taiwanese firms making electric razors and toys on an O E M basis for American buyers. 
Here the implication is that the electronics industry was not so much the child of 
government planning, but rather nurtured by foreign demand and realised by politically 
disaffected native businessmen, often originating within the local SME sector, who 
relied on a core input from a Japanese L M E . 
This division of roles constituted the seedbed in which Taiwan's distinctive version of 
the dual economy was to grow. Unlike the delineation commonly applied in Japan's 
case between keiretsu and SMEs, the démarcation in Taiwan's case was between SOEs 
(waishengren) and SMEs (benshengren), which when elaborated produces a picture as 
outlined in Box 4. Amsden (1991) sees Taiwan's company structure as being similar to 
that of other late-industrialising countries, being characterised by highly diversified 
business groups, and only differing somewhat in the small average company size on the 
one hand and the power of the large companies - SOEs, private-sector domestic and 
foreign - in the whole setup on the other. However, it is this very polarisation plus the 
speed and energy with which economic progress was pursued that can give extra 
credence to the particular attraction Taiwan potentially had for Japanese L M E s . As 
already noted in Chapter Four, the émergence of L M E s in Japan can be partly 
accredited to the need to accelerate the response to external pressure and national 
ambition. By contrast, given the adversarial internal politicai situation, conjoined with 
mounting foreign demand, it is as if Taiwan did not have time to generate indigenous 
LME-type specialists, and therefore looked outside for key éléments required for its 
economic well-being. This is discussed rurther later in this chapter. 
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BOX 3 
Taiwan 's Dual Economy circa early 1960s 
Public sector 
= capital-Ztechnology-intensive industries 
= heavy industries 
= large enterprises 
= upstream industries 
= domestic market monopolists 
= chiefly run by waishengren 
= Chinese 
Private sector 
= labour-intensi ve industries 
= light/processing industries 
= small and medium enterprises 
= downstream industries 
= overseas exporters 
= chiefly run by benshengren 
= Taiwanese 
Source: Derived from Ishida (1999), p. 21 
But at the culmination of this first phase politics was to strike one more devastating 
blow, which would give further définition to the Taiwan that Japanese L M E s 
contemplated as a business proposition. Progressive^ isolated from the international 
community politically speaking, the Taiwanese government took it upon itself to 
withdraw from the United Nations in 1971. With the simultaneous loss of U.S. support 
for military adventure - leaving aside the practical certainty of failure - the K M T 
realised that not only was retaking the Mainland out of the question but that its own 
very survival was coterminous with the existance of Taiwan. Taiwan started to become 
Taiwan, not China. This heralded the Taiwanisation of the island's economy and the 
second phase of its post-war economie development commencée. The key politicai 
events leading to this economie eventuality are summarised in Fig. 5.7. 
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5.6.3 Second Phase: Taiwanisation 
The effect of this was that Taiwan, as an increasingly and self-consciously distinctive 
entity, started to become a dynamicatly, upwardly-mobile economy. 1t commenced on a 
transformation from workhorse depository to disciple of growth through technology, a 
process which not only offered Japanese L M E s already committed to Taiwan the option 
of enhancing their Operations, but also acted as an inducement to other Japanese L M E s 
to join them there. Symbolising this new departure was the attention now paid to 
physical capital outlays in the form of railways, roads, harbours, airports and so on. 
These had been left virtually untouched since Japanese colonial times. The government 
now took it upon itself to rectify this situation, launching the first package covering 'ten 
major construction projects' - six of which entailed modernisation of the transport 
system - in 1973. Having passed through rehabilitation in the 1950s and export 
orientation in the 1960s, the economy was now to turn to an era of industriai upgrading. 
There was to be a shift from labour-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive. This 
necessitated an even more pronounced intake of foreign technology (Sato, 1999). 
Just over twenty years after the culmination of the Chinese civil war, it was possible for 
the leadership of Taiwan to draw on accumulated physical and educational resources to 
target specific industriai policy objectives rather than sketch a broad, ambiguous 
framework. This entailed the acquisition of meticulously identified technologies to 
complément and enhance the parallel development of domestic capabilities. To this end 
a number of government-s ponsò re d laboratories were created and various industry-
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oriented assistance organisations established; graduate programs were expanded and 
funds were made available for acquiring foreign technology and promoting domestic 
R & D . 
As regards the institutional makeup, in 1973 the Council for International Coopération 
and Development (CIECD), which had been responsible for designing, coordinating and 
evaluating économie policies since 1965, was replaced by the more professionally 
oriented Economie Planning Council (EPC). ïn 1977 the EPC then merged with the 
Finance and Economie Group to form the Council of Economie Planning and 
Development (CEPD). The year 1973 also saw the début of the Industrial Technology 
Research Institute (ÏTRI). The primary function of ITRI was as partner in high-priority 
projects devised by the government, and its initiation was in fact inspired by recognized 
need to hone R&D in integrated circuitry (Meaney, 1994). Thereafter, once ITRI's 
technology in a given area had developed to a certain level it was disseminated to the 
private sector for commercialisation. By the 1980s, ITRI was operating more as an 
intermediary, orchestrating a wide array of consortia for technology transfer and 
channelling large subsidies from the Ministry of Economie Affairs ( M O E A ) for this 
purpose. It also functioned as negotiator as the Taiwanese electronics manufacturer 
began to challenge the American and Japanese, rendering the latter more wary about 
potentially self-destructive collaboration. There were further refinements too. Created 
as a distinct institute under ITRI in 1974 was the Electronics Research and Service 
Organisation (ERSO) which took over the integrated circuitry project and became 
Taiwan's premier research center for complex microelectronics. In turn, ERSO's early 
prominance in software was eventually eclipsed by the Information Industry Institute 
followingthe latter's establishment in 1979. 
In précise terms, in the 1970s the emphasis was on a transference from labour-intensive 
to capital-intensive as typified by télévision sets, machinery and petrochemicals. Corne 
the 1980s, the strategy lens homed in on microelectronics, information processing, 
materials, and computers. (Wade, 1990; Gamblin, 1992; Yamauchi, 1998; Asamoto, 
1999). This advance to a further stage was symbolised and subsequently bolstered by 
the government's establishment of Hsinchu Science and Industry Park, which "has 
replaced the three export processing zones in overall importance" (Simon, 1992:140). 
Two features characterise the Taiwanese approach here. First, it unabashedly welcomed 
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FDI as a vehicle for the introduction of new technology, while at the same time trying 
to ensure that this was an integrative process founded on its own scientific and 
technological readiness to absorb the inflow (Simon, 1992; Smith 2000). In addition, 
the purchasing of technology from abroad was often effected by government agencies, 
like the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), for subséquent dissémination 
to the private sector (Simon, 1992). Second, with progressive politicai démocratisation 
the government gradually brought in, and ceded ground to, the private sector as 
illustrated by the privatisation of state-owned firms and the involvement of depoliticised 
industry associations in policy decision-making (Noble, 1998; Huang, 2001). Come the 
I980s, in fact, the legislative watchwords were libéralisation and opening up the 
economy. The rules for compétition were clarified in the Fair Trade Act of 1982, to be 
followed in 1983 by stipulations in the Foreign Trade Act restricting government 
intervention in business activities (Yatani, 1990). 
In short, the government was now promoting the economy in the interests of the 
economy itself and not for extraneous politicai ends. This expansive policy did nothing 
to hinder the inflow of FDI; quite the reverse. As can be seen in Table 5.4, there is a 
considerable and sometimes huge increase in FDI to Taiwan from each of the countries 
given between the last decade of the first phase and the first decade of the second phase. 
Thereafter, until very recent times, progress on aggregate has been virtually 
unstoppable, notwithstanding two oil shocksT the normalisation of relations between the 
United States and Communist China, the rapid émergence of alternative investment 
locations within the région, particularly the Mainland itself, and the Asian financial 
crisis. Moreover, a further quantum leap was achieved in the 1980s which brought 
cumulative FDI to US$8.5 billion in 1988. What is more, in just three years from 1987 
to 1989, Investments matched the US$4.7 billion comprising the total for three and a 
half décades from 1952 to 1986 (Klein, 1992:268). 
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Table 5.4 Taiwan: Approved Inward FDI by Year and by Area 
Units: US$1,000, (Cases) 
Area 1952 1953-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 
Hong Kong 1.067 3,658 59,445 276,639 1.092,977 2.118,458 
(5) (27) (423) (486) (488) (630) 
Japan - 4,873 98.303 323,906 3,317,240 4,939,558 
(22) (445) (457) 0,101) (1,748) 
Singapore - 146 1,210 241,217 226,549 3,122,479 
(2) (7) (34) (134) (485) 
Philippines - 302 47,004 102,091 172,398 571,400 
(1) (57) (54) (57) (31) 
U.S. - 23,615 223,605 705,167 2,695,807 7,091,291 
(16) (158) (248) (621) (1,224) 
Britain - 2,771 7,898 316,123 1.367,715 
(8) (7) (50) (150) 
Netherlands - - 22.403 85,634 382,364 1,126,142 
(4) (7) (52) (116) 
Austral i a - - 233 2,168 129.578 770,538 
(l) (5) (24) (68) 
Source: Figures derived from Statistics on Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment, 
Investment Commission, Ministry of Economie AfFairs. 
Also reflected in the FDI figures is the fact that Taiwan's adaptation is to a marked 
degree intraindustry, and this has over time helped to further define its distinetive 
characteristics to the potential investor from abroad. As can be gleaned from Table 5.5, 
electronic and electric appliances, chemicals, and machine equipment have been 
consistently vibrant and transforming in themselves. Taiwan was designated by 
Japanese and American firms as long ago as the 1960s as an offshore produetion base 
for these industries, a Status it has maintained by adapting to the regional and global 
flow of demands this implies (Sugioka, 2001) (3). Throughout the time since the 1960s 
Japanese firms have been major investors in Taiwan in all three of these industries, not 
least Japanese LMEs , To cite companies from among the five case studies in Chapter 
Seven again, Mabuchi quickly became an integral part of Taiwan's electrical and 
electronics industry from the very end of the first phase at the beginning of the 1970s in 
supplying motors to power a variety o f simple consumer goods manufactured by both 
Japanese and Taiwanese owned assemblers. Then, because of the progress in that 
industry into Computers and Communications equipment in the 1980s, it was the turn of 
Union Tool and Tanaka Kikinzoku to invest in Taiwan affiliates in order to service the 
manufacturers of same with state-of-the-art drill bits and precious metals totally or 
largely unavailable from local suppliers. 
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Table 5.5 Taiwan: Approved Inward Investment by Year and by Industry 
Units: US$1,000, (Cases) 
Industry 1952 1953-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 
Agriculture - 405 1,169 1,388 1,040 982 
& Forestry (2) (8) (4) (7) (3) 
Fishery & - 229 4,250 6,976 19,117 1,879 
Animal Husb (4) (17) (32) (10) (2) 
Mining - 73 310 191 12,499 6.436 
(I) (t) (2) (3) (5) 
Food& - 3,423 18,597 36,382 549.364 599.907 
Beverage (12) (68) (46) (108) (94) 
Textile 961 4,260 16,930 65,606 154,944 323,280 
(3) (7) (45) (40) (21) (30) 
Garment & - 121 17,789 19,977 31,103 105,100 
Footwear (4) (102) (64) (27) (27) 
Leather & - 77 2,078 8.258 14,275 146,254 
FurP (2) (19) (19) (21) (H) 
Lumber & - 86 2,970 19,744 54,310 43,498 
Bamboo P (0) (33) (39) (25) (19) 
Paper P & - 739 3,120 12,324 49,806 93,980 
Printing (3) (19) (20) (28) (26) 
Chemicals 8 17,819 62,682 229,588 1,905,108 1,712,513 
(1) (19) (98) (120) (215) (149) 
Rubber P - 100 12,336 54,505 333,915 98,177 
(0 (111) (102) (85) (12) 
Non-Ferrous - 1,303 14,245 313,554 190,450 252,369 
Metals (7) (60) (78) (63) (39) 
Basic Metals 98 - 17,278 159,212 770,953 1,328,024 
& Métal P (1) (104) (152) (221) (144) 
Machinery - 361 15,178 147,930 892,917 706,556 
Equipaient (5) (41) (97) (188) (201) 
Electronic & - 1,043 220,311 630,492 2,283,494 7,275,664 
Electric App (2) (160) (246) (393) (925) 
Construction - 11 23,402 77,862 48,683 414,863 
(t) (71) (85) (43) (173) 
Transport'n - 614 12,832 33,411 271,212 660,473 
(1) (23) (39) (62) (150) 
Banking & - - 10,380 90,717 743,448 5,953,172 
Insurance (10) (24) (83) (513) 
Services - 2,191 45,878 209,467 1,302.293 2,803,128 
(2) (52) (85) (535) (1,153) 
Source: As per Table 5.4. 
N B : P = products 
5.7 Taiwan's Attraction for Japanese LMEs 
The L M E is a concentrated 'chamber' of expertise (Chapter Two) which, in the case of 
the Japanese version, has evolved under specific historical conditions to become a 
highly effective contributor to that nation's economy (Chapter Four). Part I of this 
chapter has discussed the rôle of the East Asian région, of which Japan is a component 
part, could have played in the internationalisation of this particular type of company. 
Subsequently, Part II has so far described the country within the East Asian région 
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which, because of its perrennially strong ties with Japan and its post-war path and 
advancing nature of economic development, could arguabty hold out the most attraction 
for the Japanese L M E , especially in its initial internationalisation stage. We are now in 
a position to elaborate further on what this attraction could entail before turning to the 
aggregate sample and the case studies in the following two chapters for a more detailed 
and firm-focused interprétation of L M E motives, behaviours and impacts. 
5.7.1 The Positives 
As soon as it could begin to stand on its own feet in the beginning of the 1950s, Taiwan 
has always maintained a constructive approach to inward investment, even though in 
the First instance this was chiefly directed at creating a fortress of self-sufficiency. 
Hence, in 1952 the govemment authorised the Régulations for the Encouragement of 
Investment in Productive Enterprises by Overseas Chinese and Chinese Résidents in 
Hong Kong and Macao. This process was then turther facilitated by the Régulations 
Governing the Importation of Commodities with Self-Provided Exchange by Overseas 
Chinese for the Purpose of Making Investment in Productive Enterprise. The 
perspective was broadened two years later with the Statute for Investment by Non-
Chinese Foreigners and, in 1955, the Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese 
(Schive, 1990:9-10). So with no export policy yet explicit, in the early 1960s the large 
household electrical makers Sanyo, Matsushita and Hitachi arrived simply to exploit 
local demand (Zhou and Lin, 1999) in a neighboring country and thereby flex their 
internationalising muscles. However, a change of mood in the Taiwanese administration 
was already stirring. The implementation of the second four-year plan as of 1957 saw 
the beginning of a mutation in policy direction from import substitution to the 
promotion and expansion of exports. This portended moves extending into the 1960s 
entailing the first tentative steps into tax reform, deregulation, restoration of market 
functions, easing of exchange rate controls, and the création of a capital market (Itoh, 
1999), creating the conditions also for FDI on a large scale. So when they started to 
appear in the latter half of the decade, Japanese L M E s were met with an 
accommodating administrative disposition. 
Added to which, Japan itself had been responsable for laying the groundwork in terms 
of utilities and basic industriai and social structure during its colonial rule of the island. 
By the beginning of the 1940s, nearly a quarter of a million Taiwanese were industriai 
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occupations. "Japan's colonial activities contributed in various ways to Taiwan's post-
war economie success. Colonial development established a rapid trajectory of growth, a 
market culture and an economy [at the start of the 1940s] with the highest exports per 
head of any country in Asia, including Japan" (Howe, 1996:364). At any event, upon 
arriving in Taiwan after the Second World War, the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang 
Kai-shek had inherited a legaey of Japanese rule which placed Taiwan on a 
considerably higher level of productive capability than East Asian countries other than 
Japan (Ishida, 1999). This was conducive to making many Taiwanese well-disposed 
toward the Japanese. The Taiwanese authorities distinguish between overseas Chínese 
and others partially because the former are not really 'foreign'. Japanese Investors are, 
but they still share many characteristics with the Chinese, bolstered by 50 years 
expérience of colonial rule which enhanced their knowledge of Taiwan's economy, 
language and culture. "This unique expérience, based largely on personal contact, helps 
reduce both risk and investment size" (Schive, 1990:13, 15). Henee, the smaller 
Japanese firm was on more familiar ground, and certainly in a more friendly 
environment, than it would have been almost anywhere else outside Japan, because of 
their historical and cultural affinity. 
Taiwan's state of readiness was also enhanced by the éducation system it had Iargely 
inherited from Japanese rule. It was an institution resolutely adhered to and embellished 
by the Taiwanese thereafter, culminating in an illiteracy rate of only 6.8% by 1990 
(Gamblin, 1992:209). So, while in the early stage labour was cheap and abundant, 
compared with potential alternatives this labour was also diseiplined and educated, and 
constituted a competitive advantage which proved fortuitously timely in the 
expansionary world trade environment of the 1960s. Moreover, it meant that, as 
development progressed, the Taiwanese could absorb intellectually and practically the 
new and increasingly sophisticated technologies brought in because emphasis in this 
éducation was placed on what was required, science and engineering (Wade, 1990). 
This in turn meant that a pool of capability was there for Japanese L M E s to tap either 
upon entry or when subsequently upgrading the content of their affiliâtes1 activities. 
But probably the single most salient positive reason for Japanese L M E s ' continuing 
investment in Taiwan through to the 1990s was economic growth, particularly as it 
picked up from the 1970s. Despite the periods of turmoil both domestic and 
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international, Taiwan's economy blossomed as never before in the first decade of this 
second phase, not least because rising raw material costs and aggressive compétition 
forced multinationals and Japanese companies of all sizes to seek out cheaper 
manufacturing venues. Taiwan's annual growth rate during that decade peaked at 13.5% 
(Gamblin, 1992:55). Although it dipped to 6% in the 1980s, by that time almost ail the 
major electronics multinationals - and therefore quite a number of attendant L M E s -
were represented in Taiwan (Wade, 1990). In other words, Taiwan had largely 
successtully engaged in using and enhancing its competitive advantage to achieve an 
unprecedented degree of prosperity (Porter, 1990), which Japanese L M E s both 
contributed to and fed off. It constituted a setting that was géographie al ly, historically 
and culturally proximate, with an appropriate combination of assets and location factors 
and a buoyant market environment that made it uniquely suited to the 'first choice - first 
time' location in East Asia for internationalising L M E s from the mid-1960s onwards. 
5.7.2 Taiwan's Shortcomings 
However, the attraction of Taiwan for Japanese L M E s can equally well be construed 
from the Standpoint of what Taiwan lacked. Elucidatine this leads to insights as to what 
opportunities were opened up for Japanese LMEs in Taiwan and what thèse L M E s 
subsequently contributed to the évolution of the Taiwanese economy. As has already 
been implied, Taiwan's dual structure is partially due to its late developer status. 
Lateness refers to countries that have had to industrialise without the competitive asset 
of new products or processes (Amsden, 1991). But there is a ranking at work here too. 
Taiwan would make the grade with regard to most of Gershenkron's (1966) 
prerequisites for labour, for example; Taiwanese workers by the beginning of the first 
phase being relatively stable, reliable, disciplined and suitable for using in factories, 
although not already cut off from direct connection with the land (Gershenkron, 
1966:9). But while this labour force may have been diligent and upgraded in quality, 
during the first phase in particular, in the main this did not generate home-grown 
innovation or improvements in technology (Kim and Lau, 1993). As a resuit, even by 
the early 1970s a large part of Taiwan's exports were still labour-intensive products 
involving relatively simple technologies, such as textiles, electrical equipment, plastic 
items, and plywood (Liu, 1999:15). 
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By contrast, Japan was a late-comer twice in a sensé, once during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth Century and a second time after the Second World War, both as a resuit of 
self-imposed isolation from the West. But while it did not invent the steam engine or the 
computer, it was at both times high enough up the ranking to demónstrate a 
considerable ability for absorption plus incrementai improvement and innovation 
(Herbig, 1995), which proved to be the incubating environment for many LMEs . 
Despite its heavy technological indebtedness, Japan can still be termed a proactive 
instigator. lt devised an industrial policy for catching up with the world leaders; it kept 
inward FDI to the minimum; it created its own institutional arrangements through 
general trading companies, banks, JETRO, etc. for attacking overseas markets; it sought 
to master all tasks. By comparison, Taiwan is best described as a proactive candidate. 
Industrial policy, in the first phase at least, is in part an attempi to set the scene for 
attracting inward FDI. Having been enticed, overseas investors, especially from the 
United States and Japan, picked Taiwan as a better bargain than other candidates. In this 
way, right from the start in the early 1960s, Taiwan embarked on the path of being 
internationalised largely by outside forces rather than creating and mobilising internally 
the industriai resources required for entry onto the international stage. It performed 
specified tasks as a link in a chain of activities over which it had little control. Unlike 
Japan, again during the first phase, there was no thought of Taiwan becoming an 
autonomous economie power per se, not least because the notion still prevailed among 
the leadership of 'Taiwan as China' rather than 'Taiwan as Taiwan'. So there was not the 
pressure-cooker atmosphère ñor nationalist fervour that absorbed the Japanese as they 
strove to compete on the same level as the West, extruding the L M E in the process. 
However, there was "the magnitude of the challenge" which arguably injected a 
retarding factor (Gershenkron, 1966:18); or in other words, pressure from without 
induced an even profounder reliance on a well-worn institution, the Chinese family 
business, which became a dominant form of Taiwanese private-sector firm. 
To read Whitley (1992), the Chinese family business (CFB) is the very antithesis of the 
L M E . Essenüally equating to the business group, or guanxiqiye, the CFB is a collection 
of businesses which individually can be fairly specialised but are quite diverse as a 
whote. The CFB may thus be involved in a wide variety of industries through 
shareholdings, partnerships and family alliances (Redd'mg, 1991; Sheah. 1992; 
Backman, 1995: Hamilton, 1997). Market relations are parti eu laristic and based on 
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personal contacts. Risk is managed by minimising commitments to particular product 
lines and technologies and relying on high levéis of outsourcing and subcontracting. 
The CFB focuses on flexibility and limiting the extent of commitment to suppliers, 
traders and customers. With the exception of a few specialists, the CFB places little 
importance on employées recruited from outside the family. While, as with the L M E , 
the identification of ownership with control proscribes growth of managerial hierarchy, 
in the CFB's case the lack of empathy with the staff limits the scope for investing in 
capital-intensive activities which required délégation to compétent managers and 
technicians. There is therefore little incentive to be professional^ creative and plan for 
further, long-term expansion. Moreover, family control being the paramount concern, 
many inheritors prefer to seil the business or company units within it in order to realise 
their assets. 
In other words, we are back to the distinction between SMEs and LMEs first made in 
Chapter Two. The bulk of Taiwanese SMEs, even the successful ones, showed no 
inclination or potential for becoming L M E s . They had little or no long-term 
commitment to technological efficiency and improvement, no intensely focused market 
targeting. There was no managerial shift in gravity from kindred to the corporate 
collectivity. Indeed, the managerial culture that prevailed worked against the long-term 
commitment to focus and development of core competencies essential to the création of 
the philosophy of articulation. Their actions denoted flexibility rather than articulation. 
In fact they were offering credence to the notion that the S M E "cannot be credited with 
developing the forces of production in late-industrialising countries, even in Taiwan" 
(Amsden, 1989:164). While they looked to the SOEs, which monopolised their 
respective domestic markets, for some of their required materials and equipment, many 
Taiwanese SMEs were not organically enmeshed with thèse SOEs in what could be 
construed as part of a prolonged, mutually beneficiai endeavour. Rather, they followed 
their own pattern of development which was outward-directed and offen entailed 
forging associations with foreign capital. The plastic goods manufacturing industry 
affords a perfect example of where this character and positioning could lead. In 1966 
there were 671 SMEs making simple plastic items like boards, pipes, bags, and 
sundries. By 1976 this had risen to over 5,500 companies doing the same thing. Of this 
number, 61% had fewer than 10 employées, and the fact that they comprised 97% of the 
companies in the business in Taiwan did nothing to enhance their importance (Zhou and 
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Lin, 1999:66). To return to the relevant triangle in Seki's (1996) diagram, they were 
part of the amorphous crowd in the intermediate technologies. In a country increasingly 
reliant on special technologies, the more demanding industriai customers developing in 
Taiwan often had to look to non-Taiwanese suppliers, not least Japanese LMEs (Schive, 
1996). 
5.7.3 The Linkage Function 
This has not meant indiscriminate foreign input, however. In Taiwan's case, unlike in 
Malaysia and Singapore, FDI has contributed only modestly to capital formation, and 
this mainly in manufacturing (Smith, 2000). Financial capita! was, after ali, readily 
available on the island. Miyashiro (1999) is categorica! in stating that, looked at in 
macro terms, the contribution of foreign capita! in Taiwan is not that great. However, 
many case studies moke it clear that at industry and company level it is FDI and foreign 
technology that has made the différence (Miyashiro, 1999:177). It introduced new 
technologies, bolstered exports in electronics especially, and gave rise to several new 
export industries (Schive. 1990; Hobday, 1995). As Table 5.6 shows, even in the 1960s 
the contribution of foreign capital to fixed capital formation for all industries was only 
3.4%, and 5.8% when limited to the private sector. Having declined fiirther thereafter it 
began to rise in the second half of the 1980s due to changes in the macroeconomic 
environment. Nevertheless, it remained low by international standards as Table 5.7 
makes clear. However, it is not the volume but the specifically targeted nature of 
industriai FDI that is important. 
Table 5.6 Taiwan's Inward FDI and Gross Do mes tic Capital Formation 
(Units:US$l million, %) 
Peri od Total FDI Gross Fixed Capital P/S Fixed Capital Total Ratio P/S Ratio 
(1) Formation (2) Formation (3) d)/(2) d)/(3) 
1960-69 185 5,382 3,181 3.4 5.8 
1970-79 682 43.435 22,522 1.6 3.0 
1980-86 1,438 88,765 47,678 1.6 3.0 
1987-90 4,608 116,700 66,966 3.9 6.9 
1991-97 10,113 364,694 192,351 2.8 5.3 
1. P/S = private sector. 
2. The value of inward FDI based on international balance of payments. 
3. Fixed capital formation converted to US$ according to the exchange rate. 
Source: Council for Economie Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data 
Book, various issues. 
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Table 5.7 Ratios oflnward FDI to Gross Do m est ic Capital Formation 
1971-1993 (annual average) 
Area 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1993 
China 0.0 0.1 0.9 2.1 ¡0.4 
Hong Kong 5.9 4.2 6.9 12.9 5.7 
India 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 
Thailand 3.0 1.5 3.0 6.5 4.7 
South Korea 1.9 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.6 
Malaysia 15.2 11.9 10.8 11.7 24.6 
Philippines 1.0 0.9 0.8 6.7 4.6 
Singapore 15.0 16.6 17.4 35.0 37.4 
Taiwan 1.4 1,2 1.5 3.7 2.6 
Indonesia 4.6 2.4 0.9 2.1 4.5 
Sources: U N C T A D , World Investment Report, 1993 Annex Table 3 (for 1971-80), and 
World Investment Report, 1995, Annex Table 4 (for 1981-93). 
B O X 4 
Supplying the Missing Link 
Missing Link 





L M E Year of Entrv Products 
Teikoku Tsushin 1965 rhéostats and power swttches 
K O A 1966 resistors 
Arakawa Chemical 1967 paper strengthening agents and fenol resin 
Matsumoto Yushi-Seiyak Ü 1968 synthetic starch and oily agents for textiles 
Nippon Valqua 1969 asbestos sheet, tape seals, synthetic rubber O rings 
Hosiden 1970 Switches, connectors, drivers, remote controls 
Source: Z N K (1998) 
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In essence, Taiwan embarked on a navigated infusion of FDI, employing it as a means 
to embrace the outside world and testing its fundamental rationale of transferring firm 
and industry specific intangible assets (Smith, 2000). The configuration which 
transpired was - in its incubation phase at least - a division of labour among the 
investing firms, local capital and the state which in time spawned variegated vertical 
and horizontal linkages. By forging ties with foreign capital, Taiwanese firms were able 
more easily to import the requisite machinery, technology, components, raw materials 
and organisât io nal know-how, process the goods using Taiwan's low-cost and plentiful 
labour force, and then export abroad, especially to the United States. In this light, one of 
the noticeable aspects of Taiwan's inward FDI is the complementary and upgrading role 
specialist entrants began to play frorn the second half of the 1960s. Hence, as shown in 
Box 4, Japanese LMEs started to enter to make good the missing link, thereby 
responding to the 'technology proximity presented by the Taiwanese, and thereafter 
remaining in many cases to move in concert with a progressing economy. Indeed, Liu 
(1996) perceives the trajectory of Taiwan's technological enhancement running 
consonant with the constantly elevating complexion of the technology of Japanese 
subsidiaries located in the country. 
One significant outcome of this influx and upgrading of foreign investment has been 
interdependence, spawned in the 1980s and fast matured in the 1990s. Its character can 
be read by two trends. First, extended expérience in manufacturing and R & D allowed 
Taiwanese firms to shed their reliance on 1TRI and other state bodies and to articulate 
their own path of évolution. Second, Taiwan's growing réputation as a technology hub 
has increasingly induced foreign firms - notably Japanese - to regard the island as a 
base for advanced manufacturing and R&D (Simon, 1992; Noble, 1998). This 'deeper 
integration' is emblematic of the transformation of Taiwan from being a nationalisée 
economy, then an international partner and on to being a significant player in the 
globalising economy. Moreover, in complementary fashion, this acquired capability and 
status has proved to be a modulating variable for Japanese L M E Investors in Taiwan, as 




Taiwan, as a proactive, relatively earlyyet relatively structurally deveioped host 
for FDI, has (i) been an attractive location for foreign firms especially in certain 
specific industries, and (ii) been able to utilise FDÎfor effectively leveraging its 
industriai upgrading and economie growth to a relatively 'high' stage of 
development. Inward investing Japanese LMEs have played an important rôle in 
implementing and complementing this, while benefiting from what Taiwan offers 
as a location for instigating their own internationalisation strategy through 





(a) What relevance has proximity, as represented by East Asia and Taiwan, had on 
investment activity by Japanese LMEs? 
(b) How has FDI by Japanese LMEs assisled them in their larger régional and global 
stratégies, and what have they contributed with respect to intégration and upgrading 
in the process? 
(c ) Analysing by way of a combined quantitative and qualitative approach. how is 
the LME concept useful in helping to elucidate the globalisation process? 
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5.8 Summary 
Regionalisation is an integral component of globalisation. The East Asian région, as the 
région in which the headquarters of Japanese LMEs are located, is therefore introduced. 
It is not yet a politicai or jurídica! unit, but has developed significantly since the 1960s 
as a recognisable economie entity driven by manufacturing trade and FDI, while 
mediated by some cultura! éléments and an ever more elaborate structure for economie 
governance. Highly ¡nfluential in both of thèse activities in the région have been Japan 
and the United States, although other countries began to contribute to intraregional 
development since the mid-1980s. 
Japanese business was initially attracted chiefly to the countries which came to be 
referred to the Asian NIEs (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) for 
reasons of geographical and cultural proximity, but also 'technological' proximity, 
which meant that they could handle the simpler manufacturing and marketing processes. 
Expérience in FDI and increasingly favourable conditions in other East Asian 
subsequently allowed the practice to spread region-wide. Japanese FDI has played a 
decisive role, assisting other countries in the région to enhance their economie 
performance, which has had the effect over time of making the Japanese more aware, as 
they elaborate their international division of labour stratégies, of the individuai 
attributes each of these countries possesses. Reflecting this, Japanese L M E s carne to 
perceive opportunities for their own expansion within the région as an approach to 
internationalisation, while at the same time complementing the needs of the host 
countries. 
Taiwan, both early on and as it progressed, arguably offered the most attractive first 
step for Japanese firms proposing to embark on internationalisation. This has been 
dubbed 'super proximity' because it was not only due to proximity in all its 
manifestations, but also to the particular passage of Taiwan's economic development, 
which in the first of the two phases postulated was profoundly influenced by politicai 
exigences. Economie planning was ultimately in the interests of a politicai China; 
industrial structure was built in an adversarial atmosphère, with large firms 
(waishengren) pitted against small ones (benshengren). This, together with the 
particular practices epitomised by the Chinese family business, had the effect of 
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creating gaps in the manufacturing production chains and end-user markets which 
Japanese L M E specialists could fili. A positive attraction also for many Japanese firms, 
including LMEs , was the establishment of Taiwan as a specialist location for certain 
lines of manufacturing, especially electrical and electronic goods. 
However, it was also politics - this time on the international stage - which was to 
transform this situation as Taiwan became increasingly politically, but not 
economically, isolated. Politicai and economie agendas then began to merge as 
Taiwanisation took hold in the 1970s. Industriai policy and private-sector inclination 
turned to replenishing the infrastructure and upgrading technology. This turn of events 
was to offer further inducements to Japanese LMEs , not only because of the 
constructive host country attitude towards FDI, but also because its demands for growth 
highlighted loopholes in specialist applications which thèse Japanese LMEs were in a 
position to fili through linkage. The internai integration thus created marked a further 
step in Taiwan's industriai upgrading because Japanese inputs and local production in 
Taiwan contributed to the appearance of higher value-added items. 
Notes 
(1) But even this was to pale against the sixtyfold increase in Japanese manufacturing 
investments in China between 1985 and 1993 (SME Agency, 1995). 
(2) This is a practice not unknown to companies of other nationalities; see Wheeler and 
Mody(1992). 
(3) This contrasts with the following observation where growth is equated with 
changing leading industries. "For some purposes it is usefuî to characterise an economy 
in terms of its leading sectors; and a part of the technical basis for the stages of growth 
lies in the changing séquence of leading sectors" (Rostow, 1960:14). 
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Chapter S ix 
Japanese LMEs as Investors in Taiwan and Beyond: A 
Quantitative Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
To recapitiate the argument so far. There is a distinctive type of company designated 
here as a leading medium-sized enterprise (LME) , which has been characterised in 
Chapter Two as an entrepreneurially oriented mid-sized company, having developed 
beyond the framework of the S M E not only simply in terms of size but also of 
disposition, being a specialist adhèrent to core compétences. This approach has 
rendered L M E s leaders in their prescribed areas of expertise. While such a position has 
meant that they can successfully link up with the outside world, it has not meant that 
they can accomplish all-encompassing global stratégies practised by the large 
multinational. We refer to the particular way the L M E conducts its manoeuvring given 
its bounded range of attributes as articulation, and the business environment in Japan 
(as it has evolved over time) has been particularly accommodating to the articulating 
L M E . In like manner, the East Asian région, and within it Taiwan, has proved réceptive 
to Japanese companies, while the latter nave favoured the région - and Taiwan 
especially - in their internationalisation stratégies. The stage has now been reached 
where thèse aspects can be synthesised to determine how Japanese L M E s have utilised 
Taiwan in an articulation exercise as they incorporate the East Asian région into a 
internationalisation strategy. In doing this, in order to give added perspective to the 
distinctive situation of the Japanese L M E , comparative références are also made to 
Japanese investing firms in general and one of the country's largest TNCs, Matsushita 
Electric Industry Co., Ltd., as a benchmark of'large firm' internationalising behaviour. 
Studying adaptation of L M E s to a dynamic global environment can provide insights 
into potential internationalising formulae for the smaller firm, notably incrémental 
progression based on an established core compétence. Employing the specialised 
Japanese L M E for the purpose takes advantage of the considérable body of published 
data readily available and accessible as compared with the information that can be 
obtained for the average S M E . In addition, further tightening the scope of opération can 
help to clarify the process of events over time. Hence, in this study, globalisation forms 
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the backdrop, the East Asian région the scene of broader integration, and Taiwan the 
arena where pioneer and/or strategically significant activity actually takes place. This is 
conceptualised in Fig. 6.1. 
Of the estimated population of 110 LMEs used in this study (1), 63 are currently listed 
in the First Section of the Tokyo and/or Osaka Stock Exchanges and 23 in the Second 
Section, while the rest, or 24, are not listed. Roughly 70% can be categorised as 
engaged in midstream and upstream manufacturing, or in other words as integrators 
operating supporting industries. At 30%, therefore, the proportion of end-product 
makers is far from insignificant. They have proved themselves just as capable as the 
others in the population of articulating their internationalisation objectives by way of 
the East Asian région. They also point to the fact that the term L M E is not merely 
another way of saying subcontractor. Indeed, not a few of the firms among the 70%, 
like the case study Tanaka Kikinzoku, manufacture both intermediary and end-user 
products. O f the 110 sample LMEs , 33 saw their first foreign manufacturing investment 
before the end of the 1960s, ali of them in Asia and no less than 25 of them in Taiwan. 
Half of these 33 investing firms and 13 of those investing first in Taiwan were engaged 
in specialised areas relating to prioritised industries, like car batteries, high frequency 
coils, condensors, and précision moulds, for example, indicative of the demands for 
their expertise. By the end of the 1970s, 39 more of the population of 110 had 
commenced overseas manufacturing during this decade. In other words, a little over 
halfway through the period under discussion (1961 - 1990) around two thirds, or 72, of 
the sample L M E s had already invested directly in production abroad. Just as significant 
was that their FDI was starting to deepen. O f the 33 which had initiated FDI in the 
1960s, 15 of them had made at least one more overseas manufacturing investment 
during the 1970s, ali but one of them establishing at least one more base in East Asia. 
Come 1990, the 110 LMEs were to have a total of around 580 overseas plants 
Worldwide, with something over 400 of them in the East Asian région. 
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Japanese L M E 
Investment in Taiwan 
6.2 Methodology Note 
6.2.1 General Research Background 
In this section of the thesis, we move from reliance on published secondary sources and 
publicly accessible officiai data to analysis of more sector level and company level data 
on Japanese FDI in Taiwan. This poses a new set of methodological problems for the 
independent researcher in Japan and Taiwan. The Japanese authoritìes produce a large 
amount of general information on FDI trends. However, the main shortcoming is that 
the vast majority is not company-specific. Both the Ministry of Economies, Trade and 
Industry, or METI (formerly the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, or 
MITI), and the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) produce annual reports on 
FDI where most of the information concerns countries and industries. In its annual 
white paper, the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (SME Agency), under the 
Jurisdiction of METI , Covers international affairs to an extent as it pertains to Japanese 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The S M E Agency conduets a number of 
surveys throughout the year on which much of its findings are based, and for this 
purpose it limits the investigations to firms with more than 10 and less than 300 
employées. It does not make a distinction between 'small' and 'medium-sized'. 
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A similar situation prevails regarding local governments and quasi-government 
organisations. The Tokyo Metropolitan Commerce and Industry Guidance Office 
(Tokyoto Shoko Shidosho) annually comes out with a very detailed S M E white paper, 
but also devoid of names, while the Japan Small Business Research Institute (Chusho 
Kigyo Sogo Kenkyu Kikai) produces reams of general, non-firm-specific data. A l i the 
above-mentioned information is readily available and generously supplied. However, 
such accommodation is not always forthcoming for researchers reliant upon other 
sources. For example, two visits to the government-run Japan Small Business 
Corporation (JSBC), which is actively involved in assisting smaller firms to invest 
abroad and therefore must have a rich pool of detailed information, yielded no literature 
of any conséquence. (This, despite being accompamed by a respected Japanese 
académie small business specialist.) However, from a ministerial source I was quite 
happily given JSBC's Kaigai Tenkai Chusho Kigyo Jittai Chosa Hokokusho (Survey 
Report on the Situation of Small and Medium Enterprises Developing Overseas) for 
1998, which does in fact name companies. 
Added to this, there can on occasion be difficulties regarding access to information on 
Japanese FDI in Taiwan because of Taiwan's unique status diplomatically speaking. In 
Tokyo, for example, entry into JETRO's library simply demands the completion of a 
very brief form. JETRO's camouflage for its dealings with Taiwan is the Interchange 
Institute (Japan) (Nihon Koryu Kyokai). Its office in Japan is accessible (with an 
introduction preferabty) and the written materials available for viewing and copying are 
fairly extensive. The Taiwan office, on the other hand, is like a fortress. An introduction 
is almost mandatory, one passes through two inspection points with permanently locked 
doors, and the library consists of what the officiai deems you require. Nevertheless, 
good general information was made available for this research from both offices, quite a 
substantial part of it naming companies, both Japanese and Taiwanese. On the other 
hand, when I asked an officiai in the Taiwan office to help me contact some of the 110 
sample Japanese L M E s known to be active in Taiwan and identified from public 
sources, he denied knowledge of any of them, saying that he only dealt with companies 
in the handbook called The Japanese Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Taipei. This 
despite the fact that eighteen of the firms in my list are in fact members of the said 
Chamber, and that législation has been in place since the early 1980s stipulating that one 
of JETRO's functions is to assist smaller Japanese firms in their FDI efforts. 
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Given this situation, to obtain the detail required beyond background information, one is 
obliged to resort largely to sources produced by the private sector. Inevitably this means 
that no single body of information will be complete. Nevertheless, Japan in particular 
boasts a large volume of literature published in newspaper, magazine and book form 
and Taiwan is also far ahead of most other countries. Among the publications used for 
this thesis, for example, are the Nihon Keizai Shinbun (or Nikkei) and Jingji Ribao, the 
flagship economie dailies of Japan and Taiwan respectively, and the books and weekly 
magazine published by Toyo Keizai (Oriental Economist). Another source in Taiwan is 
Nomura Research Institute (NRI). This Japanese firm was appointed by the Taiwanese 
government in 1995 to act as an agent for encouraging Japanese investment in Taiwan. 
In fulfilling this assignment NRI produces considerable general information concerning 
the activities of the Japanese business community there, including profiles of actual 
companies, and this has been copiously fortheoming. Although again, putting an 
independent researcher in touch with individual companies on my list was apparently 
out of the question for thèse organisations. 
6.2.2 Detecting Japanese L M E s 
For detecting Japanese L M E s which have ¡nvested in Taiwan since the 1960s the 
following publications were used: Zaika Nihon Kigyo Soran (1998) (ZNK), Japan 
Company Handbook (Winter 1999) (JCH), Nihon Kaisha Joho (Autumn 1999) (NKJ), 
Mijojo Kaisha Ban (Winter 1999/Spring 2000) ( M K B ) , and Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo 
Soran (2001) (KSK). The basic détails are presented in Fig. 6.2. 
Z N K is the füllest and most detailed listing of Japanese investors in Taiwan that I have 
found. It is published by the Taipei office of the American law firm Baker and 
McKenzie Inc., in Japanese, and therefore directed essentially at a Japanese readership. 
In that the publication relies on companies responding to requests for information it is 
bound to be incomplete and, indeed, I know of companies which are not included. 
However, it does présent 1,085 companies from the very large to the very small and can 
be claimed to ofTer a cross-section for initiating the investigation. Among the 
information given are the date of approvai of registration in Taiwan and the latest equity 
ratio of the Japanese company. This latter allows for the élimination of those holding 
less than 25% of a joint venture which in 1969 was thought by the Japanese authorities 
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as stipulated in the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law to be the 
mínimum for the Japanese side to exercise an ínfluence over the management, although 
this has been lowered since to 10% (Tokunaga, I992a:13). The companies are listed by 
their Taiwan Chinese (TC) name under which is their Taiwan English (TE) name, 
followed by the Taiwan address. Under that comes the Japan Japanese (JJ) name with 
the head office address in Japan (Fig. 6.3). This enables us to see if the Company 
features in JCH, N K J o r M K B . 
JCH is in English and actually comprises two books, one for the first sections of the 
Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya stock exchanges and one for the second sections. N K J is 
essentially a Japanese language original for JCH, although published by Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun. In addition, it gives somewhat more Company information and also includes 
extra companies on the Kyoto, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Niigata and Sapporo exchanges. 
M K B is a large compilation of unlisted companies. Many significant firms, including 
for example Fuji Xerox and Idemitsu, are not stock exchange listed but do appear in 
M K B , so it is reasonable to assume that important L M E s are included in this 
publication too. So the JJ obtained in Z N K was first cross-referenced in JCH/NKJ, and 
if not there, a further check was made in M K B . Quite a few companies given in Z N K 
were not found in any of the other publicaüons, but most were successfully traced. 
From JCH/NKJ or M K B it was possible to learn the size of the parent Company in Japan 
in terms of number of employees and capitalisation together with whether it was chiefly 
a manufacturer or non-manufacturing (general) firm. 
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Fig. 6.2 Publications Used for Detecting Japanese LMEs 
Desienation Full Name Languaee Publisher Number of 
Companies 
Z N K Zaika Nihon Kigyo Soran 
(Survey of Japanese Firms 
in China [Taiwan]) 
Japanese Baker and 1,085 
McKenzie 
J C H Japan Company Handbook 
(First Section) 
English ToyoKeizai 1,494 
J C H Japan Company Handbook 
(Second Section) 
English Toyo Keizai 1,937 
N K J Nihon Kaisha Joho 
(Japan Company 
Information) 
Japanese Nihon Keizai 3,446 
Shinbun 
M K B Mijojo Kaisha Ban 
(Unlisted Company 
Edition) 
Japanese ToyoKeizai 7,119 
K S K Kaigai Shinshutsu 
Kigyo Soran 
(Survey of Companies 
Investing Overseas) 
Japanese Toyo Keizai 18,500 
1. Zaika Nihon Kigyo Soran (1998) (ZNK), gives détails of Japanese-invested Firms operating 
in Taiwan. 
2. Japan Company Handbook (Winter 1999) (JCH), détails firms listed on the major stock 
exchanges in Japan, plus over-the-counter listings. 
3. Nihon KaishaJoho (Autumn 1999) (NKJ), a Japanese-language publication almost identical 
in content to JCH above. 
4. Mijojo Kaisha Ban (Winter 1999/Spring 2000) ( M K B ) , présents détails of currently 
significant but unlisted Japanese companies. 
5. Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran (2001) (KSK), provides Information about FDI by Japanese 
companies worldwide. 
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Fig. 6.3 Company Names 
Desienation Descriotion Example Source 
JE English name in Japan and 
internationally 
Fujitsu General. Ltd. J C H / M K B 
JJ Japanese name in Japan Fujitsu Zeneraru 
K . K . 
Z N K + N K J / M K B 
TC Chinese name in Taiwan Dacheng Gongye Z N K 
TE English name in Taiwan Da Cherng 
Tndustry Co., Ltd. 
Z N K 
Fig. 6.4 Company Size/Type Designations 
Desienation Meanine Number of Enmlovees 
M L M an u factu ri ng/Large 2,000+ 
GL General/Large 
M M Manufacturing/Medium-sized 2 0 0 - 1,999 
G M General/M edium-sized 
MS Manufacturing/Small 199-
GS Genera (/Small 
Size of the investing company in Japan is the first criterion for operationally defìning an 
L M E , and we are concentrating on manufacturing, so the category M M , as in Fig. 6.4, 
is the broad target group for identifying LMEs. This complies with the defìnition of size 
given in Chapter Two. However, two other criteria are relevant: the L M E is 
independent and the investments in Taiwan must have been made within the period 
from the 1960s to 1990. By extracting and combinino selected information from the 
first five publications lìsted in Fig. 6.2 a brief summary is realised as in B O X 5. As well 
as being of the required size, the L M E must be independent. As Nakamura (1990) has 
indicated, in the Japanese business system of numerous shades of affiliation it is often a 
fine line between what can be defined as independent or subsidiary status. In addition, 
as noted in Chapter Four, companies like Akebono Brake which could justifiably be 
classified as subsidiaries thirty years ago can now - having diversified their customer 
179 
base welî beyond reliance on one or a very few firms - be catagorised as independent. 
That having been said, both JCH/NKJ and M K B indicate in their introductory remarks 
whether it is generally recognised îhat the company is a subsidiary of or has strong 
affiliations to a larger partner. In addition, they also name the major stockholders. For 
this study, if a major stockholder is a large distinct company holding over 15% of the 
stock, as opposed to an individuai owner, an owners' or employées' trust or the like, the 
investing company is not considered to be independent, and therefore not an L M E . 
180 
B O X 5 
Summary Profile of a Japanese LME Investìng in Taiwan as Synthesisedfront Sources: 
Ho s ideo 
LME Status in Japan: Leading manufacturer of mechanical components with high market 
shares in sockets and jacks. 
Established in Japan: 1950 
Company Names and Addresses (Japan and Taiwan) 
JE Hosiden Corporation 1-4-33, Kita-Kyohoji, Yao City. Osaka Pref. 
JJ Hoshiden K . K . Tel: 0729-93-0071 
www.hosiden.co.jp 
TC Taiwan Xingdian (Gu) 3 r d FI. 75 Chang A n E. Rd . : See. 1, Taipei 
TE Taiwan Hosiden Co., Ltd. Tel: (02) 5710017 
References (Page) 
Z N K (453) JCH(l ) (792) N K J (739) M K B - K S K (188) 
Investment Details 
Taiwan approvai date (ZNK) 1970 Capital increase dates 1974, 1976, 1978, 1987, 1990 
rationCurrent capital ratios: Hosiden Corporation 100.0% 
Designations 
Company size/type designation MM(I)* 
No. of employees in Japan (JCH) 1,083 
No. of employees in Taiwan (ZNK) 226 
Main produets/business in Taiwan (ZNK) Manufacture and sales of: switches, 
connectors, drivers, handsets, remote controls. 
Investment Merits (ZNK) 
Guaranteeing work force, locai sales in Taiwan; exports to third countries and Japan. 
Sources ofRaw Materials (ZNK): Taiwan, Japan, ROK, etc. 
Sales/Export Destinations (ZNK): Taiwan, HK, Singapore, Japan, Germany, US, etc. 
Other Investments Worldwide (KSK) 
East Asia Manufacturing: South Korea (1973), South Korea (1978), Malaysia (1989), China 
(1992) 
East Asia Sales: Hong Kong (1966), Singapore (1978), Malaysia (1992) 
Rest of World Manufacturing: Britain (1990), Mexico (1995) 
Rest of World Sales: United States (1978), West Germany (1986) 
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With the date of registration approval in Taiwan, the size/type designation, and 
confirmed independence status it is now possible to pinpoint the Japanese 
manufacturing L M E s which invested in Taiwan from the 1960s on. In B O X 5 this is 
indicated by MM(I)*, the (I) standing for independence and the asterisk for the right 
time period. K S K is used to confirm the basic details about the Taiwan affiliates 
recorded in Z N K , although it does not provide as much detail for each investment as the 
latter. However, it does give the names and dates of establishment of ail Japanese 
company affiliates worldwide, therefore allowing us to trace the full picture of 
investments and see, for example, how concentrated they are in East Asia as compared 
with the world as a whole. 
6.2.3 Company Names 
As can be seen from Fig. 6.3 and B O X 6, investing Japanese companies can go by a 
number of names. Understanding this is indispensible for detecting Japanese L M E s in 
Taiwan. As stated above, most official information is not firm-specific. There is a 
printout of Japanese investors made available by M O E A ' s Investment Commission 
which is useful in that it is voluminous - including hundreds of companies - and, being 
more up-to-date, can be employed to cross-check data from other sources. But it only 
gives the TC names and the JJ names in characters, plus an outline of the area of 
business; no indication of the size of operations either in Japan or Taiwan is provided. 
These must be filled in from other sources. 
The following is a general explanation of the problem, while a more detailed elucidation 
is given in B O X 6. This chapter is about Japanese LMEs investing in Taiwan. At the 
beginning of the period discussed, Taiwanese regulations concerning inward investment 
often specified the necessity for a local partner. If the Japanese firm was large and held 
the bargaining advantage, like the pharmaceutical companies which came in in force in 
the early 1960s, they could more or less dictate the name of the locally established 
company in Taiwan. This was also the case for the big electronic and automobile 
manufacturers like Hitachi and Toyota respectively, for instance. Because these are 
easily recognisable, even if the Taiwanese may pronounce the characters differently 
from the Japanese (see BOX 6), a common assumption has taken root in Taiwan that the 
only Japanese investors are the large, household names. This misconception stems from 
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the fact that many Japanese investing firms, including most of the L M E s , be they acting 
through Joint ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries (having taken advantage of the 
more relaxed regulatory climate starüng in the 1980s) are simply unrecognisable at first 
sight as Japanese. Having set up in Taiwan, a Japanese firm can have acquired up to 
four names (or more, depending on whether it has followed through into Mainland 
China and other Asian countries, for example.) These are: (i) its original Japanese name 
(JJ), (ii) its English/international name used in Japan and elsewhere (JE), (iii) its 
Chinese name in Taiwan (TC), (iv) its English name in Taiwan (TE). Of particular 
importance for this study is to be able to readily associate (i) and (iii) in the data as 
discussed below. Suffice to say here that (iii) could be any of: (a) the Japanese name 
using the original Japanese characters (which are pronounced differently in Chinese); 
(b) characters different from the Japanese original chosen so that the name will be 
pronounced by the Chinese roughly as it would be in Japanese; (c) the Taiwanese Joint 
venture partner's Company name; (d) a combination of some of the characters of the 
original names of the Japanese and Taiwanese partners; (e) a new name. 
BOX 6 
Translitération of company names 
The heart of the problem caused by translitération of names is the different writing 
Systems. The Japanese writing System consists of characters mostly of Chinese origin 
together with two phonetic syllabaries, hiragana and katakana. The latter syllabary is 
used to 'spell ouf foreign words and names, so that Microsoft becomes Maikurosofuto, 
for example. Chinese has no syllabaries, with the conséquence that when rendering the 
names of western companies in Chinese it either translates the meaning of the name or 
gives a rough idea of the sound, often restricted to three syllables if the firm is very 
familiar. So, in the first case, by putting together two characters meaning 'very small* 
and 'soft' we get Weiruan, or Microsoft; and more obviously Tongyong (General) plus 
Qiche (Motors) means precisely what it says. As for reproducing the sounds, Dubang is 
Du Pont and Keko Kele is Coca Cola, while more obscurely Huïpu is somehow a 
rendition of H.P. and therefore Hewlett-Packard, and the highly familiar McDonalds is 
Maidanglao. 
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But this is relatively simple compared with how to handle Japanese Company names in 
Chinese, To begin with, when the Japanese adopted the Chinese characters nearly two 
millenia ago, they needless to say already had a spoken ianguage. As a result, they 
proceeded to produce arguably the world's most arcane writing system. One of the 
features of this is that the same character can usually be pronounced in at ieast two 
completely different ways, one being the original Japanese word (kunyomi) and the 
other an imitation of the Chinese (onyomi). So matsu and shita are both kunyomi 
pronunciations which can combine for Matsushita. Tf read as onyomi they would be sho 
and ka, which in modern Chinese are pronounced song and xia. So i f a Taiwanese saw 
Matsushita written in characters and knew nothing about the Company he could be 
forgiven for pronouncing it Songxia and thinking that it was Taiwanese. A Japanese 
Company may get round this either by displaying its name in 'English' using the 
aiphabet (as Yamaha does in Taiwan) or selecting arbitrarily characters which will 
induce the Chinese to pronounce it more or less as in the Japanese (as Yamaha does in 
Mainland China). In addition, some Japanese Company names have never been written 
in characters in Japan but (as with Western companies) must be registered with a 
Chinese-character name in Taiwan. Sony, for example, like Exxon is a name conjured 
up to be as far as possibte globally pronounceable and is only written in katakana 
(Sonii) in Japan. There again, it has been fashionable for Japanese companies to be 
given English names first which are then rendered in katakana as with Central Glass 
(Sentoraru Garasü) given in the list below. As examples, below are five Japanese-
invested companies which registered in Taiwan in 1969 according to Zaika Nihon 
Kigyo Soran (ZNK) with their original Japanese name (JJ), their Chinese name in 
Taiwan (TC), and how the latter was derived using the designations (a) to (e) as given 
in the main text: 
JJ-Hitachi Seisakusho K . K . TC-Taiwan Rili Dianshi Gongye (a) 
JJ-Janome Mishin Kogyo K . K . 
JJ-Sentoraru Garasu (Central Glass) K . K 
JJ-Raion (Lion) K . K . 





6.3 Aggregate Analysis: Taiwan Manufacturing Affiliates 
6.3.1 Population of Japanese L M E Investors in Taiwan 
The reference sample comprises 130 Japanese L M E s which made at least one direct 
investment in Taiwan between the early 1960s and 1990 and were still in Operation 
there in fiscal 2001. This entailed searching through data produced in Taiwan (ZNK) 
concerning Japanese corporate Investors in Taiwan. The firms thus found were then 
matched against published data in Japan (JCH/NKB and M K B ) to see if they could be 
justifiably be defined as L M E s on the criteria of sector, size and independent ownership 
status. The more intangible criteria of focused competence and technical leadership 
could not at this stage be used (from these sources) as defining criteria, but carne into 
consideration in the selection of case studies in the detailed firm level analysis in the 
next chapter. However, the invariable profile description of these selected firms as 
'leading manufacturer' or 'high market share' in these sources gives confidence to their 
designation as LMEs . As a result, 110 Japanese firms with Taiwan manufacturing 
affiliates (TMAs), or corporations registered in Taiwan as engaging in some form of 
manufacturing, in which Japanese firms which could be defined as L M E s had 
substantially invested, were identified. In the nine instances where the Japanese L M E 
has invested in more than one T M A , the first of their Investments is adopted for the 
analysis in this chapter (although all Investments made are discussed when appropriate 
in Chapter Seven). The sample of 110 T M A cases is employed here to describe the 
character of Japanese L M E direct investment and the transformations it has undergone 
within Taiwan as circumstances have evolved. This is done by first investigating the 
types of LMEs investing in Taiwan, which is followed by a discussion of change in the 
investment over time. Attention then turns to the extent to which the businesses invested 
in in Taiwan are linked to Japan, the East Asian region and the world at large with 
reference to data concerning the sources of materials used by the affiliates and the 
ultimate destinations of the items they produce. 
6.3.2 Characteristics of Sample LMEs 
Two characteristics stand out with regard to the FD1 by Japanese L M E s . First, in terms 
of cases, the numbers of their investments follow the pattern of ranking investment as a 
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whole coming into Taiwan and for investment from Japan in general. That is, 'electronic 
and electric appliances' assumes a significant lead, followed by 'chemicals' and 
'machiner/ (Table 6.1). In fact, in this sample thèse three catégories account for 
considerably more than 50% of thèse approved investments and, as Fig. 6.5 implies, 
they have been a consistant feature of new L M E investment throughout the period. 
Second, and hardly surprisingly given the définition of L M E established here, the 
investments are highly specialised in nature. Both thèse points suggest that such L M E 
investment overall has not been an exercise in sloughing off sunset obsolescence, but is 
to be seen rather as an attempi to seek engagement with a vibrant economy. 
Table 6.1 Japanese L M E FDÏ in Taiwan by Industry, 1961-1990: 110 Cases 
(ndustry 1961-65 i966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1985-90 Total 
Food & Beverage 
Processing 1 1 2 
Textiles 1 3 1 5 
Garment & Footwcar 1 1 
Paper Products & 
Printing 1 1 
Chemicals 5 2 5 2 6 20 
Rubber Products 1 1 2 
Plastic Products 1 1 2 
Non-Ferrous Minerais 1 1 l 3 
Basic Metals & Metal 
Products 3 1 1 l 3 9 
Machinery 7 2 2 1 9 21 
Electronic & Electric 
Appliances 1 9 6 3 1 7 27 
Transport Equipaient 1 2 2 1 6 
Précision Instruments 1 2 2 5 
Miscellaneous 1 2 3 6 
Total 3 32 16 16 9 34 110 
Source: Derived from ZNK. 
N B : The industriai catégories are those employed by the Taiwanese Ministry of 
Economie Affairs. Catégories 'Leather & Fur Products1 and 'Lumber & Bamboo 
Products' are not included because no investments were made in them by the sample 
comparées. 
186 
Fig . 6.5 Examples of L M E FDI in Electrical and Electronic Appliances, 
Chemicals and Machinery 
Electrical and Electronic Appliances 
LME: KOA Corporation ¡966 
TUA: Dha Hsing Electric Co., Ltd 
Manufacture and sales of resistors 
LUE status in Japan: Major manufacturer of resistors 
LME: Tamura Corporation ¡973 
TMA: Kaolung Tamura Electronic Co., Ltd 
Manufacture and sales of Iransformers, switching power supplies, AC adaptors 
LME status in Japan: Leading manufacturer of xransformers 
LME: Tanashin Denki 1986 
TMA: Tanashin (Taiwan) Ltd. 
Manufacture and sales of audio recorders and VTRs 
LME status in Japan: World leading specialist maker of cassette and VTR decks 
Chemicals 
LME: Arakawa Chemical Industries, Ltd. ¡967 
TMA: Taiwan Arakawa Chemical Industries, Ltd. 
Manufacture and sales of paper strengthening agents and other chemicals 
LME status in Japan: The top maker of paper-making chemicals 
LME: Cemedine Co., Ltd. ¡977 
TMA: Taiwan Cemedine Co., Ltd. 
Manufacture and sales of industriai adhesives 
LME status in Japan: Top specialty maker of adhesives 
LME: Rinreì Wax Co., Ltd. "¡987 
TMA: Taiwan Rinrei Corporation 
Manufacture and sales offloor wax, detergents 
LME status in Japan: Leading maker of wax and detergents for industriai, etc. use 
Machinery 
LME: Janome Sewing Machine Co.. Ltd. 1969 
TMA: Taiwan Janome Sewing Machine Co., Ltd. 
Manufacture and sales of household Sewing machìnes andparts 
LME status in Japan: Largest manufacturer of household sewìng machines 
LME: Takuma Co., Ltd. TOSÒ 
TMA: Chieng Shyong Machinery Co., Ltd. 
Manufacture and sales of industriai boilers. waste heat boilers 
LME status in Japan: Renowned boiler plant maker 
LME: Union Tool Co. ¡985 
TMA: Taiwan Union Tool Corporation 
Manufacture and sales of ultra hard drills for PCBs 
LME status in Japan: 30% of world market for PCB piercing drills 
In many ways, the trends and attitudes exhibited by manufacturing L M E s are similar to 
those for Japanese manufacturing firms in general. So some data of a general nature can 
serve to underline the situation experienced by the L M E s . The figures in Table 6.2 are 
Aggregates of approvals of Japanese firms of all sizes and the sectoral distribution is 
similar to that for LMEs . The data tend to overstate the situation because not all 
approvals are acted upon. However, the reverse can be claimed regarding the figures in 
Table 6.3 in that, being a sample of 815 cases of Japanese investment taken from the 
Z N K survey, they do not account for all Investments made over the thirty-year period 
(2). Nevertheless, the same sectoral and temporal patterns are still clearly manifested, 
while the overwhelming prédominance of manufacturing (where L M E s excel) stands 
out. 
Table 6.2 Japan's Cumulative Approved Manufacturing FDI in Taiwan, 1952-1997 
Unit US$1,000 
Industry Cases Amount 
Food & Beverage Processing 73 224,725 
Textiles 35 97,074 
Garment & Footwear 49 59,703 
Leather & Fur Products 13 4,337 
Lumber & Bamboo Products 26 30,677 
Paper Products & Printing 17 10,450 
Chemicals 183 631,007 
Rubber Products 104 217,040 
Plastic Products 9 18,325 
Non-Ferrous Minerals 69 131,860 
Basic Metals & Metal Products 293 607,786 
Machinery 200 723,656 
Electronic & Electric Appliances 423 2,017,961 
Transport Equipment 15 260,744 
Précision Instruments 10 47,667 
Source: Statistics on Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment, 
Investment Commission, M O E A 
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Table 6.3 ZNK Cases of Japanese FDI in Taiwan, 1961-1990 
1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1986-90 
Total 38 123 89 81 91 393 815 
Manufacturing 32 115 80 67 65 265 624 
Non-
manufacturing 
6 8 9 14 26 128 191 
Source: Derived from Z N K 
N . B . The désignations 'manufacturing' and 'non-manufacturing' are based on the activity 
in Taiwan. 
In 1999 the Interchange Institute (Interchange Institute, 1999) conducted a survey of 
Japanese manufacturing and non-manufacturing enterprises which have invested in 
Taiwan (covering ali types of firms, not just LMEs) . One aspect of the survey concerns 
when sample manufacturing firms established their base in Taiwan. As can be seen in 
Fig. 6.6, practically 40% of the manufacturers had arrived by the end of the 1970s. 
Another big rush occurred subsequent to the Plaza Accord of 1985, when the Japanese 
yen doubled its value against the US dollar by 1987. Although, actually the New 
Taiwanese dollar was reacting in precisely the same way as the yen, while wages in 
Taiwan were also appreciating fast. The conclusion can be drawn, therefore, that 
Japanese manufacturers (including LMEs) descended on Taiwan not solely for reasons 
of cheap labour, a point to bear in mind concerning a number of the L M E s discussed in 
more detail below. 
Fig. 6.6 Time of Establishment by Manufacturing Firms in Taiwan 
• 1970s and before 
• 1980 - 1984 
H 1 9 8 5 - 1989 
• 1990- 1994 
• 1995 and after 
Source: Interchange Institute, Koryu, No. 595, Aprii 15, 1999 
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6.3.3 Elements of Change 
Once the investing Japanese L M E s ensconsed themselves in Taiwan, change has been 
the order of the day. Monitoring the dynamics of change and reaction is anpther way of 
assessing how Japanese L M E s have directed the course of their T M A s as they address 
transforrnation. Three aspects are selected here as illustrative of this phenomenon: 
perceived advantages, commitment, and withdrawal. With respect to perceived 
advantages, the Z N K data include a column where the responding companies can 
indícate the advantages they see in investing in Taiwan. Table 6.4 is a compilation of a 
number of these as drawn from the Z N K data for LMEs investing from 1961 to 1990. 
The valué placed on the Taiwanese worker by the L M E employer seems to be 
consistent throughout, implying a relatively stable relationship. However, there appears 
to be a growing appreciation of technical competence which arguably reflects the results 
of the Taiwanese commitment to technological upgrading from the beginning of the 
1980s. Another point which can be inferred from this table is the increased interest in 
using Taiwan as a production base for exports to other countries in the East Asian 
región. The two factors together suggest that by the end of the 1980s Taiwan, in the 
eyes of Japanese L M E investors, was becoming a base at a compáratively high skill 
level capable of servicing the región - and beyond - efficiently and at reasonable cost. 
This suggests a co-maturing of both the Japanese production facility and the Taiwanese 
economy over the period, a process in which the former can be represented as the 
driver, via the transfer of techology, labour skills and management skills into the latter. 
Table 6.4 Reasons Given by LMEs for Investment in Taiwan, 1961-1990 
(multiple response) 
Merit 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 Total 
Technical Cooperation 11 8 12 30 
Work force 14 17 14 45 
Reduced costs 4 - 3 7 
Local materials supply 1 3 2 6 
Taiwanese market 13 13 15 41 
Exports in general 9 8 6 23 
Exports to SE Asia/China 9 6 11 26 
Exports to Japan 4 2 - 6 
None 2 3 6 11 
Total 66 60 69 195 
Source: Derived from Z N K 
N B : Technical coopération' here is taken to mean technology transfer from Japan, 
together with the implication that the Taiwanese workforce is capable of handling the 
technology introduced, and also the development of new or improved producís. 
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Again, a further indication of the general objectives of Japanese business (not just 
LMEs) can be drawn from the Interchange Institute's survey. The main motives thèse 
companies give for setting up in Taiwan are shown in Fig. 6.7. This reveals that a strong 
motive is the Taiwanese market. This is also strong among L M E s , although somewhat 
less pronounced, possibly because Fig. 6.7 does not address the workforce or highlight 
technical compatibility. However, Fig. 6.8 does, and the fact that over 50% of the firms 
in the Institute's survey have increased their workforce over time implies the same 
overall satisfaction suggested by the L M E s in Table. 6.4 (3). 
Significant for both groups of companies are exports, although the L M E s do not share 
the same commitment as the generality of investors to selling back to Japan, possibly 
due to the high percentage of intermediary suppliers among L M E s compared to those in 
the general sample which is likely to include a fair number of large assemblers. Like 
Table 6.4, Fig. 6.9 makes clear the importance to Japanese investors of Taiwan as a 
base for production and exporting. Just over 80% export some of their output. Exporting 
is discussed further below with regard to its regional and global implications for L M E s . 
Fig. 6.7 Main Motives for General Japanese Manufacturing Firms to Invest 
in Taiwan 
(multiple response) 
Motive Responses Ratio (%) 
1 Expanding sales in Taiwan market 240 50.8 
2 Producing in Taiwan and export to 3 r d country (not Japan) 101 21.4 
3 Producing in Taiwan and export mainly to Japan 64 13.6 
4 Buying in Taiwan and export to 3 r d country (not Japan) 9 1.9 
5 Buying in Taiwan and export mainly to Japan 14 3.0 
6 Production guidance, international buying or other 
coordinating work involving China, Hong Kong, etc. 16 3.4 
7 Other 28 5.9 
Source: Interchange Institute, Koryu, No. 595, 1999 
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Fig. 6.8 Growth in Nuniber of Employées since Establishment 
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• E 
C a s e S i t u a t i o n 
A B i g i n c r e a s e 
B G r a d u a i i n c r e a s e 
C A l m o s t no c h a n g e 
D S o m e r é d u c t i o n 
E B i g r é d u c t i o n 
Source: Interchange Institute, Koryu, No. 595, 1999 
Fig. 6.9 Exporting Firms (1997) 
Non-
ex porters 
1 9 % y " " " " 
i 
• Expo r te r s 
• Non-expor te rs 
Expor te rs 
8 1 % 
Source: Interchange Institute, Koryu, No. 595, 1999 
Another feature of the Z N K data for 1961 to 1990 is that it records the dates at which 
each company registers capital increases, thereby indicating the degree of commitment 
to the undertaking in the host country. Table 6.5 indicates the results abstracted from 
this information. It can be seen that for ail three periods given, more companies added 
to their investment than did not. Hardly surprisingly this is more apparent for those 
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Taiwan affiliâtes approved in 1961-1970, but even those approved in 1981-1990 seem 
to be starting on the path previously traced by their predecessors. (The data purports to 
be up to the end of 1998). At any event, the figures are further testimony to the 
proactive and expansionary stance assumed by many investing LMEs . A similar degree 
of commitment is conveyed in the Interchange Instituten survey which shows that 
almost 70% of all Japanese investors have expanded their facilities since initially setting 
up (Fig. 6.10). 
Table 6.5 Registered Increases in Capital of LMEs in Taiwan 
Initial approvai/ 







None / / 9 8 
1 time 2 x 1 = 2 5 x 1 = 5 11 x 1 = 11 
2 times 4 x 2 = 8 4 x 2 = 8 10 x 2 = 20 
3 times 5 x 3 = 15 4 x 3 = 12 9 x 3 = 27 
4 times 5 x 4 = 20 2 \ 4 8 2 x 4 = 8 
5 times 3 x 5 = 15 4 x 5 = 20 -
6 times 4 x 6 = 24 2 x 6 = 12 1 x 6 = 6 
7 times - - 1 x 7 = 7 
8 times 2 x 8 = 16 1 x 8 = 8 -
Total times 100 73 79 
Source: Derived from Z N K 
Fig. 6.10 Increase in Scale of Production Facilities since Establishment 
C a s e S i t u a t i o n 
A I n c r e a s e in s c a l e 
B N o n o t i c e a b l e d i f f é r e n c e 
C D e c r e a s e in sca le 
Source: Interchange Institute, Koryu, No. 595, April 15, 1999 
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Fig. 6.11 Recent Cases of Withdrawal of Investments by Japanese LMEs in 
Taiwan 
L M E (JE) T M V (TC) Industry 
Saiior Pen Yongruixing Gongye Other Products (bail pens) 
Takarabune Corp. Sanshang Baochuan Foods (cakes, snacks, etc) 
Uyemura Shangcun Maoyi Chemicals (surface treatment) 
Chugoku Pearl Chemical Dahui Muye Other Products (chopsticks) 
Shigiya Machinery Works Daguang Huosaihuan Machinery (piston rings) 
Tokyo Denpa Datong Shijing Electrical Machinery (quartz 
oscillators) 
Onishi Iryo Taiwan Zhenzhi Textiles & Apparel (knitted 
sweaters) 
Koizumi Apparel Taiquan 
Baluman 
Textiles & Apparel (denim, 
jeans, skirts) 
(women's apparel) 
Dai Nippon Toryo Daritu Nanben Chemicals (paint) 
Funai Electric Taiwan X u Gongyi 
Taiwan Chuanjing Dianji 




Origin Electric Taiwan Olisheng Gongye Electrical Machinery 
Fuji Kobunshi Taiwan Jianfu Qiye Other Products (kitchen 
cabinets) 
Marutomo Taiwan Wanyou Foods (bonito) 
Uniden Taiwan Youli Dianzi Electrical Machinery 
Teika Zhongguo Jinshu Huagong Chemicals 
Tokyo Ferrite Zhongtai Qiangli Cishi Chemicals 
Source: Derived from Z N K 
On the other hand, as the Taiwanese economy has developed and expanded there are 
concomitant cost increases for the foreign companies which choose to remain. There 
again, with the economie progress in the région as a whole, there are alternative venues 
which présent to potential inward investors a choice of strategy. As a result, there has 
been some consolidation and even disinvestment by Japanese LMEs in Taiwan, 
sometimes associated with geographical restructuring of production networks. In his 
study of fourteen Japanese mainly large firms which had invested in Taiwan, Liu (1996, 
1998) found that ali but one opted for adjustment (rather than complete withdrawal) in 
one of three ways: upgrading, diversification, or consolidation. The cases of increased 
capital investment given in Table 6.5 and of production capacity in Fig. 6.10 surely 
reflect such actions. But that having been said, complete withdrawal from a venture is 
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an aspect of a changing, dynamic environment, and Fig. 6.11 lists the 16 LMEs which, 
according to Z N K , withdrew from ventures in Taiwan troni about 1990 to 1998 (4). 
6.3.4 Material Sources and Market Destinations 
The concern of this chapter is not onfy with how Japanese L M E s have fared as investors 
in Taiwan but also the implications of this investment for their regional and possibly 
global activities. The objective, therefore, is to attempi to itemize the relationships and 
evaluate the degree of involvement at various levels. Z N K again offers one potential 
avenue for such an inquiry by listing the countries and régions from which the Taiwan 
affiliâtes recorded source the materials for production in Taiwan, and to which they ship 
the goods thus manufactured. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 are simple numerical data tabulations 
of sources and markets based on the multiple responses of the affiliâtes. With respect to 
sourcingy it would seem that Taiwan provides much of the basic materials while Japan 
exports to it the more sophisticated éléments reflecting the division of labour originally 
intended for the Taiwan affiliate. Southeast Asia is also fairly significant, hinting -
although not wholly convincingly - at a further compartmentalisation of production, 
with Taiwan occupying a pivotai rôle. The relatively heavy contribution of North 
America and Europe among those areas beyond East Asia suggests a necessary 
specialised input. 
Turning to shipments, Taiwan itself is the leading récipient of what is produced. Japan 
is next, suggesting a strong élément of complementarity between the two countries. 
Almost on the same level as Japan is Southeast Asia, thereby implying an important 
supplier rôle for the Taiwan affiliâtes within the région, as part of a broader L M E 
strategy. The much stronger showing as markets (than sources) on the part of North 
America and Europe is likewise an indication of the use Japanese L M E s make of their 
ventures in Taiwan for onward sales over a wider sphère. The responses are recorded in 
the time order of affiliate establishment, to see if there would be any discernable change 
possibly reflecting différent types of Japanese L M E investing in Taiwan as the time 
séquence progressed. In fact there is not. The volume fluctuations, if they point to 
anything, simply keep pace with the investments made. What is evident, however, is the 
persistent positioning of the main players, with the one exception that China latterly has 
emerged as a market of conséquence (Hu, 2000). 
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Table 6.6 Sources of Materials for Taiwan Manufacturing Affiliates of LMEs 
(multiple responses) 
Source/ 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1985-90 Total 
Establishment 
Taiwan 3 27 13 11 7 25 86 
Japan 3 30 16 13 10 26 98 
Southeast Asia 2 3 1 4 - 3 13 
China - 1 - - - l 2 
Asia (Rest) - 5 - 1 - 2 7 
South Korea - 3 - 1 - 0 4 
North America 1 7 2 6 4 7 27 
Linited States 1 6 2 3 3 7 22 
Latin America - 1 - - - 1 2 
Europe 1 10 I 5 2 1 20 
Germany - 4 - 2 l 1 8 
Oceania - 1 - - 1 2 4 
Africa - - - - - 1 1 
Source: Derìved from Z N K 
Table 6.7 Markets for Taiwan Manufacturing Affiliates of LMEs 
(multiple responses) 
Market/ 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1985-90 Total 
Establishment 
Taiwan 3 28 7 8 12 21 79 
Japan 1 19 12 7 7 17 63 
Southeast Asia 4 20 7 10 6 13 60 
China 1 10 2 2 - 4 19 
Asia (Rest) - 7 4 2 1 2 16 
South Korea - / - ì - - 2 
North America 1 16 10 5 4 9 45 
United States / 16 10 3 3 9 42 
Latin America - 3 - - 1 1 5 
Europe - 12 S 3 4 1 28 
Middle East - 1 - 2 - 1 4 
Oceania 1 4 1 - - 1 7 
Africa - 3 3 - - - 6 
Source: Derived from Z N K 
Key Points: 
* LME FDI shows sectoral and temporal pattern, 
but similar to FDI in general 
* labour and markets are Key location factors, but 
technical capability also important 
* confidence to re-invest and Upgrade & limited 
withdrawal 
* evidence of Integration in (a) locaUJapan 
sourcing, (b) regional exports 
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6.4 Aggregate Analysis: Japanese LMEs 
6.4.1 Releva nee of L M E Investment in Taiwan to Regional and Global Settings 
In the above section, discussion has centred on Taiwan manufacturing ventures, 
otherwise known as registered corporations in which Japanese firms have invested. 
However, the ultimate subject of this thesis is not the Taiwan affiliate but the leading 
medium-srzed enterprise (LME) in Japan which instigated the investment, that is to say 
the 110 LMEs derived from Japanese sources for the sample. So here the vantage point 
for observation shifts to Japan and the L M E designing internationalisation strategy in 
which Taiwan is a single - albeit for the purposes of this particular study a core -
component. The most prominent source for this is Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 
(Survey of Companies Investing Overseas, hereafter K S K ) . It is a consistent annual 
publication recording Japanese corporate investments worldwide which are still extant 
at the time of publication. That is, no mention is made of withdrawals. Nevertheless, by 
taking the édition for the year 2001 as the référence one can, among other things, 
surmise to an extent how durable the originai Taiwan investments have been, which can 
in turn help in shedding light in the effectiveness of the Taiwan affiliate as a contributor 
to the LME's international strategy. Finally, the aspect of change is addressed and an 
attempt made to show how this affected the actions of specific L M E s . This is done by 
recounting each five-year stage from 1965 and 1990 of Taiwan's development from the 
Japanese corporate perspective and placing it in the context of a specific L M E , which 
first invested in Taiwan during the stage in question, by means of a séries of vignettes. 
These are designed to be less than case studies, but to add some texture and detail to the 
quantitative analysis of this chapter. 
6.4.2 Japanese L M E Investment Worldwide: A Comparison with MEI 
A lot can be garnered about the character of L M E foreign direct investment worldwide 
by comparing it with the approach taken by a large transnational, and Matsushita 
Electric Industriai (MEI) has been selected for this purpose. Matsushita Electric 
Industriai boasts 45,485 employées in Japan alone (JCH, 1999:760). Worldwide, 
according to K S K , MEI has a total of 205 FD1 ventures, 119 of them having a 
manufacturing content. The combined domestic (Japanese) workforce of the 110 sample 
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LMEs is not much more than twice that of MEI at 101,659 for an average of 924, 
meaning that the average L M E in employee terms here is only fractionally more than 
2% the size of MEI . The grand total of manufacturing ventures for the 110 L M E s is 
582, while the designated sales offices number 275. 
With reference to Figs 6.12 to 6.19, to start with a general comment covering ali eight 
figures, both the L M E s as a group and MEI concentrate far more of their manufacturing 
ventures in East Asia than in the rest of the world combined, while conversely both 
have a considerably larger proportion of their designated sales ventures in the rest of the 
world than in the East Asian region. In percentage terms this translates into 71.4% for 
LMEs and 60.5% for MEI with respect to East Asian manufacturing ventures, and 
65.0% and 68.6% for extra-East Asian sales ventures. (This keeps in mind, of course, 
the fact that many manufacturing units have a sales function while the reverse is not 
true for designated sales ventures.) The point to note is that even a huge multinational 
like MEI can have something of a regional bias; the hypothesis presented in this thesis 
(that the role of the region, here represented by East Asia, is cruciai for L M E s and 
similar smaller firms in shaping their internationalising endeavours) should be 
interpreted in this light. 
Fig. 6.12 Sample LMEs: Manufacturing FDI troni 1961 to 2000 
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BEast Asia 
• N. America 
• Europe 
OR est 
Source: Derived from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 2001 (Survey of Companies 
Investing Overseas 2001), Toyo Keizai. 
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Fig. 6.13 MEI: Manufacturing FDI from 1961 to 2000 
(number of manufacturing plants by region per decade) 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
• Rest 
• Europe 
• N. America 
• East Asia 
Source: Derived from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 2001 (Survey of Companies 
Investing Overseas 2001), Toyo Keizai. 
Fig. 6.14 Sample LMEs: Worldwide Manufacturing Plant Dispersai by 2000 
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Source: Derived from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 2001 (Survey of Companies 
Investing Overseas 2001), Toyo Keizai. 
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Fig. 6.15 MEI: Worldwide Manufacturing Plant Dispersai by 2000 
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Source: Derived from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 2001 (Survey of Companies 
Investing Overseas 2001), Toyo Keizai. 
Fig. 6.16 Sample LMEs: Sales Office FDI from 1961 to 2000 





• East Asia 




Source: Derived from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 2001 (Survey of Companies 
Investing Overseas 2001), Toyo Keizai. 
Fig. 6.17 MEI: Sales Office FDI from 1961 to 2000 
(number of sales offices by région per decade) 
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• East Asia 
Source: Derived from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 2001 (Survey of Companies 
Investing Overseas 2001 ), Toyo Keizai. 
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Fig. 6.18 Sample LMEs: Worldwide Sales Offices by 2000 
• R e s t 
• Eu rope 
• N. A m e r i c a 
• E a s t A s i a 
Source: Derived from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 2001 (Survey of Companies 
Investing Overseas 2001 ), Toyo Keizai. 
Fig. 6.19 MEI: Worldwide Sales Office Dispersai by 2000 
E East Asia 
• N. America 
• Europe 
• Rest 
Source: Derived from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 2001 (Survey of Companies 
Investing Overseas 2001 ), Toyo Keizai. 
Turning to manufacturing, the first thing to note is the asymmetry injected by the 
special position of Taiwan with respect to its prépondérance among the L M E ventures 
and in contrast to MEI. There are two reasons for this: first, because the starting point of 
this study is Japanese LME-invested ventures there are almost bound to be 
disproportionaely more of them than would be the case in a more general study; second, 
proximity and capability have made Taiwan an attractive location for many Japanese 
companies, as seen by the number of L M E s , but there is a limit to how much a single 
transnational would want to avail itself of this advantage (in terms of ventures as 
opposed to capital). In fact, it is pertinent here to emphasise that whereas the dispersion 
of MEI ventures reflects a centrally planned and implemented strategy by a single 
Rest 
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corporation, or at most a close-knit group of companies, almost exclusively belonging 
to the sanie keìretsu, the 110 LMEs selected here are a set of diverse, unrelated entities 
with no one unifying référence other than being Japanese, and each individually 
operating on a much smaller scale with far fewer options than MEI . Actually, Taiwan 
largely accounts for the fact that the LMEs ' manufacturing share in East Asia is 
substantially larger than MEI's, although China is rapidly changing the figures for both 
of them. Both the LMEs and MEI have advanced fairly steadily in the United States and 
Europe, with the LMEs revealing a strong préférence for Britain in the latter possibly 
for language reasons. But if anything, since the middle of the 1980s L M E inclination 
towards East Asia as a manufacturing location has strengthened. Thailand, Malaysia 
and Indonesia have ail benefited handsomely from this. But contrasting China and the 
United States is the most revealing. By the mid-1980s the United States was getting a 
steady input of L M E investment, which indeed soared over the next 15 years. On the 
other hand China's inward FDI from this source literally ballooned from zero in 1985 to 
the point that by 2000, for the four décades recorded, it had overtaken the United States 
to enjoy 14.9% of this L M E sample's total Worldwide FDI as against 12.7% for the 
United States. 
Fig. 6.20 Key Locations for Manufacturing FDI by LMEs and MEI by 2000 
(a) LMEs 
Worldwide East Asia 
East Asia 70.6% R O K 9.7% 
R O K 6.9% China 21.2% 
China 14.9% Taiwan 28.2% 
Taiwan 19.9% A S E A N 38.4% 
A S E A N 27.1% 
United States 12.7% 
Europe 9.8% 
(b) MEI 
Worldwide East Asia 
East Asia 60.5% China 43.1% 
China 26.1% A S E A N 50.0% 
A S E A N 30.3% 
United States 14.3% 
Europe 12.6% 
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The apparent contrast between the L M E s and MEI as far as dedicated sales Investments 
are concerned is that the former act to compensate for compromised reach by 
earmarking key hubs from which to project spoke-fashion to otherwise unattainable 
market targets, while the latter enjoys the relative luxury of spreading its présence over 
a much wider surface area. Henee the focalisation by L M E s on Hong Kong and 
Singapore in East Asia and on Britain and Germany in Europe, as well as the attention 
addressed to the U.S. market. MEI , on the other hand, is expanding on a matrix of 
production and sales activities which allows it flexibility in manoeuvring its assets in 
response to a changing environment, as witness its récent incursion into the transition 
économies of Eastern Europe and Russia. As with manufacturing in Taiwan, moreover, 
in that it is an essentially single entity M E I does not require a replication of effort in 
each of the four East Asían and European locations mentioned above to the extent 
exercised by the L M E s as a group, although it does seemingly share with them a 
prédilection for thèse centres. 
It is, needless to say, in the vast scope and variety of opérations where M E I differs from 
the L M E , and this can even be seen in its opérations in Taiwan alone. MEI's first plant 
in Taiwan commenced opérations in October 1962 (Ishii, 1992). Production was 
introduced in stages: radios in 1963, black and white télévisions in 1964, refrigerators in 
1965, and air conditioners in 1968. Thus, with the injection of the full gamut of 
technological know-how from Japan, did Taiwan Matsushita (hereafter TM) become an 
effective overseas subsidiary for a wide range of electrical appliances. The company has 
continued to grow since that time. In 1962 it had 113 employées, by the beginning of 
the 1990s 6,000. In 1993, TM's business amounted to NTS24.8 bil, making it the tenth 
largest private sector company on the island (Liu, 1996:106). At the time of its 30 t h 
anniversary in 1992, T M had 41 directly owned service outlets, 5 repair shops, 41 
business offices, and 600 special contract outlets, and it was still expanding. T M was 
also a global Operator in its own right, its producís selling in 111 countries worldwide 
(Liu, 1996:108). This capacity has then been wedded to a regional network spanning all 
the major manufacturing nations in East Asia, of which Fig. 6.21 is a skeleton 
illustration. 
Then as globalisation has taken hold, MEI has redesigned TM's role as a spoke within 
the sphère of the group's opérations. This has been much affected by the group's switch 
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in the mid-l980s from the multi-locally oriented 'little Matsushitas' strategy to the 
'globalising Matsushita' strategy, which bases company thinking on international 
division of labour. In this process, the Japanese head office repositioned T M to function 
in three ways: 
(1) Collaboration. Because of its personnel's relatively advanced technological skills 
and their common Chinese heritage, the Matsushita head office has coopted T M to work 
with it on other projects. The most significant of these being the inauguration of a plant 
in Xiamen, China where the group invested the capital while T M was responsible for 
the transfer of R&D. 
(2) Consolidation. The group aims for optimal operation of its subsidiaries according to 
their particular attributes. This has meant that T M has been required to cede its 
production of electric irons to Malaysia, electric rice cookers to Thailand, and baking 
ovens to the Philippines. 
(3) Concentration. Plants of enlarged scale have been introduced for two purposes. One 
is to provide the domestic market with bulky, seasonal items like refrigerators and air 
conditioners for which imports are negligible; the other is to produce electric motors 
and other electrical equipment for a global market (Liu 1996). 
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* LMEs as a group have so me what similar dispersai 
of overseas affiliâtes as a large TNC like MEI 
* but LMEs have more focus on East Asiaf 
especialty Taiwan 
* balancing capabilities/constraints, LMEs obviously 
have less scope/variety of overseas activity 
* over time, LMEs show trend to investing more in 
U.S. and China, especially in last decade 
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6.4.3 Scope and Degrees of Proximity 
Thus is the globalisation path of a very large, multifaceted TNC. L M E s , as individuals 
or as a group. cannot replicate this. To analyse how they do go about internationalising, 
therefore, it is now necessary to discard the comparison with the L M E population and to 
assess L M E s as individuai entities within the regional and global settings. 
Figures 6.22, 6.23 and 6.24 show the scale of operations abroad by the sample L M E s in 
terms of the numbers of manufacturing FDI ventures they have as of 2000. In the first 
two of these Taiwan is included, so ali 110 L M E s have at least one F0I venture, which 
means that according to Fig. 6.22 the 17 L M E s with one venture each have only one 
manufacturing direct investment abroad, and that is in Taiwan. On the other hand, the 
13 LMEs in the second column each have two ventures resulting in a total of 26 
ventures outside Japan, of which at least 13 will be in Taiwan (because ali the sample 
L M E s have at least one venture in Taiwan). As mentioned above, the grand total of 
manufacturing ventures for the 110 L M E s is 582. Hence the average number of 
ventures world wìde is 
(A) 582 - 110 = 5.3 
A few atypical L M E s have exceptionally large numbers of manufacturing ventures 
often due to the particular nature of their businesses; Hoya, for instance, with 29 
ventures makes spectacle frames and has much more need than most for a locai 
manufacturing presence. When these 'outlyers' (which I define as firms with 12 or more 
different FDI venues) (5) are removed, then, there is a discernable drop in this average 
to 
458 - 103 = 4.4 
Fig. 6.23 reveals in the first line that of the 110 L M E s , 25 of them had just a single 
venture in East Asia (either in Taiwan or another East Asian country other than Japan). 
It follows that 
110 -25 = 85 = 77.3% 
of the sample LMEs had more than one East Asian venture, most of which are outside 
Taiwan (6 L M E s in the sample each have two or more ventures in Taiwan). The 
average number of manufacturing ventures in East Asia (as defìned above) per L M E is 
(B) 411-3- 110 = 3.7 
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With the potentially distorting outlyers removed again this average is reduced to 
339 - 104 = 3.3 
Fig. 6.22 Numbers of Manufacturing FDI Ventures per L M E Worldwide 
as of 2000 
No. of FDI ventures No. of LMEs Total no. of FDI ventures 
(a) (b) (a)x(b) 
1 17 17 
2 13 26 
3 13 39 
4 17 68 
Mainstream 5 10 50 
6 9 54 
7 7 49 
8 8 64 
9 3 27 
10 2 20 
11 4 44 
Sub total 103 458 
12 , 12 
13 1 13 
15 1 15 
Outlyers 17 1 17 
18 1 18 
20 1 20 
29 I 29 
Total 110 582 
Fig. 6.23 Numbers of Manufacturing FDI Ventures per L M E in East Asia 
by 2000 
No. of FDI ventures No. of LMEs Total no. of FDr ventures 
(a) (b) (a) X (b) 
1 25 25 
2 20 40 
3 15 45 
Mainstream 4 18 72 
5 10 50 
6 9 54 
7 3 21 
8 4 32 
Sub total 104 339 
10 1 10 
Outlyers 11 2 22 
13 i 26 
14 1 14 
Total 110 411 
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Fig. 6.24 Nurabers of Manufacturing FDI Ventures per L M E outside Fast Asia 
by2000 
No. of FDI ventures No. of LMEs Total no. of FDI ventures 
(a) (b) (a)x(b) 
0 45 
1 24 24 







5 3 15 
6 2 12 
7 3 21 
Sub total 109 153 
Outlyers 18 1 18 
Total UO 171 
As for Fig. 6.24, the most important finding is that 45 L M E s , or 41%, do not have any 
FDI ventures outside the East Asian region. Moreover, of the 65 (59%) that do, 24 of 
them, or 39.9%, only have one extra manufacturing venture beyond East Asia. In 
consequence, the average number of manufacturing ventures outside East Asia for the 
sample L M E s is 
(C) 171 - 110 = 1.6 
And even with only a single outlyer to remove, it stili falls significantly to 
153 + 109 = 1.4 
If on the other hand the average is limited to those 65 LMEs with an extra-East Asian 
presence, there is quite an increase to 
171 - 6 5 = 2.6 
Key Points: 
* LME sample shows that most stili have limited 
FDI presence * av. 5.3 projeets, although some 
mudi more 
* main arena for investment stili East Asia * 40% 
confìned to the region 
* as such they présent an argument for regional 
integration via FDI 
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6.4.4 Taiwan as the First Venue in Internationalisation of Japanese LMEs 
The above is an explicit statement giving credence to the significance of proximity in 
general. What is more, this line of argument can be taken further because according to 
the dates given in K S K , Taiwan was the first manufacturing FDI location for no less 
than 74, or 67.3%, of the 110 sample L M E s . Of the remaining 36 (32.7%), 23 (20.1%) 
were accounted for by other countries in the East Asian région: R O K (8), Hong Kong 
(3), Thailand (6), Singapore (3), Malaysia (2), and Indonesia (1). With respect to the 13 
beyond the région, the United States with 8 was the standout, while Germany, Belgium, 
Brazil, Australia and India had one each. Manufacturing asìde, Taiwan was also the first 
location for any form of FDï for 59, or 53.%, of the sample. As has been emphasised 
earlier, the nature of this survey makes the bias towards Taiwan inévitable. The obvious 
point of comparison is South Korea, but its policy towards inward investment was not 
nearly as positive as Taiwan's. The figures here suggest, and plenty of évidence frorn 
elsewhere can corroborate the fact, that the A S E A N countries were later to industrialise 
than Taiwan. And to take the extreme case, by not opening its doors until 1978, no less 
than 14 years after Taiwan had reversed policy, China is in no position to lay claims to 
the role Taiwan has played as the initial testing ground for Japanese L M E s moulding 
their emerging internationalisation stratégies. 
6.4.5 The Passage of Time with Illustrative Vignettes 
To this point in the account, the individuai L M E has been an average. To see how well 
the argument fìts we have to turn to the actual firm. This is, needless to say, the subject 
of the following case study chapter. However, it is also possible to illustrate the 
approaches taken in a general manner accompanying the unfolding of events. The 
message derived from the account in Chapter Pive is that, in particular since the 
conversion to an export orientation, Taiwan's economy has undergone considérable 
growth and, therefore, change. The same drama, as Chapter Four makes clear, was also 
being played out in Japan, albeìt at some stages removed in terms of overall progress. It 
follows that how Japanese LMEs viewed Taiwan and what they could achieve there in 
the mid-1960s differed markedly from what they saw by the beginning of the 1990s. As 
has been shown, the same three areas of industry were constantly to the fore, so that 
rather than industries per se, the éléments which hold the key to understanding the 
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L M E s ' perceptions are the enhancement of technological capabilities on the part of the 
Taiwanese, the expansion and élaboration of the Taiwanese economy as a whole during 
the period, and what implications thèse two factors had regarding the progressive 
intégration of the Taiwanese economy and its component business parts with the East 
Asian région and the world at large. So, in the vignettes which accompany the brief 
descriptions of the time stages below, there is no discernable élévation proceeding up a 
hierarchy of industries. Rather, the intention is to show what stratégie options certain 
représentative LMEs availed themselves of, given their own disposition and the 
prospects, Taiwan presented to them at any spécifie time. The data is drawn from the 
published sources already cited and from corporate publications, websites and the 
financial press. 
1965-70 
As has been noted, one of the immediate outeomes of Taiwan reversing course and 
seeing FDI as an engine of export expansion and therefore economie growth in general 
was the arrivai of large TNCs, notably from America and Japan, and particularly those 
manufacturing household electricals and other household goods. Setting up shop at this 
early phase were Canon and Ricoh for manufacturing caméras, Hitachi for télévisions, 
Mitsubishi Electric for audio units, and Sony for téléphones. Costs, especially in the 
form of inexpensive labour, were a compelling factor for thèse firms, although the 
Taiwanese domestic buying power for thèse products was starting to show too. Pushing 
down costs was also the prééminent concern of a host of smaller Japanese firms who 
saw in Taiwan the means for retaining under their wing their maturing, labour-intensive 
lines. This is the time when the sewing machine maker Janome* f www. i ano me. co. i p ). 
for example, brought its low-end manufacturing to Taiwan. But even at this early stage, 
the emplacement of TNCs, the accelerating economie orientation of the authorities, and 
labour which was not just inexpensive but also relatively well-educated was already 
attracting the specialist firm: Nippon Piston Ring (piston rings), OSG (précision cutting 
tools), and Mitsumi (polyvariable condensors). 
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Vignette 1: Mitsumi Electric 
Website: www,mitsumi.co.ip Investment in Taiwan: 1967 
Head Office: Chofu, Tokyo Employees in Japan: 1,685 
Established: 1954 Employees in Taiwan: 350 (1,220) 
Sources: Nakamura (1990), company website and catalogues, Z N K , JCP, K S K 
Mitsumi Electric encapsulates the interconnecting threads of the Japanese L M E , the 
role of Taiwan, the multinational region and globalisation that constitute the leitmotif of 
this thesis. Established as a radio and television parts maker in 1954, it had as its main 
product the polyvariable condenser (polyvaricon) developed by its founder and 
president Hajime Moribe. The polyvaricon was incorporated into almost ali transistor 
radios made in Japan and exported to Philips and General Electric. This was enabled by 
Mitsumi being among the first LMEs to establish a mass production system based on its 
own technologìes employed to upgrade quality while reducing costs. Mitsumi had its 
stocks carried on the Tokyo o ver-the-co unte r market in 1960, thereafter being listed on 
the Second Sectìon of the Tokyo Exchange in 1961, and the First Section in 1967. The 
Moribe family is stili prominent today; Itsuo Moribe is president and CEO, while 
Hitomi and Shigeru Moribe occupy two of the vice-presidential posts. 
Mitsumi Electric's first production base abroad was in Taiwan. This was Taiwan 
Mitsumi, inaugurated in 1967. What followed was a process of articulation as the 
company moved in incrementai steps to internationalisation. With respect to 
manufacturing, first its position was rurther Consolidated in Taiwan with the opening of 
Taipei Mitsumi in 1969, followed by a second factory for the latter in 1974. While 
Mitsumi Electronics Singapore started in 1972, attention really turned to A S E A N 
countries from the mid-1970s and then on into the 1980s: two factories in Malaysia 
(one more in 1994), two in the Philippines, and one in Thailand. Perhaps reflecting the 
differences in attitude to inward FDI and Japanese colonial rule, the other country in 
closest proximity to Japan, South Korea, was only added in 1987. This was also the 
year that the only non-East Asian manufacturing base was established, in the United 
Kingdom. The 1990s saw the turn of China, with factories in Zhuhai, Qingdao and 
Tianjin. Before any overseas manufacturing had commenced, however, a representative 
office had been opened in New York in 1961 and a sales office in Hong Kong in 1964. 
Nevertheless, the overseas production/market paradigm as it has evolved over the past 
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four décades is quite clear: 15 of the 16 factories are in East Asia, of the 20 sales offices 
half are in the United States (7) and Europe (3). While the company's most important 
overseas market was addressed very early on, overseas production commenced very 
near the home base, in Taiwan. While the company's headquarters and main R & D 
centre have remained in Japan, the Taiwan opérations have also upgraded their own 
technological proficiency over the years. The initial plant, for example, has as a resuit 
of its accumulated capabilities now begun to manufacture high value-added products, 
including interactive cable television sets. 
1971-75 
Although, as discussed in Chapter Five, this was the time when Taiwanese survival was 
on the line, actually what concerned an increasing number of Japanese firms was their 
own predicament given rising costs in Japan. This was especially so with respect to 
wages because an expectation had taken root among the Japanese workforce that their 
income, which for the larger companies and many of the smaller ones too was 
automatically hiked annually, keep pace with GNP which gaìloped at over 10% for 
most of the 1960s. Added to which was a growing perception of what the outside world 
could offer and how it could be accommodated. This is why Daiwa Seiko was in 
Taiwan even before the so-called Nixon Shock (which raised American duties on a 
wide range of Japanese goods), the introduction of floating exchange rates (which saw 
the value of the dollar plummet against the yen), and the first otl shock. AU of thèse 
occurrences rurther exacerbated the situation of crisis for many Japanese firms, whose 
first instinct may have been to seek relief in a geographically proximate but 
economically more favourable location. 
Vignette 2: Daiwa Seiko 
Website: www.daiwaseiko.co.ip Investment in Taiwan: 1971 
Head Office: Higashi-Kurume, Tokyo Employees in Japan: 1,187 
Established: 1945 Employees in Taiwan: 550 
Sources: Company domestic and overseas Websites and catalogues, Z N K , JCP, KSK. 
Daiwa Seiko is a maker of Sports goods seeking to transform itself into a 
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comprehensive supplier. Over the past ftfty years it has advanced in this direction 
through a logicai progression, starting with fishing tackle, and then on to golf gear, 
rackets for tennis, squash and badminton, through to mountain bikes and sports wear. 
Its 'First décision' came ten years after its founding as Matsui Seisakusho - Yoshiyuki 
Matsui is the current chairman - when it embarked on the manufacture of fishing réels. 
At that time domestic demand was limited for what was essentially a luxury item and 
production was for export. In other words, Daiwa Seiko, as the company became, was 
very conscious of its international markets in advanced countries from the moment its 
core compétence was defined; domestic sales of the réels only started in 1962. 
According to its Japanese website, by 1977 it was to become the world's top seller of 
fishing tackle, a position it maintains to this day. 
Before that, in 1966, Daiwa had established its first overseas manufacturing and sales 
base where its paramount market existed, in the United States. Taiwan was to follow in 
1971. But the fact that the factory of Daiwa (Taiwan) Corporation is located in the Nan-
Tze Export Processing Zone is significant in two ways. First, it is a perfect illustration 
of a Japanese L M E taking constructive advantage of Taiwan's government-inspired 
export promotion environment. Second, Taiwan was designated by the company as a 
production site. This market/production pattern was subsequently repeated. First, in 
1977, a manufacturing and sales base was set up in Scotland, while nearly 20 years 
later, in 1995, the need for cheaper production in the face of mounting compétition 
inspired the establishment of Daiwa Thailand. The remainder of the international 
framework as it has evolved is ail market-oriented, with sales bases in Australia, 
Germany and France. While manufacturing of all products is still strong in Japan, 
Daiwa takes active advantage of professional fishing consultants in the United States of 
Europe, for example, in a further division-of-labour refmement aimed at market 
substantiation. Within this setup, Daiwa Taiwan, unlike the the home base in Japan and 
the production affiliâtes in the other advanced countries, spécialises in the manufacture 
of fishing rods only for a worldwide market, but especially the United States and Japan. 
1976-80 
The character of the 1970s as whole, and especially in the second half as Taiwanese 
government policy and industriai standards became more demanding, is best epitomised 
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by the influx of Japanese intent on providing an increasing number of Taiwanese firms 
as well as Japanese with equipment, components and materials which local industry was 
as yet largely unable to effectively produce. In other words, this was an intensification 
of what had started in latter half of the 1960s. Casio Computer started producing cases, 
rings and backs for watches, Sanyo Electric transistors and integrated circuits, and 
Takeda Chemical rubber latex and sheet molding compounds. It is in this sector - by 
now heavily export-oriented - and at this time, that investment by Japanese LMEs 
became considerably stronger. But some large firms were starting to turn more of their 
attention to the local market itself, as with Chugai in pharmaceuticals, Ajinomoto in 
frozen foods, and Bridgestone in tyres, plus also the L M E Fujitec. 
Vignette 3: Fujitec 
Website: www, fui i tec, co ip Investment in Taiwan: 1980 
Head Office: Ibaraki City, Osaka Employees in Japan: 1,431 
Established: 1948 Employees in Taiwan: 250 
Sources: Company website, catalogues and newsletter, ZNK, JCP, K S K 
As early as 1964, according to a brochure celebrating Fujitec's 50 I h anniversary, 
founder and now honorary chairman Shotaro Uchiyama stated: "The world is a single 
market. In today's economy, I believe the key to our great success is to embark on an 
aggressive strategy to take business to the global market." By 1997, and with much 
international experience having been accumulated, the same publication quotes him as 
saying: "In order to win in this fiercely competitive age, it is important for us to 
effectively implement a 'Giocai Management' for the synergy of both globalisation and 
localisation." (My italics). 
The nature of the product and the activities attendant upon it provide the clue to this 
strategy of conjoining the global and the local and the position in which the Taiwan 
operations are placed as a consequence. Mr. Uchiyama established Fujitec in 1948 for 
the research and development, manufacturing, sales, installation and maintenance of 
elevators. Over time the business has also taken on escalators and multistory parking 
systems. The company has evolved to the point that it now has what it calls a 'World 
Five-Pole Management Structure', which entails dividing the world into five blocks, 
each having its own headquarters thus: America, Europe, South Asia, East Asia, and 
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Japan. The company's global approach is also reflected by the fact that, in addition to 
Tokyo and Osaka, it is also listed in Singapore and Luxemburg. As far as the local is 
concerned, on the other hand, proximity to the market for services ancillary to 
production and the existance of, or imminent potential for, high-rise construction are 
what Fujitec requires for it to invest. Hence, its first production base in Asia was Hong 
Kong, established in 1964. This was followed by South Korea in 1968 and Singapore in 
1972. In the wider world, with Fujitec America Inc. having been set up in 1977, the 
company built the world's largest elevator production plant in Lebanon, Ohio in 1982. 
Being set up in 1980, the affiliate in Taiwan was halfway along the chain of 
development in Fast Asia, to be followed by plants in Indonesia and China. It is subject 
to the East Asian headquarters in Hong Kong, and so has no outstanding regional rôle, 
although Z N K records that it sells Worldwide. But clearly, the reason why Fujitec set up 
in Taiwan was that the Taiwanese economy itself, because of its economie 
development, now represented a market, and one sufficiently developed to support 
domestic production. Again, the company headquarters and R & D remain in Japan, 
ftom where regional and global stratégies are co-ordinated. 
1981-85 
The early stirrings of compétition in labour-intensive industries within the East Asia 
région plus the simple desire to enhance industriai status proved the motivating forces 
for upgrading the Taiwanese economy, a process symbolised by the inauguration of 
Hsinchu Science and Industriai Park and given further impetus by the return of 
successful Taiwanese entrepreneurs from Silicon Valley and other Californian bases. 
This indigenous input was in lime to be influential in the establishment by the likes of 
N E C , Toshiba and Mitsubishi Electric of semiconductor R & D departments, reflecting a 
general trend of earmarking Taiwan for specific R & D work. At the same time, the 
investments tended to be tightly controlied with closely defìned objectives, offen 
looking inward to the immediate market. A case in point is N E C ' s venture, started in 
1982 for the manufacture and sales of computers and communications terminais to 
clients in Taiwan. The island was thus beginning to suggest a growing variety of 
options for investors. With the addition of an emerging global consciousness, 
technology-intensive L M E s could begin to see it in increasingly sophisticated strategie 
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terms because of its potential as an expanding domestic market and as a node in a 
campaign of internationalisation, as illustrated by Uni-Charm. 
Vignette 4: Uni-Charm 
Website: www,nnicharm.co.jp Investment in Taiwan: 1984 
Head Office: Minato-ku. Tokyo Employées in Japan: 1,434 
Established: 1961 Employées in Taiwan: 265 
Sources: Company website, Z N K , JCP, K S K 
Uni-Charm is one of Japan's leading manufacturers of sanitary napkins and paper 
diapers. Its commencement of opérations in 1961 coincided with the very early stages 
of growth in domestic consumer spending, this being just before the Income Doubling 
Plan announced by then prime minister Ishida. It has just recently gone through its first 
generational succession with the post of président being passed from Keiichiro 
Takahara to his son Takahisa Takahara. The company enjoyed growth domestically as 
the Japanese economy expanded and now commands market shares there of 30% for 
both the above end-user products. 
Uni-Charm only ventured abroad as a manufacturing investor for the first time in 1984, 
and when it did so it was to Taiwan. In fact, the company's website categorically states 
that Taiwan was consciously selected as its first overseas base. This was a joint 
venture, called United Charm, with Uni-Charm of Japan holding just over 50%. Its 
success can be gauged by the fact that the affiliate's capital was raised no less than six 
times over the following tweive years. Further manufacturing plants were to follow, 
initially ali in East Asia: Thailand in 1988 and 1996. South Korea in 1994, China in 
1995, and Indonesia in 1997. Additionally, in the 1990s sales opérations were started 
up in Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and Mongolia. Once this East Asian network was 
well underway, Uni-Charm turned its attention with regard to manufacturing to the 
West, starting with the Netherlands - where it now has three plants - and the United 
States, again in the 1990s. The fact that Taiwan's economy was reaching a stage of 
purchasing power similar to that experienced by the company in Japan was apparently a 
point of attraction for the company. But more importantly, it would seem that Uni-
Charm looked upon Taiwan as a testing ground for the internationalisation of products 
and production techniques, because of its various aspects of proximity. Growth of the 
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Taiwanese market itself theti afforded a cushion for initial expérimentation. Although 
United Charm covers a wider range of production than other overseas affiliâtes and 
exports to Southeast Asia, its primary fonction - having acted as a stepping stone for 
Uni-Charm's internationalisation via régionalisation - is to service the Taiwanese 
market. 
1986-90 
The impact of the Plaza Accord of 1985 between the G5 nations struck with full force 
two years later. The value of the yen had by then doubled against the dollar. This meant 
that many Japanese firms had both to relocate production abroad to remain competitive 
and also effectively to withdraw from areas where the compétition had become too 
assertive. Compared with a decade earlier, however, relocation - especially within the 
East Asian région - could be contemplated with greater equanimity because of the 
growing capability and receptiveness of the component countries, most notably and 
recently China. While the New Taiwan dollar also rose precipitously against the US 
dollar and this implication for export costs was further exacerbated by substantial wage 
hikes, Taiwan successfully staked its claim on competencies which set it apart from 
most of its Asian neighbours. This contributed to a refinement of the division of labour 
within the région to which Japanese investors responded massively. Thus did Japanese 
manufacturers encompass Taiwan within their emerging internationalisation stratégies 
as Taiwan itself embarked on redefming its position in a newly globalising 
environment. One resuit of this was that Japanese firms could set up in Taiwan not only 
to service local requirements as a link in the chain of export-oriented manufacturing but 
also to use it as an extension of Japanese production, which is essentially what Okazaki 
Manufacturing did. 
Vignette S: Okazaki Manufacturing 
Website: wAvvv.okazaki-mfg.com Investment in Taiwan: 1987 
Head Office: Chuo-ku, Kobe Employées in Japan: 271 
Established: 1954 Employées in Taiwan: 20 
Sources: Company websites and catalogues, communications with Mr. Trevor H. Neve 
(managing director of A R i Industries (UK) Ltd.), Z N K , M K B , K S K 
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This firm commencée! its existence as Okazaki Trading Company Limited for the 
import and sales of thermocouples and résistance wires from Hoskins Manufacturing 
Company and bimetals from W . M . Chace Company, both of the United States. Its 'first 
décision' came when it started manufacturing thermocouples in 1959. Thereafter, in 
1966, it constructed its Akashi factory where the pulse of the company's manufacturing 
remains. It is from there that are shipped "the core of the temperature control for all 
kinds of industries, including power generation, gas, petrochemicals, food and drugs, 
steel and semiconductors" (latest catalogue). To this day it is "not Usted on any stock 
exchange; it is a private company solely owned by the Okazaki family" (Mr. Neve, 
November 9 t h, 2001). It is thèse two factors, Okazaki's strict focus on its core 
compétence of temperature measurement and heating plus the tight family control, that 
have dictated its dealings with the outside world. 
In 1972, Okazaki concluded a technical assistance and licensing agreement with A R i 
Industries of the United States which enabled it to manufacture minerai insulated cables 
in Japan. Subsequently, in 1980, Okazaki bought out A R i industries, thereby acquiring 
the latter's accumuiated technology and production facilities, along with its sales 
network in the United States, Canada and Europe. Using that name, it then established 
A R i Industries (UK) for manufacturing to serve the European market. Okazaki's first 
association with production in East Asia was through a technical know-how licensing 
agreement for the production of thermocouples with a company in China in 1985. 
Okazaki Manufacturing (Taiwan) did not come on the scene until 1987. But when it 
did, it was with very specific intentions. First, it was located in the Kaohsiung EPZ, 
thereby implying that much of its output would be for export. Second, as noted by Mr. 
Neve (November 29 t h , 2001): "Taiwan produces, almost exclusively, standard minerai 
insulated cables in a high-volume production unit. The same product can be made in 
Japan and the USA, however, the spécifications and consequently the costs are 
invariably higher ... These cables are purchased by ARi (UK) from Japan and the USA 
even if the originai manufacture was in Taiwan." The Taiwan affiliate is now the 
world's leading producer of thermocouple and conductor mineral insulated cables. In 
its internationalising strategy, therefore, Okazaki pinpointed Taiwan for production, but 
far from being production based on cheap costs, this was production based on the 
island ;s burgeoning technological capabilities which afforded it a ranking above most 
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of its East Asian neighbours, if still below Japan and the United States. Thus was the 
Taiwan affiliate from the outset allocated a global role which essentially leapfrogged 
the region. 
Key Points: 
* some of distinctiveness of LME international-
isation now apparent & ie, favouring proximate 
location (Taiwan) for both production- and 
market-led FDI 
* but also apparent is gradual evolution of LME 
networks ^ often gives Taiwan an 'upgraded' 
role 
* also see variety of LME behaviours induced by 
timing of investments + nature of individual LME 
6.5 Summary 
An aggregate sample was constructed from Japanese and Taiwanese sources which 
comprised 110 Japanese LMEs , to each of which is attributed one Taiwan 
manufacturing affiliate (TMA). Of the LMEs in Japan, about 80% are listed and 20% 
unlisted; some 70% can be classified as intermediary suppliers, 30% as end-user 
product manufacturers. The process of designating Japanese L M E s started from the 
Taiwanese side and this was then checked against data deriving from Japan. This 
resulted in summary profiles detailing the essential data for each L M E and its T M A . 
Knowledge of the Japanese language is indispensible for this part of the research, both 
for gleaning general information from most of the sources given and for tracking 
company/affiliate names. 
In first comparing investing Japanese L M E s with investing Japanese firms in Taiwan in 
general for the period 1961 to 2000, it was found that there were marked similarities. In 
both cases there were significant sectoral concentrations on electrical and electric 
appliances, chemicals and machinery, and a similar temporal distribution. They both 
valued the technical competence of the local workers and the role of Taiwan as an 
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export base, though the L M E s seemed to value the technical capabilities available in 
Taiwan more. They expressed confidence in Taiwan over time by increasing their 
outlays, although some had opted for withdrawal. In addition, the L M E s demonstrated a 
discernable integration involving their TMAs , sourcing both locally and from Japan and 
exportingto Southeast Asia, for example. 
Turning to the perspective of the internatio na lis ing L M E in Japan, a comparison was 
first effected with Matsushita Electric Industriai (MEI), a company some 50 times 
larger than the average sample L M E . The aggregate sample and M E I both showed 
similar patterns and even similar trends in the geographica! dispersai of manufacturing 
and sales activities worldwide, although the L M E s ' concentration in East Asia is more 
pronounced. The real différence is revealed when the average L M E as a single entity is 
contrasted with MEI ; the former's FDÏ ventures amount to less than 5% of the latter's. 
Although the L M E s as a group have a wide geographical dispersai, individuai L M E s 
have more limited dispersai in Taiwan, other East Asian countries and then the rest of 
the world, though 40% of the population have no présence outside East Asia by 2000. 
Moreover, the relatìonship between the aggregate sample of L M E s with Taiwan is 
strong. For no less than 74 of the 110 Taiwan was the first manufacturing FDI 
expérience, thereby suggesting the powerfu! attraction of proximity when L M E s first 
seek to enlarge their markets or escape rising costs at home. However, the illustrative 
vignettes imply a more nuanced progression. The foregrounding of the individuai L M E 
with its own specific agenda illustrâtes the variety of approaches taken and of Taiwan's 
assigned rôle. It shows examples of affiliâtes upgrading their technical capabilities and 
gaining a global role, of others in more modest locai market serving roles, and of yet 
others which are given a specific strategie role from the start. 
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Notes 
(1) The 110 fìrms are all Japanese manufacturing L M E s with at least one 
subsidiary/affiliate in Taiwan, set up between 1961 and 1990, and selected according to 
criteria and from sources discussed in the text. They constitute the best estimate of the 
population of Japanese L M E s inasmuch as they represent the number sourced in Z N K 
and confirmed in JCH/NKJ or M K B and K S K . However, the record in Z N K is almost 
certainly incomplete, and it has not been possible to confìrm the status of some fìrms 
given in Z N K through the Japanese sources. 
(2) These are cases of investment, so the same Japanese company may have made more 
than one, involving différent Taiwan-based subsidies and/or joint ventures. Hence, 
according to this survey, Hitachi, Ltd. has three Investments in companies operating as 
discrete entities, the English names being Taiwan Hitachi, Taiwan Television 
Enterprise, and Hitachi Asia. 
(3) This is not to say that things are totally smooth. An idea of the différences that can 
emerge can be gained from Okuyama (1995). 
(4) It should be noted that, even here, this may not mean total withdrawal by the 
Japanese L M E from Taiwan because it may, as in the case of Sailor Pen, the first 
company listed, have more than one venture in opération, either independently or with 
partners. 
(5) The L M E s with larger numbers (10 - 12) of overseas ventures are not in the main 
more advanced along the path of internationalisation than those with fewer, nor do they 
have a longer history of internationalising. Rather, they tend to be fìrms in markets 
where a more decentralised global présence, to a more locai market orientation with a 
smaller scale of production is a requirement of the articulation strategy. 
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Chapter Severi 
Japanese LMEs as Investors in Taiwan and Beyond: 
Case Studies 
7.1 Introduction 
The various aggregate data presented in the previous chapter gave a picture of 
the distinctive sectoral/temporai pattern of Japanese L M E FDI ventures in 
Taiwan and an indication of motives for choosing Taiwan (often as the 'first 
choice - first time' location for FDI). In addition, it imparted the impression that 
regional bias remains typical of the international production Systems of Japanese 
LMEs as they continue to internationalise, though while remaining firmly rooted 
in Japan for key corporate runctions. The changing use they make of Taiwan as 
an upgraded production location and export platform is also made apparent. 
Some specific qualitative studies now follow. Prior to that is a brief justification 
for the case study which is succeeded by an account of the means of approach to 
potential case study companies and the arrangements made as a resuit. AH the 
case studies comprise LMEs extracted from the aggregate sample of 110 firms, 
so that a chain of évidence is constructed constituting interconnecting 
quantitative and qualitative éléments. The case study outlines each follow the 
sanie format comprising a synopsis and general description of the company, its 
L M E character, its international process, the particular role of Taiwan in that 
process, and its articulation approach with référence to a characteristic 
articulation attribute. 
7.2 Methodology Note 
7.2.1 The Qualitative Componenti The Essence of the Case Study 
The case study has been described as a research strategy involving the empirica! 
investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context (Yin, 
1981; Robson, 1993). This strategy "focuses on understanding the dynamics 
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présent within single settings" (Eisenhardt, 1989:534), and as such the case is 
investigated in its own right, not as a sample of a population. The case study 
copes with a distinctive situation with many variables and relies on multiple 
sources of évidence. Yin (1994) states that a singular différence between the 
case study and related methods, notably ethnography and grounded theory, 
which "deliberately avoid specifying any theoretical propositions at the outset of 
an inquiry" (Yin, 1994:27), is that preliminary propositions are developed before 
the data collection commences. This thesis présents a variation of this approach, 
whereby information and theoretical constructs regarding L M E s , globalisation, 
and the roles of the région and the state, together with various aggregate data 
has been compiied and analysed to elicit propositions which are then employed 
as guidelines for conducting rive case studies. 
7.2.2 The Course Taken 
(i) Preliminary Approaches to Potential Case Study Firms 
It is often claimed that the Japanese are more réceptive to contact made via 
introductions than being directly approached. Having in the past lived in Japan 
for a long time, I think this has its limitations. Mevertheless, during the time that 
the general data was being put together attempts were consistente made to 
contact any of the 110 sample LMEs by way of acquaintances, académies, 
institutions (like Nomura and JETRO), and journalists and other Professionals. It 
is to be noted, though, that this was always with the ultimate intention of 
following the procedure outlined below, whatever turned up in the meantime. In 
the event, one very usefiil contact was effected by an acquaintance, an influential 
businessman in Kaohsiung who was a friend of the Taiwanese vice-president of 
Kaohsiung Mabuchi, one of two affiliâtes Mabuchi Motor has in Taiwan. It was 
decided to make this a test study and an interview took place in Japanese with 
the Japanese président, the Taiwanese vice-president and others. However, the 
sensé of obligation on the part of the Mabuchi executives was to the Kaohsiung 
businessman. That having been fulfilled, it was not possible for me to go further. 
Such reliance on the link-up of disparate individuals, even when sincere - or 
especially when sincere - can have unforeseen results and take unpredictable 
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turns. One can, for example, be led up false alleys of inquiry which, because of 
the obligations already incurred, are difficult to extricate oneself from and much 
time and effort is wasted. This contrasts markedly with atmosphere of 
commitment on the part of the four other case studies as described below. These 
companies, on their own volition, chose to respond constructively to an out-of-
the-blue request for information made formerly by an unknown party, based on 
the quality of the approach. That having been said, enough information is 
available about Mabuchi to include it as a case study for comparative purposes. 
(ü) Course of Data Collection at Case Study Level 
1. !n preparing the general information as presented in Chapter Síx, it was noted 
that 35 of the 110 Japanese LMEs with affiliates in Taiwan also had afíiliates in 
the United Kingdom. As I am British and am writing this thesis at a British 
university, I thought it would seem iogical to these 35 firms that I would 
approach them in the U K . It would also be more likely that contact would be 
made with a British management which tends to be more sympathetic than 
Japanese management to such research requests, or with a Japanese management 
aware of the need to act in a British manner. Consequently these companies were 
approached by letter (see Appendix) for catalogues and other written data (to be 
posted to my U K home, which í was visiting for a month). This yielded materials 
from nine companies. Follow-up telephone calis brought in an additional eight 
for a total of 17, constituting potential cand¡dates for the case studies. 
2. On returning to Taipei, I produced a letter and questionnaire in English (see 
Appendix). These were then translated into Japanese by a professional Japanese 
translator (most top-class translation ¡s done by a native speaker into his/her own 
language). As a professional Japanese-to-English translator I then checked this 
to ensure accuracy. The questionnaire (Appendix, item 4) was intentionally 
highly detailed for the following reasons. First, it was to indicate the seriousness 
of the researcher and the knowledge and understanding already attained. Second, 
although such detail would deter the majority of companies approached from 
responding, it was reckoned that the few that did respond, just because they 
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appreciated the detail ihat had beert achieved, would be that much more 
committed in their accommodation. 
3. The English and Japanese versions were sent by facsimile to the 17 Taiwan 
affiliâtes of the Japanese LMEs also having affiliâtes in the UK which had sent 
me materials, plus to all other Taiwan affiliâtes with Japanese (as opposed to 
Taiwanese) managing directors as documented in K S K , for a total of 59 firms 
out of the 110. The inclusion of the top executive's name for each affiliate by 
K S K allowed for each communication to be addressed personally to that 
executive. The 17 were informed in the letter that information had already been 
received from their U K affiliate, thereby indicating that a connection with the 
company had already been established. The facsimile machine used was one 
which indicates if you get through or not. Al l did. Four positive responses came 
back - Pentel, Shofu, Union Tool and Tanaka Kikinzoku; the first three of these 
were among the 17 with U K affiliâtes, suggesting that the prior contact 
established via the U K affiliate had made an impression and influenced response. 
Pentel, Union Tool and Tanaka Kikinzoku agreed to interviews in Taiwan. The 
Taiwanese président of Shofu's 50/50 joint venture informed me immediately 
that he had sent the letter and questionnaire to the Japanese headquarters. From 
this materialised a proposed meeting in Japan. These four firms, plus Mabuchi, 
constituted the case study firms for this chapter. 
4. The interviews with the three affiliâtes in Taiwan were arranged for the end of 
May and first half of June, 2002. The request for them to be conducted in 
Japanese was accepted by all three. The reason tbr this request was to underline 
the compétence to deal with the subject matter and possibly thereby to elicit 
profounder insights into the company's situation. The format as in the 
questionnaire sent to them was followed. It is common in the case of such 
meetings with Japanese that proceedings are initiated with discussion of mutually 
familiär ground, hence the simplicity of the opening questions which the 
interviewée knows are being posed for confirmation at most. To this extent the 
interviews were structured. However, two of the interviewées had very 
conscientiously studied the questionnaire beforehand and were therefore well 
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apprised of what was wanted. So I allowed them to run ahead of the order of 
questions as they incorporated and interconnected facts which actuaily answered 
questions further down the line. 
Prior to the interviews a notebook was prepared. On the right hand page were 
the questions as sent to the interviewées with spaces under each of them for 
annotating the comments made during the interview. In addition, on the left hand 
page were notes derived from written data about the particular company already 
obtained which were used to embellish and individualise the originai non-firm-
specific questions. Taken together with the notebook to each interview was a file 
with ali the collected materials concerning the particular firm (and which formed 
the basis for the notes on the left hand page) so that they could be referred to if 
more detailed confirmation of a point was required. The notes taken at the 
interview were subject to immediate review afterwards. At the end of each 
interview, in addition to requesting newspaper and journal articles as well as 
company historiés, I asked if they could arrange for me to visit their 
headquarters in Japan. Ai l three accepted and arrangements were made. 
5. With Shofu, this meant four interviews in Japan which took place in the third 
week in June 2002. In that arrangements with the three already interviewed in 
Taiwan were made in-house by thèse companies it was not possible to stipulate 
the language, so 1 did not push for it. The resuit was that the interviews at Pentel 
and Tanaka Kikinzoku were conducted in English, while those at Union Tool 
and Shofu were in Japanese. (With Mabuchi included, therefore, of the total of 
eight interviews at five firms, six were in Japanese.) The same interview format 
as above was repeated, except that with the three repeat interviews Taiwan was 
de-emphasised to an extent, with greater concentration on question groups 1, 2 
and 6 (see Appendix). Nevertheless, comments on Taiwan were forthcoming. 
(ni) Anafysis 
The data compiled for the analysis of the case studies for this thesis (including 
the test case study) are thus derived both from verbal and written sources in 
English, Japanese and Chinese. They are as follows: 
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(i) General materials reviewed in Chapter Six 
(ii) Interviews 
(ili) Case study company catalogues and other published materials 
(iv) Newspaper and journal articles 
(v) Case study company websites 
7.2.3 Methodological Framework 
(i) The Quantitative Base 
The account of the 110 firms in Chapter Six can be regarded as the first stage in 
the case study analysis in that it constitutes a documentary underpinning to what 
is to follow in this chapter. It is a filter allowing for parsimonious control of data 
input volume and timing. Yin (1994) maintains that the strengths of 
documentation are that it is stable and can be reviewed repeatedly; it is 
unobtrusive in that it is not created as a resuit of the case study; it is exact 
inasmuch as it présents names, références and détails; it comprises a broad 
coverage over time, events and settings; it is precise and quantitative. This, 
needless to say, does not drive a wedge between documentary évidence and the 
case study. On the contrary, as Eisenhardt (1989) avers, the case study typically 
combines data collection methods which include documents, archivai records and 
interviews, and the évidence can be quantitative (presented as figures, for 
example) or qualitative (in words) concerning motives and reasons for corporate 
behaviours and exploration of the priority given to influential factors as those 
determined key events in the company history. This, as stated above, is 
essentially the process followed here. The particular characteristic of the 
approach is that the case studies actually form part of the initial pool of 
quantitative data and are then abstracted from that pool for deeper analysis. That 
is to say, having already been part of a general analysis which has had 
chrono logicai, geographica! and comparative éléments, while also being both 
explanatory and descriptive (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Yin, 1994), they are 
now to be matched against this background both individually and as a group, 
with a focus on uncovering a managerial perspective in the processes driving the 
patterns discovered in Chapter Six. 
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(iï) The Qualitative Construct 
So the quantitative and qualitative are complementary. The data compiled in 
Chapter Six can act as a break to narrow, idiosyncratic conclusions drawn from 
excessive concentration on a few case studies and therefore not generalisable 
(Gill and Johnson, 1977; Eisenhardt, 1989). The essence of the case study, on 
the other hand, is that it individualises and humanises; it allows the investigation 
to sustain the holistic characteristics of what actually takes place within and 
around the single, particular firm or small group of firms. That is to say, the case 
study, as one of the qualitative research methods, gives the researcher more 
flexibility in tackling the intricacies of real-life social phenomena. It can explain, 
describe and illustrate institutions and events which are too complex for survey 
or expérimental stratégies to handle. The core within that is the attempt to 
elucidate the décision or set of décisions, in terms of why they were taken, how 
they were implemented, and with what resuit (Schramm, 1971). Or to put it in 
the terms of this thesis, the case study has been employed to explore the 
intricacies on the individuai firm level of the décision to invest abroad as an 
élément of its strategy of articulation as it internationalises in a globalising 
environment. The individuai case studies in this thesis were also backed up by 
data particular to the individuai firm, again mostly compiled in advance of the 
interviews. This allowed for the interviews to be targeted, while at the same time 
a certain distance could be maintained so that conclusions would not be 
prejudiced by too intimate a relationship with the interviewées (a danger which 
could have been quite real if reliance had been placed on a web of personal 
contacts). 
7.3 C a s e S tudy Out l ines 
7.3.1 Opening Re marks 
In the following are presented case studies comprising rive Japanese firms which 
could be classified as leading medium-sized enterprises when they made direct 
manufacturing investments in Taiwan during the period from the 1960s to 1990. 
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The fact that they can be categorised as LMEs has to be justified. Henee, the 
initial two sections of each of the case study accounts constitute, first, 
descriptions of how the company was conceived and thereafter how il evolved 
with its chosen product line, and second, a rundown of its L M E character. This 
is an essential background because a cardinal assertion of this thesis is that an 
enterprise's history, product sélection and business cornportment have a direct 
hearing on the course it pursues internationally. Or, to put il otherwise, the way 
the L M E has initiated and conducted its affairs on its home territory is reflected 
in the way it articulâtes abroad. One potential articulation manoeuvre in this 
internatio nal ising évolution is to take advantage of proximity as represented nere 
by Taiwan and extending eventually to the East Asian région. The case studies 
are presented in the order in which they made their initial investment in Taiwan, 
and this coincides to a marked extent with the attitude taken towards Taiwan. 
This is encapsulated in a final section for each company which discusses its 
articulation by pinpointing a distinctive 'articulation attribute' as done for the 
briefer illustrative international examples in Chapter Two. Although, again, it 
should be recognised that this is only one of each company's attributes selected 
to illustrate a point. Product and quality are at the heart of their articulation 
attributes in ail cases. In fact, the cases presented (though not selected with this 
in mind, since they were to a degree self-selected by willingness to participate) 
do turn out to represent a range of LMEs by attributes and behaviours, and serve 
to illustrate thereby the variety possible within the L M E category. 
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7.3.2 Case Study 1: Pentel 
7.3.2(a) Interview Details 
Interview 1 
Date June 14,2002 Place Taipei 
Interviewee(s) Mr. C. Sakamoto, Managing Director 
Language Japanese Duration 1 hr 20 mins 
Interview 2 
Date June 20,2002 Place Tokyo 
interviewee(s) Mr . N . Mumo, Assistant General Manager 
Language English Duration 2 hrs 
Remarks Mr. Mumo was marketing manager in Los Angeles for 10 years 
References PI = Mr. Sakamoto; P2 = Mr. Mumo; P3 = Mr. M . Izuka (UK 
Pente! General Manager; e-mail contact); PC - English 
catalogue for 2002; PW = Japanese Website in December 
2002; P H = Japanese-language 'Steps in Pentel's 50-year 
History' 
Synopsis B O X 7 
7.3,2(b) Company Description and Internationalisation Progression 
Company and Product. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War 
Yukio Horie came to the conclusion that what was most needed for the building 
of a new Japan was education. Whereupon, in 1946, he established the AU-Japan 
(Dragon) Stationery Co., Ltd., which would in 1971 be renamed Pentel Co., Ltd. 
Mr. Horie's commitment was given extra emphasis by his assumption of the 
chairmanship of the newly inaugurated Tokyo Stationery Association in that 
initial year (PH, 1). Over the next half-century the Company was to become an 
all-round supplier of stationery items and office equipment, being particularly 
renowned for its roller pens and ballpoint pens. The industry was to become 
indebted to Pentel's enterprising innovativeness as it posted world firsts with 
new types of crayons and pens. In Japan it climbed to third ranking in the 
industry after Pilot and Mitsubishi Pencil, although now it is being put to the test 
by other rivals. For instance, Zebra (www.ZEBRA co. ip) recently overtook it on 
the domestic front in volume sales, while a new challenge is surfacing 
international^ with Korean companies like Dong-A Pencils 
(www, dongapen.com) Starting to develop original products rather than merely 
copying, a menacing new departure (P2). 
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B O X 7 
Case Study 1 
Pentel 
IME Status in Japan: Comprehensive maker of stationery items and onice 
equipment, ranking in top three overall. 
Established in Japan: 1946 
Company Names and Addresses (Japan and Taiwan) 
JE Pentel Co., Ltd. 7-2, Koami-cho, Nihonbashi, Chuo-ku, 
Tokyo 
JJ Penteru K . K . (03)3667-3333 
www. pentel.co.jp 
TC Feilong Wenju (Gu) 3 [ d . FI., 40, Long Jiang, Rd., Taipei 
TE Pentel (Taiwan) Co., Ltd. (02)2471-2555 
References (Page) 
ZNK(562) J C H - N K J - M K B (726) KSK(187) 
Investment Details 
Taiwan approvai date (ZNK) March 1968 Capital increase dates 1979, 1988, 
1991,1993 
Current capital ratios: Pentel Co., Ltd. 100.0% 
Designations 
Company size/type designation MM(1)* 
No. ofemployees in Japan (JCH) 1,408 
No. of employees in Taiwan (ZNK) 110 
Main products/business in Taiwan (ZNK) Manufacture, import and 
export of: stationery items. 
Investment Merits (ZNK) 
Contributing to development of Taiwanese economy; supplying quality items to 
locai Taiwan market; exports worldwide. 
Sources of Raw Materials: Japan, Britain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Germany. 
Sales/Export Destinations: Taiwan, Southeast Asia, United States, Central and 
South America, Europe, Middle East, Africa. 
Investments Worldwide (KSK) 
East Asia Manufacturing: Taiwan (1968) 
East Asia Sales: Hong Kong (1977), Singapore (¡980) 
Rest of World Manufacturing: United States (1965) 
Rest of World Sales: France (1967), Australia (1967), Germany (1969), Britain 
(1970) 
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Pentel soon honed the art of mass production so that it was primed for fast 
growth and the attainment of L M E status in the 1960s (P2). At the outset 
éducation meant children. So the company's initial products were crayons and 
other art materials, as opposed to Pilot with its fountain pens and Mitsubishi 
with its ballpoint pens. However, such a market is restricted, or 'closed niche'. 
To achieve more stability and greater potential for growth Pentel needed to 
extend along the continuum of its expertise to encompass writing materials 
appealing to ali age groups (PI), and this was the decisive step that ensured the 
company's consolidation. Over time the company has sought to guarantee 
volume by engaging in originai equipment manufacturing (OEM) in addition to 
supplying its own products, and it has pursued depth by, for instance, coming up 
with a range of inks for its own pens (PW). Furthermore, with production 
mounting apace it set up Pentel Chemical in 1965 to make plastic moulds for its 
own production purposes and for sale (PH, 4; PW). This évolution was 
accompanied by the development of a sales network, adding branches in Nagoya 
and Sapporo in 1956 and 1957 (PH, 3) on the way to achieving nationwide 
coverage through the Tokyo headquarters and eight branches in other major 
cities, supplied by three factories (PW). Having also entered office automation 
and robotics in the early 1980s, Pentel lays claim to a substantial body of 
technological expertise (PW), but the question seems to be how much it can 
realistically handle. There have been expensive failures and it is pulling back to 
some extent from its involvement in machinery - including robots, printers. 
automatic assemblers - due to incomplete production and maintenance 
capabilities (P2). 
L M E Character of Company. No little part of both the successes and 
shortcomings of this company can be attributed to the extraordinary vitality and 
assiduity of one man, Yukio Horie, who remains at the helm as chairman in his 
nineties. Pentel is an independent, unlisted company whose destiny has long been 
dictated by the purse of "an old-fashioned businessman" (P2), being iargely 
owned by him and his immediate family, and averse to resorting to the market 
for financing (P2). Despite the prolonged adhérence to a single individuala 
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prédilections, however, Pentel has strong L M E credentials. U has never invested 
in land, trusts and bonds (P2). It has always stuck strictly to the manufacturing 
and marketing of its core and related producís - whatever may be said about the 
latter - and the commitment to thèse two activities can be subsumed under the 
rubrics of perfection and profile. Perfection has been pursued through research 
and development, processing, delivery and service. Very early on the founder 
realised that he needed educated engineers, with the resuit that Pentel pioneered 
the systematic advancement of stationery items in Japan with the establishment 
of an R & D centre in 1960 (P2; PH, 3). It places a priority on deveîoping its own 
machinery and equipment in order to consummate and accelerate responsiveness 
to demand (PW). Such résolve was to produce, already in 1965, the only pen at 
the time which dîd not leak under extreme changes of atmospheric pressure and 
so was deemed suited for use on Gemini space flights numbers six and seven 
(P2). This symbolised the drive to become the most prestigious company in the 
industry as profile was targeted as part of the product mix. So the next stage was 
winning the Deming Award - a much coveted prize in Japan - as testimony to a 
mastery of total quality control, and this was achieved in 1976 (PH, 7). 
Subsequently, from the late 1980s through the early 1990s, image was cultivated 
by deveîoping exclusive brands for Burberry, Oxford University, and Yomiuri 
Giants baseball team, as well as sponsoring a soccer club in the Japan League 
(PW). Ever conscious of visibility, Pentel walked away with the Gold Prize at 
the Paris International Stationery and Office Equipment Sample Fair (SIPPA) in 
1994 (PH, 10). 
Internationalisation. Another prize going Pentel's way was the Prime Ministeri 
Award for Exports, which it had captured for eight successive years by 1971 
(PW). Overseas markets were a very early priority. with the président himself 
travelling in 1953 to Okinawa (then occupied by the United States), Taiwan, 
Thailand and Hong Kong, not only to open sales offices but also to hold lectures 
jointly with well-known local artists (PH, 2). This was one man's decisión; he 
simply wrapped some crayons in a furoshiki (Japanese kerchief) and went, 
combing the yellow pages in his hotel upon arrivai (P2). The following year saw 
staff dispatched to do likewise and hold booster sessions in retail outlets and 
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department Stores in Southeast Asia (PH, 2). By 1958 it was the turn of the 
United States, which thenceforth was to enjoy a fabled role in Pentel's 
internationalisation Odyssey. Certainly the air of mythical adventure is sustained: 
not being able to speak English to get into a Convention in Los Angeles, Yukio 
Horie stood outside handing out pens and name cards, which were thereafter to 
engender business (P2). Success and celebrity came quickly in the 1960s. In 
addition to Gemini fame, President Johnson appeared on the cover of Newsweek 
signing a document with a Pentel pen, while the Company - in those less 
expensive times - obtained a sponsorship for the Rice Bowl (PH, 4). Eventually, 
in the 1970s and 1980s, the United States was to become Pentel's most 
flourishing manufacturing base abroad. But before that, in 1965, Pentel of 
America was estabüshed in Chicago as the core of the sales effort there, while 
Paris became the location for the first sales office in Europe. 
With Hong Kong already active, these were succeeded in quick order by 
incorporated affiliates in England and Australia (1967), and subsequently in 
Switzerland (1977), Singapore (1980), Malaysia (1982), and Amoy (Xiamen), 
China (1994) among others (PH, 5-10). As of now, Pentel has some 23 purely 
sales offices worldwide. Overseas manufacturing, on the other hand, was 
launched in two places during 1968, these being Taipei and suburban Paris, to be 
foüowed in 1971 by Los Angeles. Of more limited scope are plants set up in 
Tianjin, China and Uruguay, both in 1991 (PH, 5-10). In global terms the 
essential marketing shape is production in France for Europe, in Japan and 
Taiwan (plus Tianjin) for Asia, and in the United States for the Americas (with 
knockdown in Uruguay) (PI). Outside Japan, where the innovative inspiration 
and superior technology still reside (P3), the Los Angeles plant replicates the 
biggest ränge and volume, with the third place in global ranking shared by Paris 
and Taipei (PC, 107; P2). The Paris and Los Angeles plants were ffom the 
outset and still are market-orlenttd, while Taipei and Tianjin were at their 
conception production-orlented, Tianjin starting with 90% exports and thus 
tracing the pattern set by Taipei twenty-odd years before (PI). Overall, though, 
there are apparent problems of effective reach. The Paris plant is limited in 
capacity and must Supplement with imports from Japan to Service a European 
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market of dauntìng complexity to the company (PI, P2). Overseas production 
and sales are concentrated on writing and art materials; machinery and other 
items are restricted to Japan. Although Pentel has sold some of its electronic 
machinery in the United States, it had to pull out for lack of maintenance 
capability. An American firm offered to act as agent for the machinery, but 
Pentel declined, seemingly wary of the large size of that company and, by 
implication, the danger of losing control (P2). 
Role of Taiwan. In being production-oriented, Pentel's investment in a Taiwan-
based manufacturing affiliate in 1968 was a conscìous resolution to take 
advantage of lower costs. It was also inspired by géographie and cultural 
proximity, and the fact that a lot of Taiwanese could speak Japanese and were 
amicably disposed towards Japan. A nascent domestic market was an additional 
contributing factor (PI). In the full swing of ebullient economie growth, Japan 
had absorbed its surplus workforce and was becoming too expensive for labour-
intensive tasks, while Taiwan seemed ideally suited to service the Asian markets. 
Al l that was needed was to shift the machinery to Taiwan (P3). So a start was 
made with art materials and pastels; writing materials were to follow in the 
1980s (PI). There were quality problems with Taiwanese intermediate suppliers 
in the early stages, but thèse have been ironed out to the extent that 80% of the 
company's needs are now local content. The initial quota of six Japanese 
engineers has been pared down to four, and the Japanese now busy themselves 
with design and quality control while ail other aspects of production are in the 
hands of the Taiwanese. Pentel Taiwan enjoys domestic market shares of 50% in 
art materials and 17 - 20%» in writing materials, while its biggest export market 
is Southeast Asia (PI). 
Unusually for the 1960s, Pentel managed to establish a wholly-owned subsidiary 
rather than enter into a joint venture agreement. It has remained committed to 
Taiwan ever since, increasing its capital into the 1990s and building a new plant 
some years back (P3). However, its original raison d'être is no longer tenable 
for the very same reasons that production was offloaded from Japan in the first 
place. Nowadays, to fijlly vindicate its status as a viable regional nucleus with 
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global pretensions, the Taiwan affiliate must develop 'technically innovative', 
higher value-added products (P3). In that the manufacturing output has been on 
the rise, especially over the past five years (PI), there seems to have been a 
successoli adjustment. Transformation in Taiwan has also been a contributing 
factor in this process: augmented Taiwanese technological proficiency enables 
Pentel Taiwan to purchase moulds locally, its plants have replaced manual 
operations with machinery, and the maturing ofthe domestic market in particular 
has allowed it to offer products of higher quality at higher prices (PI). Equally 
pertinent to the Taiwan affìliate's sustained relevance is the division-of-labour 
role it plays within the company. From the headquarters' global perspective 
Pentel Taiwan is the base for low- to medium-priced items. As such, it is Pentel 
Taiwan which is now responsible for manufacturing art materials and erasers for 
worldwide distribution. It has fulfìlled large orders for the Los Angeles affiliate 
too (P2). After Japan and America it ranks third technologically, although it stili 
has some ground to make up on design (PI, P3). 
Ali this having been said, there seems to be some divergence of opinion within 
the company as to what extent Pentel Taiwan functions as a regional hub. The 
managing director, Mr. Sakamoto (PI), a long-time resident of Taiwan and a 
fìuent speaker of Chinese, saw no such role (1). The people of East Asia are too 
culturally diverse; the Chinese do not have much in common with the 
Indonesians, for example. Conversely, according to Mr. Mumo (P2), who has 
little hands-on experience of Asia as a whole, Mr. Horie has always wanted to 
see Taiwan as a manufacturing centre for the region, complementing Tokyo, Los 
Angeles and Paris. Mr. Mumo claimed that the head office is pushing Taiwan to 
assume a centrai role in Asia; that is why art materials and erasers have been 
moved there. Nevertheless, in terms of overall iogistics as opposed to 
manufacturing and sales, Pentel Taiwan's contribution has been limited. Tianjin, 
which commenced operations in 1991, assembles a small range of simple items 
with materials and personnel ali emanating from Japan. Neither has Pentel 
Taiwan been involved with a technical tie-up in India (PI). Shanghai, on the 
other hand, offers greater prospects and Pentel Taiwan engineers could be 
dispatched to that city to assist in the preparations for manufacturing there. 
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Chinese-speaking Mr. Sakamoto regards this as simply a matter of differing 
ünguistic and cultural distance; the southern Shanghai Chinese are easier to 
understand for the Taiwanese than the northerners of Tianjin, and besides there 
are many Taiwanese who have taken up residence in Shanghai over recent years. 
The longer term strategie role of the Taiwan affiliate stili has to be clarifìed, and 
the influential factors having a hearing on this are as much external and 
historically contingent as based on an agreed internai corporate vision. 
7.3.2(c) Articulation 
Articulation Attribute: Publicity 
To say that Pentel's articulation is based on its gift for self-publicity is not in any 
way to underplay the foundations essential to it. As has been seen, Pentel 
distanced itself from SNÍE status at a very early stage by effecting mass 
production and pursuing in-depth research and development. As business grew it 
extended its core compétence 'chamber' by inventing new types of writing and 
drawing items while attaining depth by, for example, developing a full range of 
inks. Operations were rurther amplified by the insistence where possible of 
building machinery in-house and ensuring its own manufacturing of essential 
materials, instanced by the establishment of the plastic forming plant in 1965 
(PH, 3, 4). In its own words Pentel aims for: "high produetivity in response to 
needs"; "the réalisation of low costs"; "process design free ofdefects"; and "tight 
control through in-house production" (PW). 
That having been said, the instinct for publicity as an indispensible ingrédient of 
the articulation was, it would seem, born with the company because it was 
inhérent in the founder's own disposition. Already, by 1950, the manifestations 
were strikingly apparent. In that year, photographs of famous baseball players 
were inserted in each pack of crayons, Pentel introduced the first advertising 
vehicle in the history of Japan's stationery industry, conférences aimed at 
teachers were inaugurated to promote the teaching of art, and the publication of 
a monthly magazine called 'Aesthetic Culture' (Bi-iku Bunka) was commenced. 
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This also ensured having the right people seen using Pentel pens; after Gemini 
and President Johnson in the 1960s, it was the turn of the Tokyo Summit leaders 
in 1979 (PH. 7). Likewise targeted were prizes and awards: the annual export 
prize, the Deming Award, S1PPA. And now there are on-line clubs called Milky 
and Miffy which children can access to get the latest news. 
The essence of this approach, as noted, was transponed abroad right from Mr. 
Horie's first visit. The one important difference with the domestic scene is that 
concentraron is almost totally on the core competence of writing and drawing 
materials. When an attempt was made to sell machinery in the United States, it 
was found that the supporting framework was not in place because there had 
been no incremental development towards this. This implies that the form of 
articulation applied by Pentel is limited in scope. On the other hand, the company 
can achieve an international presence for its core competence producís - which 
are easily transportable and require little, if any, maintenance - with a few 
strategically placed factories and a larger number of designated sales bases, plus 
effective publicity. When President Johnson's picture appeared in Newsweek the 
sales impact was worldwide, including back in Japan (PH, 4). Henee, the 
advertising vehicles, prizes and created incidents are a self-conscious, 
deliberately targeted aspect of strategy for the elaboration of image and 
reputation. More importantly, they strike directly home to the end-user, and this 
is where Pentel's articulation has proved to be successful because it is the maker 
of end-user producís; publicity packages the presentation for the end-user. 
Key Points: 
* early internationalisation 
* Taiwan first choice for overseas manufacturing 
* Japan remains core location for R&D 
* évidence of upgrading in Taiwan 
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7.3.3 Case Study 2: M a buchi Motor 
7.3.3(a) Interview Details andReferences 
Interview I 
Date June25,1999 Place Kaohsiung 
Interviewee(s) Mr. S. Awai, General Manager 
Mr. Y . C . Tsai, Chief Engineering Manager 
Language Japanese Duration 45 mins 
Remarks Company film shown after interview; then factory tour. 
References M l = Mr. Awai; M C - Mabuchi catalogue dated Aprii 1999; 
M W = Mabuchi website in December 2002 + Journals as 
given 
Synopsis B O X 8 
7.3.3(b) Company Description and Internationalisation Progression 
Company and Product. In 1946 Kenichi Mabuchi founded Kansai Rika 
Kenkyusho, a research institute, which subsequently devetoped "the world's first 
high-performance horseshoe-shaped magnetic motor" (MC, 18). This was to 
lead to the establishment in 1954, for full-scale production and sales of this 
motor, of Tokyo Science Industrial Co., Ltd., renamed in 1971 Mabuchi Motor. 
The initial market for the company's products consisted of toy manufacturers in 
Japan. A small company to start with, Mabuchi grew rapidly to become a mass-
production L M E , thereby epitomising Nakamura's (1990) idéalisation of the 
Japanese L M E in the first post-war phase to 1970. In addition, the company 
started on what was to become a constant search for new markets, one of the 
first of thèse moves being the development in 1960 of high-precision small 
electric motors enabling it to enter the audio equipment and timepiece markets 
(MC, 18). Shortly thereafter, in 1962, expansion impelled the first geographical 
extension with the inauguration of a new factory, while by the end of the décade 
the need for further capacity exacerbated by labour shortage sent the company 
further afteld to Tohoku in the north of Japan. During this time also, the 
company was increasingly conscious of the need not only for mass production 
but also for uniformity of production, resulting in the inauguration of a model 
factory in 1965. This was complemented by the establishment in 1974 of 
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Mabuchi Précision Industries Ltd. for in-house production of motor shafts. Fast 
expansion from the 1970s on allowed for listing on the second section of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1986 and the first section in 1988 (MC, 19). In fact, 
by the end ofthat decade Nakamura (1990) regarded Mabuchi as one of those 
fìrms that had successfully outgrown L M E status. However, our définition is 
based on the number of domestic employées only, the most récent figure for 
which is 980 (MW). Moreover, Mabuchi demonstrated a very strong L M E 
character for almost ali the period from 1961 to 1990. 
L M E Character of Company. This character was based on being the pioneer on 
the way to becoming "the world's leading manufacturer of small electric motors" 
(MC, 1 ) - to quote the current président Takaichi Mabuchi - now boasting an 
annual production capacity of some 1.4 billion motors. Application diversity 
means that thèse motors now cover a wide range of products adapted to ail 
kinds of environments, encompassing the broad catégories of audio and visual 
equipment, automotive products, information and communication equipment, 
and home and industriai equipment (MC, 14-17), extending over office 
automation, car Windows, electronic locks and many more (Asano, 1995). This 
progress has been achieved by the simple but highly effective formula first 
practised with the toy manufacturers of approaching the leading firms in the 
respective industries for their individuai spécifications, then developing motors 
which set the standard for industry (Nihon Noritsu Kyokai, 2001). This was the 
tactic which propelled Mabuchi into markets for cassette tape recorders and 
automatic vending machines in 1975 and for information and communications 
equipment in 1995, for example (MC, 19). Quality, price and reliable delivery are 
the key éléments to be addressed. Quality is maintained through constant 
workforce training and strict adhérence to production based on manuals. Severe 
price compétition has been one of the reasons for a division of labour whereby 
the company headquarters in Chiba Préfecture, adjacent to Metropolitan Tokyo, 
is engaged in sales and research and development at its technology centre, whiie 
virtually all manufacturing is now done abroad. The need for reliable delivery is 
another reason for overseas production, at locations in close proximity to its 
customers. 
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B O X 8 
Case Study 2 
Mabuchì Motor 
LME Status in Japon: World famous manufacturer of small DC motors. 
Established in Japon: 1954 
Company Names 
JE Mabuchi Motor Co., Ltd. 
JJ Mabuchi Motaa K . K . 
TC Huayuan Dianji Gongye (Gu) 
T E Mabuchi Taiwan Co., Ltd. 




6F, 3 Tun Hwa S. Rd., Sec 1, Taipei 
(02) 579-6535 
References (Page) 
Z N K (120) JCH (1 ) 734 N K J (693) M K B - K S K (192) 
Investment Details 
Taiwan approvai date (ZNK) January, 1969 Capital increase dates -
Current capital ratios: Mabuchi Motor Co., Ltd. 76.0% 
Huayuan Dianji Gongye 24.0% 
Designations 
Company size/type designation M M (I)* 
No. of employees in Japan (JCH) 958 
No. of employees in Taiwan (ZNK) 1,961 
Main products/business in Taiwan (ZNK) Manufacture and sales of: 
DC motors. 
Investment Merits (ZNK) 
Export base for Southeast Asia and China; can deal better with clients through 
localisation; contributing to Taiwan's industrialisation. 
Sources ofRaw Materials: Taiwan, Japan. 
Sales/Exports Destinations: Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, 
Europe, United States. 
Investments Worldwide (KSK, Company Sources) 
East Asia Manufacturing: Hong Kong (1964), Taiwan (1969), China (1988), 
Malaysia (1990), China (1994, twice), China (1995), Hong Kong (1995), 
Vietnam (1996) 
East Asia Sales: Singapore (1989) 
Resi of World Manufacturing: -
Rest of World Sales: United States (1977), Germany (1993) 
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Internationalisation. Mabuchi's first manufacturing venture abroad was 
inaugurated in 1964 in Hong Kong to supply that market with motors and to 
runction as a low-cost base for the world market. The précèdent of having 
wholly owned subsidiaries was set at that time and this has been adhered to in 
most cases with subséquent plants in Taiwan, China, Malaysia and Vietnam, thus 
exhibiting, also, a notable regional bias. Complementing the manufacturing setup 
is a sales network, starting with an office in New York in 1965, thereafter 
supplemented by more offices in North America as well as in Germany, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and China (MC, 7, 11). As well as pioneering the 
standards in Japan, therefore, in initiating production in Hong Kong so early 
Mabuchi also took the lead in its industry in the imp[ementation of an 
international division of labour, initiating the same training, conducted by the 
Japan-based staff, at ali its bases to achieve the same product resuit (Nihon 
Noritsu Kyokai, 2001:205). In the process there have also been shifts in 
locations for manufacturing bases within the East Asian région (where ali the 
manufacturing is done), notable among which has been the staged divestment of 
Hong Kong's manufacturing role between 1976 and 1986 in favour of sites in 
Guangdong Province (although stili under Hong Kong Mabuchi), followed by 
the opening of plants in Dalian, Jiangsu and other places in China, and then most 
recently in Vietnam (MC, 19; Hodo and Xie, 1995). As of 1993, moreover, in 
the interests of upgrading the opérations of thèse overseas plants, they have been 
equipped to produce key components m-house rather than relying on 
outsourcing (Nihon Noritsu Kyokai, 2001:211). Contact among ali the 
company's operating units is maintained through an intranet system (MI). 
This manufacturing structure has a truly global reach, serving such customers as 
Matsushita Electric Industrial (MEI, our référence large TNC) of Japan, Acer of 
Taiwan, Braun of Germany, Hewlett Packard ofthe United States, and Samsung 
of South Korea (MW). These companies, too, are globally operating TNCs, so 
that where they receive Mabuchi's motors is where they are having their own 
producís assembled. Henee the prominence of China as indicated in Table 7.1 as 
a source of demand. Table 7.2, on the other hand, suggests how Mabuchi is 
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being challenged and forced to modify its product mix: sales of its rnotors for 
toys and hobbies are declining because of mounting compétition from Chinese 
firms (MW). 
Table 7.1 Récent Trends in Ma buchi Motor Sales by Geographie Area 
Unit: Million rnotors 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Projected 
Japan 197 175 143 139 
North and Latin 
America 135 141 127 137 
Europe 191 209 204 221 
China and Hong 
Kong 705 803 660 846 
Asia Pacific 356 380 326 354 
Total 1,584 1,707 1,462 1,700 
Source: M W 
Table 7.2 Récent Trends in Mabuchi Motor Sales by Application 
Unit: Million rnotors 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Projected 
Audio-Visual 
Equipment 793 897 722 873 
Office Equipment/ 
Precision Instruments 105 118 100 135 
Automotive Products 322 351 345 397 
Home Appliances/ 
Power Tools 189 212 216 226 
Toys and Hobbies 174 128 77 66 
Total 1,584 1,707 1,462 1,700 
Source: M W 
Rôle of Taiwan. Mabuchi Taiwan Co., Ltd. (Taiwan Mabuchi), the first of two 
ventures on the island, was established in Taipei in 1969 with the intention of 
supplementing the Hong Kong production for the world market. A decade later 
the need for a oirther boost in production was answered by the addition of 
Mabuchi Motor Taiwan Ltd. (Kaohsiung Mabuchi) at the export processing 
zone in Kaohsiung. Taiwan Mabuchi added two more factories in 1973 and 
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1978, while Kaohsiung Mabuchi constructed a second factory in 1984. On top of 
that, Mabuchi Kaohsiung enlarged its production facilities in 1980 and Taiwan 
Mabuchi expanded its third factory in Hukou also in 1984. This heralded the 
peak of the motor manufacturing endeavor in Taiwan. As production began to 
shift to the Asian mainland thereafter, the Taiwan afhTiates assumed new roles of 
no lesser importance. For one, they helped to set up these subsequent ventures 
and were also engaged in the training of personnel for them (MI) . Added to 
which, Taiwan Mabuchi was a source of finance for them. Mabuchi Motor 
(Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., established in 1989, was wholly flnanced by Taiwan 
Mabuchi and has a Chinese general manager, while both Taiwan affiliates jointly 
put up the funds to start Mabuchi Motor (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd. in 1993 (MC, MW). 
Sun Zuei Che, the general manager of Taiwan Mabuchi, is the only non-Japanese 
member of the board of directors of the parent company in Japan (MW), and his 
own company in Taiwan has now developed into the manufacturer of moulds 
and other sophisticated equipment required by the group (Nihon Noritsu Kyokai, 
2001:211 ), a good example of knowhow transfer leading to corporate spin-out. 
However, there seems little doubt that Mabuchi is in the process of exercising its 
option of withdrawal from Taiwan and relocation within the East Asian region. 
By the time \ visited the main Kaohsiung Mabuchi factory in the summer of 
1999, mass production had ali but ceased and the few operators around were 
Philippino women - a sign of last-minute cost-cutting because Philippino 'guest 
workers' will accept lower wages than the locai Taiwanese. Mr. Awai (MI) 
claimed that the main function of the factory at that stage was making 
prototypes. As is evident from Table 7.3, though, motor production itself carne 
to an end shortly after our discussion, while that at Taiwan Mabuchi was being 
further curtailed on the one hand and Mabuchi Motor Vietnam Ltd. (wholly 
financed by the parent company) was beginning to take off in a big way on the 
other. 
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Table 7.3 Recent Trends in Mabuchi Motor Production by Factory 
Unit: Miilion motors 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Projected 
Hong Kong Mabuchi 861 1,030 816 921 
Dalian Mabuchi 152 176 141 132 
Wafangdian Mabuchi 128 135 104 126 
Jiangsu Mabuchi 127 183 124 156 
Malaysia Mabuchi 101 124 102 82 
Taiwan Mabuchi 18 13 7 6 
Kaohsiung Mabuchi 2 - - -
Vietnam Mabuchi 85 148 160 215 
Total 1,473 1,809 1,455 1,638 
Source: M W 
7J.3(c) Articulation 
Articulation Attribute: Positioning 
Mabuchi's motors are not, in the main, state-of-the-art. True, they may have to 
respond to "intense cold, blistering heat, dramatically high or low humidity, the 
effects of sait or gasoline" (MC, 11) in their more sophisticated guises. But, 
generally speaking, they constitute an essential part of a host of producís which 
are not high technology themselves and do not need high technology inputs. 
What they need is consistency and reliability, plus inexpensive motors because 
the end producís themselves are often very cost-sensitive. These are the reasons 
why positioning is of the utmost importance lo Mabuchi. H can be seen 
functioning in three distinct ways: product identificai ion, processing and 
workforce, and manufacturing location. Product identification has already been 
touched on with référence to Ihe company coniinuously looking for new 
applicafions, from toys to audio equipment and so on. This in turn is related to 
simultaneously identifying key clients with whom to work with and standardise 
ahead of the competilion. The exercise over time can be summed up as: 
developing markets offering cheap, high-quality motors ^ expansion of the 
motor applications ^ creating profitable basic models (Nihon Noritsu Kyokai, 
2001). As a conséquence, some one hundred types of motor have been 
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standardised in this fashion for Mabuchi's Worldwide markets, where in many 
cases the end producís would not exist without its motors (Asana. 1995). 
However, a constraint is apparent in the processing which calis for a distinctive 
gearing of the articulation strategy. The fact is that at présent automation is at a 
premium in the manufacture of these motors which is stili extremely labour-
intensive. This has meant that, especially as it has internationalised, Mabuchi has 
taken on an appearance very similar to apparel makers with their minimal 
managerial headquarters complemented by a much larger factory workforce 
overseas (Evans, 1997). However, where Mabuchi differs tram the apparel 
industry is that, being aware of the continuous changes ¡n its industry, the centrai 
management fonctions to instil in the workforce through constant training based 
on the manual format an ability to spontaneously react to such changes at the 
locai level in support of the global business. In other words, in an industry where 
there is not much scope for différentiation in the core producís, the ability to 
respond quickly and imaginatively with siandardised, cheap mass produced iiems 
holds ine key. 
The necessary elemenis for achieving this are price competiliveness and iimely 
delivery. These then turn on the manufacturing location. Essentially Mabuchi has 
two kinds of customer: those who produce inexpensive items, such as electric 
razors and hair dryers, using cheap-labour locations like itself; and those who 
produce relatively expensive items, such as automobiles, where the location is 
less influenced by labour costs, and for which the electronic motor is a much less 
signifícant factor in the total cost of the fully assembled end product, but 
nevertheless must be as inexpensive as possible to meet the compétition. This has 
resulted in a dual articulation strategy. In setting up in Hong Kong and 
subsequently in Taiwan and China, Mabuchi was, in the first instance, targeting 
the first type of customer in an exercise where the exigences of both market and 
production coincided; the market and cheap production labour were at the same 
location. In setting up a sales office in Detroit, it moved to serve a large market 
of the second type with producís made at competiiive prices using cheap labour 
in East Asia. This is the essence of Mabuchi's inlernafionalising articulation. 
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Key Points: 
* early internationalisation 
* Taiwan not first but early overseas location 
* EastAsian bias in manufacturing + regional 
integration 
* Japan remains as headquarters and R&D hub 
* évidence of upgrading in Taiwan + knowtedge 
transfer (though recent withdrawal) 
7.3.4 Case Study 3: Shofu 
7.3.4(a) Interview Details 
Interview 1 
Date June 21,2002 Place Kyoto 
Interviewee(s) Mr. Y . Wakino, Managing Director, International Division 
Mr. K. Murakami. Manager, International Department 
Language Japanese Duration 1 hr 15 mins 
Remarks 
Références SI = Mr. Wakino; SC = latest English catalogue; SW = 
Japanese/English website in December 2002 + newspaper 
articles as given 
Synopsis B O X 9 
7.3.4(b) Company Description and Internationalisation Progression 
Company and Product. Shofu is now a major manufacturer and supplier of 
dental materials, claiming top ranking in Japan and Asia and third ranking 
Worldwide, after Dentsply of the United States and I V O C L A A G of Lichtenstein 
(SI). This dépends on what is actually included in the définition of dental 
materials but there is no doubt that it is very strong in abrasives and cernent for 
dental technicians, for example, where its position is overwhelming in Japan 
(JCH, 1999:722). It is also the only specialist dental company listed on any of 
the Japanese stock exchanges, having first had its shares registered as over-the-
counter stocks in 1963, before being listed on the second sections of both the 
Osaka and Kyoto exchanges in 1989 (SC, 23). The company saw its beginnings 
in its modem guise with the establishment by Katei Shofü III of Shofu Dental 
Mfg. Co., Ltd. in 1922 to manufacture and seil artificial teeth. At that time 
higher quality porcelain teeth were almost exclusively imported from the United 
States and Germany. What Shofu did was to adapt its expertise in traditional 
Kiyomizu-yaki ceramics to the production of porcelain teeth for a growing 
domestic market (SI; SC, 3). The company was to progress unspectacularly 
thereafter until its 'golden age7 (SI), a period extending from around 1967 in the 
height of Japan's economie expansion to 1980. Düring this time there was a 
rapid increase in the number of dentists, while a changing diet resulted in more 
bad teeth among the Japanese, and the universal health care insurance system 
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initiated better coverage for dental services. Business was excellent and Shofu 
rushed to open new plants in Shigaraki, Japan as well as South Korea and 
Taiwan (SI). However, the heyday was shortlived. Already, in the 1970s the oil 
shocks had caused a dramatic rise in the price of resin, by then a basic ingrédient 
in Shofu's product. Business flattened out as the market became saturated with 
domestic production and imports. And in addition to the woes suffered by the 
industry as a whole. Shofu had to cope with the demise of its largest customer, a 
dealer accounting for over 10% of its business (SI). 
This culminated in a complete overhaul of the company's top management in 
1983 as it sought to restructure under the slogan 'Challenge of Changes' (SI; 
SW; SC. 3). The turn of events had induced a rethinking about the realm of the 
company's core activity. No longer was it to be "just the manufacture of ceramic 
teeth .... but also to produce a whole field of dental materials" (SC, 3). That is 
to say, with world firsts to its credit such as its dental spherical amalgam 
launched in 1965, Shofu's basic position with regard to artificial teeth was fairly 
sound, but given the fact that - as Mr. Wakino (SI) put it - the dental business 
as a whole in Japan, including dental chairs and other equipment, is only half that 
of the dog food business, there was at the very least a need to extend the logie of 
the company's potential as far as possible. So Shofu Inc., to use the new name 
adopted in the restructuring, now produces some 50 million artificial teeth a year 
for a domestic market share of nearly 60%, while also being a general 
manufacturer of ail materials and equipment necessary for dental care, ranging 
over - to cite at random - porcelain powders, alloys, waxes, and orthodontie 
appliances (Kyoto Shinbun, May 11, 2001; SC, 23). Beyond the headquarters in 
Kyoto, nationwide distribution is channelled through six sales offices, the first of 
which was opened in Tokyo as early as 1955 (SC, 19; SW). But even with 
substantiation of the core business conséquent upon the restructuring initiated in 
1983, the fact is that this is a business serving a market heavily affected by the 
unerring pressure to cut the costs of a universal health insurance system overseen 
by the government. Internationalisation of its own producís apart, one solution 
has been to act as import and sales agent, as it does for Bausch & Lomb (electric 
toothbrushes) (SC, 23) and for Johnson & Johnson (JCH, 2000). 
249 
B O X 9 
Case Study 3 
S ho fu 
LME Status in Japan: Leading manufacturer of dental materials. 
Established in Japan: 1922 
Company Names 
JE Shofu Inc. 11 Kamitakamatsu-cho, Fukuine, Higashiyama-
ku, Kyoto 
JJ Shofu K . K . 75-561-1112 
www.shofu.co.ip 
TC Taiwan Songteng (Gu) 8 FI., 2 FuxingN. Rd., Taipei 
T E Shofu Dentai Taiwan Company Ltd. (02) 891-4772 
Références (Page) 
Z N K (364) JCH (2) (722) N K J (942) M K B - K S K (84) 
Investment Details 
Taiwan approvai date (ZNK) October 1974 Capital increase dates -
Current capital ratios: Shofu Inc. 50.0% 
He Dong 50.0% 
Designations 
Company size/type designation M M ( I ) * 
No. of employees in Japan (JCH) 412 
No. of employees in Taiwan (ZNK) 43 
Main products/business in Taiwan (ZNK) Manufacture and sales of: 
resin false teeth, dentai abrasives. 
Investment Merits (ZNK) 
Using labour force, base for exports to Southeast Asia. 
Sources of Raw Materials: Taiwan, Japan. 
Sales/Exports Destìnations: Southeast Asia, Japan, US, Taiwan. 
Investments Worldmde (KSK) 
East Asia Manufacturing: Taiwan (1974) 
East Asia Sales: -
Rest of World Manufacturing: Britain (1991) 
Rest of World Sales: United States (1971), Germany (1978), Britain (1992) 
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L M E Character of Company. Porter et al (2000) have indicated the unique 
status of Kyoto among JapanTs larger cities. It is the home of industries, such as 
précision electrical products, some of the origins of which can be traced way 
back in time, like ceramics with its history of 1.200 years in that city, the imperial 
capital of Japan until the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Largely ignored by industriai 
planners during Japan's economie growth throughout the twentieth Century, they 
aver, Kyoto firms have not been enclosed in keiretsu networks offering their 
ambiguous mix of financial and market access but ultimate exogenous control. 
Standing on their own feet. small Kyoto enterprises have instead been able to 
focus on their core businesses - not unusually benefiting from contacts with locai 
académie institutions - and perchance compete globally (Porter et al, 2000:157-
8). Shofu Inc. is one of these companies. The company is tradition-bound in 
every Japanese sense, Its founder was in fact born Jotaro Inoue in 1870, but 
having been apprenticed to a second-generation ceramics artisan, Katei Shofu II, 
his outstanding work was rewarded by marriage to the daughter and élévation to 
successor as Katei Shofu III (Kyoto Shinbun, May 11, 2001). This is the 
traditional Japanese practice of coopting ability into the ie, or household, often in 
eftect synonymous with a business enterprise. In 1906 he set up his own 
company to export ceramic wäre and to develop insulators based on Kiyomizu-
yaki techniques to Substitute for imports, and for export. Mounting expertise and 
new market potential were to result in the establishment of Shofu Porcelain 
Teeth Research Institute (Shofu Toshi Kenkyujo) in 1919 (Kyoto Shinbun, May 
11, 2001), the immediate forerunner of Shofu Dental Mfg. Co., Ltd. started in 
1922. 
Hence, Shofu is a classic example of a company which successfully adapted from 
a traditional industry to a modem one white sustaining a continuity symbolised 
by Katei Shofu V , who as chairman up to 2000 was the prevailing retainer of the 
ie, or family, interest. The family, as we have stated, is usually an essential 
ingrédient of the putative L M E . But when what we have termed the 'first 
décision' to concentrate on artifìcial teeth was taken in 1922, it also came with a 
commitment to research, indicative of the depth of resolute endeavour in a core 
compétence likewise associated here with the L M E . It is through this route that 
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Shofu has parleyed the skills of Kiyomizu-yaki into state-of-the-art dental 
technology. In addition to the spherical amalgam mentioned earlier, this has been 
the source of a wealth of innovation in dental materials and machinery in which 
the company claims world leadership, calling for the integration of discrete 
technologies such as organic and inorganic chemistry, ceramics, machinery, 
electricity and electronics (SC, 8, 11). Shofu was the first in the Japanese dental 
industry to acquire ÏSO900T and 9002 approvai as well as C E certification, 
évidence of the quality of its offerings. A further progression was the 
inauguration of its Institute for Life Technology Inc. in 1992 as a base for the 
development of dental equipment computer software (SW). Then in 1997 was 
completed a new research building, at its heaquarters site in Kyoto, housing 
"the most advanced facilities in the dental industry" (SC, 23). Complementing 
this is a drive for visibility and linkage. In addition to active participation in trade 
shows, it provides specialised computer software for use exclusîvely at 
universities and research Institutes. It supports symposiums as a means of 
assisting researchers and scholars, and established its Shofii Dental Club in 1976 
to promote close contact with practitioners and dealers. As far back as 1947, 
Shofu started collaborating with leading universities in the production of dental 
publications (SC). 
Internationalisation. ïndeed, académie linkage features prominently, in Shoru's 
international strategy too. Among others, it has established arrangements with 
researchers at the universities of Indiana, Houston and California (San 
Franscisco) in the United States, and the universities of Newcastle and 
Manchester in Britain (Europe) (SI). This network of international collaboration 
is a relatively récent development, but in fact Shofu was already exportîng its 
products before the Second World War, chîefly to neighbouring China, Taiwan 
and Korea (SI). It restarted in the 1960s, eventually setting up Shofu Products 
Inc. in 1972 as the trading arm (SC, 23). This trade was afforded a particular 
boost in 1965 with the launching on the international markets of its new 
spherical amalgam which replaces silver for fillings. This particular material 
caught the attention of 3M at an exhibition in Paris, but negotiations stalled and 
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that American T N C lost interest. However, the interpréter was so fascinateci by 
the prospects that he concluded a joint venture with Shofu, which resulted in the 
establishment in 1971 of its first overseas branch, Shofu Dentai Corporation 
based in Menlo Park, California (SI; SC, 18), thus providing a good example of 
how opportunism affects the first step in internationalisation. In so doing, Shofu 
also became the first Japanese dental materials company to set up a sales office 
abroad (SI). Overseas sales opérations were subsequently augmented with 
affiliâtes established in Dusseldorf in 1978, Singapore in 1980, and Shanghai in 
1996 (SW), while in the wake of restructuring in the mid-1980s the trading 
functions of Shoru Products Inc. were absorbed by the newly constituted Shofu 
Ine. in a consolidation exercise. 
And yet there is the question as to whether Shofu has moved fast enough on the 
international scene over the past four décades, notwithstanding an overseas sales 
ratio now of some 19% (JCH, 2002:846). As late as 2001, the président, 
Katsuya Ohta, was saying that it was important from now on to actively develop 
overseas markets, notably Southeast Asia (Kyoto Shinbun, May 11, 2001). But 
although it may catégorise itself as the world's third dental product company, it 
is only a fraction of the size of the leader Dentspry (www.dentsplv.com: January 
2003), which ciaims to distribute its products in over 100 countries from 
manufacturing bases in 22 nations spanning six continents. What is more, with 
the purchase of the then second largest company in the industry, Degussa Dental 
of Germany, in 2001, Dentsply is now the only non-domestic supplier with a 
significant foothold in Japan. Taiwan apart with respect to overseas production, 
Shofu by contrast purchased the small British firm of Advanced Healthcare Ltd. 
(AHL) in 1991 to safeguard its position with the imminent E U integration, and 
then supplemented this venture with the establishment in the same country of 
Shofu Dental Products Ltd, as the second European sales base in 1992. A H L has 
similar links with universitïes, in this case Queen Mary & Westerfield College, a 
part of London University, and the Royal London Dental Hospital 
(www.ahlgeneric.co.uk; November 2001), and it is working with Shofu on the 
development of new bonding materials (SC, 18). 
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Rôle of Taiwan. Taiwan hosts Shofu's only significant, still extant production 
venture outside Japan at présent (although A H L may be growing). However, this 
joint venture has always occupied a somewhat ambiguous position within 
Shofu's internationalisation strategy. To start with, it did not come into existence 
out of the need to engage rivais or potential rivais in a progressively 
internationalising environment. Rather it was the direct outcome of a shortage of 
labour, which had become a serious obstacle especially for smaller firrns in Japan 
by the early 1970s, to produce for the domestic market. This was exacerbated by 
the requirement to attain the J1S (Japan Industriai Standard) for artificial teeth, 
which was much more stringerà than in neighboring countries and was subject to 
vérification and approvai by the Ministry of Health and Weifare (MHW) (2) for 
health insurance purposes. At the beginning of the 1970s an attempi was 
commenced to manufacture artificial teeth in South Korea, but this ended in 
failure and withdrawal after five years because the Japanese standard was 
unattainable (SI). Likewise a first assay in Taiwan proved abortive. Finally, the 
partnership with Ho Dong in a joint venture which now has Mr. Andy Ho, son of 
the initial party to the agreement, as chairman achieved the desired level, 
although it took ten years to 1985 and a visît to the Taiwan factory by M H W 
officiais to consummate the effort (SI). That having been said, this made Shofu 
the first Japanese dental produci company to acquire JIS abroad (SW). It is also 
significant that the Taiwan venture was able eventually to reach the required 
technical production standard, and as such this stands as an example of 
upgrading. 
The question is what kind of rôle Shofu Dental Taiwan has in the parent 
company's regional and global strategy building. Cultural and geographical 
proximity were influential in the initial choice of location (SI) - although no 
more nor less than South Korea. However, since the inception of the joint 
venture the organisation has remained largely unchanged and there has been no 
increase in capital. Every year some of the Taiwanese engineers go to Japan for 
retraining. Other than that the attitude imparted by Mr. Wakino (SI) was one of 
simply keeping an eye on them, implying a distancing of relationships between 
Japanese and locals, once standards are achieved. noted in a number of studies of 
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Japanese investing companies in East Asia (cf. Ibuki, 1994; Imada and Sonoda, 
1995). The intention at the outset was to transfer part of the production of 
artificial resin teeth to Taiwan where costs are lower, and this was done (SW). 
But again, this simple objective has not changed; all the materials for production 
are still imported from Japan to ensure quality and 70% of the output is shipped 
back to Japan. Of the resi, the largest part - or 30% - is destined for Taiwan 
itself where Shofu is the top brand for artificial teeth with a market share of 60% 
to 70%. The remainder is exported mainly to Singapore, India, Indonesia and 
Malaysia (SI). But while the manufacturing in Japan is of the high-end producís 
and is completeíy robotised, ihal in Taiwan is low-end and not nearly so 
automated. Mr. Wakino was pessimistic in summing up: the Taiwan venture is 
gradually becoming less signifìcant, no new lechnology emanales from Ihere, 
labour costs have risen, and the exporis from Taiwan are not increasing. 
Moreover, Taiwan has no special relationship with the sales offices in Singapore 
and Shanghai (SI). So, Taiwan shares a division-of-labour exercise with the 
parent company to supply the demand for less expensive artificial teeth in 
Japan's domestic market and some exports elsewhere. 
7.3.4(c) Articulation 
Articulation Attribute: Linkage 
In terms of FDI, Shofu is the least internationalised of the five case studies 
presented here. Size of Operations apart, there is an argument that its articulation 
attribute - linkage - which has proved highly successali on home territory could 
prove obstructive, or at least présent difficulties, when attempts are made to 
replicate it abroad. To recapitúlate and embellish on what has been stated above, 
in Japan the company has devoted much time and effort to cultivating its links 
with every associated aspect of its business. These can be grouped as follows: 
technology integration, dental practitioners and sales personnel, universities and 
research institutions, and publications. The nature of Shofu's business, notably 
since the restructuring in the 1980s, has called for the need to interconnect staff 
and outside collaborators covering a wide range of disciplines, including 
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chemistry, metallurgy, and computers. The reconstruction, with its much broader 
perspective, also stimulated the extension of core compétence with the 
development and production of machinery and equipment for dentists and dental 
technicians. Because specialist knowledge is required for using them, Shofu 
regards regular communication with ail professionals involved, as well as training 
of dealers and sales représentatives, as de rigueur. Moreover, it caps this with 
clinical lectures 30 times a year in major cities around Japan (SC, 14, 15). There 
again, face-to-face contact by its own sales staff is seen as an absolute necessity 
for assimilating information trom outside. 
As for the académie world, Shofu has solicitously cultivated knowledgeable 
collaborators through, for example, the development of specialised software for 
exclusive use at given universities and research institutions (SC, 8). It 
participâtes in training programs with research and éducation institutions, 
including dental universities and dental clinics. "Académie and technical 
information gathered through product démonstrations by instructors, through 
equipment maintenance, and via day-to-day contact with clients, is fed back to 
the company and applied to product development" (SC, 14). Reciprocally, it 
produces academically acclaimed publications, such as the two-volume annual 
entitled 'Color Atlas' which carnes many colour photographs detailing clinical 
treatment. In other words, the reason for Shofu's success domestically is in no 
little way due to its very thorough attention to reach and réputation in its 
articulation strategy, encompassing key éléments of the dental profession. 
The question is how much of this strategy can be transplanted abroad, or indeed 
need be transplanted given the company's not-inconsiderable overseas 
achievements largely through exports. As has been seen, the Taiwan affiliate 
does not extend the company's internationalisation to any great degree, though it 
plays a rôle in production by way of its allocated rôle in a division of labour. On 
the other hand, some of the practices refined at home have been applied to the 
internationalising efforts. Shofu is a major participant in international académie 
conférences and exhibitions as an exercise in creating its information networks. It 
maintains contacts with various universities. notably in Europe and North 
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America, while its bases in the United States (for the Americas), Germany and 
Singapore (for Southeast Asia) perform similar publicity, symposium and 
information gathering fonctions as in Japan. Moreover, the purchase of A H L in 
Britain seems to portend a closer linkage at the locai affiliate level between these 
fonctions and the manufacturing itself. However, the interconnecting density 
here pales against the coverage - albeit heaviiy in the United States and Europe 
- achieved by main rival Dentsply. In other words, it would seem difficult for 
Shofo to replicate in full its articulation attribute internationally, because of the 
depth and reguiarity of contacts that have to be made. These are hard to 
reproduce outside its originai domestic setting. One solution could be acquisition 
of local capability and established networks, like Dentsply, and as it has done in a 
small way with AHL, Another could be to concentrate on the growing potential 
of Southeast Asia, taking advantage of weaker compétition and market 
proximity. But at this stage it would seem that internationalising articulation 
needs to be further elaborated to match the quality of the products. 
Key Points: 
* early ìnternationatisation of sales 
* Taiwan one of few places able to support 
overseas production 
* Japan remains main centre of technology 
creation and networking with medicai profession 
(though overseas links growing) 
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7.3.5 Case Study 4: Union Tool 
7.3.5(a) Interview Details 
Interview l 
Date May 31,2002 Place Taoyuan Hsien 
Interviewee(s) Mr. T. Inami, General Manager 
Mr. Chen 1 Hsing, Deputy Manager 
Language Japanese Duration 1 hr 30 mins 
Remarks 
Interview 2 
Date June 18,2002 Place Tokyo 
Interviewee(s) Mr. H . Ohdaira, General Manager, Corporate Planning Division 
Language Japanese Duration 2 hrs 15 mins 
Remarks Film shown before discussion 
References U l = Mr. Inami; U2 = Mr. Ohdaira; U C = latest Union Tool 
English catalogue; U W = Union Tool Japanese Website in 
December 2002; UF = Union Tool English film; M T W = 
Megatool Website dated December 2002; TUC = Taiwan 
Union Tool English/Chinese catalogue; T U W = Taiwan Union 
Tool English/Chinese Website + Journals and newspapers as 
given 
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7.3.S(b) Company Description andInternationalisatlon Progression 
Company and Product. Coincidentally Union Tool also saw its origins in the 
dental materials industry. Union Tool Chemical Research Co., Ltd. came into 
existence in 1960 to conduct research into and commercialise the nation's first 
carbide burrs for dental use (UW). By the time its corporate name was changed 
to what it is now in 1971, however, its 'first decision' had redirected its course 
to much more lucrative prospects. Union Tool was to grow in tandem with the 
evolution and diffusion of the printed circuit board (PCB) and the Computer 
because of its accumulated expertise in the design and productkm of ultra-hard 
carbide drill bits (U2; Keieisha Kaiho, November, 1990). An initial approach by 
Japan IBM to produce such drill bits tbr making tiny holes in Computer PCBs did 
not work out, chiefly because Union Tool was not equipped for the volume 
production required. However, the interest of founder and electrical engineer, 
Ichiro Katayama, had been sparked, and with the encouragement of the 
electronics components industry mass production of PCB drill bits commenced 
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in 1970 (UW). These drill bits have ever since remained the core of the business, 
while being surrounded by a panoply of related equipment, machinery, machine 
tools and measuring instruments. These in turn have opened up new 
opportunities and dient industries, like for example its rolüng machine, RF-20, 
which incorporâtes technology developed in the grinding process of PCB drill 
bits and is used in the forming of automobile power Windows, mirrors and door 
locks (UW;UC, 14). 
Government policy arguably gave an initial boost to Union Tool's chances with, 
to give one example, the désignation in 1970 of manufacturing machinery 
incorporating PCBs for special amortisation considération in the so-called 
rationalisation measures for smail business. But the tact that Union Tool could 
flourish when the World of précision engineering really took off in the 1990s was 
in a very large measure due to Mr. Katayama's dedication and engineering 
perspicacity (Ul ) . The lead-up to this in the decade of the 1980s saw annual 
turnover rise by a factor of ten from ¥700 million to ¥7.5 billion (Keieisha Katho, 
November, 1990); by the end of the millennium Union Tool was an 
internationally established manufacturer churning out 10 million PCB drill bits a 
month for around 40% of the Japanese market and 30% of the world market 
(UC, 9; Dianzi Shibao, August 31, 1999). Profit increases were to continue 
unabated to the first quarter of 2001, although PCB drill bit sales tapered off 
ìater in the year (Handotai Sangyo Shinbun, September, 2001). Such rapid 
growth allowed for a fast élévation in corporate status; starting with its listing on 
the over-the-counter market of the Japan Security Dealers Association in 1989, 
Union Tool was listed on the second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 
1995 and the first section in 1998 (UW). 
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B O X 10 
Case Study 4 
Union Tool 
IME Status in Japan: Manufacturer of piercing drill bits for printed circuii 
boards (PCBs) ; wtth 40% of domestic market and 30% of world market. 
Established in Japan: 1960 
Company Names 
JE Union Tool Co. 4-15-8 Minami-Ohi. Shinagawa-ku, 
Tokyo 
JJ Yunion Tsuuru K . K . 3-5493-1001 
www.uniontool. co.jp 
TC Taiwan Youneng Gongju (Gu) No. 51-9, Hai-Hu, Hai-HuTsun, Lu-
Chu Chiang, Tauyuan Hsien 
TE Taiwan Union Tool Corporation (03) 354-3111A5 
References (Page) 
ZNK (478) JCH(i ) (650) NKJ(655) M K B - KSK (232) 
Investment Details 
Taiwan approvai date (ZNK) 1985 Capital increase date 1986, 1990 (twice) 
1995,1996 
Current capital ratios: Union Tool Co. 80.0% 
Taiwan Youneng Gongju (Gu) 20.0% 
Designations 
Company size/type designation MM(I)* 
No. of employees in Japan (JCH) 619 
No. of employees in Taiwan (ZNK) 107 
Main products/business in Taiwan (ZNK) Manufacture and sales of: 
ultra hard drill bits for print circuit boards. 
Investment Merits (ZNK) 
Base for locai sales in Taiwan and for exports to the Asian region. 
Sourccs of Raw Materials: Japan. 
Sales/Exports Destinations: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Philippines, Japan, Europe. 
Investments Worldmde (KSK) 
East Asia Manufacturing: Taiwan (1985), China (1995) 
East Asia Sales: Hong Kong (1998), Singapore (2000) 
Rest of World Manufacturing: United States (1981) 
Rest of World Sales: Swiizerland (1986), Britain (2000) 
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Responsable for production in Japan are three faetones all on the same site in 
Nagaoka, Niigata Préfecture, which accommodaLe 80% of the company's Japan-
based workforce (Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun, February 27. 2002). This site was 
acquired in the 1970s by Mr. Katayama from a bankrupt friend in a tìmely move 
just when the costly Tokyo factory location was proving too small to 
accommodate expansion ( U l ; U2). Structural backup for manufacturing is 
afforded by the Mishima Research Centre in Shizuoka Préfecture and five sales 
offices nationwide, while the company now has seven wholly-owned subsidiarles 
operating abroad. Compétition domestically comes from large keiretsuAinktd 
companies Toshiba Tungaloy, Mitsubishi Materials and Sumitomo Electric (Ul ) . 
Even by the early 1980s, though, Union Tool was well on top, recording 
monthly output of 220,000 drill bits as against 140,000 to 150,000 for 
Sumitomo Electric and 120,000 to 130,000 for Toshiba Tungaloy (Nikkei 
Sangyo Shinbun, February 16, 3 982). Ils biggest rival abroad is aclually TCT of 
Taiwan (www.tct-tool.com) with some 15% of the world's market share for 
PCB drill bits as of 2001. Others include RTW in Europe (7%) and Tycom 
Corp. in the United States (6%). which is in fact an arm ofthe Japanese ceramics 
giant, Kyocera (wwAV.kvoceratvcom.com) (U2). Union Toofs customers in 
Japan run the gamut of Ihe electronics industry, including Ibiden, Canon, Citizen 
Walch, Sodick, Sony, TDK, Japan TBM, Makino Mitling Machine, Mitsubishi 
Electric, Ricoh, Yokogawa Electric, and Matsushita Electric Works (UW), all 
the kind of demanding customers whose escalating requirements have forced 
Union Tool to keep up the pace of technical innovation. 
L M E Character of Company. This company's forte has been intensive innovation 
rooted in and stemming from a finely specialised core. When it started Iife it was 
a small urban factory (machi koba) run by a highly gifted engineer, but heavìly 
reliant on Mitsubishi Metals, the member of a huge keiretsu, for both input 
materials and product marketing. With a mere 20 to 30 employées, for its first 
ten years it could muster sales of only some five to six million yen in the dental 
equipment market which was anyway extremely small (Keieisha Kaiho, 
November, 1990). But to develop the carbide burr for dental application. Mr. 
Katayama also had to devise the machine lools because nothing suitable was 
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available from elsewhere, and it was the result deriving from this combination of 
skills that first caught the interest of Japan IBM (Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun, 
February 17, 1982). It was also this self-supportive, pioneering technology 
which was to ensure Union Tool's leadership in PCB drill bits from the outset 
(U2). Technological ingenuity reduced costs which guaranteed markets. The 
core technology is the ability to insert an expensive tungsten carbide drill bit into 
a cheap stainless steel shaft in a manufacturing process called shrinkage fitting 
(yakibame) adapted to this particular need, which substantially lowers costs 
because tungsten is not thereby used for the shaft (U2; Nihon Noritsu Kyokai, 
2001:226). Union Tool likes to express this as 'triangulation of production', 
connecting drill bits, materials and machines (UF). Its approach can also be 
conceived in terms of layers, with the core drill bit and sub-core exclusive 
technology just described, which remains unpatented in the interests of secrecy, 
enveloped by a periphery of proprietary machinery and equipment likewise 
employed within the firm but also for sale. In fact, most of its manufacturing 
machinery and equipment is designed and built in house (UC, 6), another 
element in keeping costs down while also allowing for quick response to 
customers' idiosyncratic demands (U2). Such machines can also be profitable in 
themselves: once Union Tool's crossed roller guides had been perfected and 
thereupon mass produced in the mid-1980s, for example, they were an instant hit 
in the PCB industry (Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun, February 18, 1982). 
With its technological prowess thus amply confirmed, Union Tool's L M E status 
is given further definition by the fact that it remains an independent, family-run 
business. But this independence was not easily come by. The first PCB drill bits 
Union Tool made were under the Mitsubishi Metals' brand name, and it was only 
in 1976 that Union Tool's own brand appeared on the market. This was 
obviously much to the satisfaction of Ichiro Katayama who is quoted as saying, 
"You're not a company if you're doing subcontracting" (shitauke wa kigyo ja 
nai) (Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun, February 17, 1982). At any event, from that point 
on Union Tool was able to pull away from subordination in an exercise the 
Japanese refer to as datsu keiretsu (breaking away from the keiretsu). Thereafter 
the company was to show its L M E evolutionary qualities in two significant ways. 
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First, as was already apparent in the early 1980s, Union Tool was precariously 
dépendent on the engineering genius of its founder, a weakness which did not 
escape his own attention (Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun, February 18, 1982). It would 
seem that one attempt to make good this shortcoming, coupled with the hiring of 
more engineers, is the establishment of Mishima Research Centre in Shizuoka 
Préfecture, some one hundred miles from Tokyo, in 1996 (UW). Second, is the 
contrast in character between the founding father, Ichiro Katayama, and the son 
who has now taken over as président, Takao. Although trained as an engineer 
like his father, the younger Katayama is equipped with a strong marketing sense 
and a grasp of modem corporate strategy (U2). While the father oft times burned 
the midnight oil at the drawing board, the son has in recent years sought funding 
from institutional investors in the global financial market (Nikkei Kin'yu 
Shinbun, Aprii 16, 2002). And this would appear to be from a position of 
strength. That is to say, for fiscal 2000 Union Tool ranked twelth among ali 
listed companies in Japan regarding sales profit ratio (Nikkei, August 15, 2001), 
while in the same year Takao Katayama was counted among Japan's wealthiest 
individuáis (Forbes, September, 2000). 
Internationalisation. From its inception, as part of the electronics revolution, the 
making of PCBs has been global in its implications and réalisation. Venturing 
abroad at the beginning of the 1980s synchronous with the big Japanese PCB 
makers, Union Tool was embarking on a strategy which it has not faltered from 
since, that being to instali production bases where the markets are (UC, 18). 
Bigger than Japan or anywhere else at the time as a market for PCBs was the 
United States. So from the outset Union Tool's objective was not exporting but 
establishing local production there. This took concrete form with the founding in 
1981 of Megatool Inc., based in Buena Park, California (UW). Owned 51% by 
Union Tool and 49% by the former président of Toolon Inc., at the time the 
largest ultra-hard drill bit maker in the United States, it was the first time that a 
Japanese ultra-hard drill bit maker had set up abroad (Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun, 
February 16, 1982). It was to prove a highly successici joint venture (U2), not 
only because of the markets it created in the United States and the Americas 
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generally bul also in terms of the overall growth of the company in the 
international arena as a whole. To cite Ichiro Katayama as quoted: "By 
establishing Megatool, in addition to learning about the state of the ultra-hard 
drill bit industry in the United States, we were also able to get the latest 
information on what was happening in the computer industry. For example, just 
to take the drill bits, clients frankly told us about the results of in-house tests 
they made comparing our drill bits with those of other makers and this was very 
helpful for us" (Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun, February 18, 1982; my translation). 
Union Tool subsequently, in 1995, assumed complete ownership of this 
subsidiary which now has 368 employées and thirteen bases other than Buena 
Park - the only unit involved in manufacturing - in the United States, Canada 
and Mexico engaged variously in inventory supply and resharpening of drill bits. 
Capital was increased in 1998 and expansion of the Buena Park factory was 
completed in the following year (MTW). 
Following on front the United States, overseas manufacturing bases were to be 
established in Taiwan in 1985 and in Shanghai 1995 to provide an East Asian 
manufacturing platform. These were supplemented by sales offices in 
Switzerland (Europe) in 1986, Hong Kong in 1997, and Singapore and the 
United Kingdom in 1998 for a full complément of seven wholly-owned 
subsidiaries worldwide. However, as the catalogue remarks: "At the same time, 
we also have expanded our domestic manufacturing and research and 
devolopment facilities so that we can further strengthen our global network" 
(UC, 15). This bespeaks a prevailing préoccupation with cohesiveness, stili 
centrally directed from the corporate headquarters in Japan. Whereas the 
presidency of Megatool was in the first instance held by the American joint 
venture partner, it has since been assumed by Takao Katayama (MTW). He is 
also président of the other major production subsidiary in Taiwan (TUW). Al i 
machinery and equipment used in the overseas manufacturing plants originate 
from Japan, including those purchased from Mitsubishi, Hitachi and Britain's 
Sandwick (U2). The company has set up a global information network to ensure 
integrated research and development leading to new manufacturing prospects 
(U2). This centralisation of focus is also the better to see where the global trends 
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are heading, as with the shift of market to Asia in recent years, which resulted in 
the décision in 2002 to raise the monthly production of drill bits at the Shanghai 
plant fivefold (Nihon Keìzai Shinbun, February 7, 2002). This also entails a 
regional division of labour to some extent, partially in récognition of a hierarchy 
of technological capacity among the respective plants, but also partially 
provoked by the perceived danger of loss of business through technology piracy. 
So while the principle is local production for local sales, the secrets behind the 
process for making very thin drill bits are kept in Japan where they are ail made. 
The Taiwanese and Chinese subsidiaries are restricted to the relatively simple 
and cheap drill bits for motherboards and the like. There is also the fact that the 
most sophisticated demand is in Japan and state-of-the-art products have to be 
developed there jointly with the Japanese PCB makers (U2). This bespeaks an 
'internai control' over the scope for technology diffusion from Japanese L M E s to 
overseas subsidiaries in some cases, as for example where the key core 
technology is deemed too sensitive to release to even the 'technologically ready' 
subsidiaries. 
Rôle of Taiwan. In contrast to the United States, exports were the precursor of 
investment in Taiwan. In the event, import duties were high and the market was 
growing, so at the request of the local distributor - and probably through the 
indirect prompting by the host country government that the high duties imply -
Union Tool set up a manufacturing joint venture with the distributor in 1985. 
Upon the death of the Taiwanese partner in 1989 (TUC), this became a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Union Tool, subsequently comprising two factories on the 
same site some twenty miles along the seashore from Taipei ( U l ; UW). Mr. 
Inami (U l ) , rather ingenuously perhaps, accredited this timing, just as the 
electronics industry was taking off in Taiwan, to Iuck rather than judgement. Be 
that as it may, the new company enjoyed a tax holiday for the first five years of 
opération and a substantial customer base already in place. It has been managed 
from the start by Mr. Inami himself, who was already fìuent in Chinese (Ul ) . 
Product upgrading was to occur in the reassuring environment of inévitable 
growth as, indeed, we have seen with the other Taiwan subsidiaries of the case 
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study LMEs in this chapter. There was some element of production-orientation 
at the initial stage with exports from Taiwan going to North and South America 
and South Africa, but this has tapered off considerably since. In fact, contrary to 
the information in Box 10, which is no doubt dated by comparison, Mr Inami 
(UI) claimed at my interview with him that, apart from a little to China, there 
were no exports now because Taiwan Union Tool was having great difficulty 
keeping up with demand in Taiwan. In fact, all exports to the Union Tool's 
Swiss, Hong Kong and Singapore subsidiaries originate from Japan (Ul ) . Thus 
the Taiwan opération has taken on the replication of Megatool, being all but 
totalty market-oriented around all but the more advanced of the company's 
products. This is not least because Taiwan now has the world's second largest 
PCB manufacturing industry (Ul ) . 
In fact, the market has always been the overriding déterminant for establishing a 
production base in Taiwan. At the time: "There are many Japanese companies 
putting up factories in Southeast Asia. Half of thèse are looking for cheap labour 
costs, but Union Tool is différent. As it is after satisfying domestic demand in 
Taiwan, there are few exports" (Kishi, 1990:47; my translation). Neither were 
local costs converted into a déterrent as wages climbed rapidly in the second half 
of the decade. Other than the market itself, another reason for this was the high 
degree of automation possible in the work of making the PCB drill bits, drill bit 
pointers and routers allocated to the Taiwan plant (Ul ) . These are ail made to 
Japanese standards employing Japanese technology with machines and materials 
all emanating from Japan (Ul ) . Of necessity, though, given the rising 
sophistication of demand, the Taiwan plant is being constantly upgraded to keep 
in step with international standards. Moreover, growth has been incessant, with 
capital increases in 1986, 1990, 1995 and 1996. Having risen significantly from 
the founding year in 1985 to 1998, sales of drill bits then rocketed from 2 million 
a month in 1999 to 3 million in 2000 (U2; TUC). Taiwan Union Tool was right 
at one of the epicentres of the new high-precision mounting industry. What is 
more, it was far from merely supplying Japanese transplants. In fact, of the 
fìfteen main clients listed in its catalogue, only two - T.C.I. and Hitachi 
Chemical - are Japanese ( U l ; TUC). Al i the rest are local Taiwanese companies 
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which have emerged in the electronics boom enjoyed by that country for most of 
the past two decades: companies like BoardTek Electronics 
(www.boardtek.comtw). Printed Wire Corp. (www.tpwc.comtw). Phoenix 
Precision Technology (www, ppt. com tw). and World Wiser Electronics 
(www, wwei. com tw) (TUC). In other words, Union Tool's contribution to the 
upgrading of Taiwan's economy is not so much by direct transfer of technology 
and know-how to its suppliers or by spin-off, but by making possible the 
technical advancement of its downstream (Taiwanese) customers. The question 
on the horizon perhaps is the potential emergence into prominence of the 
Shanghai subsidiary after its relocation in larger premises in 2000 (UW). Taiwan 
has dispatched its engineers for two-month spells to assist in installation and 
training, but to what degree it will integrate further with developments on the 
mainland is perhaps still on the drawing board. One thing that does seem possible 
is a distinctive regional division between these locations of labour predicated on 
the fact that Union Tool is playing the labour-intensive card in Shanghai where 
four Chinese do the work of one Japanese while still commanding a much lower 
wage bill (U l ) . The respective roles of China-Taiwan within the integrating East 
Asian region will be shaped by the results of corporate choices such as these. 
7.3.5(c) Articulation 
Articulation Attribute: Ultra-focus 
What 'ultra-focus' means here is not that Union Tool single-mindedly produces 
just one very narrowly denned product range, but that everything ultimately 
revolves around the one item, the PCB drill bit. In the simple diagrammatic 
representation in Fig. 7.1, this drill bit is the bull's eye in the middle which 
concentrates the company's vision. Exemplifying the inner circle is the shrinkage 
technology for combining the tungsten drill bit and steel shaft, plus the 
machinery and accumulated skills involved in grooving, finishing and pointing, 
together comprising the 'black box'. The outer circle constitutes the processing 
and other related machinery used in-house, but also for sale. The inner circle is 
unpatented because the very survival of the company in its present form is 
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almost exclusively dépendent on it being impenetrable for outsiders. The outer 
circle, on the other hand, is considered to be beyond the risk of such an 
eventuality white at the same time being a counterveiling centrifugai force in 
récognition of the vulnerability inhérent in such intensive focusing. That is to say, 
on the one hand the philosophy reigns to the effect that reliance on outsourced 
machinery would render it difficult to attain the same quality in product and 
service at the righi price, on the other there is the desire to broaden the base of 
opérations and redefine the company as a machine tool maker, to facilitate 
manoeuvre in the event of, say, laser beam technology suddenly undermining Hs 
position. This is a highly concentrated manifestation of articulation. 
Fig. 7.1 The Three Basic Elements of Union Tool's Articulation 
Concentration is also the key word for describing Union Tool's core compétence 
activities, meaning the way business and, as an extension of that, 
internationalisation, have been carried out. As we nave seen, Mabuchi's mainly 
medium-tech offerings and employment structure resuit in it swinging on a 
pendulum between production and market priorities depending on the 
customer's product. By contrast, Union Tool is highly specialised with a much 
narrower customer base of PCB makers who are geographically clustered, 
notably in Japan, Taiwan and California. In fact, business is so concentrated in 
the latter two that the market takes absolute precedence, henee the factories buìlt 
there by Union Tool. This means that, in California's case in particular, the 
importance of being at the market doorstep which also présents opportunities for 
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gathering the latest industry information, far outweighs the bürden of extra costs 
in the strategie mix. 
Union Tool does compete on cost, but it is cost predicated on the market plus 
technical skill and excellence. With this combination, production-oriented 
décisions are more nuanced and less motivated by crude formulae heavily angled 
to cost considérations. More to the point, automation and rationalisation have 
reduced the labour input to around 10% of the production cost (Ninon Noritsu 
Kyokai, 2001), so Southeast Asia, for instance, does not hold out an 
expenditure-cutting appeal. This is why, along with the fact that Japan itself is a 
major market, most of Union TooPs manufacturing is still done at Us plant 
complex in Nagaoka, though with a signrficant amount in Taiwan for that key 
market. However, over the past decade a new market pressure has been building 
up in the form of China, where many of Union Tool's clients have moved, not 
least from other parts of East Asia. Hère again though, it is client clustering that 
is the justification for the plant in Shanghai, not cheap labour for production as 
such. Thus does a specialist intermediary supplier internationalise in concentrated 
form while the core - the ultra-focus - is retained firmly on the home territory. 
Key Points: 
* early internationalisation 
*followed market to U.S., then to Taiwan 
* technotogy transfer to Taiwan, but key éléments 
internaliscd + impact more on downstream/users 
* keeps domestic (Japan) focus 
* production stili in évolution with division of 
labour between Taiwan and China in the offìng 
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7.3.6 Case Study 5: Tanaka Kikìnzoku 
7.3.6(a) Interview Details 
Interview 1 
Date June 1,2002 Place Taipei 
Interviewee(s) Mr. Y . Sodeyama, General Manager (TI) 
Language Japanese Duration 1 hr 30 mins 
Remarks 
Interview 2 
Date June 20,2002 Place Tokyo 
Interviewee(s) Mr. O. Ikeda, Chief, Présidents Office (T2) 
Language English Duration 1 hr 20 mins 
Remarks Film prepared, but discussion took precedence 
Références T l = Mr. Sodeyama; T2 = Mr. Ikeda; TC = Tanaka's latest 
English catalogue; TW = Tanaka's Engüsh/Japanese 
website dated December 2002; T H = Tanaka's history 
published in its centennial (1985) (3); EW = website of EEJA, 
a joint venture, dated December 2002 + newspapers as given 
Synopsis B O X 11 
7.3.6(b) Company Description and Internationalisation Progression 
Company and Product. The history of modem Japan is said to commence with 
the so-called Meiji Restoration of 1868. In founding Tanaka Shoten in 1885, 
therefore, Umekichi Tanaka participated in the inaugural wave of Japan's 
industrialisation (TW). Umekichi collected small coins from shrines and temples, 
handed thèse over to banks for notes and then transferred thèse notes to the 
shrines and temples for a commission (T2). In short order he was also melting 
down silver American dollars to make silver bullion, then expanding his business 
with the processing of platinum metals (T2; TW), as well as arbitraging silver 
and gold (Tl ) . As early as 1889, in fact, Tanaka Shoten became the flrst 
enterprise to manufacture platinum products in Japan (TH, 53). 
The company was incorporated in 1918 with Umekichi Tanaka as chairman of 
the board of directors, a position he was to hold until his death in 1936 (TW; 
TH, 53-4). In 1923, the company became the sole sales agent for Soviet 
platinum in the Far East (TH, 54). It also began importing platinum ingots from 
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the Soviet Union for manufacturing of products for domestic distribution (T2). 
By 1933 the production of platinum-rhodium alloy catalyst gauze had 
commenced, followed three years later by the building of new plants for platinum 
refìning and Silver electrolysis (TH, 54). Come the war period Tanaka was 
manufacturing platinum needles and ignition coils (TI), and by the time it 
adopted the current name of Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo in 1943 (4), it had 500 
employées working in four factories (TH, 54). 
However, in the immediate afìermath of the war it was to revert to small 
company status with only 30 employées in 1946. Nevertheless, its réputation 
remained assured, for two years later it was directed by the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare to start producing metal bullion for dental materials. In 1952 it was 
designated as a 'gold dealer' by the Ministry of Finance and its reemergence as 
an industriai supplier was underlined by it starting to produce electric contacts 
for wired téléphone exchange equipment. By 1953, when it commenced the 
production of rolled gold and karat gold following the revision of the Gold 
Control Act, Tanaka's workforce had climbed to 100 (TH, 55). The construction 
of specialised plants was to follow in quick succession thereafter as illustrated in 
Fig. 7.2 ( T i ; TW). Having received a first fillip from demand for the Korean 
War in the early 1950s, Tanaka was to benefit greatly from the Japanese 
economy's expansion in the 1960s, with an extra bonus from the sales of its 
commemorative medal for the Tokyo Olympics of 1964. Its fortunes were then 
further boosted by government's libéralisation measures during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, which among other things allowed for the free sale of bullion 
across national borders (T2). Such international exposure was eventually to lead 
to accréditation by prominent precious metals associations around the world, 
starting with the London Bullion Market Association in 1978 (TW). 
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B O X 11 
Case Study: 5 
Tanaka Kikinzoku 
LME Status in Japan: Leading processor industriai precious metals. 
Established in Japan : 1918 
Company Names 
JE Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo K . K . 6-6, Nihonbashi Kayabacho 2-chome, 
JJ Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo K.K. Chuo-ku, Tokyo 3-3667-8206 
www, tanaka. co. in 
TC Taiwan Tianzhu Guijinshu Gongye (Gu) 
TE Taiwan Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo Co., Ltd. 9F, No. 146 Sung Chiang Rd., 
Taipei (02)2571-5870 
References (Page) 
Z N K (382) JCH - N K J - M K B (78) K S K (107) 
Investment Details 
Taiwan approvai date (ZNK) October 1986 Capital increase date February 1998 
Current capital ratios: Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo K .K . 36.0% 
Tanaka Kikinzoku International K . K . 63.0% 
Dachuan Qiye (Gu) 1.0% 
Designations 
Company size/type designation MM(I)* 
No. of employees in Japan (MKB) 1,136 
No. of employees in Taiwan (ZNK) 46 
Main products/business in Taiwan (ZNK) Manufacture and sales of: electric 
points. 
Investment Merits (ZNK) 
Expansion of sales in Southeast Asian region. 
Source of Raw Materials: Japan. 
Sales/Exports Destinations: Taiwan, China, etc. 
Investments Worldmde (KSK) 
East Asia Manufacturing: South Korea (1973), Taiwan (1986), Malaysia (1995) 
East Asia Sales: -
Rest of World Manufacturing: -
Rest of World Sales: -
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Fig. 7.2 Factorits of Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo 
EtablJshment Name Function 
1959 Kobe Plant* Manufacture of spinnerets 
1960 Hiratsuka Plant Welding, casting, rolling; making cross bars 
for contact tape 
1965 HiratsukaNo. 2 
Plant** 
Collecting and refining gold solutions and 
compounds 
1973 Isehara Plant Making platinum instruments for glass 
industry, eg optical glass 
1977 Tsuruoka Plant Manufacturing PCBs and rivet contact 
points 
1996 Atsugi Plant Manufacturing of conductive paste 
* Sìnce closed due to noise pollution. 
** Renamed the Shonan Plant in 1999. 
Source: Derived from TW. 
As a processor and supplier of precious metals and precious metal products 
Tanaka Kikinzoku is now first in Japan, ahead of keiretsu companies Mitsubishi 
Metals and Sumitomo Metals, which are, admittedly, essentially mining firms 
before being manufacturers. Internationally, Tanaka ranks around fourth behind 
Johnson Matthey (UK), Degussa (Germany) and Engelhard-CLAL 
(USA/France) (TI; T2). This is a generalised ranking, however, and dépends on 
the product; in bonding wire its is first (TI). Tt Claims to be engaged in the 
manufacture, research and development of ali types of precious metal industriai 
products and precious metal bullion (TW). With such diversity based on a hard 
core of expertise it has been able to command 50% of the world's demand for 
bonding wire used in a wide range of products such as integrated circuits and 
transistors (T2; TC, 11), initiate the production of printed circuit boards in 1970 
(TW), and begin selling Krugerrand in 1980 (TH, 60). It can take direct 
advantage of the public demand for gold during economie downturns (Sankei 
Shinbun, Aprii 28, 2002), while continuing to introduce innovative products, like 
its new platinum coating fluid (Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun, Aprii 25, 2002). Its 
clientele spans the industries of electronics, automobiles, télécommunications, 
ceramics, health and environment, as well as the individuai in the Street seeking 
personal adornment and financial security (TW). 
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L M E Character of Company. For over one hundred years the Tanaka company 
had a Tanaka at the heim, although now the current président does not bear the 
family name. Nevertheless, the L M E qualifies still prevail and the core business is 
still paramount. As Mr. Ikeda (T2) was keen to point out, Tanaka Kikinzoku did 
not go on a land investment binge at the end of the 1980s, like many Japanese 
companies did, and then keel over with the bursting of the economie bubble. 
This is because it stuck to what it knew, which is precious metals. The 'first 
décision' was made at the start when the first président, Umekichi Tanaka, 
resolved to focus on precious metals, and the second, third, fourth and fifth 
présidents have not wavered from that stance (T2). In addition to gold, silver 
and platinum, today this means rhodium, palladium, iridium and so on (TC, i). 
Around this core are arrayed a copious range of specialised processes as 
epitomised by the plants shown in Fig. 7.2. Circling thèse domains of this still 
unlisted company are a growing number of satellite spinotTs linked by spokes of 
cross-shareholdings, like Tanaka Kikinzoku Jewelry for the sales of meta! 
jewelry and bullion, Tanaka Kikinzoku Hanbai for domestic distribution of the 
group's industriai products, and PC Print for the manufacture of special printed 
circuit boards (TC). A further contribution to the matrix for 'finding solutions' is 
the research structure. Each manufacturing arm conducts its own research. But 
this is complemented by the Research and Development Centre established in 
Hiratsuka in 1990 to carry out R & D for the group as a whole, and this is again 
supplemented by a third élément of basic research commissioned by universities 
and like institutions, mainly in Japan (TW). From this closely integrated 
endeavour have so far emanated some 1,000 patents, with nearly 4,000 more 
applied for (TW). Then, in addition to the company's own international units 
discussed below, Tanaka Kikinzoku has also entered into joint venture 
arrangements with Mitsui Mining and Smelting (Tanaka Denshi Kogyo) in 1960 
(TH, 56) and Johnson Matthey (Tanaka Matthey) in 1969 (since liquidated) 
(TW). 
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Internationalisation, This tie-up approach has also been extended abroad through 
Electroplating Engineers of Japan Ltd.(EEJA), a joint venture started in 1965 
with what is now Enthone-OMI Inc., an American company associated with 
Cookson Electronics Co. The parent company of the latter is Cookson Group 
pic, headquartered in London and quoted on the London Stock Exchange (EW). 
EEJA itself has operating units both in Japan and California producing 
electroplating solutions, surface treatment agents and related equipment (EW; 
TW). But overall Tanaka Kikinzoku is a reluctant internationaliser in the sensé 
that. as Mr. Sodeyama (T1 ) put it, they would prefer to develop and 
manufacture everything in Japan. Mr. Ikeda (T2) concurred, saying that 
originally the company wanted to manufacture only in Japan and would have 
preferred ail its customers to import from Japan. Actually he claimed that, in 
addition, MITI proved an obstacle to Tanaka's desired mode of doing business 
because of its prolonged restrictions on the export of precious metáis (T2). The 
export of gold was not completely free until 1978, for example (T 1 ). 
However, there were other factors that eventually impelled FDI, notably the 
exigencies of delivery time and cost, including labour costs, Naturally the 
company would not have invested abroad if there were any question about the 
local ventures' ability to perform, but the fact is that so far the ventures in 
Taiwan and South Korea have been kept to low-end, low-profit producís which 
are easy to make and for which it is necessary for Tanaka to retain its market 
share, such as silver contacts and bonding wire (T2). Mr. Ikeda was of the 
opinion that the considerable amounts invested abroad were so far not justified 
by the returns. The strategy, therefore, was to fonction with the minimum 
number of manufacturing bases abroad. However, he argued, it is still possible 
for Tanaka Kikinzoku to meet its global commitments because of its highly 
differentiatedproducís, coupled with the good réputation it has built up with its 
customers (T2). Other aspects dictating this approach include the fact that the 
company's business is capital-intensive and is therefore not seeking cheap labour 
per se; its location référence is markets rather than production. But at least as 
salient is the reality that Tanaka Kikinzoku is an L M E competing against giants. 
which means that its room for manoeuvre, especially on the home territories of 
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these giants in North America and Europe, is bounded. It can attain global reach 
with its bonding wire, which ¡t sells to the ükes of Intel, I B M and Advanced 
Micro Devices, but some of its other producís encounter stronger rivals (TI). 
Specifically, in the postwar era Tanaka Kikinzoku saw its First exports of 
spinnerets for chemical fíbre production depart for Yugoslavia in 1954, and then 
to India and Taiwan in 1955 (TH, 55), and exports thereafter acceierated from 
the mid-1960s (TI). A lot of the latter comprised bonding wire and the like in 
pursuit of Japanese companies which had set up plants in Southeast Asia (T2). 
This international activity was eventually to give rise in 1991 to one of the 
company's specialist spinoffs, Tanaka Kikinzoku International, to expand 
marketing and take overall charge of the group's overseas activities. 
Manufacturing FDI, subsequent to EEJA, was implemented on the principie of 
"where there is a market, build a factory" (TI). By 1974. the market in South 
Korea was growing fast; some Japanese firms had moved there and requested 
Tanaka to produce locally because they needed short-term delivery. Exporting 
from Japan would nave taken weeks, whereas they wanted the materials within 
days of ordering (T2). So a joint venture, Hi-Seong Metal Industry, was 
established to in time supply a whole range of precious metal producís (TH, 59; 
TW). lt started by supplying Japanese transplants and thereafter added a Korean 
diéntele (T2). While Tanaka has a 45% interest, the operation is loíally managed 
by íhe Korean side wilh no Japanese personnel sent o ver (TI, T2). In addition ío 
Taiwan in 1986, the only other manufacturing units set up abroad are in 
Singapore in 1978 and Malaysia in 1995, both of which are actually directly 
owned by Tanaka Denshi Kogyo for manufacturing semiconductor materials 
(TH, 60; TW; TI). So this is another example of a strong East Asian bias in the 
overseas production operations of our case study L M E s . Allhough íhere are 
some sales lo the neighboring countries of Thailand, Myanmar and Indonesia 
from these plants, 80%» - 85% of the Malayan output is for íhe domestic market, 
mainly comprising the afTüiates of its Japanese corporate customers; acceierated 
delivery time again being the overriding rational for the investment (T2). Other 
markets around the globe are serviced through represenlative offices in Hong 
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Kong and Manila and through liaison offices in Indianapolis and Frankrurt-am-
Main (TW). 
Role of Taiwan. Among the Tanaka Kikinzoku group's overseas manufacturing 
facilities, the Taiwan affiliate was the third to appear after South Korea and 
Singapore (TI). Again, the reason for its establishment was the pre-existence of 
a substantial customer base, given extra impetus by the predictable impact of the 
Plaza Accord of 1985 which made Japanese exports more expensive, together 
with a strategically high host country import duty (TI). A représentative office 
was set up in 1985, followed by a locai manufacturing corporation in the 
following year (TW), managed from the start by Mr. Sodeyama (TI), a fluent 
Chinese speaker, who has remained in Taiwan for most of the fune since. This is 
to ali intents and purposes a wholly owned subsidiary, with Tanaka Kikinzoku 
International taking over the major share of the stock after its incorporation a 
few years later (see Box 11). The subsidiary was destined to be encouraged from 
the start as it was engaged in one of the ten industries priorìtised by the 
Taiwanese government at the time, which translated into an initial five-year tax 
break and low-interest financing (TI). It now purchases some 75% of its 
machinery and production equipment from sources in Taiwan, while the 
analysing instruments all come from Japan. A good 80% of the tooling and 
mould-making is done in-house, a fact which renects the general upgrading of 
the affiliate's technological base and attainment of independent capabilities since 
it commenced opérations (TI). It is now being entrusted with some product and 
process development functions, such as its contribution to bringing down costs 
by reducing the gold content in its products (TI). Local compétition in Taiwan is 
represented by ten small Taiwanese firms, and a telling signal of where the 
market lies is that nine of the ten Japanese expatriate staff working in Taiwan are 
saiesmen. This suggests that 'Japanese are selling to Japanese' in the Taiwan 
market. 
Taiwan Tanaka Kikinzoku manufactures and sells electrical and rivet contact 
points, as well as thick film pastes, in which it is the world leader. In addition, it 
provides a contact welding service ( T l , TW). Of its rivet contact points, 75% 
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are exported to the overseas plants in China and elsewhere of companies such as 
Siemens, Tyco, Matsushita and Omron (TI). Taking its exports as a whole, 50% 
are destined for Thailand and Singapore, illustrative of its role in sustaining 
regional integration. The rest of the output is sold domestically to Taiwanese and 
Japanese fìrms, but none is exported to Japan. On the other hand, the affiliate 
imports from Japan for sales to Taiwanese companies (TI). There is little scope 
for Taiwan Tanaka in Europe and the United States because they are already 
strong in what it produces. The Taiwanese authorities prohibit the export of gold 
to China, but now both are in the World Trade Organisation, so presumably this 
ban is due to be overturned and a wider regional role may develop for the 
Taiwanese opérations. And although there is no regional division of labour 
strategy in place, the Taiwan affiliate and its Chinese-speaking staff are 
considered a key factor in any moves that should be effected in China from now 
on. So far, despite its large and growing exports to China mainly from Japan, 
Tanaka Kikinzoku has not established itself there. This is now under examination 
by a special team and Taiwan is seen as a base from which activities could be 
launched (TI). Not least among the considérations here is the fact that Japanese 
customers in Taiwan are also shifting production over to the Mainland, so it is 
therefore essential to gauge the degree to whìch the company's markets are 
relocating (T2). This example again illustrâtes how the production networks of 
Japanese LMEs in East Asia are in a state of flux and évolution, as the 
émergence of China as market and production base créâtes new opportunities 
and challenges. How established Taiwanese opérations fit into thèse emerging 
networks will be influenced by the capabilities they have developed and the role 
the local managers can advance for them, as well as the role Japanese bosses 
allocate to them. 
7.3.6(c) Articulation 
Articulation Attribute: Density 
Density implies here not just density in product range while in the quest for 
breadth of application, but also in production location and in manufacturing 
plant. That is to say, the company concentrâtes on the production of precious 
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metáis and items made from them at just enough locations to retain viable market 
reach, and usually at precisely designated plants. Density also refers to the strong 
inclination to conduci thèse activities at home in Japan wherever tenable, even as 
the company strives to elaborate on its international présence. In addition, it 
points to how Tanaka Kikinzoku along with its various organisât io nal 
components, including research facilities, factories and affiliâtes, while 
maintaining their individual identities, runction as a group from the development 
stage through to marketing. 
In this light, whereas Union TooPs Operation has been envisaged as concentric 
circles enclosing the bull's eye, Tanaka can be seen as a core of solution création 
by way of precious metal processing technology, to which are attached satellites 
of expertise. Close in are the factories in Fìg. 7.2, a little further out are the 
affiliâtes spun off as business has progressed, like Tanaka Denshi Kogyo, 
Specialising in bonding wire and materials for the electronics industry, and PC 
Print, maker of printed circuit boards. There again, in contrast to Union Tool 
which is intent on defending its inner sanctum of expertise because of its 
indispensibility to survival, Tanaka understands its strength to be in the ability to 
address constant change through overlapping incrementalism expressed in an 
abundance of patents and patent applications. 
It is with this posture that Tanaka Kikinzoku looks to the outside world, almost 
as if in a fortress from which forays are made, based heavily on the superiority of 
the skills it has accumulated in Japan and the fact that its producís are easily 
transportable. Given these characteristics it has taken two distinct routes to 
internationalisation. The first is the joint venture, particularly Electroplating 
Engineers of Japan through which, because of the high level of expertise Tanaka 
contributes, it is abte to reach a global market. This, in fact, is a classic strategie 
alliance approach where closely defined technical capabilities are married to 
achieve much more extensive reach than the individuai partners could muster on 
their own. The second is FDI, but FDI only ìndulged in when clients cry out for 
it and when the alternative would be loss of market. The FDI ventures set up in 
Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia are ali of this nature. Here the market 
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priority is based purely on locai client demand, not on the need to cut costs 
predicated on a broader global strategy. Internationalising artìculation for 
Tanaka Kikinzoku is a matter of beaming out from a dense domestic core with a 
marked tendency to demur on manufacturing FDI. 
Key Points: 
* reluctant internationaliser regarding FDI, but 
not sales 
* Taiwan has important rôle + évidence of 
upgrading 
* Taiwan*s rôle changing with émergence of China 




From the 110 LMEs , five were abstracted as case studies. Mabuchi was a test 
case early on in the study, introduced by an acquaintance. With respect to the 
other four, Pentel, Shofu and Union Tool were first contacted through their 
British affiliâtes. Subsequently, their Taiwan affiliâtes and that of Tanaka 
Kikinzoku responded to the letter and questionnaire sent to them. Interviews 
were held in Taiwan and Japan with Pentel, Union Tool and Tanaka Kikinzoku, 
in Taiwan only with Mabuchi, and in Japan only with Shofu. Six of the 
interviews were conducted in Japanese, and two in English. 
This case study approach was intended to complément the quantitative analysis 
in Chapter Six by adding depth of vision, especially the understanding of motives 
and stratégies, to mainly Statistical data. On the other hand, five case studies 
were deemed adequate to avoid undue specificity. The results of the interviews 
were incorporated with collated data in each company présentation. Each 
présentation comprised accounts of the company and its product, the L M E 
character of the company, its internationalisation progression, and the rôle 
played by Taiwan in the quest for global reach. Finally, each case study L M E 
was ascribed an articulation attribute to bring out the particular quality of its 
internationalisation given this attribute. 
(b) Overview 
AU five companies revealed strong L M E qualities for the period from the 1960s 
to 1990; they are ail highly specialised with a powerfiil commitment to their core 
compétence. Upon their internationalising, which was usuaily early in their 
modem corporate évolution, there is évidence that the initial overseas investment 
was made in proximate locations. Although Taiwan was the inaugural FDI 
location for Pentel alone, Mabuchi, Shofu and Tanaka Kikinzoku did see their 
first Investments in the East Asian région, and Taiwan followed on quickly 
thereafter. It can be noted also though that, as shown in Fig. 7.3, as a group they 
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reveal a séquence of timing in their initial Investments in Taiwan, which could be 
correlated with their type of business and the stage of Taiwan's development. 
Their current degrees of commitment to Taiwan in their respective 
internat io nalising stratégies vary considerably, though after a long period of 
commitment and a history of re-investment and upgrading. Pentel remains 
positive, although with réservations about the regional placement. Mabuchi is ail 
but withdrawing from Taiwan, although this is only to deepen its attachment to 
East Asia as a whole. Shofu takes a practical approach but is somewhat negative 
regarding the international implications. Union Tool is aggressively positive. 
Tanaka Kikinzoku is essentially favourable to Taiwan itself while remaining 
diffîdent about expansion through FDI overall. In some cases, the emerging rôle 
of China is causing a rethink about the future of Taiwan opérations, indicative of 
the 'never finished' nature of the international production Systems of 
internat io nalising LMEs . 
(c) The Five LMEs and Taiwan 
Again with référence to Fig. 7,3 it is possible to draw out the particular 
significance of the relationships the five case study L M E s bave had with the host 
country, Taiwan, in a time séquence. By the end of the 1960s, Japan's labour 
surplus no longer existed and wages were rising apace. The 'push' factor was the 
key motivating force. At the same time, Taiwan's export-orientation policy was 
taking off. Pentel was looking for lower labour costs and a location for making 
some of the simple end of its production line. Subsequently, with the 
improvement of manufacturing capabilities Pentel gained confidence in Taiwan, 
relied on it for more and more inputs, and increased its investment four times 
over thirty years, a fact also induced by the amplification of the local market as 
the Taiwanese economy grew. Taiwan Pentel has become a fully-fledged 
member of the international team in its divisïon-of-labour rôle. 
By the turn of the decade, the mounting compétence of the labour force 
attracted Mabuchi, which was seeking to supplément its overseas production 
capacity while avoiding Japan's high wages. lt extended its plant space rapidly. 
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but progress in other parts of the East Asian région - especialty China - soon 
undermined Taiwan's temporary cost advantage. Nevertheless, Mabuchi has 
retained the island's services by using it as a base for the manufacture of 
equipment for corporate use. Even if Mabuchi should completely withdraw, 
historically at least, Taiwan's imprint on that company's internationalisation 
process is assured. 
Mounting overall costs in Japan constituted the underlying motive for Shoru's 
attempts to seek out potential manufacturing venues overseas. So the 'push' 
factor was still very much in évidence. However, the company also wanted a 
proximate location where employée training and compétence were up to the 
standard for the task. In this light we see the 'pulì' factor now presented by 
Taiwan, in fact, by the mid-1970s the scales of Japanese 'push' and Taiwanese 
'pulì' were beginning to balance out, reflecting Taiwan's progress economically 
and industrially and the advancing mutuality in its relations with Japan. The 
simple but effective division-of-labour role the Taiwan affiliate achieved with the 
parent company in Kyoto is évidence of this. 
Taiwanisation, industriai planning and industriai upgrading got underway in the 
1970s and were in tuli swing by the 1980s. Increasingly sophisticated needs were 
partnered with policies designed to deter imports of advanced inputs while 
encouraging inward FDI. Rising manufacturing capability reinforced Taiwan's 
'pull' incentives, in that locai input needs were strong enough to counter the 
potential déterrent of fast-rising wages. It was in this environment, with the take-
off of the electronics industry, that Union Tool entered Taiwan. In short order, 
its Taiwan affiliate has become fiilly occupied with the demand for its produci 
from that country's state-of-the-art industries as a contributor to the upgrading 
of locai output. 
Shortly after Union Tool carne Tanaka Kikinzoku for fundamentally the same 
reasons. The locai demand calied for Tanaka's présence. Now we are definitely 
in the domain of 'pull' because, as has been stressed, Tanaka Kikinzoku is a 
reiuctant foreign investor. For most of its product range, Japan's high wages are 
not an issue. But, along with responding to customer demand, Tanaka could 
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align itself with host country planning because it was in one of the ten industries 
prioritised by the Taiwanese authorities at the time. Having arrived, it took 
advantage of the high levels of training and manufacturing capability available to 
reach a point where most of the tooling is now done in-house. The local affiliate 
has also been assigned a regional rôle with half its production going to East Asia. 
In addition, the affiliate's significance with respect to the company's entry into 
China is recognised, which possibly has global implications. 
When looked at as a whole, what cornes across very strongly regarding the 
relationships between the five case study L M E s and Taiwan is phased 
complementarity, which owes its consistency to the attitudes of both sides. It 
befits the character of the L M E as elaborated in this thesis; it underscores 
Taiwan's désignation as an Asian NIE. That is to say, the L M E s described in this 
chapter have all applied their strategie philosophy of articulation in their dealings 
with Taiwan. Their approach has been studied and measured because moving an 
élément of the 'Chamber' to Taiwan is a serious business and locating there is a 
serious proposition, not to be abandoned lightly even in Mabuchi's case. 
Although the actual timing of particular overseas ventures by thèse companies 
has been fortuitious to an extent (especially in the West), getting established in 
Taiwan - whichever order it occupied in the séquence of overseas ventures -
seems in ail cases to have been a very deliberate and purposeftil move strongly 
influenced by proximity in plans which, if in no way global at the outset, would 
gradually take on that potential. Apart trom the geographical, cultural, linguistic 
and historical aspects of proximity, a very important further élément has been the 
technological aspect, with Taiwan upgrading over time but not able to achieve 
ail the linkages. The five case studies, and likewise the 110 sample LMEs as a 
whole, have been contributors to making good the linkage gaps over the past 
forty years. At the same time, because of its proximity and its growing 
competencies, Taiwan has proved to be an effective partner for Japanese L M E s 
articulating their bounded options in the global arena. 
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Fig. 7.3 Timing of Investment in Taiwan by Case Study LMEs 
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(d) Key Points 
To continue the généralisations about the five case study LMEs with référence to 
the key points given at the end of each account in this chapter, early 
internationalisation in their postwar modern phase of development, either in the 
form of exporting or overseas investment was common to all. This again 
bespeaks their character as L M E s or L M E s in the making; high-quality products 
can travel. While there was an élément of spontaneity in how things actually got 
underway for some, internationalisation was never simply the resuit of external 
prompting. Confidence in the produci was there and action was internally 
motivated. The second point in common is that Taiwan was early on the üst as a 
location for manufacturing, if not for sales, although the situation regarding the 
latter was transformed with the passing of time and the development of the 
Taiwanese economy. In fact, with the timing of their first investments the five 
show the process in motion; Pentel initially came in just for exports, Union Tool 
ends up not being able to export because it is overwhelmed by Taiwanese 
domestic demand. 
Third, technology transfer is at a premium; Taiwan is required as a junior partner 
in a division-of-labour exercise for extending outwards to the regional and/or 
global marketplace. This strategy is hardly unique to LMEs , however the 
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consìstency with which it is practised among these case studies suggests a 
powerful consciousness of the 'Chamber' which must be guarded at ali costs 
because it is the very lifeblood of the L M E . That having been said, the fourth 
point in common is that they have tended overall to take advantage of growing 
compétence in Taiwan to Upgrade technology at their affiliâtes' factories. These 
two points reveal the line of tension along which L M E s with bounded reach 
internat io nally must pass along; while it is necessary to staunch leakage of core 
compétence know-how, to internationalise effectively - which among other 
things means maintaining superior standards of output - affiliâtes must be able to 
perform at a high level. On the other hand, to an extent this dépends on how the 
division of labour is parcelled out and for what reasons, and this can be related 
to the émergence of China, a factor very much on the minds of three of the five, 
reflecting in turn the still very significant pull of regional proximity for all rive in 
their internationalisation stratégies. 
(e) Articulation Attributes 
So Taiwan has been important, if not crucial, for all rive LMEs in their 
articulation stratégies aimed at the outside world. The articulation attributes 
allocated to each of them can be employed to project the vision of how they have 
performed as they internationalise on the global stage. 
Case Study 1: Pentel - extended its talent for publicity abroad, manipulating it to 
gain reach with limited manufacturing présence but global markets. 
Case Study 2; Mabuchi - used its knack for positioning to get in ahead of the 
compétition, relocate manufacturing internationally, and balance market and 
production orientations in its key markets, notably the United States and East 
Asia. 
Case Study 3: Shofu - had a very effective linkage network with key 
Professionals in Japan but found difficulty adapting it to internationalisation; 
nevertheless it developed a clear regional division of labour within East Asia. 
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Case Study 4: Union Tool - surrounded its ultra-focus on the drill bit with layers 
of receding intensity which allowed it to devise a concentrated internationalising 
strategy, while keeping a lookout for opportunity or threat; like other LMEs, 
though maybe more than most, it kept key strategy and technology generating 
functions at home and in-house. 
Case Study 5: Tanaka Kikinzoku - relied on its density of opérations at home to 
project itself outward only when necessary to safeguard and expand its 
international interests; although the changing position of China may open up a 
new phase of internationalisation, impacting on established opérations. 
(ß Role o/Case Studies 
The live L M E s described in this chapter provide insights into the 'dynamics' of 
L M E internationalisation which was expected from the extended case study 
approach, and therefore amplify its justification. This approach reveals much 
more than one usually obtains from surveys. At the same time it can convincingly 
corroborate survey findings. For example, all five case study L M E s provide 
évidence that they have contributed to the upgrading of the Taiwanese economy 
as they fili the 'technology gaps'. Although this has been a mutually beneficiai 
exercise - and this is something that only case studies like these can clarify in 
detail - it has nevertheless been conducted in the individuai LME's self interest 
as reflected in the sélective transfer of technology to suit its own purposes and 
protect its own position. Implications of how these LMEs ' activities add to the 
economie integration of the East Asian région are also given extra définition, 
notably in how they employ their Taiwan affiliâtes to extend their reach into the 
région, and notably for some into China. Here, the case studies have provided 
some insights into the internai debate as it unfolds within internationalising 
LMEs, rather than simply into actions fortheoming from the decision-making 
which results. Finally, these detailed 'written-through' case studies will prove 
beneficiai for other researchers who can use them as évidence for interpreting 
aspects of ongoing regional integration and trends in globalisation additional to 
the intepretations placed on the data in this chapter. 
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Notes 
(1) See question 6b. in the Appendix. As well as being interviewed in Japanese, 
Mr. Sakamoto responded to the Japanese version of the written questions he had 
received in advance by making notes in the margin. In this case he simply put 
'No ' ; Pentel Taiwan did not act as a hub either regionally or otherwise. The 
problem could be in the translation, which in Japanese reads chukeiteki kino, 
literally translatable as 'relay function', which has a somewhat différent nuance 
to the English. The interview with Mr. Mumo was conducted in English, so the 
word 'hub' was used. 
(2) As of2001, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Weifare. 
(3) This book, published to mark the company's centennial, is actually entitled 
'Precious Metals Science and Technology: An Introduction', and contains 
considérable information about Tanaka's historical development. 
(4) This company's chosen 'English' name is in fact the original Japanese 
transliterated into alphabetic letters: Tanaka Kikinzoku. It is translated as Tanaka 





'Economie orientation may be a matter of tradition or of expediency. Even in cases where there is a high 
degree of rationalisation of action, the clément of traditional orientation remains considérable.' (Max 
Weber, 1947:166) 
From the end of the Second World War to the 1960s, the world was seemingly evolving 
on a fixed course towards intégration. Globalisation, it can be said retrospectïvely, 
remembering that the term had yet to be coined, at that time meant simply world 
intégration, or convergence, and especially - although by no means exclusively -
économie intégration. This could, and did, give rise to theorisîng posited on such a 
mono-directed trajectory (cf. Hymer, 1960: Vernon, 1966). The emphasis was on the 
large firm, while the study of smaller firms was marginalised if not regarded as a trifle 
eccentric. By the 1970s, however, observers of the gênerai process of what came to be 
called globalisation began to detect anti-intégration, disintegration and destructive 
éléments. The world was not moving along a single inexorable path as previously 
supposed (Miyanaga, 2000). Local societies were reacting in différent ways; or perhaps 
it would be more correct to say that the différences inhérent in local societies around the 
world and how they responded to the pressures of globalisation and/or westernation and 
modernisation varied and were continuing to do so. In this light it is arguably justified 
to restate the Weber quote above and say that économie orientation is a matter of 
tradition and of expediency. 
Certainly the Japanese L M E as it has evolved in Japan and subsequently addressed the 
outside world in the postwar era can be envisaged as such a phenomenon, that is as an 
institution with traditional roots re-embedded in the process of reflexive modernisation 
capable of rationally engaging progress on its own terms. It can be seen as one way in 
which 'late-developer', Japan, has addressed the antithesis as represented by 
westernisation, otherwise referred to as modernisation (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1988). 
While bearing in mind, then, that the L M E is not exclusive to Japan, the mission of this 
thesis has been to trace the course of internationalisation of the Japanese L M E from its 
origins and to see if it achieves this in ways différent from that recorded in the literature 
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about both large and small firms. Is there a distinctive L M E quality which can add to 
the knowledge concerning the internationalisation of the firm and thereby contribute to 
the unfolding awareness of the multifaceted nature of globalisation? 
In Chapters Two and Three, a séries of propositions were postulated with respect to 
each of the concepts introduced, namely the L M E , articulation and globalisation, to 
which was appended in Chapters Four and Five a set of more spécifie propositions 
concerning the L M E in Japan, the rôle in globalisation of the région here represented by 
East Asia, and within that the rôle of Taiwan, as arguably an exceptionally attractive 
host country environment. Chapters Six and Seven then looked at how Japanese L M E s 
have actually internationalised from the aggregate and individual perspectives 
respectively. The stage has now been reached where the propositions can be linked to 
the descriptive analyses to see how well they fit. This is done by restating each 
proposition and commenting on its validity. That having been done, suggestions are 
offered regarding the possible wider implications that the L M E has as actor in the 
globalising environment and as concept in globalisation theory. 
8.2 Review of Propositions 
8.2.1 T b e L M E 
PROPOSITIONS 
PI 
The LME is a concept which dérives its définition from three key éléments: size, type 
and stage. That is to say, it has a minimum of200 and a maximum of 1,999 employées 
at its home country base; it is highly specialised, having a selfdefined and self-
contained core compétence; it is already established as a medium-sized company 
occupying a leading position in its selected sphère of business. Thèse éléments have a 
direct bearing on the distinctive way in which the LME conducts its affairs. 
Generally speaking there has been an évolution in thinking with regard to the relevance 
of firms of différent sizes and characteristics. From being the orphan of économie 
theory fifty years ago, the study of the small firm exploded into the limelight in the 
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1980s. But such attention is still not accepter] in ail circles; among macroeconomists, 
especially, the belief is still strong that only large firms and TNCs direct and order the 
economy because of économies of scale; small firms just drift along in their wake. On 
the other hand, most scholars Specialising in the study of SMEs think that the biggest 
difficulty they have to contend with is the extreme heterogeneity with which they are 
characterised. This being so, it is difficult to create viable theory to encompass them as 
a totality. This has led Julien (1997), for one, to suggest that medium-sized firms be 
detached from small firms in the debate because, according to him, the former have 
started to conduci business in ways that to some extent resemble those of large firms. 
The affirmation of the L M E is just such an exercise, remembering that in addition to 
being medium-sized it is also a leading company in its chosen line of business. 
Moreover, in the Japanese setting the L M E has been shown in this thesis to be more 
than merely a successili! SME which has parlayed success into survival, above-average 
size profitability and an international présence. It possesses a distinctive identity; it is a 
'Chamber' of core-competence which articulâtes its attributes. One co unter-argument to 
this could be that in fact not a few of thèse L M E s can be traced to keiretsu-tyçe links 
and they are not as independent as depicted here. This can be rebuffed by pointing to 
the high proportion of L M E s discussed in the pages of this thesis with individual 
founders and family ties over générations, as well as close managerial control over 
long-term strategie planning. What is more, Nakamura and I do not claim that thèse are 
sharp distinctions. There are large grey áreas. The sharp distinctions are with the dual-
economy theorists who see the Japanese economy simply in terms of large and small, 
assembler and subcontractor. But the objective of analysing an economy is to unravel it. 
It is not to potish an intractable bail of received opinion. It may be that by isolating 
LMEs we are ignoring, or at least downplaying, linkages that would be seen in an 
idealised Anglo-Saxon depiction as action within a group rather than independent 
action. But without taking concepts like the L M E as analysing tools, inroads of 
understanding as to how the Japanese or any economy works, and how globalisation can 
be manifested in différent ways, will not be fortheoming. Having been argued and 
subsequently proven to exist, therefore, the L M E is justified as a concept to drive 
economic analysis. 
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Proposition Evaluation: L M E is a valid concept in itself and can be applied effectively 





Articulation characterises a stratégie approach entailing the exercise of bounded 
options within a fteld of sustained mobility. h captures well the stratégie philosophy 
of the typical LME, while not being exclusive to it. Articulation is a gradualist, 
incrémental approach which entails movement of the firm as a unit of embodied 
core compétence. It can be contrasted with the création of new compétences within 
the business entity (adaptation) and the attachment to compétences outside 
(flexibility). Articulation and the core compétence comprise a symbiosis, the source 
for both being the first décision '. 
The concept of articulation as delineated here is born out of the desire to underline the 
fact that organisattonal dispositions and requirements can trigger a variety of 
approaches. It is posited between adaptation, which essentially entails the internai 
shirting of resources (and may be said to be the key strategie attribute of the large 
TNC), and flexibility, which here is taken to imply a relatively random diversification of 
activity often with at most incidental links to any previously acquired capabilities (and 
which may be a characteristic of more or less successful SMEs). By contrast, 
articulation is meant to suggest that the core compétence, or closely connected set of 
core compétences, fili the 'Chamber', leaving little if any scope for adaptation in the 
way suggested above. At the same time, so much commitment has been sunk into the 
core compétences that the value of what has been created is far too evident to be 
discarded, to the point that flexibility as defined here would be a wasteful dispersion of 
accumulated capability, a distraction of effort, and a route to vulnerability. Articulation 
as a concept, therefore, is an attempt to illustrate the movement of the type of 
organisation (or organisation encountering in a given way a certain constellation of 
circumstances) where there is a high degree of tension between capabilities and 
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constraints. The capabilities impel a forward progression; the constraints trim the wings 
of extravagance. 
This, in turn, encapsulates the nature of the L M E ' s sphere and scope of operations as 
described in Chapter Two: the offspring of powerful entrepreneurial instincts often of a 
founder with a very singular sense of direction, intent on leadership in a tightly defined 
area of expertise, and driving a wedge of knowledge differentiation comprising 
attributes between itself and latent competition to counter constraints imposed by size. 
The limitations that follow in scope and opportunity for the L M E (as against the TNC) 
in internationalising are well illustrated by the aggregate sample in Chapter Six, while 
the tension line along which choices are made is apparent for both the vignettes at the 
end of that chapter and the full case studies in Chapter Seven. 
Proposition Evaluation: Articulation is an appropriate concept to be applied here, 
particularly for L M E s ; the concept stands alone, and is not exclusively the preserve of 
LMEs, but it is definitive of their strategic philosophy and orientation throughout their 




Globalisation is a process which at the same time entails extension (reach) and 
intensification (depth). As theory it is the culmination of attempts to interpret 
integrative forces, starting with trade between nations, then addressing the rise of 
competing hierarchical firms, and the evolving relationship between the nation and the 
firm. The concept of globalisation itself emerged as a result of rapid progress in 
technology and communications, the advent of the TNC and the acceptance of liberal 
politics; with the development of economically integrating multinational regions, the 
workings of globalisation have become multilayered and multifaceted. This has 
provoked a need to study globalisation from various angles and the LME. because of its 
distinctiveness, character and contribution presents one such opportunity. 
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As remarked above, since the 1970s, reactive as well as proactive patterns have been 
observed in the globalisation process and, in a sense, the Japanese L M E can be 
interpreted as a response to the antithesis of modernisation. However, the position taken 
in this thesis overall is that globalisation, particularly as it pertains to economic 
evolution, is essentially an integrative phenomenon; its integrative force ultimately 
overrules and reshapes reaction. Because of its reach and depth, moreover, it embraces 
within its progression locations and organisations of all types and sizes. It has 
accelerated communications and transactions, multiplied business clusters and regions, 
impelled infusions of FDI, given birth to a host of internationally operating 
corporations, and lowered the drawbridge for technology transfer. 
What this has done for LMEs, with their concentrated core competences, is to facilitate 
their manoeuvres abroad because of the specialised input they provide (often to already 
internationalising customer firms) and the speed with which it can be supplied. The 
aggregate sample given in this text is ample evidence of the fact that L M E s are 
internationalising, and this internationalisation is related to their attempts to either 
extend their core competences into markets outside their original domestic markets, or 
to maintain their core competences by seeking to appropriate overseas production 
locations when original domestic locations suffer rising costs and/or shortages. More to 
the point, many of them started to internationalise precisely when globalisation as a 
distinct phenonemon was beginning to take shape. Their distinctive qualities as 
internationalisers has been brought out more effectively through analysis of the five 
case studies and this is discussed further below. Suffice to note here that to say that 
globalisation is a regionally structured process is to admit to the reciprocal role 
régionalisation plays, because it is inevitably incorporated into the extension and 
intensification of globalisation. It is not to say, however, that régionalisation constitutes 
the preordained conduit to globalisation. Again, the important point to stress, and 
indeed an aspect that has been underlined by this research into internationalising L M E s , 
is that it is not correct to think of globalisation as having a single set direction (Giddens, 
1994), or as ever being a finished process. 
Proposition Evaluation: Globalisation is an essential concept to use in this study 
provided that it is recognised that its application here is restricted to economics and that 
régionalisation is one of its key manifestations. 
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8.2.4 Tbe Evolution of the Japanese L M E 
PROPOSITIONS 
P4 
Japan 's keiretsu-dominated domesiic industriai market structure, liberalising 
external market relations and certain aspects of industriai policy have been 
particularly favourable to the formation and évolution ofLMEs, making them an 
increasingly significant part of the evolving industriai structure. They are 
distinguishable from the general SME, from which category most of them have 
originated, by their concentrated emphasis on their core compétence and their 
ability to assume a leading position in their chosen line of business. This has 
placed them very favourably for extending their activities abroad, notably to the 
immediate région of East Asia. 
Reasons for Japanese L M E strengths largely come from within Japan's 
economic/industrial structure and this has then been rendered extra définition by the 
exigences of the tìmes. In fact, some of the characteristìcs that have been ascribed to 
Japanese L M E s , such as commitment, loyalty and long-termism are usually regarded as 
common to the Japanese business world in general, especially when contrasting with the 
practices of other countries and societies (cf. Whitley, 1992). So the seedbed for 
distinctive, relatively independent companies goes back a long way and has certainly 
been there at least since Japan's initial industrialisation moves in the nineteenth Century, 
though in the later 20 t h Century it was the independent and focused leadership of the 
L M E s that gave their distinctive attributes time to develop. Tanaka Kikinzoku is 
évidence of the tradition, while Shofu shows the tradition blending in with the early 
twentieth Century, or addressing modernisation in other words. Then the circumstances 
for stimulating and sustaining the L M E was further elaborated in the postwar era due to 
necessity to survive, the overriding importance of economie growth, the calls from 
outside for more accommodating reciprocity, and the transforming fashion in which the 
economy and its component parts were viewed. Pentel symbolises the survival instinct, 
Mabuchi the response to economie growth, and Union Tool the need to embrace a more 
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demanding and rapidly changing world. Added to which, in ail being established from 
the mid-1940s to the early 1960s, the five vignette L M E s underline the emergïng 
significance of this kind of company during that time and thereafter. Subsequently ail 
ten companies, along with the rest of the aggregate sample, in a sensé outgrew their 
home environment and sought further expansion by establishing themselves abroad, 
notably (but far from exclusively) in East Asia. 
Proposition Evaluation. Tt is fair to say that the particular économie and political 
circumstances that prevailed in the postwar era in Japan contributed to the évolution of 
LMEs, as long as it is also borne in mind that the roots for this kind of company go back 
much further. They have extended their activities with particular force into East Asia, 
which has served as both favoured production platform in a régional division of labour, 
evolving in lagged parallel to that of Japan itself 
8.2.5 Régionalisation as Essential to Globalisation 
PROPOSITIONS 
P5 
Régionalisation isan essential component of globalisation. Especially for smaller firms 
like LMEs, it présents proximity and an intermediary scale which facilitate their 
process of internationalisation. The évolution of the région, 'East Asia', within this 
overall process of globalisation has been strongly influenced by the activities of 
internationalising Japanese TNCs and LMEs. in addition to being contributors to 
régional growth and intégration, the LMEs have ai the same time taken advantage of 
proximity and intermediary scale to advance their own programs of 
internationalisation. 
Régionalisation is essential to globalisation in that it is one of the indispensible agents 
for realising intensity and therefore depth of activities. There is also évidence that the 
multinational région offers an arena for the smaller firm to internationalise because of 
its proximity and intermediary scale (cf. Anderson, 1995; Duchéneaut, 1995). Japan and 
Japanese firms in gênerai have been seen in Chapter Five to have been significant 
investors and contributors to East Asia's rapid économie expansion since the 1960s 
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driven by manufacturing and FD1. Japan was the first country within the région to use 
it for extending its base of initially labour-intensive opérations. Thereafter, under the 
influence of liberalising législation at home and 'shocks' emanating from abroad, Japan 
rapidly enlarged its présence in East Asia, especially for manufacturing purposes (in 
contrast to the greater spread of investments in North America and Europe). In so doing 
Japan's contribution to the East Asian région evolved in nature over time: countries like 
Malaysia and Thailand, having been initially reckoned as cheap-labour locations on 
minimally discriminating criteria, came to be more finely defined in terms of specified 
rôles because of the skills they had attained, not least due to Japanese FDI in the first 
place. This process subsequently achieved the depth of networking Clusters and 
intraregional complementarity with the arrivai of parts makers and subcontractors, 
many of whom can be classified as LMEs . These latter have been notably effective in 
'fiUing the gaps! in East Asian manufacturing development through linkage, including 
gaps conséquent upon industry policy favouritism for large state run enterprises in 
countries like Taiwan, or conséquent upon the préférence for diversification over 
technical focus in the strategie orientation of Chìnese-owned SMEs. Restricted by 
limits imposed on them by the home environment and those inhérent in their own core-
competence définition, Japanese LMEs took advantage of the demands for 
technological upgrading and specialist inputs in the région to become key influences on 
the upgrading of some national économies other than their own. The aggregate sample 
of 110 L M E s in Chapter Six makes a good case for the prominence of the East Asian 
région in Japanese L M E internationalising strategy because of the weight in numerical 
terms of their présence as represented by their manufacturing affiliâtes. In addition, the 
vignettes in Chapter Six and the case studies in Chapter Seven paint a convincing 
picture of a positive economie and technical impact on the national économies where 
they have a présence. 
Proposition Evaluation: The région does hold considérable attraction to the 
internationalising smaller firm, and East Asia has benefited due to its proximity and 
intermediate scale to varying degrees from Japanese firms investing there, including 
L M E s . The pull of East Asia for LMEs , however, is a major, but not overwhelmingly 
dominant factor in their internationalisation stratégies. Moreover, the rôle of différent 
nations within the intraregional division varies over time, as disinvestment/re-
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investment alters the picture, and as new locations emerge as both production-attractive 
and market-attractive sites, notably China. 
8.2.6 Taiwan as Attractive Host Country 
PROPOSITIONS 
P6 
Taiwan, as a proactive, relalively earlyyet relatively structurally developed host 
for FDI, has (i) been an attractive location for foreign ßrms especially in certain 
specific industries, and (H) been able to utilise FDI for effeclively leveraging its 
industriai upgrading and economie growth to a relatively 'high' stage of 
development. Inward investing Japanese LMEs have played an important role in 
implementing and complementing this, while benefìtingfrom what Taiwan offers as 
a location for instìgating their own internationalisation strategy through 
incrementai articulation, often as a 'first choice - first time' location in such 
stratégies. 
The account of Taiwan's growth in this thesis leaves little doubt that in overall terms 
the outeome has been favourable. Despite contending politicai and economie postures 
early on, thèse were ironed out by circumstance and survival instincts. Prior 
infrastructure put in place under Japanese colonialism, together with a ready market in 
the West and a commitment to leaming, comprised the springboard for take-off It has 
also been stressed that specific industries, especially the electrical and electronic, have 
been particularly effective in both stimulating growth and attracting foreign investment 
in general. Taiwan has utilised this situation to achieve a status as a specialist location 
for given industries. Akamatsu (1961, 1962) has portrayed the East Asian economy as 
assuming the same formation as a school of flying geese in which Japan is in the lead, 
followed in the next row by South Korea and Taiwan. Although this model is a 
contested concept (cf. Bernard and Ravenhili, 1995), it can be usefully employed here 
to indicate that the East Asian nations are of différent technological and industriai levels 
of development relative to each other and to Japan. Hence, in addition to the other 
aspects of proximity, we have here added the notion of 'technological proximìty' which 
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arguably gives another fillip in Taiwan's appeal to the leader Japan and which was 
identified as an attraction attribute of Taiwan for Japanese L M E s in Chapter Five. It 
helps to generate a simple logic which says that Taiwan, with its technological 
capabilities close to those of Japan when compared with almost all of the rest of East 
Asia, but still a few rungs below Japan, presents an all but irresistible strategic 
progression for Japanese LMEs , especially if we recognise that LMEs are sometimes 
slow, nervous and conservative overseas investors initially, and thus likely to favour 
'known' locations for first or early ventures. What is more, those differentiating rungs 
can also represent missing links which can be (partially) made good in order for Taiwan 
to come up with an enhanced package of technological expertise, which in turn may 
ensure subsequent re-investment by the Japanese L M E . 
This, as has been demonstrated in this thesis, is where many of the L M E s in the 
aggregate analysis have made their stand in Taiwan. Especially as Taiwanisation has 
taken root, they have been able to take advantage of the situation for their own 
expansion while playing a complementary role by compensating shortcomings and 
ensuring linkage for upgrading of Taiwanese industry, both suppliers and downstream 
users. Part of the reason for this is found in Taiwan's weak capacity for proliferating 
such companies. But the L M E s themselves, in aggregate, have also exhibited a strong 
inclination to utilise the advantages of proximity as presented by Taiwan (and Taiwan 
within the East Asian region) in a strategically constructive fashion: they have 
consciously benefited from the competence of the Taiwanese workforce, positioned 
their T M A s ' functions in an interplay of intraregional sourcing and marketing to a 
considerable degree, and related Taiwan to a greater or lesser extent to regional and 
global manufacturing strategy via product and process upgrading. But again, as with the 
East Asian region as a whole, the parsimony of this contention is modified when 
attention turns to the vignettes and the case studies. The lines of this simple logic are 
more nuanced on closer analysis, which also yields examples of L M E s internalising or 
withholding technology, or confining the Taiwan venture to a subordinate role. And in 
every case study the corporate functions and R&D remained rooted in Japan. 
Proposition Evaluation: Over the past four decades Taiwan has proved itself an 
attractive host country for inward FDI, a situation both the Taiwanese and investors 
have been able to take advantage of effectively. This includes a lot of Japanese L M E 
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investors, but with the proviso that closer study reveals considérable variation in the 
positioning of Taiwan in their individuai stratégies, and important limits to the generally 
positive picture of industriai upgrading that the L M E s have brought to Taiwan. 
8.3 Research À p p r o a c h and Applications 
8.3.1 Com bin ed Quantitative and Qualitative Approach 
Finally, it is now possible to comment on what has been learned through a combined 
quantitative and qualitative research approach for studying the internationalising L M E 
and how effective the L M E is as a concept for analysing aspects of globalisation. It 
should be borne in mind fiere that the quantitative study in its essentials preceded the 
qualititative, that is, they were done one after the other and not simultaneously. The 
comments here, therefore, can adopt the same pattern, first noting what the qualitative 
examination confirms concerning the quantitative analysis and then stating what it adds. 
To start with, there was a fairly strong représentation in both of one area of industry, 
electrica] and electronic, Both analyses showed that Taiwan was the initial or close to 
being the initial investment location for many L M E s on the course to 
internationalisation. And they both demonstrated that having set up in Taiwan, there 
was a strong sensé of commitment leading often to increased investment. Upgrading of 
opérations was also a common feature, as was the appréciation in the main of local 
personnel. There was a significant prédilection for the East Asian région, with respect to 
both exports from Taiwan and further investments. As such, the importance of 
proximity in the internationalisation process of thèse L M E s is established. 
What the qualitative approach adds is a picture of the L M E in ail its dimensions. In fact, 
because the L M E as a concept is a compound of size, type and stage, the qualitative is 
indispensible. The concept is dynamic, representing movement through time and space 
and, thereafter, at some instance in the process of examination can only be looked at as 
an individuai unit to see what exactly is happening, and even more important how it is 
happening. Référence to the articulation attributes helps to elucidate this. Publicity, 
positioning, linkage, ultra-focus and density are abstractions intended to capture the 
fundamental forces driving thèse individuai companies, and they cannot - or only with 
difficulty and incompletely - be put to the statìstica! test. They are essentìally holistic 
représentations drawn from viewing the individuai firm's existence and actions as a 
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whole and cannot then be dissected with the idea of having the component parts serve 
as devices to investigate other companies. That is the work of quantitative analysis 
using différent références. More to the point, because thèse individual fírms occupy 
leading positions in strictly delineated areas of business which they themselves have 
consciously defined, they are unique. So, although généralisations about their FDI, their 
attitudes towards overseas locations and so on are perfectly in order, because of its own 
closely guarded self-definition, how exactly the individual L M E cuts its way through 
the globalisation thicket is unique to it. This, in turn, is where the L M E concept 
contributes to theory. Because of its success and leading position, considerable 
information about the L M E is accessible for study and analysis. And because of its tight 
définition the L M E can be tracked as a unit in the gtobalising environment while as a 
concept being used to probe the globalisation process. The quantitative analysis then 
comprises the screen withtn which the individual L M E unit enacts its unique 
contribution, which can only be the province of the qualitative analysis. 
8.3.2 Applications and Further Research 
The L M E can be seen as fact and concept. With respect to the first of thèse, the L M E is 
also a fact whose progress can be followed with comparative ease. In that they are 
devoid of the impedimenta of Chandler's (1990) giants, the manoeuvering of L M E s can 
be pursued more easily as an entity, just as the medieval Swiss militia unit would have 
been easier to observe than a huge French army. Japanese LMEs, applying their 
specialist core compétences and their strategie philosophy of articulation, are visibly 
establishing themselves as internationalising firms of a distinctive type. Having initially 
developed under Japan's particular industrial structure, then progressed by way of FDI 
into the immediate East Asian région - where Taiwan has been a very significant 
component - they have advanced their interests and contributed to the industrial and 
economie integration of the région and its member countries in a progression which is 
relatively clearly outlined and that can be traced in considerable detail, in 
internationalising, moreover, they have not sprawled amorphously across space; their 
efforts are crystallised into readily discernable patterns, which again are relatively easy 
to follow. As fact, also, they présent a type of business approach which could be 
emulated by others, both front the Standpoint of the general character of the L M E as 
described in this thesis and from the Standpoint of the particular attributes of the 
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Japanese L M E because of the trends of influence and référence that may transpire in 
the future. To expound on this latter point, the world will continue to change, and just 
perhaps in ways more amenable to Japan's way of doing things. "Another decade or 
two and the weight of East Asia in the whole world economy could seriously éclipse 
that of the United States and of Europe," to quote Dore (2000:225), The Japanese L M E , 
assuming it sustains its strong internal and extemal loyalties, long-termism and 
commitment to core compétence, is unlikely to be a candidate for dismantlement to 
satisfy stockholder demands in an Anglo-Saxon fashion. It could remain for a long time 
as fact and référence as it internationalises, while benefiting and servicing a burgeoning 
regional economy. 
As for concept, the argument has been emphasised in this thesis that the growing 
complexity of globalisation calls for new analytical tools. As with any other académie 
sphère of study, mere is a tendency for angles of perception to take root. To take an 
illustration from politicai science, Muramatsu (1997) has noted that in a country like 
Japan that is considérée! centralised, there is very much less interest in community 
power structures as there is regarding the United States which is assumed to be 
decentralised. Instead, as far as Japan is concerned, the concentration is overwhelmingly 
on intergovernmental relations. Prior catégorisation has dictated the sélection of subject 
matter; the protocol of observation has been lodged and it is difficult to reshuffle the 
order of conceptions. The study of economic globalisation, comments made in the 
opening paragraph of this chapter notwithstanding, is not immune from this. In its case, 
discussion of the subject unerringly lists towards largeness; large firms, large money, 
large geographica! settings, and so on. 
Elements of this approach can be gleaned by weaving together one historian's view of 
globalisation, a working paper on global production networks, and a recent front-page 
article about Toyota in Japan's leading financial newspaper. Michel Beaud (2000) sees 
capitalism in its new globalist guise as the creature of the strong states and big firms in 
the Triad; they not only control a large part of commercial production, but also the 
means of financing, scientific research and technology, and the capacity for innovation. 
The combination of key technologies which govern the workings of the world economy 
are mastered and constantly renewed by a small number of firms which are integrated 
into networks or Systems possessing their own logics and norms. These firms are large 
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or very large, controlling notably the information, Communications and multimedia, 
biotechnology and space industries. They occupy two strategic spaces, those comprising 
the basic technologies and those comprising the combining of these technologies. Only 
huge corporations (in league with national governments) together with highly 
specialised firms are in a position to mobilise the latest technologies for 
commercialisation (Beaud. 2000:398-400). The working paper already cited in this 
thesis looks to define the global production network as a concept which takes into 
account how "the flows of materials, semi-finished producís, design, production, 
fínancial and marketing services are organised vertically, horizontally, and diagonally in 
complex and dynamic configurations" (Henderson et al, 2001:16-17). These networks 
are perceived as, to some extent, hierarchies ultimately controlled, or at least 
significantly influenced, by Mead firms', under which are 'secondary' or 'lesser' firms 
which are 'absorbed' into specific networks as subcontractors and have possible degrees 
of independence for upgrading which have not as yet been closely investigated by 
researchers. On June 9, 2003 Toyota announced that it would bring into being a 
common design and parts information system to runction woridwide, at a cost of 200 
trillion yen. This information system is to be developed in cooperation with I B M which 
will make the heart of the system, while the peripheral equipment will come from the 
likes of Fujitsu and N E C . Leading parts makers woridwide are also likely to buy in 
(Nikkei,June 10,2003). 
Here is Beaud's coordination of the huge writ large. The leading parts makers used by 
Toyota throughout the world can be seen as a global production network envisaged by 
Henderson et al. But how much does that explain? The implication in Beaud's account 
is that the highly specialist companies are large like their customer assemblers. This is 
not so of Union Tool which commands some 30% of the world market for very 
specialised drill bits with a workforce woridwide of just over a thousand. The 
implication of the theorising by Henderson et al is that global production networks are 
single structures despite their vertical, horizontal and diagonal qualities. In fact, the 
leading parts makers that Toyota uses also service other networks. It is quite possible 
that Tanaka Kikinzoku and Mabuchi supply their producís to all four of the giant 
companies mentioned above. Actually, Tanaka and Mabuchi possess their own 
networks while also beíng participante of a whole matrix of other networks. They are 
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not Messer or 'absorbed' just because they perform a subcontracting rôle, not least 
because in fact they perform a host of subcontracting rôles. 
In other words, one of the important emphases of this thesis is that globalisation and its 
manifestations must be studied from viewpoints other than the large or the top. Even if 
we accept that there are large organisations which manipulate a wider scale of 
opérations through networks, it is still necessary to go within the business networks or 
matrixes to see what globalisation is doing at différent levels. This is where concepts 
like the L M E are useful. Although we recognise that networks are there, and that the 
L M E can be part of them, it can be abstracted from them and made to stand on its own 
for clearer observation. Then, rather than sitting atop the structure, we are using the 
L M E as a tracking device to probe the inside. And because it is a leading medium-sized 
enterprise with a successfu! record it can prove highly proficient in revealing insights 
about the globalisation process in motion. 
This in turn suggests further areas for research. As it stands this thesis has been 
concerned with introducing the internationalising L M E in gênerai terms. The aim has 
been to get the 'concept in action' across. Having been accepted, the L M E concept could 
be used, for example, to investigate their rôle in the globalisation of spécifie industries. 
The electronics industry, given its prominence among the L M E s in this dissertation, 
présents an obvious starting point, but there are other potential candidates including the 
service industries. Takîng this approach, a group of L M E s could be employed to look at 
what is happening in the middle rather than from the more usual top end of the scale of 
firms. The spokes of investigation then spread out from a différent angle; globalisation 
is brought alive from another and distinctive perspective. 
Taking matters a step beyond that, the degree to which the L M E concept is viable in 
other politico-économie environments could be examined. Germany, for example, is 
often likened to Japan regarding its économie and industrial structures and, indeed, has 
been noted for its large number of firms with L M E features (Simon, 1996; Dore, 2000). 
The possibly distinctive characteristics, behaviours and régional impacts of German 
LMEs is a thème inviting research. Given the importance attached to the immédiate 
East Asian région and its member states in this thesis, moreover, another interesting 
departure would be to investigate the extent - if at ail - that the Japanese L M E is 
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replicated in, for example, South Korea and Taiwan and perhaps latent in an emerging 
China. Moreover, the specific ways Japanese L M E s have entered, used and impacted on 
thèse differentiated locations (compared to Taiwan) is an area also worth examining. 
Indeed, while some attention in this thesis has been directed at the impact L M E s have 
on the countries and régions in receipt of L M E direct investments, more detailed 
analysis of this aspect could be forthcoming taken frorn, for example, the Standpoint of 
the host régions rather than that chietìy of the L M E , as has been done here. The 
relationships L M E s strike up with thèse states, their governments plus other institutions 
and actors - both governmental and non-govermental - are also open to exploration, as 
in the 'dynamics' of impact over time, and the assessment of the longer term 
contributions to locai economie development. There is also the question of the degree of 
reciprocai influence host governments and L M E s exert on each other. L M E s may be 
more 'hidden' from the attentions of the host government that large TNCs, for example? 
Finally, this thesis has to a considérable degree isolated the L M E for close inspection as 
an individuai phenomenon. However, like any operating firm, the L M E must runction 
through networks, and by internationalising it inevitably créâtes and joins international 
production networks. Moreover, thèse international networks are not necessarily 
coterminous with national borders. The points to investigate, therefore, are the range of 
networks in which the L M E is involved; how the L M E positions itself in such networks 
and how it in turn shapes them; in what ways its relationships and circumstances (within 
and apropos thèse networks) differs from those of other types of firm, notably the large 
T N C ; and how the networks map onto the more bounded territories of nation states. 
8.4 Summa ry 
Having once been thought to be a straight line of inevitability, globalisation is now seen 
as multifaceted. The Japanese L M E can in that light be seen as a Singular Japanese 
response to globalisation, presenting a tocally dtstinctive facet of globalisation. At the 
same time, the L M E is a valid concept for economie analysis beyond Japan's borders. 
Its particular character - based on core compétences, size and ownership - renders it a 
viable area of study as a part of the examination of economie globalisation, not least for 
its distinctive aptitude in the art of articulation. This, in turn, is derived frorn the 
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development of Japan's economic structure, notably over the past five decades, which 
was particularly conducive to the fashioning of LMEs . Régionalisation has played a 
cardinal role in L M E internationalisation, and the appeal of Taiwan for the Japanese 
L M E has been considerable, because of its persuasive mix of proximity attributes and 
the (state influenced) character of its economic development. 
In studying the progression of globalisation, the L M E can be employed both as an 
aggregate and on an individual basis. Especially with regard to Japan, at this juncture in 
history LMEs are numerous enough to deploy as a general group, as well as for certain 
industries like electronics, to seek an understanding of some of the aspects of the 
workings of globalisation. Collectively they are important drivers of globalisation, 
albeit not recognised as such in the literature. Yet once their role has been identified, 
they become more visible as units than large, multifunctional corporations on the one 
hand and a myriad of smaller firms on the other, both because they can be clearly 
defined and because of their manifest successes domestically and, increasingly, 
internationally. At the same time, because the individual LMEs are so distinct they can 
be isolated as units for in-depth appraisal. This distinctiveness, as defined by the 
researcher, can be used to sharpen insights about how firms address globalisation and 
how the globalising environment impacts on them. The L M E is an effective analytical 
tool for examining the intricacies of the internationalisation of the firm in a globalising 
setting, and the impact of internationalising firms on the locations they choose to invest 
in. Further research can be envisaged with respect to the viability of the L M E concept 
for addressing globalisation issues in other countries in the world, the mutual impact of 
LMEs with host governments and other institutions, and the involvement they have with 
international production networks of key sectors. 
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Appendix 
Letters and Questionnaires 
1. Sample of Letter to UK Affiliates of Japanese LMEs Dated October 31,2001 
16 Great College Street 
Brighton 
East Sussex BN2 1HL 
U.K. 
Tel: (01273) 692-357 
E-mail: fergev@vahoo. com 




Surrey GUI 5 2PL 
U.K. 
Attention: Mr. Trevor Neve 
Dear Sirs, 
I am conducting research for a PhD into direct investment by Japanese medium-sized 
firms in Taiwan, together with the implications this has in the East Asian region and the 
wider world. My interest in this goes back to the 1970s when I worked for small 
manufacturers in Japan as export manager. Thereafter I was a translator of written 
Japanese, having as clients among others the Ministries of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI, now METI) and Health and Weifare (MHW, now M H L ) . In doing this 
research in Taiwan I have enjoyed the kind Cooperation of Nihon Koryu Kyokai (which 
performs diplomatic and JETRO functions in Taiwan) and Nomura Research Institute. 
Okazaki Manufacturing Company, as a high-technology instrument maker, set up a 
manufacturing venture in Taiwan in 1987, having already established a manufacturing 
affiliate (ARI Industries) in the U.K. in 1983. As I shall be at my home at the above 
address for a month from November 11,1 thought it apposite to take the opportunity to 
contact you to make the requests as attached in the interests of deepening my research. 
It is my policy to collect as much written material as possible - including when 
available official Company histories - in Japanese, Chinese and English. In addition, I 
am particularly interested in Okazaki Manufacturing because (a) it is a firm not listed on 
the Japanese stock exchange which is apparently successfully expanding abroad, and (b) 
according to the records I have, it took the relatively unusual Step for a Japanese firm of 
investing in the U . K . before Taiwan. 
Any assistance you could afford me would be most gratefully received. 
Yours faithrully, 
Ferguson Evans 
Middtesex University Business School 
307 
2. Accompanying Questions to Letter Dated October 31,2001 
RESEARCH REQUESTS 
by 
Ferguson Evans PhD Candidate, Middlesex University Business School 
16, Great Collège St. 
Brighton 
East Sussex BN2 1HL 
U . K . 
Tel: (01273) 692-357 
E-mail: fergev^g'ivahoo.com 
P L E A S E USE THIS F O R M TO RESPOND ÏF C O N V E N A N T 
1. Could you forward company publications (advertising, statements, etc.) concerning 
business opérations in the U.K./Europe/other. 
2. Could you recommend any other contacts in Europe for obtaining more information 






3. Could you recommend personnel to contact at the head office in Japan. (AH 






4. Any further advice. 
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3. Letter Faxed to Taiwan Affiliates of Japanese LMEs Dated May 1,2002 
A JAPANESE VERSION F O L L O W S 
1 s t May, 2002 
Attention: 
Dear Sirs, 
I am conducting research for a PhD into the internationalization of Japanese leading 
medium-sized enterprises (LMEs). My main focus is on firms which made their original 
direct investments in Taiwan between 1965 and 1990, and how this affects and relates 
to their other foreign direct investments within the East Asian region and globally. Their 
designation as 'medium-sized' is due to their scale of operations within Japan, although 
their operations worldwide can have increased their organization size substantially. 
My qualifications for doing this research are a London University degree in Economics 
and21 years experience working in Japan from 1969 to 1990. During that time I was 
employed by small manufacturers in Japan as export manager, functioning chiefly in 
East Asia. Subsequently I was a translator of written Japanese, having as clients among 
others the Ministries of International Trade and Industry (MITI, now Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry) and Health and Welfare (MHW, now Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare), 
In doing this research in Taiwan I have have enjoyed the kind cooperation of Nihon 
Koryu Kyokai (which performs diplomatic and JETRO functions in Taiwan) and 
Nomura Research Institute. The Roppongi, Tokyo office of Nihon Koryu Kyokai has 
also been very helpful, as well as the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, JETRO 
and the Japan Small Business Corporation among others. Basic reference materials for 
the research have included: 
* Zaika Nihon Kigyo Soran - Baker & McKenzie, Taipei 
* Japan Company Handook - Oriental Economist, Tokyo 
* Mijojo Kaisha Ban - Oriental Economist, Tokyo 
* Kaisha Joho - Japan Economic Journal, Tokyo 
* Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran - Oriental Economist, Tokyo 
* Your individual enterprise websites (in English, Japanese, some Chinese) 
[In addition, your company also has an affiliate in the United Kingdom which has 
kindly provided me with company catalogues and other materials about your 
international activities.] Based on this accumulated data I wonder if it would be possible 
for me to visit your base in Taiwan to conduct an interview, in Japanese or English, 
lasting a maximum of one hour. The points Í would like to discuss are outlined in the 
Attachment. 
Realizing that you no doubt have a very busy schedule, I would naturally be happy to 




Middlesex University Business School 
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4. Questionnaire Accompanving Letter of May 1, 2002 
A T T A C H M E N T 
POINTS FOR DISCUSSION 
/. The Company in Japan 
a. When was your company established? 
b. What is its main area of specialization and what is its underlying business strategy? 
c. In its specialized area how does the company rank in Japan? How does it rank in the 
world? 
d. Did the company expérience particularly rapid growth at any period in Japan, for 
example, during the high growth period of the 1960s? 
e. How has the company changed since its establishment in terms of types of product 
and Services and in terms of customer base? 
2. Company Internationalization 
a. What was the company's first experience in internationalization? Did it take the form 
of exporting or investment, for example? 
b. When did this first internationalization move occur? Was ìt connected wìth any 
significant development in Japanese government policy like, for example, the capital 
liberalization measures initiated between 1969 and 1972 or MITI's promotion of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the 1970s? 
c. Where was the location (country) of your company's first FDI? Why was that 
particular location (country) selected? 
d. What form did the FDI take? Was it a wholly owned investment or did it involve a 
joint venture with locai host-country or Japanese partners, for example? Was it a sales 
office only or did it involve manufacturing abroad? 
e. Why did your company start to move operations overseas? Some of the possibilities 
nere include: in response to the needs of a major Japanese customer which has relocated 
some operations abroad; the introduction by a Japanese trading company to business 
opportunities overseas; high costs and labour shortages in Japan; mounting East Asian 
competition; the threat of protectionist measures by Western countrìes. 
310 
3. The Company's Establishment in Taiwan 
a. Was Taiwan your company's first ever overseas manufacturing base? \f not, which 
country was? 
b. Was Taiwan particularly attractive for reasons of hìstorical familiarity, or cultural and 
geographical proximity, for example? Was it viewed as a naturai extension of the 
company's business development in Japan? 
c. What, in the first instance, were the chief motivating causes for manufacturing in 
Taiwan? Some possibilities here could be: production expansion; production variation; 
reduced costs including labor costs; growing Taiwanese market demand; a production 
base for East Asia or countries worldwide. 
d. Was your company initially attracted by Taiwanese government policy for 
encouraging inward FD1, like the Export Processing Zones, for example? 
e. What did you first start to manufacture in Taiwan? Was it relatively low tech and 
labour-intensive? 
4. The Company's Progress in Taiwan 
a. Following on from your initial investment in Taiwan, have you increased your 
investments here? If you started with a joint venture arrangement, have you 
strengthened your share of the Taiwanese business? Alternatively have you divested? 
b. Since starting manufacture in Taiwan, has your company increased local content and 
reduced imports of components and other intermediate items from Japan? What has 
influenced the switch to local content, for example, improved quality, prompt delivery, 
cheaper price than imports? 
c. How has your company been influenced by technological progress in Taiwan, as 
promoted, for example, by the government's policy to shifì the production emphasis 
from labor-intensive to capital-intensive in the 1970s and then to microelectronics in the 
1980s? 
d. Has technological progress together with the concomitant élévation of the 
technological capabilities of your Taiwanese staff been a positive force encouraging 
you to retain some of your activities in Taiwan? And have local Taiwanese employées 
taken on increasingly important positions in the company over time? 
e. Since the start of your company's opérations in Taiwan, how has the market for the 
local affiliate's products and services changed? Did it progressive^ export more to East 
Asia and the rest of the world, including Japan, for example? 
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5. The Company fs Présent Situation in Taiwan 
a. What are the products and services now offered by the affiliate in Taiwan? To what 
degree has their content evolved since the initial investment? 
b. Is the Taiwanese affiliate now in compétition with companies offering similar 
products and services in the East Asian région? Has this compétition grown 
significantly over time? 
c. Does the Taiwan affiliate link up its opérations with other affiliâtes of your company 
in the East Asian région in a division of labor for production? 
d. How does the technological level of the Taiwan affiliate compare with that of the 
parent company in Japan and other affiliâtes. Does the Taiwan affiliate engage in 
research and development and design, for example? 
e. What are the current merits of the Taiwan affiliate? These could include: 
technological capability, effectiveness of the workforce, locai materials supply, the 
Taiwanese domestic market, a base for exports to Southeast Asia and China, a base for 
exports Worldwide. 
6. Regional and Global Positioning of Taiwan Operatìons 
a. Does the Taiwan company function as a specialist producing a specifìc range of your 
company's products for sale in the East Asian region and/or worldwide? 
b. Does the Taiwan affiliate runction as a hub for the company's operatìons within the 
East Asian region and/or over a wider area? 
c. Could you describe the Taiwan as being on a technological continuum with the order 
of capability being, for example: Japan => Taiwan -> Southeast Asia/China? 
d. Does the Taiwan affiliate occupy a particular position of importance for your 
company in dealing with the Chinese business community in East Asia (China, 
Singapore and the overseas Chinese in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, etc.)? Have your 
Taiwanese staff proved helpful in developing business in this Chinese business 
community outside Taiwan itself? 
e. In strategie terms how do you now perceive East Asia? Do you see it is a number of 
separate production units and markets or do you see it as a single production and 
marketing unit? 
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5. Japanese Translation of Letter of May 1,2002 
UtEt>tc< Lft 0 ^ W ^ Ü g ^ H (Leading Medium-sized 
Enterprises) ©SRHbfc |?§-f-Ölf ±UUW%£ff ^X & 9 £ f o ^HU**©fêfiïftf*! 
m\¿ñaZiaX, Zb^-ftib<n£:%è\z#ttZ(D'&t*<D£ o^LXMT 
^^ÍCti^: L T ^ £ H ^ a t ' L J: ? 0 
(JETRO) ¿ L T © « | Ê ^ f e o T f c ^ ^ * i - 0 * J | ï S Î C Î b S i î l t f â A « l * , fcitTír' 
fedéli-Lfc„ 
Japan Company Handbook-^:Wi&fâ/MsK 
^ t ^ m ^ i ^ ? ' - ^ h mm, ^ M ) 
è ibi::, A t t í D ^ S ^ á s ^ s ^ e í t o ^ b í ) , w v v f t ^ i ê f ë t i j M 
LTâr£t# * n ^-töDfiüafiSrSriäiE 9 Tf £ * Ufc0 r C KU¥< *3ÍL* L±ff „ 
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F. 
6. Japanese Version of Questionnaire Accompanying Letter of May 1, 2002 
1. B^tD-ïkM 
a. # l ± t 0 ^ 3 i ¥ 0 
2. i k t w i ^ b 
b. A I ± ( C ^ o ^ T , &®ommik<Dm$m^fè^v&vt^?m^të:£ti\*, 1969^ 
4. &M(Di3m?È{tift$l 
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A t t r o & f c f c f c M t ô S f ë f ê t ë & i f e , M M Í f f i , l f t A a * 4 t p B n , fc^im^T 
A t t K í s ^ - t S t ó , £ $ « t o ¿ ' í 9 J : 9/«cÍÜppn*5J:TJí-9— f x « L T ^ t t 
fttt©^ÍSS*liaS0Kílítt*^^tt, iï*<D&î±& £Xßm±^&ii òn<Dfàftm 
mt^ieüo^r^r^^xß^m^-ftcM^m^mvx, -äm^m^a^^n 
m<D&m%&oXì,^-tfr? 
& #J £ £ te i~ ci ¿ f i h i9 * -r¡ó - ? 
; B 3íÍÍÍ7'v :7Ar 1|S 
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